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Abstract 
 
This research on the international multilateral system has its raison-de-être in 
the problems of lack of effective global governance manifested in areas such as global 
politics, security, economy, environment and others. A fundamental focus of the 
research is on the latest changes in world politics, including state power shifts, power 
diffusion from state to non-state actors and the implications of the rapid evolution of 
globalization over the last two decades, with its proliferating challenges and 
opportunities. In addition, the research examines reform efforts in multilateral 
institutions and some of the reform proposals suggested in academic circles. The main 
objective of the research is to provide a holistic analysis of the current state of the 
multilateral system, the imperatives of reform in the system, its potential future 
scenarios as well as some suggestions for the future. No doubt, the United Nations (UN) 
is the core hub of the current system. Hence, the research principally approaches its 
subject from the perspective of the UN. In particular, the UN General Assembly is the 
subject of a case study that aims, among others, to highlight the predicament and 
potential of this unique forum of multilateral cooperation.  
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Preface 
 
 As per the system of postgraduate studies in the Faculty of Social and Human 
Sciences in the New University of Lisbon, this research is supposed to seek a PhD 
degree in the area of International Relations, with specialization in Globalization and 
the Environment. The focus of the research is on the international multilateral system, 
with further focus on the UN and its General Assembly. These focus areas are of 
significant importance to the prospects of globalization and the global environment. 
With respect to globalization, the multilateral system plays an important role, albeit 
falling short of expectations and snagging on accounts of ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency. Nevertheless, the system remains an indispensable platform for the 
management of globalization. As for the global environment, the international 
multilateral system, and more directly the UN, is the main platform of debate, 
coordination and agreements on specific actions. The UN also stands as a symbol of a 
“constructed environment,” a concept that is so dearly and deeply used in the holistic 
ecological approach of human, social and collective behaviors, besides being one of the 
major players in human societies. Hence, the analysis, arguments and suggestions 
presented in this research are of significant relevance to the specialization of 
globalization and the environment. 
 
Thesis Statement 
The world we live in today resembles a small village enjoying a level of 
connectivity similar to that one typical country used to have long time ago. This world 
is awash with new global challenges and opportunities, and it needs a system of 
governance that addresses its new features. In contrast, the current world order is 
characterized by power shifts, power diffusion, great power indifference, 
defragmentation of stakeholders and a deep sense of unfairness on the side of some 
strata of different societies. In such an environment, a unipolar system could serve the 
interests of the sole pole better in the short to medium run, and so is a multipolar system 
for the small number of countries seeking it. In contrast, a multilateral system that 
serves all states on equitable footing is in the best interest of all humanity in the long 
run. Such a multilateral system should apply minimum rules of power and wealth 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM  RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Preface 
xii
sharing. It should be one that enjoys the least common denominator of effectiveness, 
representativeness, accountability and democratization: Effectiveness that ensures that 
the system does not fail as it did in the past; representativeness that brings all players 
onboard, including small states, civil society and the private sector; accountability that 
provides for checks and balances and guarantees that spoilers are subjected to 
international legitimacy; and democratization that helps heal the schizophrenia between 
national and global governance and ensures a basic level of equality and fairness.        
It should be noted, however, that the international multilateral system is not 
responsible for all the woes of the world. The research differentiates between local and 
global responsibilities. If some national government fails to live up to globally set 
standards, the prime responsibility on this failure lies with that national government, 
though it is incumbent on the international community to help overcome such a failure. 
Thus, the main focus of the research is on the so-called global public goods (GPGs) 
such as basic human rights, poverty eradication, peace and security, fight against 
terrorism, international economic stability and international trade integration. Notably, 
the basic characteristics of such goods are: they exist in the public domain – not the 
private one –, concern all humanity and cross borders, sectors and groups. The flipside 
of GPGs is global public bads (GPBs) such as violations of human rights, poverty, 
insecurity, economic turmoil and trade distortion.   
 
Research Methodology 
 The methodology of the research is based on the use of available literature, the 
researcher's own experience in world politics, as a middle-career diplomat, and other in-
field contributions. Policy makers, diplomats, academics and officers of international 
organizations could be sources of valuable practical insights to the research, and as such 
they were approached using a questionnaire form covering the main focus areas of the 
research. For the sake of this questionnaire, direct interviews were the principal means 
with high-profile, immediate-vicinity contributors, while correspondence was used more 
with remote contributors. The results thereof will be presented and analyzed throughout 
the dissertation, besides being summarized in a separate appendix. In particular, the UN 
General Assembly is the subject of a case study. The main motivation behind the choice 
of this body is its uniqueness as a formal body of multilateral cooperation enjoying 
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global membership on equal footing, its general mandate in contrast to the specific 
mandate of forums such as the Security Council and the scarcity of academic interest in 
it if compared with the Security Council or several other multilateral forums. And the 
main objective of the case study is to highlight the problems and potential of the 
General Assembly in global governance.   
 
Research Objectives 
 The issues of global governance are of vital importance for the future of 
humanity, and so they should not be monopolized by some governments or think tanks 
approaching them from their own narrow perspectives. Instead, they should be taken up 
diligently by all states, academic institutions and civil society partners, in a holistic 
manner. They should also be appropriately debated at all-inclusive international, 
regional and domestic levels. With this background, the research aims to contribute to 
the heating debate on how best to reform global governance. The potential value added 
of such an endeavor would lie in its keenness to present a comprehensive, deep and 
balanced approach to the subject. This vision shall guide the whole process, including 
the basic literature review, substantial analyses and in-field contributions. It is also 
intended to develop alternative future scenarios for the international multilateral system, 
under variable global political environments. And, cognizant of the need for practicality, 
the research will attempt to draw a number of suggestions for action by the different 
national, regional and international players in order to improve the performance of the 
international multilateral system. 
 
Executive Summary 
The research starts with an introductory chapter, Chapter One, on the current 
international setting. In effect, this chapter serves as a detailed introduction to the 
subject. It analyzes, in a historical context, the international multilateral system; the 
main conventional and unconventional international security concerns; the nature and 
major forces of globalization; the state of the global economy, with focus on the 
increasing vulnerability to crises and the sharp divides between the poor and the rich; 
and the global environment, with focus on the challenge of climate change.  
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM  RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Preface 
xiv
 Chapter Two, on the imperative of change, attempts to elaborate on the main 
reasons why, from the point of view of this research, the international multilateral 
system needs holistic reform today. Rather than the phenomena, this chapter aims to 
provide a deeper diagnosis of the root problems of global governance. It addresses these 
argued root problems under three main items: power shifts among the United States of 
America (USA) and other traditional and emerging powerhouses, with particular focus 
on China and the European Union (EU); power diffusion from states to non-state actors; 
and the complexity of current global challenges, lack of effective responses to them and 
the threat of anti-globalization forces, including nationalism.  
Consequently, Chapter Three, on the current reform agendas and ideas in 
debate, examines the current reform agendas in the UN, Bretton Woods institutions and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, it analyzes three serious reform 
proposals in academic circles: the trans-governmental networks approach of Anne-
Marie Slaughter, the proposal of setting up a global power club or global executive 
committee along the lines of the Group of 20 (G-20) and the demands to establish a 
concert or league of world democracies together with transforming the North-Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) into a global security organization.  
Chapter Four, on potential future scenarios, attempts to map potential future 
scenarios of the international multilateral system. Virtually, this chapter provides a look 
into the future based on current trends and indicators. It underlines three significant 
potential scenarios: effective multilateralism, where the UN plays a central overarching 
role; multilateralism à la carte or multi-multilateralism, which indicates the optional use 
of various multilateral forums, according to feasibility, on a case-by-case basis; and 
return of multipolar power politics akin to those of the early 19th century. This chapter 
also refers to two other extreme scenarios, global government and global chaos. And it 
highlights the determining roles of the USA, other great powers and other actors as to 
which scenario is more likely to take root.  
The aim of Chapter Five, on the UN and the international multilateral system, is 
to poise the UN at the center stage of this research. It addresses the historical 
background of the organization; its mission, structure and main functions; the value of 
the world body at the time it faces increasing existential threats; and the historical 
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problem of lack of political will on the side of its members. This chapter also highlights 
two critical challenges to the UN today: lack of representative legitimacy and the UN’s 
relevance to the surrounding global environment. 
Finally, Chapter Six is dedicated to a case study on the UN General Assembly. 
Most importantly, this chapter attempts to shed light on the unique value of the General 
Assembly and its potential role in ensuring more effective global governance, provided 
there is sufficient political will on the side the UN membership. After a basic 
background, the chapter analyzes the working culture and the current reform agenda in 
the Assembly. Consequently, it provides an analysis of how the role of the Assembly 
could be enhanced to improve the effectiveness of the UN in particular and the 
multilateral system at large.  
 Throughout, the research refers to the results of the aforementioned field 
questionnaire. This questionnaire was administered on a sample of 50 professionals, 
drawn from 32 countries, with careers in the fields of diplomacy, international 
organizations and academia. It contained 11 substantive questions about the 
international multilateral system and the UN in particular, including the UN General 
Assembly and the UN Security Council.  
Ultimately, the research ends with an afterword that basically recapitulates the 
main arguments and suggestions presented in the research. It should also be noted that 
the research adopts a general problem-solving approach that, besides identifying the 
root causes of the problems of the international multilateral system and the UN more 
specifically, attempts to provide practical, balanced suggestions to resolve these 
problems. 
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Abstract 
 
This is a preliminary stocktaking chapter for research on the international 
multilateral system: imperatives of change, potential scenarios and suggestions for the 
future. Ever since its consolidation after World War II, the international multilateral 
system appears to be in perennial crisis. All states assume collective responsibility on 
this, but super and great powers, most importantly the USA today, bear the brunt of the 
responsibility, as they could either bolster the system or undermine it without fearing 
repercussions. In the field of international security, at the time interstate conflicts appear 
to be retreating, increasing civil wars pose grave legal and institutional challenges. In 
addition, after September 11 attacks, terrorism has quickly jumped up the ladder of 
international security concerns. Nonetheless, as the issues move beyond hunting down 
Al-Qaeda, the global war against terror snags on entrenched disagreements and mistrust. 
Moreover, weapons of mass destruction pose inherent threat to human survival and 
impose significant strains on scarce resources that are otherwise needed to meet 
pressing needs. To say the least, the state of the nonproliferation regime is disgraceful 
and, failure after failure, the world has reached a point where these weapons are in fact 
proliferating not retreating. As for the main forces underlying the multilateral system, 
the current wave of globalization has transformed the world into a small global village, 
thus unprecedentedly increasing the degree of interdependence among states. However, 
the forces behind globalization sometimes work in such a chaotic manner that they 
create sharp divides between haves and have-nots, expose the world economy to vicious 
cycles of crises and endanger the progress achieved this far in world trade integration. 
Finally, over the last few years, environmental challenges have been crossing the 
scientific credibility threshold to pose increasing present and sensible dangers, thus they 
have transcended the technical and domestic spheres to become highly politicized and 
internationalized subjects. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the richness of the record of 
international cooperation on environmental issues, the international community has 
been faltering in its quest for combating some of the most pressing environmental 
challenges of the day, especially climate change.  
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Chapter One 
The Current International Setting 
 
The main subject of this research is the international multilateral system. And its 
main objective is to provide a practical analysis of the challenges facing the system 
today, with a view to highlighting the imperatives of change, drawing potential 
scenarios and providing suggestions for the future. To lay the ground for these tasks, 
this first chapter provides a preliminary stocktaking of the current setting of the system. 
In addition, it examines the main subjects and forces underlying the evolution of the 
system. Accordingly, there will be brief analyses of the international security 
environment, the forces behind the current wave of globalization, the state of the global 
economy and the challenges of the global environment. 
 
I. The International Multilateral System: Multilateralism in Perennial Crisis 
 The international multilateral system is so wide and diverse in nature that there 
needs to be a clear starting point to addressing it. It is also intrinsically connected with 
history of international relations, which mandates an elaboration of its historical 
context. Henceforth, the first section of this chapter provides a basic definition and a 
conceptual framework of multilateralism. In addition, there will be a historical review of 
the evolution of the system since the end of World War II to date. It should be noted, 
however, that Chapter Two will provide a more detailed analysis of the current 
challenges facing the system.  
 
A. Basic Definition and Conceptual Framework 
 Simplistically, multilateralism could be defined as all forms of common action 
amongst states in international relations. To provide a more articulated definition, in his 
1993 book “Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form,” 
John Ruggie states that “multilateralism is an institutional form that coordinates 
relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct: 
that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without 
regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may 
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exist in any specific occurrence.” Ruggie further explains that the principles of 
multilateralism imply “indivisibility” and “diffuse reciprocity” with respect to subjects 
at stake and through time, which makes multilateralism a very demanding form of 
international relations (Newman, Thakur and Tirman, 2006).  
On establishing the UN in 1945, the framers of the UN Charter were mostly 
motivated by the need for a fresh start after the calamities of the two World Wars 
(Kennedy, 2006). The devastation inflicted on humanity as a result of unilateral policies 
and hegemonic ambitions impelled the community of states to steer a new path with an 
unprecedented deal of cooperation. Indeed, the establishment of the UN crystallized the 
resolve of the community of states to work together to put an end to recurrent use of 
force in international relations. Thus, the UN emerged as the prime symbol and most 
focal embodiment of the values of the multilateral system, and today it stands as the 
most representative tapestry of aspirations, promises and limitations related to 
multilateralism. Ever since, the UN and the larger multilateral system have been serving 
the international community in different ways. Most importantly, the system has 
contributed to the avoidance of wide military confrontations such as those during World 
Wars I and II. It is also playing critical roles in the areas of conflict prevention, 
mediation, peacekeeping and more recently peacebuilding. In addition, the multilateral 
system facilitates international cooperation and coordination in such diverse fields as 
the global economy, environment, energy, food security, information and 
telecommunication technologies and many others.  
Of course, the UN and its wider system of specialized agencies, funds and 
programs lie at the core of the multilateral system, and the Security Council is 
considered its highest-profile organ. But the span of the system goes beyond the UN and 
its system to include a sophisticated and overlapping plethora of international 
organizations, be it at the global level, such as the different international treaty 
organizations, the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, or at the regional level such 
as the EU, the African Union (AU) and the Organization of American States (OAS). In 
addition, the system is in continuous momentum, leading to new additions and 
transformations in its components. And the state of multilateralism in the system is 
subject to the surrounding political environment. At any point of time, the foreign 
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policy of any state is a set of sovereign, bilateral, regional and global tools. And even 
small states have some space to choose between going through multilateral institutions 
and going it alone. At the end, the sum of the foreign policy choices of individual states 
makes up the balance of international cooperation. However, the impact of the 
international political environment is perhaps most obvious when there are shockwaves 
in the foreign policies of great powers and at times of major crises, such as the terrorist 
attacks of September 11. To put it briefly, these policies and events usually have strong 
impact on the degree of multilateralism in the system.  
 
B. Historical Review of the Evolution of the System: 
1. The Cold War Era 
 During the Cold War, the world was divided along two main lines, the Western 
camp led by the USA in confrontation with the Eastern camp led by the former Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), with an iron curtain dividing Europe between the 
two camps. The division was mainly ideological in nature, with the West embracing the 
notions of democratic governance and free-market economy, while the East employed 
the notions of communist governance and centralized economic planning. Strategic and 
military interests of the two superpowers were addressed through two opposite military 
alliances, the NATO on the Western side and the Warsaw Pact on the Eastern side. 
 In response to this acrimonious confrontation, the so-called doctrine of 
containment was given birth in 1946, at the hands of George Kennan, an American 
diplomat in Moscow at the time. In a long telegram, Kennan argued that the main 
causes of friction between the USA and the USSR are ideological, not due to some 
misunderstanding or faulty communication. He added that the Soviet foreign policy 
was, in essence, based on communist ideological zeal and tsarist expansion, that there 
was no room for the two poles to meet and that the USA had to prepare itself for a long 
struggle with the USSR (Kissinger, 1994). In fact, the USSR viewed the USA and the 
West as irrevocably hostile to the most important founding principles of its ideology 
and vice versa. Afterwards, Kennan’s understanding evolved into the so-called 
containment doctrine that largely shaped the USA’s policy toward the USSR. In other 
contexts, the USA has also drawn on that doctrine in dealing with countries such as Iran 
and North Korea.     
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Other states often found themselves caught in the fire of the confrontation 
between the two camps. Hence, a group of visionary leaders mainly from the 
developing world launched the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, with the aim 
of protecting the interests of the great majority of states, while at the same time playing 
the role of a buffer zone between the two competing camps. Two overarching principles 
of this movement were to keep a distance from all kinds of military alliances and to act 
as a catalyst for the effective functioning of the international multilateral system at large 
and the UN in particular. In a related move, the Group of 77 (G-77) was set up in 1964 
basically to encourage South-South cooperation and promote the economic and social 
interests of the majority of developing countries. Consequently, the world became 
divided into three main blocks: The Western camp, the Eastern camp and the NAM 
bloc. There was a fragile balance of power between the two rival camps, with the NAM 
striding the borderline between them. However, at any point of time, each of the two 
camps was somehow attempting to expand its circle of influence at the expense of the 
other. Thus, although the NAM was meant to be a buffer zone between the two poles, 
its members were often subjects of fierce competition between them, which further 
kindled their bitter feud (Morphet, 2004). Moreover, individual states in different 
regions used to play the two superpowers against other and at times to even switch sides 
to achieve national benefits.       
Nonetheless, there was a bridge of high-power politics between the two 
superpowers and this bridge did not usually pass by the UN. The two superpowers used 
the UN as a tool to varying degrees at different stages. In fact, one of the main 
principles of the USA's doctrine of containment was to predicate USA's policy toward 
the USSR on multilateralism, through the use of the UN to confront Soviet 
expansionism (Kissinger, 1994). Hence, the international multilateral system was 
mostly hostage to the competition between the USA and the USSR. This was 
particularly true for the UN, where the USSR was actively engaged, while in other 
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the 
WTO, the USSR and states revolving in its circle of influence were absent, which 
largely absolved these institutions from the implications of the Cold War. Although the 
two poles could always opt out and move individually or rally groups of states behind 
them, they were sometimes in need of some cover of international legitimacy. For 
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instance, the UN Security Council was a center stage of the confrontation during the 
famous “pigs’ bay” episode in 1962. Hence, the confrontation between the two poles 
offered the UN the chance to be a prime stage and decisive factor between them. This 
was particularly anchored on the moral value so exclusively invested in the UN as the 
only multilateral forum with quasi-global membership.  
The tug of war between the two poles often led to impasses in the UN and 
escalated to edge-of-abyss confrontations at times, with the rest of world largely 
standing by helplessly. During periods of accentuated confrontation, the world had to 
pay dearly for the lack of an environment conducive to addressing its more pressing 
woes. On the other hand, during periods of détente, when the two poles could give the 
voice of wisdom more space, the international community could achieve some progress 
toward addressing the different challenges it faced (Newman, 2006). Other international 
forums and regional organizations were not in any better position. And even in cases 
where neither of the two superpowers was member, there used to be divisions along the 
lines of the confrontation between the West and the East. As a result, the Cold War era 
was fraught with wars such as those in Korea and Vietnam. Even worse, in 1962, the 
aforementioned Cuban missile crisis took the two superpowers to the verge of nuclear 
confrontation. And, instead of attempting to resolve long-entrenched regional conflicts, 
such as those in the Middle East and Kashmir, these conflicts were somehow used by 
the two poles to project their relative powers (UN, 2004). However, in the case of the 
Middle East, the USA ultimately managed to monopolize the cards of the game, 
especially after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and ever since, the role of the UN in the 
conflict has almost been reduced to nothing. Moreover, people in different parts of the 
world had to stand ruthless oppression, especially those in communist circles of 
influence and in marginal areas, such as Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, while 
the attention of superpowers was mainly focused on the dynamics of their relentless 
rivalry.   
 
2. The Aftermath of the Cold War 
 With the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the USSR in 1990, the 
USA came out as the winner of the Cold War. For the first time in modern history, there 
was only one world superpower in what was to be called the new unipolar world order. 
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Consequently, the world was set for massive transformations, whether in foreign or 
internal policy settings, and all and sundry looked up to the USA for steering the path. 
There were strong hopes that with the end of the Cold War, the international multilateral 
system was headed toward reinforcement without the USSR standing in the way. And it 
seemed positive at the beginning with the UN Security Council making unprecedented 
moves on some subjects (UN, 2004). For instance, in a historical resolution, the Council 
authorized the use of force to liberate Kuwait after its invasion by Iraq in 1990. This 
incidence gave people affected by long-entrenched conflicts in different parts of the 
world hope that change would be forthcoming. It also seemed that there was a new 
revolution in foreign policy in the making, with the introduction of such controversial 
notions as human security and the right of intervention to stop massive human atrocities 
such as genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Notably, these new 
notions were met with fierce resistance from a big majority of states, mostly from the 
South, but they persevered on their appeal to a wide swathe of Western states and global 
public opinion.   
Logically, it all depended on the direction the new sole pole decided to take, 
whether it engineers its foreign policy on the basis of multilateralism or chooses to go it 
alone. In his article “The Unipolar Moment” published in Foreign Affairs in 1990, 
Charles Krauthammer is recognized to be the first to coin the term “unipolar world 
order.” In this article, Krauthammer argues that the UN is good for nothing. He even 
reduced multilateralism to providing coverage for USA's actions that are in fact 
unilateral, only to accommodate supportive USA's public (Krauthammer, 2003). One 
should indicate that this kind of arguments reflects the conservative line of thinking that 
prevailed later on during the Bush administration. In contrast, during its first year in 
office in 1993, the USA's Clinton administration declared its adherence to what it called 
“assertive multilateralism.” This orientation was based on the argument that 
international institutions and multilateral partnerships were useful tools to share burdens 
and risks, win wide global support for USA's policies and accomplish objectives that 
seemed otherwise out of reach. Unfortunately, this policy soon came under attack, 
especially as moves through the UN to restore peace in areas such as Somalia and the 
Balkans failed. And opponents attacked multilateral institutions for reducing the 
freedom of movement of the USA and threatening USA's interests (Patrick, 2003). 
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Thus, the Clinton administration had to retreat to a more conditional stance with regard 
to multilateralism: “multilateralism when we can, unilateralism when we must.”       
In effect, it appeared that the end of the Cold War only created a need for the 
USA to find an appealing rationale for keeping the state of militarization of the world in 
the absence of the Soviet threat. What followed was the continuation of war doctrines in 
foreign policy, predicated on the alleged need to fight against a wide spectrum of 
alternative threats, including rogue states, terrorist groups and organized-crime 
networks (Klare, 1995). It was the USA's conviction that the world continued to be a 
dangerous place, with threats no less alarming than those of the “evil Soviet empire,” 
and that the best means to face these threats was through absolute military superiority 
more than anything else. Thus, it turned out that the UN had exchanged the constraints 
of the cold war for the shackles of the unipolar world order (UN, 2004). Long-standing 
conflicts, such as those in the Middle East and Kashmir, dragged on. And failures to 
react on time to the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia rendered a strong blow to the 
hopes for an effective multilateral system and a just world order. Moreover, the USA 
chose to diverge with worldwide consensuses on issues such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol 
on Climate Change and the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal 
Court. In sum, the aftermath of the Cold War presented a mixed picture and a missed 
opportunity to launch a more effective multilateral system. 
Nonetheless, some argue that although the Cold War was fraught with crises, it 
did offer one important thing and that was order (Kurth, 2007). States belonging to the 
Western camp enjoyed a good deal of liberty and prosperity under order. And, on the 
other side, states in the Eastern Camp, though largely deprived of liberty or prosperity, 
could still enjoy the essential advantage of order, even if it was despotic in most cases. 
In addition to preserving order within their respective circles, it was in the best interest 
of the two superpowers to also sustain a variety of mostly despotic regimes in the Third 
World, especially those that were perceived as client regimes. In contrast, the aftermath 
of the Cold War witnessed violent turbulences in world politics and the world seemed in 
need for reordering. Hence, there has been a plethora of “world order” concepts after the 
Cold War, including unipolar, multipolar and nonpolar orders. Unfortunately, none of 
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these concepts could hold true for long. And, currently, the world seems to be still 
undergoing transition to a new, unclear world order.   
 
3. The Attacks of 11 September 2001 
 The whole world was severely shaken by the suicide-attacks that took place in 
New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. The attacks targeted one prime 
symbol of capitalism, the building of the World Trade Center in New York. They also 
targeted the world military powerhouse, the Pentagon in Washington and the world 
highest-profile building, the White House, but failed to strike the latter. These attacks 
caused huge human and material losses, and it was later revealed that the perpetrators 
were all Muslims originating from the Middle East and affiliated to the so-called Al-
Qaeda terrorist network. In effect, the September 11 attacks were so grave that they 
ushered in radical changes in the global political environment and in the concepts and 
doctrines of national and collective security.      
Without hesitancy, the whole world declared its readiness to stand by the USA 
in its endeavor to hunt those behind the attacks and to react to the threat posed by Al-
Qaeda and all kinds of terrorist groups (Luck, 2006). The UN-endorsed NATO 
operation in Afghanistan was launched, with the contribution, logistical assistance and 
support of an unprecedented number of states. It became clear that, for the first time in 
centuries, the world has come together to face one common threat. The whole world 
also stood behind the interim government that was installed in Afghanistan shortly after 
the war there. In fact, the attacks were the main factor behind a concert of international 
efforts at the multilateral, regional and national levels to confront the threats of such 
extremist groups as Al-Qaeda. And it seemed that the attacks could give multilateralism 
another chance by forcing the Bush administration to modify its campaign rhetoric and 
adopt a policy of more active international engagement. Indeed, there were early signs 
that the attacks would lead to a post-September 11 new world order (Rahiman, 2001). 
However, the USA chose to react through the so-called "coalition against terror," 
established after direct consultation with USA's allies and away from the UN. Thus, 
from the outset, the USA leaned toward informal multilateralism. Moreover, the USA’s 
foreign policy threatened of a grave polarization of the international community, as it 
employed a radical classification of countries, according to which they are either friends 
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or enemies. In this light, the USA’s approach to the fight against terrorism was 
somehow reminiscent of the old Cold-War politics.     
In particular, the USA’s Bush administration deserves singling out as one of the 
most important factors behind the retreat of multilateralism since World War II. 
Although the problems of the USA with the world and the problems of the world with 
the USA date before George W. Bush took office, his approach to multilateralism was 
based on notions of neo-conservatism that dismayed the world. President Bush and his 
team basically viewed USA’s foreign policy from the narrow perspective of USA’s 
national interests, while disregarding the role and duties of the USA as a natural world 
leader (Kagan, 2008). Although the September 11 attacks enforced some deal of nuance 
in Bush’s foreign policy, it turned out to be only a tactical change of tones. Indeed, the 
Bush administration adopted a general foreign policy line that was in stark contempt of 
multilateralism, including withdrawing from globally tumultuous multilateral treaties, 
polarizing the international community along the fault lines of friends/enemies, 
democratic/undemocratic in addition to monopolizing the war against terror as if it was 
a USA’s domestic affair. As a result, anti-Americanism reached unprecedented heights 
throughout the world, which denied the world the needed moral example and leader that 
only the USA was qualified to discharge.                  
Moreover, shortly after September 11 attacks, the USA indulged in 
unprecedented classification of states, most particularly using the so-called lists of rogue 
states, failing and ungoverned territories. The list of rogue states included those that 
pose threats to the USA or provide safe heavens for terrorist groups that could target the 
USA. In particular, the Bush-administration’s list of rogue states included North Korea, 
Iraq and Iran. Accordingly, these three states were set for special targeting mechanisms 
and pressures. In 2003, the USA decided to attack Iraq, with the unfounded claim that it 
had a program for developing nuclear weapons (Williams, 2004). The two others, North 
Korea and Iran, are still in confrontation with the USA, but attacking them seems to be 
less feasible militarily and politically. In particular, the spirit of common destiny that 
prevailed after September 11 attacks got rapidly eroded by the insistence of the USA on 
striking Iraq in spite of wide objections to this move in the UN Security Council, 
especially from other permanent members and USA’s European allies.   
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4. After the Invasion of Iraq 
As previously mentioned, the USA’s Bush administration arrived at a conviction 
that Iraq is a rogue state and that Saddam Hussein’s regime has to be toppled by force. It 
deployed desperate efforts to authorize the use of force against Iraq in the UN Security 
Council, on the pretext that the Iraqi regime is posing a threat to international peace. 
The American administration tried to substantiate this claim on the ground that Iraq is 
concealing a nuclear-weapons program and attempted to manipulate the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into this direction. Although all these efforts failed and 
there were wide objections from the international community to using force against 
Iraq, the USA rallied the so-called “coalition of the willing” and invaded Iraq in 2003, 
thus rendering a grave blow to the UN and multilateralism (Slaughter, 2005). 
The episode of Iraq is still dragging on today and it has even turned out to be so 
influential that it has become a landmark for policy makers and international relations 
theorists arguing that it was a turning point between two different world orders, the 
unipolar world order led by the USA and a new world order in the making (Haas, 2008). 
Several factors have contributed to this line of thought. Firstly, as it became obvious 
after the invasion, the USA had a clear entry strategy but lacked a similarly clear exit 
strategy. It was as if the USA wanted to topple the Iraqi regime at any price and 
notwithstanding whatever happens afterward. To its dismay, after its early sweeping 
victory, the war proved to be a serious over-stretch in the USA’s military capacity, 
especially given USA’s commitments to operations in Afghanistan. In particular, the 
guerilla war tactics used by different Iraqi militia have been a source of continuous 
drain on the USA’s military, thus weakening the overall military outreach of the USA 
and shaking the security foundations of USA’s allies who have for long depended on the 
USA’s global security umbrella.  
Secondly, the images and news reports of torture in Abou Gharib prison in Iraq 
and in Guantanamo Bay detention camp in Cuba have, to say the least, shocked the 
global public opinion. Especially, the revelations of torture at Abou Gharib rendered a 
serious blow to the soft power of the USA and undermined the credibility of its 
advocacy of human rights (Roth, 2005). In addition, the combined effect of the 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
The Current International Setting 
13
elongated operations in Iraq, together with the wrongful ideological handling of the war 
and its assimilation to crusades, have transformed Iraq into a pole attracting extremists 
from the region and beyond, thus further complicating the situation. Moreover, the 
Abou Gharib revelations coincided with preceding criticisms of the USA for its 
insistence on treating those detained in Guantanamo Bay as enemy fighters, not as 
prisoners of war, which could have brought them under the umbrella of the 1949 Third 
Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. This stance was widely 
condemned, as a poignant action to evade responsibilities set by international law. Now 
that the new USA’s administration has committed to withdraw from Iraq and to close 
the detention camp in Guantanamo Bay, the USA’s reputation could meet some 
consolation. Nonetheless, the damage done was so huge that it will not be easy to 
overcome.  
     Thirdly, the acrimonious disagreement between the USA and its transatlantic 
allies over the war has caused a rift in transatlantic relations (Kagan, 2008). Although a 
world powerhouse, the UK, sided with the USA on using force against Iraq, along with 
some other European countries including Spain, other European powerhouses, such as 
France and Germany, along with most other European countries were outspoken against 
the USA’s insistence on using force. However, the then USA’s administration paid too 
little attention to the concerns of its European allies. This has left a scar in the 
transatlantic alliance and proved to be detrimental to transatlantic cooperation on other 
issues of global concern. Moreover, the episode of Iraq was used as a landmark 
epitomizing the deep ideological and historical differences between the two transatlantic 
allies. For instance, Robert Kagan argues that the USA belongs to Mars, indicating hard 
power, while its European allies belong to Venus, indicating the power of example. Of 
particular importance here, the USA-European rift left both sides in weaker positions in 
the international arena. And the USA found itself not only lacking the support of its 
traditional European allies, but also suffering from a grossly damaged image in Europe 
and worldwide.   
 Fourthly, the Iraq war served an ultimatum to small states and the international 
community at large that the new sole superpower is not a benign hegemon that defends 
a rule-based world order, exercises its power through multilateral institutions and plays 
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the role of an “offshore balancer.” Instead, it was proven, the sole hegemon, facing new 
external challenges, is driven by internal particularistic interests, in quest for building an 
informal empire, where force is used to topple antagonist regimes, impose client ones 
and enforce economic subordination (Hinnebusch, 2006). Thus, the very event of the 
eruption and quick victory of the USA in Iraq was a clear indication that there has 
arrived a new unipolar world order, where the new sole pole is itself a source of 
disorder or self-centered chaotic order. Of course, other states may adapt to, or even 
benefit from band-wagoning with, a new rogue superpower, but it is these states that are 
to bear the brunt of a world setting where the sole superpower undermines the rules 
constraining the use of force in international relations.         
 With the election of the current USA’s Obama administration, the USA’s neo-
conservatism that was behind the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has significantly 
subsided. In parallel, the new administration has been striving to heel the woes in the 
transatlantic alliance. In addition, it has taken an outright decision to close the detention 
camp at Guantanamo Bay, in an attempt to repair the USA’s image. Moreover, it has 
reshuffled the war agenda, by agreeing to a schedule of withdrawal from Iraq by 2011 
and moving the focus of its military clout to the still ongoing war in Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, the new administration has honored its electoral campaign commitment to 
cooperate more closely with external partners, including China and Russia, and to work 
more through multilateral institutions. Thus, multilateralism might be said to have got 
another chance with the new USA’s administration. Notably, the USA is still the world 
most powerful nation and the future of multilateralism depends on its conduct. And, 
clearly, there has been some tangible progress in the effectiveness of multilateral 
institutions during the new administration. However, the reading of the USA’s 
multilateral inclination this far reveals a great deal of reliance on informal 
multilateralism, through forums and group meetings outside the UN, as the main pillar 
of its foreign policy, at the expense of binding multilateral institutions. In fact, this trend 
vindicates the theory of Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Affairs, of 
“multilateralism à la carte,” as the most likely course for the multilateral system in the 
foreseeable future (Haas, 2008). 
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To sum up, it seems that the international multilateral system has been facing 
hurdles ever since its consolidation in the aftermath of World War II. The community of 
states assumes collective responsibility on this overall picture. Indeed, multilateral 
institutions do not have wills of their own; instead their wills are those of their member 
states. Nonetheless, super and great powers, most importantly the USA nowadays, 
assume special responsibility, given their weights and roles, which make them capable 
of either bolstering the system or undermining it without fearing repercussions. 
Fortunately, the new USA’s administration has shown some better commitment to 
multilateralism. However, the system is still at crossroads and either multilateralism 
takes the road of effective global governance, i.e. rule-based governance by all and for 
all, or it takes the less-travelled road of informal and looser global governance. In effect, 
it is the very basic aspiration of a fair and just world that is at stake today.           
 
II. Global (In)Security 
 Global security has been a constant concern for the international community. In 
large part, the UN was established to provide a guarantee against relapse in aggressions 
after World War II. In so doing, the UN employs the so-called collective security 
principles enshrined in the UN Charter. Notably, the UN has succeeded in preventing a 
recurrence of world wars, but time and again, it has been proven ill-poised and ill-
equipped to guarantee a secure world. Various threats to international security have 
been fomenting. This section, it follows, will provide concise analyses of the main 
challenges to global security, including interstate conflicts, internal conflicts, 
international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  
 
A. Interstate Conflicts 
Interstate and regional conflicts are the traditional types of conflicts threatening 
international peace. Fortunately, the frequency and magnitude of these conflicts have 
decreased significantly since World War II. The probability that a state could be party to 
a war or a military intervention in any year has decreased from one chance in seven for 
the period from 1495 to 1918 to one chance in hundred since 1990 (Holsti, 2006).  
During the Cold War, there was usually some kind of balance at flashing points, with 
parties on one front taking sides with the USA and parties on the other front taking sides 
with the former USSR. Accordingly, the Cold War contributed to the retreat of this kind 
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of conflicts. More recently, the forces of globalization have been closing the gaps 
among states, increasing the degree of interdependence and binding humanity 
altogether. Economic, social and cultural exchanges among states create strong interests 
in avoiding disruption to the flow of these exchanges. Thus, states find more and more 
reasons to relegate the resort to outright war to fewer and fewer cases of interstate 
conflicts.  
However, statistics also indicate that if we combine incidences of interstate war 
since 1945 with acts of unilateral military intervention aimed at toppling or otherwise 
reinforcing regimes in other states, the figures suggest an overall increase in this type of 
armed conflicts. In the period from 1496 to 1945, a war or military intervention took 
place every three years on average. Since 1945, the interval shrank to one year and half, 
which refers to a doubling of overall incidences of resort to violence in international 
relations (Holsti, 2006). Although the number of states has substantially increased since 
1496, this figure remains an overly alarming indicator. Moreover, long-entrenched 
conflicts remain unresolved in areas such as the Middle East, South Asia and North-East 
Asia. These conflicts continue to pose threats to international peace and security and 
hinder the potential of cooperation between the antagonists such as the Arab states and 
Israel, India and Pakistan and South Korea and North Korea. Furthermore, they have 
implications on the internal stability of the states involved and have in some cases 
fueled internal conflicts and civil wars, which in turn exacerbate wider regional 
conflicts. Such an environment diverts scarce resources into weapon stockpiling at the 
expense of pressing developmental needs. In addition, external conflicts are sometimes 
used as an excuse for lack of progress on internal challenges, which imposes dear 
sacrifices on local populations.               
In particular, the Russian Georgian War of 2008 is novel evidence that there is 
some kind of resurgence of use of force in international relations (Peral, 2009). The 
images of Russian troops sweeping into Georgia served a clear ultimatum that the case 
of a UN member state waging an outright war against another UN member state is still a 
standing, albeit latent, threat to international peace and security. Although, this war 
erupted in a traditionally contentious region, the Caucus, it took place at a time the 
international community was self-assured that the transition to the post-USSR era has 
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completed and while attention was largely focused on helping ex-USSR and Eastern 
European states modernize and become more active members of the community of 
states. Moreover, in the geographical sense, the war was so close to the footsteps of the 
NATO and the EU that it caused a great shock to the West and the international 
community at large and alarmed that wider confrontations could ensue if Russia is not 
contained. As a result, the war in Georgia led to a comprehensive reassessment of the 
relations between the West and Russia. And there is growing evidence that Russia, a 
powerful belligerent, stands to gain from this reassessment in terms of its foreign policy 
agenda.              
 
B. Civil Wars 
Civil wars have substantially increased in number since the 1970s, reaching up 
to 30 such conflicts by 2003 (UN, 2004). They have come to dominate the agenda of the 
UN Security Council, with traditional interstate wars largely succumbing to history. The 
African continent plays host to most of these conflicts. Generally, root causes of such 
conflicts include ethnic polarization, lack of good governance, weak institutions and 
poverty and deprivation. They cause massive human sufferings and have implications 
on regional peace and security. As an intergovernmental organization, and given its 
background, the UN was not configured to deal with internal conflicts. And this is all 
the more evident when lacking the approval of the government or the warring parties 
concerned. Still, the UN played an active role in many internal conflicts through means 
such as mediation, peacekeeping, post-conflict assistance in addition to humanitarian 
relief. This is particularly true for the period after the end of the Cold War, especially as 
sentiments soared that the UN could finally rid itself of the fetters of the sensitive 
balance of the Cold War and would hitherto move more swiftly to face threats to 
international peace and security.  
Nonetheless, some of the most discrediting claims against the UN and the larger 
international multilateral system stem from failures to contain civil strife in areas such 
as Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and Darfur. In fact, the conflicts 
most challenging to the international community today are mainly internal in nature, 
with those in Darfur and Somalia topping the list. Although the UN Security Council is 
the prime international authority in charge of international peace and security, regional 
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organizations have been playing an increasingly important role, as foreseen by the UN 
Charter (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2006). Most particularly, the AU and its predecessor 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) played an active role in dealing with rampant 
internal conflicts in Africa. However, this does not absolve the international community 
and most specifically the UN Security Council, of the responsibility toward such 
conflicts. And this becomes all the more needed when we take in consideration the lack 
of human expertise, technical, logistical and financial capabilities required to face civil 
wars at the regional level.           
In this regard, after the attacks of September 11, the USA developed the concept 
of weak, failing and failed states, in the course of revisiting its national security strategy 
(USA National Security Strategies 2002 and 2006). In fact, there is an understanding in 
the USA that weak and war-torn states could pose as much threat to USA’s security as 
strong states (Slaughter et al, 2008). Although this concept was mostly motivated by the 
need to deprive terrorists from safe heavens in states with poor governance, it is also 
linked to the proliferation of internal conflicts. According to the USA’s vision, weak 
states are generally those that lack central control over their territories, which leaves 
room for terrorist groups that could as well cooperate with dissident groups, organized 
crime networks and local militia. Applying these general criteria, it turns out that most 
sub-Saharan African countries are either weak, failing or failed states. Thus, in the 
context of the global war against terrorism, internal conflicts and their related chaos 
have gained new dimensions. Fortunately, this may also hold fruits, as it sheds more 
light on internal conflicts such as those in Darfur and Somalia.     
However, the biggest failures of the international multilateral system in 
containing civil strife have been in preventing ethnic cleansing, genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes (UN, 2004). One stark example of these failures is the 
genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994. The UN failed to foresee the deterioration 
of the conflict to the level of genocide. Moreover, after the genocide started, troop 
contributors withdrew peacekeepers and the UN Security Council, bowing to USA’s 
pressure, failed to respond. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1995, the role of the UN was 
confined to humanitarian assistance, while watching mass killing taking place over a 
long stretch of time, without any meaningful political or military action to stop it. A 
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third example is Kosovo, where the paralysis of the UN Security Council gave way to 
the military intervention by the NATO in 1999 to prevent further ethnic cleansing.  
In a related move, the introduction of the notions of human security and 
humanitarian intervention (later named the responsibility to protect) came as a major 
aberration from the post-Westphalian world order. The two notions are very 
controversial and could stand many definitions. But one could say that the notion of 
human security is in fact a wider frame for the responsibility to protect. For the first 
time since 1648, the world appeared set to redefine the notion of national sovereignty to 
open the door for international intervention in internal affairs of nation-states in cases of 
massive atrocities. In 1999, in an address to the UN General Assembly, Kofi Anan, then 
UN Secretary General, went so far as to suggest that the classical legal concept of state 
sovereignty may have to yield in some circumstances to the “sovereignty of the 
individual.” In reaction, UN member states have shown a great deal of division on the 
subject, and there seems to be very little space for reconciling divergent views on the 
balance between the notions of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention (Evans 
and Sahnoun, 2001).  
Notably, these two controversial notions started taking shape after the end of the 
cold war, with sponsorship from several countries, including the USA, Japan and 
Canada. In a historical landmark in 1992, the UN Security Council authorized the use of 
force in Somalia for humanitarian purposes. In a second incidence, the NATO 
intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 to protect UN designated safe areas. 
Another landmark, though without UN authorization, was the USA-led NATO strikes 
against Serbia in 1999 to halt the human atrocities in Kosovo. However, the UN, the 
body where the notions of human security and humanitarian intervention were born, 
failed to uphold them in two stark cases (UN, 2004). The first was the failure to act on 
time to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the second was the massive ethnic 
cleansing that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995. As a 
result, currently, the international community seems more determined not to let such 
gross violations of human rights take place again. 
More specifically, the notion of human security first appeared in 1994 in a report 
of the UN Development Program (UNDP). Later on, it gained momentum thanks to the 
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report of the Independent Commission on Human Security in 2003 (Commission on 
Human Security, 2003). However, the UN Millennium Review Summit in 2005 failed 
to reach a consensus on the issue. Under the subtitle of “human security,” the Outcome 
Document of the UN Millennium Review Summit in 2005 stated that “We stress the 
right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We 
recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom 
from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and 
fully develop their human potential.” Due to the wide controversy such a concept raises, 
the Outcome Document only reflected a commitment to further discussing and better 
defining the notion of human security in the UN General Assembly (UN, 2005). 
In contrast, the more specific notion of the responsibility to protect received 
some kind of international endorsement. The UN Millennium Review Summit in 2005 
provides a practical definition of this notion, stating that “Each individual state has the 
responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help states exercise this responsibility and support the UN in 
establishing an early warning capability.” Beforehand, the Canadian government had 
sponsored the so-called International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty that issued a report on the responsibility to protect in 2001 (International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). Although this commission 
lacked a specific UN mandate, its report contributed significantly to ultimately building 
some consensus around the subject at the Millennium Review Summit. Still, it is not the 
ink on paper that matters, as there continues to be wide controversy, with some states 
even contending that the language in the Outcome Document of the Millennium Review 
Summit is not binding to them.    
In the real world, the application of the notions of human security and the 
responsibility to protect seems to be subject to a political-appropriateness test. For 
instance, concurrently with the atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, in 
Russia, was witnessing perhaps no less shocking atrocities. Nonetheless, the world was 
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unable to move to put an end to the tragedy there. There are plenty of other examples, 
including atrocities in Sierra Leone, the Great lakes region and the Sudan. In contrast, 
when the USA deemed it appropriate to intervene militarily to reinstall the Aristide 
regime in Haiti in 1994, it did so without even consulting the UN. Although this 
intervention was donned the mantra of human rights and values, it failed to meet the 
basic internationally agreed standards of the responsibility to protect. In fact, the criteria 
for international intervention are highly politicized (Kissinger, 2002). While moral 
principles are universal and timeless, foreign policy is subject to circumstances. 
Unfortunately, recent history indicates that incidences of mass human suffering are 
likely to happen again in the future. Consequently, if the international community is 
serious about confronting these incidences effectively, there has to be a clear, stable and 
unbiased framework for timely responses to them (Evans and Sahnoun, 2001).       
 
C. Terrorism 
The attacks of September 11 marked a turning point in the cognizance of the 
international community about terrorism and brought that term forward as a keyword in 
international relations. As a result, there has risen a fervent interest in studying that 
phenomenon and combating it. However, it should be noted, terrorism as a phenomenon 
had existed long before September 2001 and scorched many countries with its flames. 
Countries like Egypt, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Algeria, Philippines and Ireland are 
among those that had to pay dear price for terrorist activities. Along these lines, this 
subsection will set off with an elaboration on the definition and recent history of 
terrorism. Then, it will provide brief analyses of its root causes and international 
reactions to it, especially after September 11 attacks.       
 
1. Definition and Recent History 
 Negotiations in the UN on an international convention on terrorism have failed 
this far to arrive at a consensual definition of this phenomenon, because of gaps of 
positions that will be examined later on. But the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change provided a basic definition, describing it as “any action, that is 
intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the 
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
The Current International Setting 
22
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” 
(UN, 2004).  
Notably, terrorism as a phenomenon has no specific home or religious 
affiliation. One of the first and most significant acts of terrorism after the establishment 
of the UN was the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, the then UN mediator in 
Palestine, in Jerusalem in 1948. However, it is evident that there has been an 
unprecedented surge in terrorist activities since the end of the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan in 1989, shortly before the collapse of the USSR. During the fight against 
the Soviets, the USA in coordination with allied regimes, such as those in Pakistan and 
Egypt, was encouraging volunteer fighters to travel to Afghanistan to join the resistance 
against the Soviet occupation, in the name of Islam (Al-Shobki, 2006). This tactic 
served the USA’s purposes in the Cold War and at the same time served cooperative 
regimes by ridding them of unwanted extremists on their soil. Shortly before the Soviets 
withdrew from Afghanistan, terrorist groups there established the so-called World 
Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders. By the time the Soviets 
withdrew from Afghanistan, it had become home to an avalanche of virulent terrorist 
groups including Al-Qaeda. And these groups wanted to redeploy their jihad, fighting in 
the name of God, in some other direction.  
It was no secret that jihadists were determined to fight whom they thought of as 
enemies of Islam, including in Israel, the USA, the larger West and even the Arab 
world. At the outset, the ensuing civil war in Afghanistan helped guarantee that the 
country would continue to serve as a safe heaven for groups like Al-Qaeda, which later 
formed an alliance with the Taliban movement originating from Pakistan. It was also 
clear that the long-entrenched Middle Eastern conflict played a decisive role in the 
redirection of jihad operations. Indeed, this conflict is one of the main sources of 
extremism in the region, in view of the animosity it grows between the Arabs and the 
Israelis. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, some of the more fatal terrorist operations 
targeted USA’s assets around the world. In particular, the USA increasingly became a 
target of terrorist groups based in the Middle East, partly because of USA’s support to 
Israel and repressive Arab regimes (Luck, 2006). In response, the USA started to move 
more actively in the UN and other multilateral forums to combat terrorism. 
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Consequently, terrorism started to attract worldwide attention, out of fear that it is 
becoming an open war against modern life patterns and Western values. Ultimately, the 
attacks of September 11 marked a radical departure in the perception of terrorism, given 
their huge magnitude and impact.  
 
2. Root Causes and Catalysts 
Certainly, terrorism is unjustifiable under any circumstances and whatever the 
reasons could be. To say the least, it is an inhumane way of expressing one’s ideas. 
However, there is a noticeable gap in understanding its causes between two main lines 
of thinking. On one hand, there is some belief that terrorist groups are mainly motivated 
by grudge against the American and Western model of life and that they are meant to 
destroy this model and revive the memories of the dark ages (Ikenberry and Slaughter, 
2006). This value-based understanding is widely shared by Western circles. On the 
other hand, there is a counter argument that is being defended mostly by Southern 
circles. These latter circles tend to think that terrorism has some root causes, most 
importantly injustice, poverty and lack of democracy (UN, 2004). And they perceive 
destroying the American model of life as a byproduct of these root causes, not a root 
cause in itself. Clearly, the gap is large and hinders joining efforts in the fight against 
terrorism.  
For instance, with regard to injustice, there is some sort of sympathy with Al-
Qaeda and some like terrorist groups in Arab and Muslim countries, as sympathizers 
share the extremist perspective that the existing world order is one that lacks basic 
justice (Bell, 2006). Although large swathes of Arabs and Muslims, especially from 
younger generations, are fond of the American model of life, there is widespread rage 
against the USA’s foreign policy in the Middle East, in view of the USA’s traditional 
support to Israel in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And the Iraq war added a 
significant deal to tarnishing the image of the USA in the Arab and Muslim world. 
People disaffected by USA’s policies toward other conflicts are no much different 
(Glynn, 2005). In fact, a quick look at the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and some 
other entrenched conflicts reveals a state of despair about reaching peaceful settlements 
to these conflicts, with the USA and the West at large receiving the brunt of the blame. 
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Poverty and inequality are also believed to provide a fertile environment for 
extremism and terrorism (Glynn, 2005). Globalization has failed to realize the basic 
expectations of a great majority of humanity. There are currently more than one billion 
persons living under the UN official poverty line. A dynamic analysis of this situation 
further complicates the image, as large groups of people not only lack access to basic 
necessities, such as food, clean water and sanitation, but also lack decent education, 
healthcare and decent work and feel hopeless about the future. Terrorist groups find this 
environment availing and exploit it to promote their agendas. Most importantly, the 
sense of deprivation of young poor people makes it easier to recruit and replenish 
membership cadres of terrorist networks. In addition, poor and deprived people make up 
a large base receptive to, or at least sympathetic with, extremist ideas. Hence, terrorist 
groups find more safe heavens among poor populations, be it in poor or rich countries.          
There is also another contended root cause; lack of democracy. This basically 
refers to the lack of the basic freedoms of opinion, expression and association, which 
are the three most fundamental freedoms in international human rights law. The 
aforementioned sympathy with Al-Qaeda in Arab and Muslim countries stems partly 
from the close relationship between the USA and conservative regimes in these 
countries (Bell, 2006). Most of these regimes stifle popular participation and fall short 
of meeting the basic requirements of modern democracy (Glynn, 2005). They also 
suffer from corruption, lack of rule of law, lack of accountability and transparency and 
deep-rooted misconceptions about history and traditions. In addition, there is some kind 
of security paranoia in Arab and Muslim countries, with red lines that if crossed could 
lead to arbitrary arrests, imprisonment and torture. In such an environment, there can 
hardly be any space for disagreement or dialogue. Consequently, opponents find solace 
in different kinds of secret organizations that could have extremist ideologies.     
In addition to root causes, there are catalysts that magnify terrorist threats. In 
effect, the era we are living is ripe with factors that contribute to what could be called 
the “globalization of terror” (Al-Shobki, 2006). No doubt, terrorism has become more 
horrifying, as the revolution in mass communications has made it easier for terrorist 
groups to spread their dogma and reach. In addition, the unprecedented globalization of 
finance and the torrents of newly invented financial instruments have helped financing 
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terrorism. Moreover, there is evidence that global terrorist networks draw on the 
capabilities of organized-crime networks, as manifested by the relation between opium 
trade and terrorism in Afghanistan. In fact, the attacks of 11 September 2001 are 
exemplary of the “globalization of terror,” in view of the globalized nature of the 
attacks, which were perpetrated by Middle Easterners who lived and studied in Europe 
and the USA, at instructions from Al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan. These attacks 
also reflected another important trend; the evolution of terrorist operations from 
targeting political leaders and elites to targeting symbolic and high-profile targets, such 
as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, without sympathy toward the would-be 
innocent victims. Moreover, the continuing shackles of the international systems of 
WMD nonproliferation contribute to yet more magnification of terrorist threats. There 
are substantiated fears that terrorist networks could get their hands on nuclear or other 
WMD, which scenario could lead to inflicting hitherto unimaginable human and 
material losses (Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006). These fears were clearly reflected in 
the USA’s national security strategies that came out since September 11 attacks as well 
as in the EU security strategy. Obviously, one of the main objectives of the last 
generation of Western security strategies is to prevent the scenario of WMD 
“catastrophic terrorism” (Slaughter et al, 2008).    
 
3. International Reactions to Terrorism 
As mentioned above, the attacks of September 11 in Washington and New York 
shook the world violently. In the aftermath, terrorism has come to the forefront as the 
most dangerous global threat. This led to far-reaching implications on international 
military and political fronts. Militarily, the attacks proved outdated the traditional 
national security doctrines. In effect, they have come as significant evidence that threats 
to security have become globalized, and so they require global approaches. The fact that 
the heart of the USA, given its traditional sense of geographical isolation, was the target 
of the September 11 attacks left no doubt that no single country can face the security 
threats of the day on its own. The UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change states that these attacks were an indication that states and intergovernmental 
security institutions have failed to keep up with changes in the nature of threats (UN, 
2004). It adds that the technological revolution enables smaller and smaller numbers of 
people to inflict greater and greater harms. And it articulates three basic pillars of 
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collective security today: threats go beyond state borderlines, they are linked and they 
must be addressed at multilayered levels, including global, regional and national levels.   
A byproduct of the attacks of September 11 was the birth of the so-called 
preemptive defense concept in the USA, before some other states transplanted it 
(Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006). Notably, the Charter of the UN prohibits member 
states from using or threatening to use force against each other, as a general rule in the 
interest of world peace and security as well as friendly relations between member states. 
While the Charter provides two exceptions to this general rule: one for self-defense 
against imminent threats and the other for military measures authorized by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII, in cases of threats or breaches of international peace. 
However, the USA, shocked by the attacks, expanded its own doctrine of national 
security to introduce the concept of preemptive strikes in its two national security 
strategies of 2002 and 2006, on the basis of need for removing threats of attacks before 
they materialize, which could fail the UN test of the right to self-defense. In 2010, the 
new USA national security strategy partially diluted this concept, tying it to exhausting 
diplomatic means.   
On the political level, the response of the international community to the attacks 
reflected greater involvement and dedication. One day past the attacks, the UN General 
Assembly and the Security Council issued two strong, unanimous resolutions 
condemning the attacks and drafting the way forward for consolidating international 
cooperation in combating terrorism. The Security Council’s resolution was interpreted 
to provide a blanket authorization for the USA to use force against the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda. Two weeks later, the Security Council passed the famous resolution 1373, which 
is the most comprehensive and far-reaching of its genre in the field of combating 
terrorism. That resolution established the so-called Counter Terrorism Committee, as an 
ongoing subsidiary body in charge of overseeing the anti-terrorism measures elaborated 
by the resolution. Three years later, the Security Council passed a resolution on the link 
between terrorism and WMD, which established two more bodies, bringing the total to 
four subsidiary organs in charge of combating terrorism (Luck, 2006).          
The report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change reflected 
an agreement on the need for a global comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy that 
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incorporates measures broader than coercive ones and addresses the so-called root 
causes of terrorism (UN, 2004). In 2005, the Outcome Document of the UN Millennium 
Review Summit marked another qualitative shift in global reactions to terrorism. That 
document expressed a strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and stressed the 
need for a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy and a comprehensive convention 
on international terrorism. In 2006, the UN General Assembly passed the UN Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, with an annexed plan of action elaborating guidelines for 
detailed measures by all concerned actors. Notably, there are currently 13 international 
legal instruments on combating terrorism, but these instruments are scattered and lack 
core focus. In this respect, negotiations on a comprehensive international convention on 
terrorism started after the 2005 Millennium Review Summit, with a view to integrating 
the 13 preceding agreements into a new convention. But, unfortunately, these 
negotiations are still facing insurmountable disagreements. Although the High Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposed a basic definition of terrorism, the 
negotiations are mostly stalemated around this very basic item (Schlesinger, 2008). On 
one side, states belonging to conflict areas like the Middle East insist that such a 
convention must exempt resistance to foreign occupation from the scope of terrorist acts 
and demand that state terrorism be covered by the convention. On the other side, there is 
staunch rejection to these demands, coming mainly from states with unsettled territorial 
claims as well as from Western states whose definition of terrorism is almost Al-Qaeda-
tailored.      
In the overall analysis, the reaction of the international community to the threats 
of terrorism is fragile. Only targeting Al-Qaeda enjoys general international consensus, 
but as the issues move beyond Al-Qaeda, they become problematic (Pillar, 2004). The 
main reason is that there is a lack of consensus on the appropriate means to combat 
terrorism, with many states disagreeing with the USA’s record of concentration on 
coercive and military measures as well as its disrespect of international law and 
multilateral institutions. In view of this lack of consensus, the current trend indicates 
some kind of satisfaction with addressing terrorism as a localized issue. One obvious 
reflection of this trend is the lack of compromise on the divergent positions in the 
ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive international convention on terrorism. 
Another problem is the proliferation of international anti-terrorism efforts in the UN, 
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Bretton Woods institutions, G-8 and other forums, which raises questions about the 
efficiency and effectiveness of these efforts. Moreover, the USA’s approach to 
combating terrorism has alienated the international public opinion and tarnished the 
image of the USA in the world. The saga of the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo 
Bay as prisoners of war or enemy combatants stands out as one issue where the USA 
defied the rest of the world. And leaked images of prisoners in Guantanamo shocked 
international public conscience and had negative implications on the unity of the 
international front against terrorism. Notably, these images contributed to sympathy 
with terrorist propaganda, and so they were received by terrorist networks as a boon to 
their agendas.  
 
D. Weapons of Mass Destruction    
 The very existence of WMD, including nuclear, chemical, biological and 
radiological weapons fails to meet any human logic, as they threat all humanity with 
apocalyptic ends. Although they were meant to enhance security, they not only 
represent a critical threat to human survival, but also impose significant drains on scarce 
resources that are otherwise short of meeting basic human needs such as food, 
healthcare and education. Nonetheless, the state of international cooperation on WMD 
is disgraceful to say the least and, failure after failure, the world has reached an 
alarming stage, where these weapons are in fact proliferating not retreating. 
Notwithstanding that the last wave of globalization has brought about an unprecedented 
degree of interdependence and there is some tacit consensus that these weapons must 
not be used unless there are exceptionally grave threats, states still fail to steer the path 
toward reliable regimes of nonproliferation, not to mention their removal altogether.      
One of episodes of failures was at the 2005 UN Millennium Review Summit that 
even failed to include any textual agreement on WMD in its Outcome Document. This 
not only reflects wide gaps between positions, but also, and perhaps more importantly, a 
lack of confidence that seriously threatens the sensitive and precarious nonproliferation 
regimes. In fact, there was a series of unavailing events that led up to such an impasse in 
the UN Millennium Review Summit (Findlay, 2006). First, the 7th review conference of 
the 1968 NPT in 2005 failed to achieve any progress with regard to nuclear 
nonproliferation and disarmament. Secondly, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
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(CTBT) continues to be out of force for lack of ratifications. Thirdly, the work of the 
Conference on Disarmament has been deadlocked over the basic issue of its agenda. 
The list of failures goes on and on, but to mention only a few more very concisely, it 
includes the inability to launch negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, the 
collapse of negotiations on a biological weapons verification protocol and the state of 
uncertainty with regard to the future of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission.  
Like in other fields, the USA receives most of the blame for the precarious state 
of the WMD regimes (Findlay, 2006). In particular, there has been little progress on 
USA-Russian nuclear disarmament, although the Cold War ended more than 20 years 
ago and the USA came out of this war as the victor, which granted the USA quasi-
monopoly of the cards of the game. Notably, neo-conservative unilateral policies of the 
USA’s Bush administration have caused a lot of harm to international cooperation on 
WMD. Fortunately, the current USA’s Obama administration has taken a welcome 
reengagement stance in this regard. In an audacious move, in his remarks before the UN 
General Assembly on 23 September 2009, president Obama called for resuming 
international cooperation to reinvigorate the nuclear nonproliferation regime and 
ultimately achieve complete nuclear disarmament (Obama, 2009). He also announced 
his administration resolute to pursue a new agreement with Russia to further reduce 
strategic warheads and launchers. In this regard, the readjustment of the Bush-era plan 
for a missile-defense system in Europe is hoped to hold some fruits for USA-Russian 
cooperation and wider international cooperation.   
However, it is still unclear whether the USA could lead the world to break the 
deep deadlocks on WMD, which the USA itself had long nurtured (Yale Global, 2009). 
In particular, it seems that the main focus of the new USA’s administration is on 
avoiding the fearful scenario that terrorists could get their hands on nuclear weapons, a 
high strategic priority for the USA, given the horrifying background of the attacks of 
September 2001. In addition, the USA assigns high priorities to addressing the nuclear 
programs of North Korea and Iran. In fact, the nuclear nonproliferation regime has been 
previously discredited when India, Pakistan, Israel, along with North Korea passed the 
nuclear weaponry threshold, thus joining the ranks of the five nuclear states recognized 
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by the NPT. But the cases of North Korea and Iran are radically different from the 
USA’s perspective. Obviously, the USA and the West at large cannot contemplate the 
possibility of failure in these two cases, provided the classification of the two states as 
antagonistic, rogue and axis of evil states. However, for WMD nonproliferation and 
disarmament efforts to meet success, there has to be consistency in addressing the 
security concerns of all countries on equal footing.   
 The Middle East region poses a particular conundrum in the context of efforts 
aimed at reinvigorating the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The USA’s war in Iraq 
shocked the sensitive balance in this overheated region. After the war, Iran appeared as 
a regional superpower, thanks to a number of political cards at its disposal, including its 
hard-won strong influence in Iraq and its influential proxies in Palestine, Hamas, and in 
Lebanon, Hezbollah. Iran’s rise came at the expense of other traditional powerhouses in 
the region, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Iranian regime is also known for its 
animosity toward Israel, a special USA’s strategic ally. As a result, the USA and the 
West at large have become embroiled by the dilemma of reconciling the rejection of 
moderate Middle Eastern regimes to what they call double-standard favoritism toward 
the nuclear capabilities of Israel, their traditional enemy, while at the same time 
intensifying the pressure on the Iranian regime to make sure it comes clear and safe on 
its nuclear program (Yale Global, 2009). This conundrum was one of the main, if not 
the most influential, debacles that the NPT review conference in 2005 stumbled on. And 
it played a critical role in the NPT review conference in 2010, which met a relative 
success.                    
 
III. Globalization: Our Small Global Village 
By and large, globalization has become the tone of life of the world. It manifests 
itself in our day-to-day life as well as in the life of states and all other players in the 
international arena. This section starts with a general definition of globalization, before 
moving on to its modern history. Afterwards, it highlights some of the fundamental 
forces behind globalization: technological change, economic globalization, 
globalization of paradigms and regionalism.  
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A. General Definitions of Globalization 
There is no standard definition of globalization. Rather, there are several 
different definitions, all explaining the process from different perspectives, while 
keeping one main common line: technological change. Five such definitions are 
provided here. Held (2007) defines globalization as the intensification of worldwide 
social relations and interactions, such that distant events acquire very localized impacts 
and vice versa. It, he adds, involves a rescaling of social relations, from the economic 
sphere to the security sphere, beyond the national to the transnational, transcontinental 
and transworld.  Stiglitz (2002) defines it as the closer integration of the countries and 
peoples of the world, which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of the 
costs of transportation and communication and the breaking down of artificial barriers 
to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge and people across borders. 
Rothschild (1999) states that in the last two decades, globalization or 
internationalization has been depicted as a condition of the present and the future – a 
phenomenon without a past. This phenomenon is associated with new and 
unprecedented technologies: the internet, international capital markets, supersonic 
travel, cable news and just-in-time deliveries across vast distances. Streeten (2001) 
defines international integration as the result of increased flows of trade, people, 
information and ideas across national boundaries. This integration implies the 
application of policies by different countries as if they were a single political unit. The 
IMF defines economic globalization as an extended process of increasing economic 
integration that is originally motivated by technological change (IMF, 2000). Notably, 
the term “globalization” also covers other dimensions, including cultural, political and 
environmental ones. Thus, it could be said that globalization is such an overwhelming 
force that is meshing the different strands of mankind together in one pot.  
 
B. Short History 
Though the word “globalization” itself was barely used 20 years ago, 
globalization is not a new process. Instead, we are only living a new wave of this 
historical phenomenon. Notably, there are three big forefathers of globalization: the 
British economist Adam Smith, the French writer and diplomat Francois-Rene de 
Chateaubriand and the German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder (Rothschild, 
1999). In 1776, in his book “The Wealth of Nations,” Adam Smith wrote that the 
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discovery of America in 1492 by Christopher Columbus and the discovery of the Cape 
of Good Hope in 1498 by Vasco da Gama are the two greatest events in the history of 
mankind, since they allowed distant parts of the world to satisfy one another’s needs 
and encourage each other’s industry. He predicted that globalization would further drive 
economic growth through international division of labor, which stimulates productivity 
and growth. This prediction was vindicated in the following two centuries. Two long 
waves of globalization, the first from 1870 (the introduction of the gold standard) to 
1914 and the second from around 1950 till today, have been characterized with rapid 
growth of the global economy. On the contrary, the interwar period of 1914-1945 was 
mostly a period of rebellion on the liberalization principles of Laissez Faire and Laissez 
passer (Sachs, 2000).  
In 1841, Chateaubriand stated that “when fiscal and commercial barriers will 
have been abolished between different states, as they have already been between the 
provinces of the same state; when different countries, in daily relations, tend toward the 
unity of peoples, how will you be able to revive the old model of separation?” And in 
1774, Gottfried wrote: “When has the entire earth ever been so closely joined together, 
by so few threads? Who has ever had more power and more machines such that with a 
single impulse, with a single movement of a finger, entire nations are shaken?” More 
recently, Slaughter (2003) argues that the concept of nation-state is “out of fashion” and 
that the 1990s witnessed the return of “medievalism,” a back to the future model of pre-
Westphalian Europe, where authority was overlapping among many players within one 
geopolitical unit. A group of bright figures had also expected the demise of the nation-
state long ago, beginning with Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace,” 
through Karl Marx in “Withering Away of the State,” to Bertrand Russell in his 
speeches in the 1950s and 1960s. However, it should be noted, though significantly 
marginalized by the forces of globalization, nation-states remain at the helm of world 
affairs. It is also widely agreed that nation-states will continue to play the most decisive 
role in the world in the foreseeable future, most importantly deciding on whether to 
advance or, otherwise, rein in globalization (Drucker, 1997).           
In the past centuries, big firms from advanced countries got intensively involved 
in international trade and production activities, particularly during the colonial reign of 
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their home countries. For instance, starting from the late 18th century, the Dutch, 
English, French and Swedish East India companies played a crucial role in 
globalization. This was followed by further economic expansion in the 19th century 
(Rothschild, 1999). However, especially the last two decades (1990-2010) have 
witnessed a new vigorous wave of globalization. After the formulation of Washington 
Consensus in the late 1980s, the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the 
former USSR in 1990, formerly centrally-planned economies as well as most other 
developing countries started to pursue increasing liberalization. These developments 
turned out to be some of the most influential catalysts behind the last wave of 
globalization, as they opened the way for global integration to sweep throughout the 
world, under the influence of the technological revolution. 
 
C. Major Forces behind Globalization 
1. Technological Change 
Since the mid-twentieth century, technological change has been driving the so-
called information revolution or third industrial revolution. This revolution is still 
unfolding and produces huge flows of information and knowledge as its main outputs. 
In particular, technological advances in the fields of information, communication and 
transportation have become the most important sources of economic growth, 
competitiveness, wealth and power. Consequently, information has become a source of 
power and today a large portion of the world population has access to this power. In 
effect, the information revolution has transformed the world into a small global village, 
by virtually minimizing the value of distance in space and time and removing traditional 
barriers to the movement of goods, services and people. However, one major paradox of 
information is that of plenty, where the huge flows of information are welcome but go 
beyond the human absorptive capacity and require advanced computers and software to 
process them. Hence, the technological revolution is driven by rapid technological 
progress in computer hardware, software and communications. And it not only increases 
the speed of communications across the globe, but also makes them unimaginably 
affordable. It has three main dimensions; the first is information as data in forms such as 
news and statistics (Nye, 2002). The second is information in the form of technical 
knowhow used for building competitive advantages. And the third dimension is 
strategic information or information about the plans and moves of peers.  
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This has led to far-reaching effects on human life, economy, politics and all 
other facets of life. With respect to human life, technology has become an integral part 
of our lives and its pervasiveness has come to dominate all fields, including education, 
health and entertainment. Technology has also restructured the fabrics of societies along 
technological lines, with technological utilities, such as chatting, instant messages, 
tweets and blogs, becoming important vehicles of human interaction across the globe. 
Moreover, technology has made possible the evolution of some sort of global public 
opinion, as events taking place at one end of the globe has come within easy reach of 
peoples at other ends. As for the economy, capital and labor were long considered the 
main factors of production. Today, with the increasing globalization of business 
activities, knowledge and information have been gaining importance as vital factors of 
success. Competitive advantages, such as technological leads and product 
differentiation, play an ever increasing role in accumulative comparative advantage 
building. In addition, rapid information flows through the globe connect distant markets 
in an unprecedented way, thus making competition in world markets all the more 
demanding. In parallel, the technological revolution helps open up new opportunities for 
developing countries to leapfrog stages on the development scale using advanced 
technologies. In fact, the world has transcended from an industrial age to an information 
age, in which technology has become the most decisive factor of production (Dunning 
and Narula, 2000). As for politics, political decision-making has now become 
technology-dependent. It is unthinkable that a state authority could take an enlightened 
decision on a given subject without consulting the information made available by 
advanced technologies. In particular, in the fields of international relations and 
diplomacy, there has been a revolution in state representation before other states and 
international organizations. Thanks to technology, the share of information that is not 
usually widely circulated by international media outlets has shrunk to the negligible 
margin of highly classified information. Thus, the role of state representatives as 
information agents has almost elapsed and their focus has now moved onto acting as 
communicators and analysts.          
 
2. Economic Globalization 
Although globalization has different dimensions, economists usually describe it 
as if it was synonymous with economic change. In particular, the apostles of the new 
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economy declared irrelevant anything invented before the internet. The revolution in 
information technology has transformed the world into a virtual small village, as it made 
possible transferring huge amounts of money within few seconds. This is perhaps the 
most pronounced aspect of the current wave of globalization. Other secondary factors 
include the collapse of the international fixed exchange rate system, the increasing 
deregulation and liberalization of capital flows and the emergence of new financial 
instruments such as financial derivatives and hedge funds. In fact, financial 
globalization has radically changed the face of the world (Tobin, 2000). It facilitates the 
transfer of savings in rich countries to productive investments in poor countries and at 
the same time can be a source of currency crises, recessions and depressions (Knight, 
1999). In 1776, Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritar, Marquis de Condorcet, stated 
that people who work on and own land have an interest in the general happiness of the 
society because it is more difficult for them to leave it. Today, this rationale has largely 
ceased to exist for the investor who, by a banking operation, within a few seconds, 
could become Egyptian, Portuguese or Chinese (Rothschild, 1999). 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods USA’s dollar-gold standard in 1971, together 
with the information revolution, made possible torrential trading in “virtual money” 
across borders (Drucker, 1997). This money is not created by investment, production, 
consumption or trade, and it has no existence in the real economy. Instead, it is an 
imaginary offspring of financial innovation. However, the power of virtual money is 
real and its volume is so huge that its movements in or out of a given country could 
have far greater impact than movements of direct investment or foreign trade. 
Miraculously, the amount of virtual money traded in one day on world markets could be 
as big as the amount needed to finance global investment and trade in a whole year. And 
this money enjoys total mobility, because it reflects no real economic activity and 
follows no economic logic or nationality. In addition, it is highly volatile and sensitive 
to rumours, which makes it a lot more dangerous.     
 Apart from financial globalization, international trade liberalization is said to be 
the most concrete aspect of globalization. It has grown fast thanks to drastic reductions 
in quota and tariff barriers. And, today, the bulk of world trade has become intra-
industry or even intra-firm. In fact, manufactured products nowadays contain 
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components from so many countries that it makes little sense to attribute single 
nationalities to them (Feenstra, 1998). In particular, the Uruguay Round outcome has 
contributed a historical stride on the road of international trade liberalization. And, 
according to the Doha Declaration, the current Doha Round should foster further 
liberalization, including in the agricultural sector, industrial goods and trade in services 
(Cho, 2007). Foreign direct investment (FDI) is another important force of economic 
globalization, including multinational (production locations in different countries) and 
transnational (loss of national identity and consolidation of global citizenship) 
investments by giant firms. In fact, FDI flows have become important vehicles of 
development, growth and integration in the global economy. In parallel, these flows 
have also become subjects of fierce competition among countries, especially developing 
ones. As for developed economies, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have become 
important drivers of FDI, due to increased competition in the world economy and the 
need for bigger pools of resources. Notably, through MA, fewer numbers of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) come to control larger proportions of global markets 
in a wide variety of sectors. As a result, TNCs have evolved into important players in 
the global economy and global governance at large. Even more, big business firms are 
now being referred to as the “private authority,” which insinuates a kind of rivalry with 
conventional state authority (Fritsch, 2008).   
 
3. Globalization of Paradigms: Democracy and Capitalism  
In his 1992 book, “The End of History and the Last Man,” Francis Fukuyama 
argued that with the end of the Cold War, the victory of western democracy in its 
confrontation with communism signaled the endpoint of mankind's ideological 
evolution and the final form of human government. In fact, especially since the end of 
the Cold War, the world has been witnessing a multifaceted fever combining the forces 
of democracy, rule of law and human rights in transforming societies from the roots and 
reshaping world politics. Even more, democracy has become the only serious source of 
legitimacy in today’s world, thanks mainly to the advocacy role of the USA and the 
West (Fukuyama, 2004). Thus, democracy has developed into a world common value 
and a dear aspiration of those who lack it. In addition, the democratic world has 
employed democratic reform as a corner stone of its foreign policy agendas and an 
almost sine qua non condition for official development assistance. To be clear, the core 
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strength of democracy is that even if it does not guarantee the choice of the best 
government, it provides the means to change any government.  
Nonetheless, Fukuyama’s theory fell short of accounting for nationalistic 
affiliations as a decisive factor of state formation and governmental policies. No doubt, 
nationalism is still a significant force in world politics. It suffices to look at the map of 
world conflicts to see how nationalistic sentiments are playing a decisive role in 
kindling these conflicts and in shaping the agenda of international relations, such as in 
the cases of the Middle Eastern conflict, the conflict in Kashmir, the Russian-Georgian 
war in 2008 and civil wars such as those in the Sudan and Somalia. It should also be 
noted that for democracy to be sustainable, it necessitates some core local pillars, 
including an educated citizenry, a culture of democracy, stable and strong institutions 
and rule of law. And, that although democracy is generally recognized to be the best 
available system of government, it is not flawless. In contrast, practical experiences 
indicate that democracy could fall hostage to small interest groups that do not 
necessarily uphold general public interests. Moreover, the configuration of democratic 
forces could block vital decisions and stifle further reform policies, especially when 
political parties lack the culture of dialogue. Furthermore, drawing on the experiences of 
democratization, it is clear that there can be no one size democracy that fits all. Instead, 
democratic reforms should be sensitive to local traditions and cultural particularities and 
should be home grown and owned, otherwise they would come face to face with local 
populations, which might undermine them.  
In particular, for real democracy to take root, there has to be strong liberal 
institutions in place, without which scenarios like that of Adolf Hitler taking power in 
Germany before World War II could be repeated (Zakaria, 2003). Taking the example 
of the Arab world, if free elections are introduced before strong liberal institutions are in 
place, radical Islamists could gain access to power, which would certainly dismay the 
West. Another example is Sub-Saharan Africa, where there is a general lack of 
institutionalism altogether. As a result, news about coups d’états on the continent have 
been business as usual. And even with recent progress in building institutions in some 
parts, many African countries are still far from reaching the basic prerequisites for 
stability and sustainable progress. In addition, some countries in Asia and, until 
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recently, Latin America are in situations similar to those of African Countries. A 
contradictory opinion holds that democracy like any other system of governance has its 
shortcomings and that its introduction should not be withheld until the would-be 
optimum conditions are in place. USA secretary of state Condoleezza Rice advocated 
this very theory fiercely and even went so far as to speak of tolerance to what she called 
“constructive chaos,” i.e. chaos that could arise as a result of the introduction of 
democracy, on the basis that it is likely to short-live and gradually give way to 
sustainable democracy (Rice, 2008). Accordingly, Rice saw no justifiable reason why 
should not the USA and its democratic allies intensify their efforts in order to spread 
democracy in all directions, defended the introduction of democracy in Iraq by force 
and further suggested punishing uncooperative regimes by isolation.       
As for capitalism, one could say that it has become the flip side of one same coin 
with democracy. With the end of the Cold War, capitalism gained unprecedented pace, 
as the Washington Consensus of the late 1980s was largely a byproduct of the new 
unipolar world order. Ever sine, the policies of market liberalization, privatization and 
fiscal austerity have come into force as global mantras of reform in societies that 
heretofore hardly knew about the free-market economy. And Bretton Woods institutions 
were entrusted with a pivotal role in facilitating and, at times, enforcing transformation 
into free-market economies. Notably, these institutions, along with the capitalist world 
led by the USA, impose harsh reform conditionalities on countries seeking development 
assistance. Hence, it is made clear that joining the capitalist club offers some lucrative 
opportunities, while remaining outside it means detrimental isolation. However, 
capitalism has failed to bail hundreds of millions out of the quagmire of poverty 
(Stiglitz, 2002). Thus, protests against the policies of Bretton Woods institutions have 
surpassed all expectations. For long, people in underdeveloped and developing countries 
used to take to the streets to express their frustration with economic reform policies 
imposed on them. More recently, however, people in developed countries have also 
joined the march against capitalism, which has markedly contributed to the anti-
globalization movement.  
Consequently, there has been increasing voices calling for a withdrawal from the 
Washington Consensus. For instance, a group of intellectuals and politicians from the 
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North and the South have formed a global left front that has consolidated itself as an 
advocacy group of what they call “global socialism.” In addition, a group of leaders 
from both developed and developing countries have established a forum for what they 
call the “the third way.” Moreover, in 2000, the G-20 ministers of finance adopted the 
so-called Montreal Consensus, as a would-be alternative to the neo-liberal Washington 
Consensus (Hale and Slaughter, 2005). This new consensus emphasized the role of 
economic globalization as a powerful engine of growth, while at the same time 
recognizing the need to complement liberalization with social programs. Around the 
same time, the 2000 UN Millennium Summit endorsed the so-called Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), setting concrete targets for efforts to combat poverty, 
disease, hunger and other global ailments. More recently, the international economic 
crisis that broke out in the USA in 2007 has had a detrimental effect on capitalism. In its 
aftermath, there has been an irresistible movement toward more state intervention, 
strengthened and new regulations and trade protectionism. The old wisdom that all can 
win in a single world market has received a severe blow (Altman, 2009). Ironically, 
while new-comers to the free market has suffered what they called unfair damage, 
countries with relatively closed markets, like China and India, have suffered the least. 
Although the G-20 at the newly introduced summit level, besides the old ministerial 
level, has made some strenuous efforts to contain the crisis and regain confidence in the 
free-market economic system, it remains to be seen if this would put the global 
economy back on track.       
 
4. Regionalism, Inter-Regionalism and Globalization 
Like globalization, regionalism or regional integration lack a widely recognized 
definition. But one simple, practical definition is that it refers to a “process by which a 
group of usually contiguous countries moves from a condition of partial or complete 
isolation toward one of partial or complete unification” (Thakur and Langenhove, 
2006). This move usually involves a progressive erosion of internal boundaries, 
concurrently with a progressive rise of external boundaries vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world. It also often provides for the establishment of some kind of formal 
intergovernmental institution to oversee the integration process.        
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 The early signals of regionalism coincided with the end of World War II, i.e. 
long before the last and most overwhelming wave of globalization began. And there 
have been three main forces behind this phenomenon. Firstly, regionalism was induced 
by the decolonization movement. Decolonization resulted in a plethora of newly 
independent, vulnerable states, which needed to form regional blocs to protect their 
collective interests, and this was the case of the OAU, the predecessor of the AU. 
Secondly, regional integration was also motivated by common security concerns, such 
as in the case of the EU. Thirdly, a rebounding rationale behind regionalism is the quest 
for free trade and economic integration. In fact, the configuration of the international 
trade system gives impetus to regional economic blocs through the exemptions granted 
to these blocs from the basic principles of non-discrimination and most favored nation. 
Hence, today, there is an avalanche of regional economic blocs, at different levels of 
integration and sometimes so overlapping that their rationalization becomes a 
sophisticated exercise. Notably, for such blocs to be compatible with the need for world 
trade liberalization, members should have similar intra- and extra- bloc comparative 
advantages (Kono, 2002). Unfortunately, this is not often the case and regional 
economic blocs could even have negative net effects on world trade.   
From one perspective, regionalism could be looked at as both a midway step to, 
and a vehicle of, globalization. In essence, regionalism is globalization within a specific 
regional context. Paradoxically, its main motivation is usually building strong fronts to 
face up to the rest of the world. And, although sovereign nation-states are the main 
building blocs of both global and regional organization, it is often more efficient and 
effective for a global institution, such as the UN, to delegate its authority with respect to 
a specific region to organizations in that region, especially in the case of security and 
peacekeeping activities (Durward, 2006). It also appears that states in general favor 
multilayered structures of international cooperation, moving up the ladder from state to 
regional and global levels. Thus, regionalism also plays an intermediate role between 
global governance and state government (Thakur and Langenhove, 2006). Particularly, 
the EU is a pioneer regional integration model. It is also a strong advocate of a rule-
based multilateral world, including nation-states and regional blocs (Grevi and 
Vasconcelos, 2008). 
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Along with the proliferation of regional integration structures, there has also 
been a gradual emergence of inter-regionalism. Starting from the beginning of the 20th 
century, we have been witnessing a transition from the classical Westphalian world 
order based on the nation-state to a world order where regions and their organizations 
are playing an increasingly important role as players in international relations 
(Langenhove, 2004). The EU has been leading on this front, beginning with its inter-
regional cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the 
1980s. Today, the EU has a wide inter-regional cooperation network that includes, 
among others, Africa, Asia and the League of Arab States (LAS). Other regional 
organization are following suit, with the AU establishing a no less pervasive inter-
regional cooperation network that involves African sub-regions as well as different 
external organizations. Although most inter-regional cooperation structures focus on 
economic, social and cultural exchanges, they also, though to a lesser extent, cover 
coordination in foreign policy, international security and other fields.              
 
IV. The State of the Global Economy 
 It is still incumbent to deal with the specifics of the global economy to come to 
grips with their state of play. Accordingly, this section will start with a short historical 
background of the global economic order before moving onto the state of the 
foundations of the global economy. Afterwards, it will examine the current state of three 
main pillars: global finance, global development and international trade. Throughout, 
the pros and cons of the global economic order and its institutions as well as the impact 
of the current international economic crisis will be integrated into the analysis.  
 
A. Short History 
 The Industrial Revolution in England from the mid 18th to the mid 19th century 
marked the move from agrarian economies and handicraft fabrication to large scale 
industrialization and economies of scale. From England, the revolution spread to Europe 
and the rest of the world. Afterwards, the record of world economic growth could be 
divided into three main stages (Sachs, 2008). At the beginning, world economic growth 
was marked with divergence, as there were increasing gaps in production and income 
between the North Atlantic countries and the rest of the world. Major factors behind the 
lead of the North included early industrialization and market development, extensive 
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coal deposits and large pools of natural resources mostly coming from colonies in the 
South. Almost until World War I, Western economies were on the rise and the rest of 
the world was falling behind. Later on, the stage from World War I to the aftermath of 
World War II witnessed a general trend of convergence among different parts of the 
world. Notably, the two World Wars with the intervening Great Depression had 
disastrous effects on European economies, while the USA came out as a world-class 
powerhouse. This in turn contributed to the decolonization movement, which dealt 
another blow to European empires. On the other side, the South was beginning to reap 
the benefits of education, science and technology and improved infrastructure and 
economic development policies, which the North had a vital role in introducing as part 
of colonial policies. Ultimately, the current stage of evolution extends from the 
aftermath of World War II until today and it is also marked with convergence, including 
between the North and the South, the West and the East. An outstanding example of this 
stage is the fast rise of Japan and, in its footsteps, Southeast Asia through the flying 
geese model. More recently, China, India, Brazil and Mexico joined the convergence 
trend with the launching of rapid market-based growth. Currently, the North is giving 
way to economies in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East in terms of shares in 
global income. This trend is expected to continue in the foreseeable future and perhaps 
to lead to deep reconfiguration in the distribution of economic power in the world.                  
 
B. The State of the Foundations of the Global Economy 
There is an overwhelming majority of voices that argue that globalization is the 
best recipe the world has developed and that retreating from it could lead to more 
disadvantages than what is already here (Sachs, 2003). Rightly, free-market policies 
have brought some benefits for the world. And, although falling short of the promised 
0.7% of gross national income (GNI), official development assistance (ODA) has been 
benefiting millions of needy populations in the South (Hoeven, 2000). Ironically, to the 
developed north, globalization equals triumphant capitalism on the American style, i.e. 
a straight jacket that developing countries must accept, if they are to join the club 
(Stiglitz, 2002). In contrast, globalization has become controversial lately and general 
perceptions about it have turned increasingly negative. For many in the developing 
world, it has failed to bring about the promised benefits. Especially, the big masses of 
the unemployed and angry young people in the South pose serious challenges to 
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stability throughout the world. Hence, there have been more and louder calls to rethink 
globalization over. At the same time, there have been concerns as to the sustainability of 
the current wave of globalization and whether it would lead to a breakdown of the 
remaining order in the system or, more plausibly, the birth of a new system that can 
effectively administer the mighty forces of globalization (Ikenberry, 2000).  
Obviously, the West looks determined to keep globalization on track, even in the 
midst of the current crisis. Nonetheless, there has been a lot controversy about the 
demise of globalization and whether it remains in force after the attacks of September 
11 and the war on Iraq (Held, 2007). In this regard, it is sometimes argued that 
globalization is irreversible, while history proves that it is in fact reversible. Even more, 
the history of the world economy is in essence the history of the ends of periods of 
globalization (Streeten, 2001). All previous globalization epochs came to an end in a 
more or less abrupt manner and this can be traced by looking at the history of 
international trade, international finance and the evolution of international economic 
institutions (Rothschild, 1999). To give but one example, after reaching a peak by the 
early 20th century, the world withdrew from international economic integration in the 
interwar period and until after World War II. Thus, being unprecedentedly integrated 
today is no reason why the possibility of reverse should be excluded. And even if 
globalization is the best option available for today, its chaotic forces may deal it a self-
defeating blow earlier than some can expect. In 1798, Thomas Malthus wrote: “the 
laboring poor, to use a vulgar expression, seem always to live from hand to mouth. 
Their present wants employ their whole attention and they seldom think of the future.” 
In addition to the suffering poor, other anti-globalization and radical groups are 
proliferating, including global socialists, radical environmentalists, anarchists and neo-
communists, which is further galvanizing the threat to globalization.   
In any case, it is evident that capitalism is facing retreat, especially after the 
outbreak of the last international financial crisis in 1997. This crisis is clear evidence 
that the forces of economic globalization have run out of control and have come to pose 
insurmountable challenges to nation-states and international institutions. In fact, the 
overall political foundations of economic liberalism have significantly weakened over 
the last decade, as the growth of international trade and capital movements has exposed 
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the inadequacy of international economic institutions (Gilpin, 2000). And although 
reform has long been on the agendas of the Bretton Woods institutions as well as the 
WTO more recently, including calls for a new Bretton Woods, even basic reform has 
been facing hurdles, due to lack of political will. In addition, there has been a two-tier 
catch-up dynamic that has been redistributing power in the international economic 
order, one within the North and the other drawing the South increasingly closer to the 
North. Notably, the last international economic crisis has further accelerated this power 
shift. In particular, the USA’s economy has been shocked violently by the crisis and the 
USA had to stand the brunt of the blame for the crisis, which has significantly damaged 
the USA’s superpower status. As a result, and as the USA finds itself forced to focus 
inwards, lack of leadership behind economic globalization poses threats of potential 
relapse into the vicious circles of the past, including chronic turbulences in financial 
markets, trade protectionism, economic nationalism and unproductive regional blocs. 
And this could even further escalate into social strife and political instability (Gilpin, 
2000).  
The role of the USA’s dollar as an international reserve and transaction currency 
has been vital for the stability of the international economy (Stiglitz, 2009). It has also 
bestowed special privileges on the USA, including the right to print extra dollars at will, 
i.e. the right of “seigniorage.” No doubt, the status of the USA’s dollar is a national 
security issue for the USA (Bergsten, 2009). However, the leading role of the dollar has 
come under increasing pressure, as the USA has been running huge trade and current-
account deficits. In addition, the USA’s budget is currently operating at about USA $ 12 
trillion debt, while a country like China is hording the largest stash of foreign reserves 
in the world (the balance of foreign assets of the People's Bank of China rose to about 
USA $ 2.4 trillion in 2009) and has become the USA’s largest foreign creditor. Together 
with the distorting peg of the Chinese yuan and other key currencies to the USA’s 
dollar, this is feeding into worrying structural imbalances that are threatening the global 
economy. Notably, these imbalances are a source of great concern during the current 
international economic crisis, which in turn has further shaken the status of the dollar. 
Consequently, countries such as China, Russia, Brazil and some oil-producing countries 
are calling for the revision of the dollar’s position as the world’s leading currency. And, 
in practice, there has been a gradual withdrawal from the USA’s dollar toward other key 
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currencies, especially the euro, and this is increasingly evident in oil-pricing policies 
and the composition of national reserves of foreign assets (Eichengreen, 2009). 
 
C. Vulnerability to Crises 
 The world economy is bubble-prone and vulnerable to crises. Even worse, the 
question is more precisely about time, not whether or not a crisis will hit, and 
economists have become under increasing criticism for failing to steer the path out of 
recurrent crises. In fact, the global economy has taken a course parting with the 
prescriptions of John Maynard Keynes, the prominent economist who co-engineered the 
establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions. Crisis after crisis only reveals the 
sightedness and wisdom of Keynes who advocated governments taking a dominant role 
in financial markets. In contrast, the efficient-market hypothesis, based on the 
presumptions that market forces are the most rational and reliable determinants of value 
and that markets are inherently invested with the power to correct themselves, has 
proved to be flawed. Unfortunately, this and other neo-classical concepts have been 
shaping the configuration of the global economy (Makin, 2009). Even in the midst of 
the current Great-Depression like crisis, one could still see some strong advocacy of 
these concepts in parallel with strong resistance to introducing new regulations of 
international financial markets.  
Although financial globalization is relatively recent, it went too far too fast 
(Tobin, 2000). Today, this is the most integrated sector of the global economy. By 
nature, capital is the factor of production most mobile and volatile. And capital 
movements across borders have been a force of integration at times of stability, of 
disintegration at times of crisis and a source of concern for governments all through. 
However, more recently, the technological revolution opened the way for sweeping 
capital movements across borders at a click of a button. Consequently, in 2008, the 
amount of outstanding international debt securities reached over USA $ 22,731 billion, 
the level of world stock market capitalization exceeded USA $ 33,513 billion and the 
total amount of national foreign reserves skyrocketed to USA $ 6,787 billion (IMF, 
2009). Naturally, the huge figures of these indicators contribute to the magnification and 
accentuation of the risks associated with the mobility and volatility of capital. In 
addition, they challenge governments and international institutions and aggravate the 
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calculations of potential crises. Notwithstanding, international institutions demand 
developing countries to follow the path of financial liberalization, on the basis that 
financial openness would help fund development programs through capital inflows. 
Hence, these countries have become more than ever vulnerable to the risks associated 
with the volatility of cross-border, short-term capital flows and foreign-exchange 
speculation. The infancy of their financial architectures and their relative lack of 
resources render developing countries more vulnerable to financial crises than 
developed countries (Knight, 1999). As for developed countries, one very important 
lesson from the current crisis is that vulnerability does not only stem from trading 
activities in international financial hubs, but can also hit these very hubs at the core.    
The record of international finance is awash with crises, especially after the 
collapse of the gold standard in 1971. However, the sovereign debt crisis of developing 
countries in the 1980s and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 were unparalleled in 
nature and magnitude. The sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s hit developing countries in 
Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa. It derived from several factors, including the 
global recession that prevailed at the time, the implications of untoward import-
substitution models of economy, as well as the trickle-down effects of the oil boom 
since 1973-1974. Altogether, these factors led to a credit crunch and sovereign debt 
defaults that commenced by hitting Mexico in 1982. Notably, the crisis was accentuated 
by the increased level of interdependence in international financial markets, taking into 
consideration that Eurodollars coming from the Middle East, invested in stock markets 
in the USA and Europe and then used to finance loans to Latin American and other 
developing countries were a major factor behind the crisis. It was so grave that it caused 
massive social strife and political instability, especially in Latin America and Africa. In 
the aftermath, the IMF dismissed import-substitution models as villain and most 
countries in the hit region and beyond rushed to replace them with export-oriented 
industrialization models.    
In turn, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 caught East and Southeast Asia 
in a cascade of unwinding external deficits and currency collapses that were mixed with 
deep economic crises and political upheavals. Early signs of recovery started about two 
years later, but the crisis had so grave implications that it is still in active memory today. 
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Shaken by the crisis, the world launched efforts to review the international financial 
architecture. Consequently, there was some limited restructuring of international 
sovereign bonds and the IMF introduced a few new lending facilities tailored to help 
economies facing crises arising from sudden fluctuations in capital flows (Narine, 
2008). However, international efforts fell short on two main fronts. First, IMF help was 
not sufficient and was tied to stringent conditionalities, which later on led some 
countries to announcing that they would never seek IMF support again. As a result, the 
implications of the crisis gave birth to suggestions related to helping emerging 
economies reduce their vulnerability by building up large reserves of foreign assets. 
Nonetheless, today, these reserves cause worrisome international economic imbalances. 
Secondly, as usual, the role of the IMF in the crisis was defined more by decisions taken 
by key countries during time of crisis, rather than by well-thought moves taken by all 
concerned parties toward an adequate reform of the international financial architecture 
(Sester, 2009). In other words, the international community tackled the crisis using the 
same old tactic of emergency measures and palliatives.   
Most recently, the world economy has been hit by a Great-Depression like crisis 
that was triggered in the USA in 2007, as a downturn in USA’s home prices led to large 
losses for banks and broker-dealers in the so-called housing bubble. Some of the main 
factors behind the build-up of that bubble included lack of regulation and surveillance, 
circumventing regulations through financial inventiveness, sub-prime high-risk lending, 
exaggerated leveraging in financial institutions and the easy credit conditions that 
prevailed before the crisis. In 2008, the crisis seeped to other market clusters and the 
USA’s stock market collapsed. Within three days in September 2008, three USA’s 
financial icons fell apart: Lehman Brothers, the financial giant, filed for bankruptcy, 
while the mega-insurance firm, American Insurance Group (AIG), was taken over by 
the USA’s government and Merrill Lynch, another financial icon, was absorbed by 
Bank of America, in a deal induced by the USA’s government. From that moment on, 
the contagion of the crisis spread at unanticipated speed to other financial markets 
throughout the world and it especially hit those markets having strong linkages with the 
USA’s market. As a result, panic hovered above the world economy, credit withdrew 
from circulation and the world gradually plummeted into a recession unprecedented 
since the Great Depression. In response, governments throughout the world, especially 
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those emerging economies that went by the book of financial liberalization and were 
booming until the crisis, directed severe criticisms at the USA. In addition, there 
emerged a rush toward putting in place stimulus packages to boost economic activity. 
However, one major problem with these packages is that they increase budget deficits, 
hence implying the need to either cut spending or raise taxes shortly afterward. Thus, 
the crisis and its subsequent ramifications have been confounding policymakers, 
entrepreneurs and the working class. It has also caused massive social strife and 
threatened fragile security in different parts of the world. 
The crisis also gave rise to calls for better regulation and surveillance of 
financial markets, and so it mandated increased coordination at the international level, 
without which new regulatory measures in one country could harm, or otherwise be 
preempted by, others. Hence, there has been improved international coordination, with 
the slightly expanded G-20 forum elevated to summit level and given the role usually 
played by the Group of Eight (G-8) as the main forum dealing with the global economy. 
One clear advantage of the G-20 is that it gets other important countries onboard, 
including the so-called Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). 
However, other countries from both the North and the South are pushing for further 
expansion to have places onboard. In addition, there have been voices of concern in the 
UN over the increasing marginalization of the organization, where the G-20 is rising to 
dominate the global economic scene. Moreover, there is no adequate mechanism for 
enforcing the decisions of the forum, which provides no guarantee that its efforts could 
make a significant difference. Furthermore, the G-20 has not this far confronted the root 
causes behind the crisis (Setser, 2009). Notably, there has been strong resistance to 
introducing new regulations, on the basis that the existing regulations are sufficient and 
only need to be better enforced. Hence, the largely unregulated institutions and financial 
instruments that sparked the crisis remain out of rein (Dieter, 2009). In sum, one could 
say that the G-20 succeeded in projecting a united front in facing the crisis, sending 
reassurance messages to the markets and controlling the damage. However, if the 
international community is serious about preventing future crises, there should be 
serious remedies for the main ailments of the international financial architecture, 
including the long-due reform of international financial institutions, global structural 
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imbalances, the problems posed by the too-big-to-fail institutions and distortive foreign-
exchange regimes.                              
 
D. The Haves and Have-Nots 
Globalization has been a source of disillusion, especially for those who advocate 
it as a force of improving standards of living and convergence between the rich and the 
poor. The forces of economic globalization work in such a chaotic manner that they 
create sharp divides between the haves and have-nots. Notwithstanding the rapid catch-
up of countries in the South with the North, there are many parts in the world where 
poverty is in fact increasing. This is true for countries as well as strata of societies 
within countries in the South and the North. However, the picture is particularly bleak in 
some regions, including sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and parts of the Andean and 
Central American highlands, as these parts seem to be revolving in vicious poverty 
circles. In addition, many other Latin American and Asian countries have experienced 
long periods of stagnation or decline in average living standards. Thus, at the time we 
see some countries making good use of globalization, others are suffering from it. For 
instance, the miraculous success story of China, which has achieved an average growth 
rate of around 9% a year over the last three decades, stands in sharp contrast to the 
decline in average living standards in most sub-Saharan African countries since the 
early 1980s. Despite the promises made by international economic institutions and 
countries at the vanguard of global capitalism, standards of living in the South have 
deteriorated in relative, and in some cases absolute, terms. Over the last decade of the 
20th century, the number of people living in poverty has increased by almost 100 million 
and this occurred while total world income increased by an average of 2.5% a year 
(Stiglitz, 2002). Today, it is estimated that around 1.5 billion person live under the 
poverty line of USA $ 1.25 a day (UN, 2009). This inequality is threatening the 
sustainability of the global economic system, as it is lacerating social fabrics, sowing 
sources of grudge and threatening political stability.  
As for hunger, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates the 
number of people suffering from hunger to be around one billion, i.e. one in every six 
human-beings, of which some 200 million are children. Starting in 2007, a mix of 
factors, including hikes in oil prices, falling USA’s dollar, market speculation, climate 
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change and some types of bio-fuels, has produced a world hunger crisis, as it led to an 
alarming lack of food with an unwarranted increase in its prices. As a result, developing 
countries found themselves in a precarious situation, and demonstrations against hunger 
swept throughout the world. Particularly, the situation in drought and conflict-stricken 
countries, most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa, is most worrying. For instance, 
FAO estimates the numbers of people suffering from extreme hunger in Ethiopia at 
around 20 million, four millions in the Sudan and 3.6 million in Somalia. The 2009 G-8 
Summit in Italy pledged USA $ 20 billion for combating hunger over three years, but 
this falls too short of the funding needed to feed the hungry, which FAO estimates at 
USA $ 44 billion per year (FAO, 2009a). Moreover, the World Summit on Food 
Security in Rome in November 2009 was ignored by most of the leaders of world’s 
richest countries and the meeting failed to agree on precise funding commitments or 
action objectives to stop this human farce (FAO, 2009b).        
The UN Millennium Summit in 2000 endorsed the eight so-called MDGs. It is 
noteworthy to indicate that these goals had previously been projected by different 
international organizations and agencies and that the UN Millennium Declaration only 
compiled them in one document and renovated and elevated the commitment to achieve 
them as one holistic package by 2015. Although there has been some progress toward 
achieving some of the eight goals, especially those less demanding, this still falls short 
of the required progress to meet the 2015 deadline. Furthermore, performance in some 
regions and with regard to some goals reversed, as in the case of the rise of people in 
developing countries living in hunger from 16% in 2006 to 17% in 2008 (UN, 2009). In 
parallel, although there has been some progress on scaling ODA up to achieve the UN 
target of 0.7% of GNI, its level in 2008 was 0.3% only, i.e. less than half the target. In 
addition, provided that ODA targets are sometimes set in percentage of GNI, the current 
global recession translates into net decreases in ODA outflows from some countries. 
This could lead to negative effects on development efforts, especially in least developed 
countries that seem to live hand to mouth. Even more worrisome, the economic crisis 
threatens of reversing the progress achieved this far, due to its adverse effects on 
economic growth, poverty eradication, employment creation, trade and investment.            
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The sense of deprivation is not limited to the means to steer a decent life. Rather, 
the world is also divided along technological lines to haves and have-nots, and this 
division is likely to have an ever increasing impact on growth in the foreseeable future. 
In fact, globalization does not imply universality, as large numbers of people in 
different parts of the world continue to lack knowledge and even access to computers or 
telephones. At the level of nation-states, the World Bank's World Development Report 
(2010) lists only 40 countries in its statistics on innovation, research and development, 
because of lack of national statistics in other countries. In addition, this list is mostly 
dominated by countries from the North, with only seven countries from the South 
lagging at the bottom. By itself, this is an indication of the gravity of the technological 
divide. Furthermore, statistics show that the bulk of world investment in research and 
development (R&D) is dominated by a relatively limited number of countries and 
TNCs. Knowing that innovation bears increasing returns to scale, advanced-technology 
owners are better placed to innovate further, because they have the required 
infrastructure and means. In contrast, technology laggards seem to be caught in poverty 
and disease traps.  
 
E. The State of World Trade 
World trade has by far been the most successful example of global economic 
governance, thanks to the basic principles of the most favored nation and 
nondiscrimination (Birkbeck and Melendez-Ortiz, 2009). Since 1947, the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), and the WTO as of 1995, has markedly 
contributed to the growth of international trade and its regulation. Unfortunately, 
progress toward concluding the Doha Round of trade negotiations still eludes member 
states. In addition, the recent global recession has significantly slowed the growth of 
international trade. According to WTO estimates, world exports were expected to shrink 
by 9% in 2009, mainly because of decline in global economic activity by 1%, which 
would be the largest such decline since World War II. In effect, lack of progress in the 
Doha Round and the current global recession act as double jeopardy factors that risk of 
a collapse in world trade. In contrast, on the positive side, the size of world exports 
continued to rise in 2008 to USA $ 15.8 trillion in commodities and USA $ 3.7 trillion 
in services, numbers that were until the recent past unimaginable (WTO, 2009). In 
addition, there are some signs that the world economy may already be on a recovery 
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slope. No doubt, a breakthrough in the Doha Round can significantly contribute to these 
early positive signs.   
In particular, the WTO dispute settlement body (DSB) is a pioneering model of 
effective multilateral cooperation and rule-based global governance. Although 
developing countries continue to face capacity constraints in resorting to the body, they 
are reported to be parties to about 80% of all cases this far (Dadush, 2009). There has 
also been an increasing resort to the body by emerging economies over the period 1995-
2009 (refer to Chart 1 below). In essence, the DSB provides a role model of how to 
protect the weak. Thus, the frequency and intensity of trade disputes have been on the 
rise. However, its judgments are time-consuming and strictly law-based, which does not 
often lead to conciliatory conclusions. As a result, judgments could leave dismay, which 
would in turn lead to vicious circles of retaliatory measures. Notably, there have been 
intensifying trade confrontations involving old and emerging world powerhouses such 
as the USA, EU, Japan, China, India and Brazil. In addition, predatory and retaliatory 
trade policies have been sowing further like policies, which have had negative 
implications on the efforts to further consolidate the international trading system. And 
this precarious state of affairs has been further exacerbated by the implications of the 
current international economic crisis, especially as more and more countries are giving 
in to protectionist pressures. 
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Chart (1) 
World Trade Organization Disputes 
        In 15 years since its birth on January 1995, 401 trade disputes—over matters ranging from export curbs on 
minerals to restrictions on the import of seal products—have been brought to the WTO’s DSB. The bulk of these 
cases has been brought by a few litigious members. The USA and the EU have lodged 176 cases since the WTO 
came into existence, and they are also the most frequently complained against. Rich countries were the most active 
users of the DSB in the first five years of its existence, filing more than three quarters of all the complaints. But, in 
the last 10 years, that share has fallen to just over half, as big emerging economies have become more active trade 
litigators. 
 
Source: www.economist.com  
  
In this regard, there have also been some questions as to the fairness of the 
international trading system. The bargaining balance in trade negotiations is obviously 
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tilted toward the powerful countries, and these countries can easily exploit the process 
and prevail over the weak countries (Cho, 2007). And although the increasing power of 
developing countries over the recent past has served the interests of the weak, this has 
not so often helped the interests of the overall system. The counterbalance of developing 
countries fuels disagreements and has come up as one of the main forces behind 
repetitive derailments of the Doha Round. Moreover, the process is subject to hijacking 
by domestic pressure groups, whose causes sometimes come at the expense of the 
public interest. For instance, domestic pressure groups in different countries have been 
hindering progress toward compromise on agricultural subsidies and tariffs, an issue at 
the core of the current negotiations, although these subsidies and tariffs cause 
significant distortion to international trade and harm developing countries heavily. 
Furthermore, the agreement on trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) restricts 
the access of poor countries to medicine they need but cannot afford. Hence, at the time 
patents draw lucrative profits for their right-holders, the poor and sick in developing 
countries hardly receive some sympathy.  
Indeed, since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the 
WTO in 1995, the international trading system has failed to live up to the expectations. 
At some exceptional juncture in the aftermath of September 11 attacks, and after 
faltering for six years, the Doha Round with its Development Agenda was launched in 
2001 at the impetus of the developing countries’ need to address their developmental 
concerns. Ever since, ministerials after ministerials have failed to launch negotiations on 
the core issues of agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA), as member 
states even find problems closing their position gaps on the basic issue of modalities of 
negotiations. Leading developing countries also insist that the outcome of the Doha 
Round should be integrated in a single undertaking, in order to pressure developed 
countries on the need for progress on the tracks of agriculture and NAMA. 
Consequently, countries have been relying more on unilateral, bilateral and regional 
approaches to further their trade interests (Beth, 2006). No doubt, the whole world 
stands to lose from this inertia through the opportunity costs involved. However, in 
particular, it is estimated that the so-called development failure, i.e. the failure of the 
Doha Development Agenda, costs developing countries around USA $ 100 billion 
annually (Cho, 2007). 
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Moreover, despite promises to the opposite, the current global economic crisis 
has led to a wave of new protectionism. Some 78 protectionist measures have been 
proposed or implemented by both developed and developing countries since the 
inception of the crisis, the most famous of which is the “Buy American” provisions in 
the USA’s stimulus package (World Bank, 2009b). In this regard, it appears that while 
developing countries tend to erect new barriers in the face of foreign imports, developed 
countries lean more toward introducing new subsidies to their products. Although most 
of these measures are likely to comply with WTO rules, they are still a reason of 
concern for the international community. In a worst-case scenario, protectionist and 
beggar-thy-neighbor measures could build up to force a withdrawal from global trade 
integration. In addition, such measures might lead to a relapse of fragmentation in the 
international economy, similar to that of the inter-war period.     
 
V. The Challenges of the Global Environment 
 The global environment is perhaps one of the most pressing challenges facing 
the international community today. Clearly, it is very high on the agenda of 
international relations. However, one main distinctive feature of environmental 
challenges is that their impacts are usually mooted into future uncertainties and 
controversies. Unfortunately, these challenges have recently been passing the scientific 
credibility threshold to pose increasing present and sensible dangers such as global 
warming, tsunamis and famines. In parallel, environmental issues have transcended the 
technical and domestic spheres to become highly politicized and internationalized. 
Along these lines, this section will provide a concise review of the challenges of the 
global environment, with special focus on climate change. 
The increasing human population, now at 6.7 billion, producing around USA $ 
67 trillion in annual output and growing at around 3-5% annually, puts an increasing 
pressure on non-renewable environmental resources (Sachs, 2008). In fact, one 
important byproduct of economic growth has been the careless appropriation of limited 
environmental resources. Although technology is growing more environment-friendly, 
the current pace of resource exploitation is unsustainable if the world continues with 
business as usual. Unless there is some adequate technological shift toward 
environment-friendly production and consumption patterns and a commensurate 
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political action to halt, or at least slow, the depletion speed, planet earth will continue to 
seep out of control. And it will probably continue to surprise us with devastating 
reactions. To name just a few, over the last few years, the world was hard hit by 
environmental catastrophes such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Katrina 
hurricane, the 2010 volcano of Iceland and the 2011 tsunami in Japan.    
Understandably, the environment plays a pivotal role in the so-called triangle of 
sustainable development, besides economic and social development. In 2002, the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg highlighted the linkages between 
these three axes. A sustainable environment is necessary for sustainable economic 
growth, poverty alleviation and development. And without economic growth, social 
wellbeing will continue to be out of reach. Thus, it becomes clear that the wellbeing of 
the world is environment-dependent. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of conflict 
between environmental concerns and economic interests. This unnecessary conflict has 
grown to become a paramount hurdle to environmental preservation in both the North 
and the South. In fact, although all humanity stands to lose from lack of progress toward 
better environmental management, a large and dominant swathe of opinion seems to 
favor short-term economic growth at any price, even at the expense of sustainable future 
economic growth.                             
In addition, there is a multiplicity of factors that transform the environmental 
challenge into a political and security one. Some of these factors include the fervent 
economic competition within the North, the catch-up momentum between the South and 
the North and the vicious poverty traps in the South. At the time rich and emerging 
countries have been reaching out for access to natural resources in relatively less 
developed regions, countries in these regions have been struggling to provide for their 
subsistence. For instance, there has been a scramble by China, the USA and Europe for 
larger shares in the highly unexploited natural-resource base in sub-Saharan Africa. In 
the meantime, African countries themselves are striving to come out of age. This mix of 
fierce competition and careless consumption of environmental resources, together with 
continuing social and political strife in some parts of the world could feed into a spiral 
of risks, including wars, pandemics, displacements, illegal migration and criminal 
activities. One might even say that the already fragile state of global security will, to a 
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great extent, depend on the understanding of the linkages between environmental 
challenges and global stability as well as the capacity to find appropriate technological 
and political solutions to face those challenges (Sachs, 2008). 
In fact, the record of multilateral cooperation on environmental issues boasts 
significant successes, including around 900 international agreements and strong 
expressions in dozens of major international forums. The first seminal moment of 
multilateral cooperation in this area was the 1972 UN Conference on Human 
Environment in Stockholm, which marked the evolution of environmental issues from 
tight national frameworks to international horizons. In addition, there are numerous 
other international forums that concluded specific agreements on environmental 
cooperation, including the 1987 Montreal conference that adopted the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. But, in particular, the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro was an outstanding 
seminal point for having ushered in the dynamic of transnational citizen activism with 
unprecedented participation in its proceedings by non-state actors.  
The 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm established the 
prime international governmental authority in charge of the global environment, the UN 
Environment Program (UNEP), to supervise the implementation of the 
recommendations of that as well as subsequent related conferences. Although the UNEP 
has been doing a good job, it continues to lack the clout of full-fledged 
intergovernmental organizations. Thus, there have been some moves lately toward 
upgrading the UNEP to an independent international organization, though these moves 
face strong resistance from several major countries in both the North and the South. In a 
related move, in 1991, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established as a joint 
venture of the UNEP, the UNDP and the World Bank, with the main objective of 
helping developing countries fulfill their commitments under different environmental 
agreements. This innovative new body has been playing a critical trail-blazing role in 
providing developing countries with needed technical assistance and helping raise 
funding for their environmental projects on a voluntary basis. However, some of the 
criticisms usually directed at the GEF include lack of transparency in decision-making 
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and the tendency of donor countries to monopolize the orientation of funding and to 
impose unproductive conditionalities (Winchester, 2009).     
Although the record of international cooperation on environmental issues is rich, 
governance of the global environment still falls short of expectations (Gupta, 2006). 
Even more, international cooperation in this field has plummeted over the last few 
years. And addressing issues related to the global environment through global legal 
instruments has become one of the most intractable tasks, as the interests at stake have 
grown bigger and the parties to the equations have increased. Examples of this reverse 
of direction include the continuing tug-of-war over climate change, conflicts over 
genetically modified food and the failure to act appropriately to halt deforestation in 
different parts of the world. Conspicuously, the global environment is a common good, 
in the sense that no single person or institution, private or public, has control over it. 
This, in turn, indicates that any contribution to preserving the environment is useful for 
all and any damage to it is harmful for all. On the national level, although national 
governments play leading roles in combating environmental threats, as the only 
sovereign sources of authority in world politics, they face restrictions and pressures that 
limit their freedom of movement. The balance between domestic pressure groups 
advocating environment-friendly policies and counteracting influential industry lobbies 
that resist such policies is not always conducive to positive change. In aggregate, the 
restrictions that different governments face on the domestic level sum up to conundrums 
on the international level.  
Of course, foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy, but national 
governments could not be absolved of the blame for lack of effective global 
environmental governance. For instance, the USA, though the world superpower, has 
failed to strike a good example for others, especially during the Bush administration. In 
fact, the Bush administration acted in general contempt of multilateralism at large over 
most of its two terms in office, including disregarding the 1997 Kyoto protocol on 
climate change in 2001. Some other countries share in the blame for taking stringent 
positions and failing to raise public awareness and to rally support for environmental 
objectives that serve the interests of all humanity. In contrast, the EU has risen as a 
major advocate of developing a rule-based world in general and as a torch carrier with 
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regard to the need to take immediate action to address environmental concerns in 
particular.  
Lately, faced with increasing internal and external difficulties standing in the 
way of concluding multilateral agreements on environmental issues, the international 
community has started relying more on hybrid approaches such as UN multi-partner 
conferences along the lines of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg (Winchester, 2009). Although this summit set out a detailed plan of action 
with multi-level supervisory machinery and has given space for several hundred 
voluntary initiatives, its outcome is not legally binding and lacks effective 
implementation mechanisms. Nonetheless, there seems to be growing global awareness 
of the imperative of environmental challenges. And public and private actors from 
around the world have been coming forward with new contributions toward preserving 
the global environment. These new trends and contributions are welcome, but it remains 
to be seen if they could lead up to a breakthrough on environmental challenges.   
 
Climate Change 
 Today, climate change is a kicking reality and threat, not an abstract scientific 
theory anymore. Emissions of green-house gases (GHGs), most importantly CO2 
methane and nitrous oxide, into the atmosphere has led to global warming, which in turn 
is being felt in more floods, droughts, storms and heat waves. If global emissions of 
GHGs continue at the current pace, scientists expect the temperature of planet earth to 
rise five Celsius degrees above its preindustrial level by end of century. This could lead 
to disastrous implications, including more unwieldy weather conditions, inundation of 
islands and coastal areas, transformations in ecosystems and the extinction of whole 
species. Henceforth, there seems to be an international consensus that the rise in earth’s 
temperature should not exceed 2 Celsius degrees, the worst acceptable threshold 
earmarked by scientists. But even achieving this target requires immediate efforts to 
reduce GHGs emissions and adapt to the resulting changes in the global environment. 
Although some vested interests, especially in the developing world, insist on 
rejecting any commitment to specific reductions in GHGs emissions, on the basis that 
such commitment would restrict their economic growth potential, the two are not 
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necessarily mutually exclusive. Instead, investing in new green development could 
create new opportunities for employment, poverty alleviation and growth. Statistically, 
while high-income countries have been responsible for 64% of cumulative GHGs 
emissions since 1850, developing countries account for 62% of emissions in 2005 
(World Bank, 2010). However, although developed countries are better prepared to face 
the challenges of climate change, given their technological and financial capabilities, 
these challenges remain global in nature and do not differentiate between north and 
south, rich and poor. Indeed, developed countries should help developing countries 
adapt to the challenges of climate change, at least from the viewpoint that no country 
can isolate itself from the goings in the rest of the world, especially in today’s 
globalized world.    
 Strongly related to the green-house effect, the first serious multilateral effort 
toward addressing problems related to the atmosphere was aimed at the thinning of the 
ozone layer, where the UNEP, in 1982, set up a non-political international forum to 
work toward concluding an international framework convention on protecting the ozone 
layer (a natural gas that protects life on earth from harmful ultraviolet radiation from the 
sun) from chlorofluorocarbons (chemical compounds used as propellants in aerosol 
cans, insulation, refrigerants and others). Although this forum succeeded in reaching an 
interim agreement in Vienna in 1985, European business lobbies objected to it, and a 
new effort was launched to conclude a separate protocol on reducing 
chlorofluorocarbons. Subsequently, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer was concluded in 1987 and was later on signed by 24 countries, 
including the major chlorofluorocarbon emitters, which guaranteed the reduction of 
50% from the emissions levels of 1986 (Winchester, 2009) .  
 In contrast to the relative success with regard to reducing the emissions of 
chlorofluorocarbons, the international community has been faltering in its quest for 
reducing GHGs that stand behind global warming. The 1992 UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change set the ground for international cooperation in this field, 
albeit without setting specific targets. The convention states as its ultimate objective 
“the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” As a first 
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concrete step, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol employed a cap-and-trade regime, which put 
specific ceilings for the emissions of developed countries by 2012 in comparison with 
their 1990 levels. It also introduced the so-called carbon trading regime, through which 
an actor can sell carbon credits to another, so that ceilings of emissions could still be 
met by all actors at the end. Although a vast majority of states are parties to the 
aforementioned UN Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, the USA, the 
world superpower and second biggest emitter of GHGs, disregarded that protocol in 
2001. In addition, other countries have shown tendencies to act in ways that they 
perceive protect their own best interests, even when this comes at odds with the need to 
halt global warming (Winchester, 2009). While less developed countries refuse to 
commit to emission reductions that would curtail their growth potential, and oil-
producing countries reject any moves that could lead to falls in demand for oil, 
countries most vulnerable to the risks of rising sea levels demand strong and immediate 
action.   
 At the time the Kyoto Protocol is nearing its time threshold of 2012, there has 
been a concentration of efforts behind the 15th annual Conference of Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen in December 2009. 
However, reaching a new binding agreement on restricting GHGs emissions beyond 
2012 has been utterly excluded in Copenhagen, and there seems to be a common 
understanding that efforts should be now refocused on realizing such an agreement. 
Still, reaching such an agreement by next year seems vanishingly small, given the 
complications of the USA’s internal position (Levi, 2009). Other contentious issues 
include developing countries' rejection to any specific commitment as to the reduction 
of GHGs emissions and these countries' demands for specific developed countries’ 
commitments in financial and technical assistance to the former adapt to the challenges 
of climate change. Noticeably, there has been some progress toward reducing GHGs 
emissions in different other forums, including the G-20 and the Major Economies 
Forum (MEF), in addition to agreements and voluntary initiatives to this effect at 
international, bilateral and national levels. However, the premature failure in 
Copenhagen caused a great deal of disappointment throughout the globe. Although there 
is a good record of international cooperation with respect to environmental issues, and 
notwithstanding the existence of a strong case for more and continued cooperation on 
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climate change, the potential of achieving a breakthrough in this field looks remote. 
This could lead to unexpected consequences, especially that there is an emerging 
scientific and political consensus that emissions of GHGs should be cut by half from its 
1990 levels by 2050 in order to safe planet earth.  
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Abstract 
 
 Power shifts among states, within the North as well as between the North and 
the South, is the master phenomenon of world politics today. It seems that the old East-
West dichotomy of the Cold War is now giving way to a growing North-South 
dichotomy, with emerging Southern powers shaking the international power balance. 
Consequently, multilateral institutions are growing illegitimate and ineffective because 
their structures and rules do not reflect real power distribution. Power is also diffusing 
away from nation-states to rising new actors in the international system, including civil 
society, private sector and infra-state and sub-state actors. These new actors are 
continuously challenging nation-states and the state-centered world order and seeking 
bigger stakes in that order. At the same time, global connectivity and interdependence 
have reached unprecedented heights. And globalization has been outdoing global 
governance on all fronts. As a result, globalization has entered a turbulent stage, with 
threats to international security and wellbeing growing rapidly and risks proliferating 
across borders. In addition, anti-globalization and new nationalistic discourses are 
increasing. To address these challenges, power shifts between states need to be managed 
carefully in the short as well as long runs to make sure that their implications are 
smoothed out and that emerging powers are accommodated. The multiplication of actors 
in the international system should also be addressed holistically, so as to capitalize on 
its opportunities and overcome its difficulties. Perhaps even more importantly, the 
world needs a shift in the quality and quantity of multilateral cooperation, with the 
prime objective of readjusting and safeguarding the direction of globalization.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Imperatives of Change 
65
 
Chapter Two 
Imperatives of Change 
  
It is clear from the previous chapter that the international multilateral system is 
facing acute problems that require appropriate reforms. However, one also needs to be 
clear on the exact causes of the current crisis of multilateralism, so as not to confuse the 
symptoms with the real ailments. In other words, it is of essential importance to be clear 
on the imperatives of needed change in the multilateral system. Accordingly, this 
chapter addresses the main imperatives of change in three substantive clusters: shifts in 
conventional state powers inside the West and between the North and the South, the 
proliferation of actors in the international system with non-state actors playing 
increasingly influential roles, the complexity of current global challenges that both 
transcend and penetrate conventional state boundaries and defy the premises of the 
current international system, which results in lack of world public goods such as order, 
security, natural resources, food and other basic human needs.  
 
I. Power Shifts: The Dynamics of State Power Politics 
 To start, one should preferably lay down a clear understanding of the notion of 
power. It could simply be defined as the ability to realize desired results (Nye, 2002). It 
derives from such sources as population, land, natural resources, economic means, 
technology, civilization and culture. Generally, sources of power could be grouped in 
three main clusters: military, economic and cultural or ideological. Military power is 
purely hard, as it involves using force to coerce others to do as desired. Although there 
is no consensus on one classification of economic power, with some seeing it as hard 
and others seeing it as soft, it is perhaps more accurate to say that it has both hard and 
soft aspects. It is hard when employed in the form of sanctions or as a stick in 
negotiations. And it is soft from the perspective of aspiration to wellbeing and 
prosperity. Cultural or ideological power, such as the power of example, role models, 
values and style of life, is soft in nature, in the sense that they attract rather than coerce 
others. In the current age of globalization and information revolution, soft power, the 
power of attraction and the ability to shape others' preferences, play an increasing role 
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in the power mix of any nation. Military and economic capabilities are no longer the 
determining factors they used in the past.     
 For the multilateral system to be effective, it should reflect the underlying 
distribution of power among its members. Historically, the current system was 
consolidated in the aftermath of World War II. The winners designed it according to 
their interests, with the exclusion of the then called enemy states. Although there have 
been some later changes in the membership of multilateral institutions, the underlying 
power formula remains flawed. This is most obvious in the composition of the UN 
Security Council as it stands today. As has been demonstrated in Chapter One, power 
politics during the Cold War stood in the way of more and better multilateral 
cooperation. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the system witnessed some signs of 
unsustainable progress and shortly fell victim anew to great power complacency. 
Recently, flaws in the distribution of power in the system have increasingly rendered it 
incapable of functioning properly. More specifically, the main dimensions of power 
imbalances in the current system relate to shifts in the USA’s power, power shifts inside 
the conventionally powerful North and the rise of new powers in the South. This section 
will attempt to analyze those three dimensions while keeping focus on the relationship 
between relative power distribution and the performance of the multilateral system. 
 
A. The United States of America 
 The twentieth century was largely an American century. The world enjoyed an 
epoch of relative peace under Pax Americana, which took the lead from a correlated Pax 
Britannica. Starting from the interval of World Wars I and II, the USA had been rising 
as a world powerhouse replacing the UK in the leading power seat. By the end of World 
War II, the USA had become a world superpower in acrimonious confrontation with 
another superpower, the USSR. With the fall of Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold 
War, the USA has become the world sole superpower, a global power posture without 
analogy since the old Roman Empire held unchallenged sway throughout the world. 
Thus, the USA has come to be named the colossus, empire and hegemon of the day. 
Indeed, the USA’s primacy is pervasive in all aspects of life, be it military, political, 
economic, technological or ideological. It has been at the helm of globalization, steering 
the path, leading the way and sometimes even dictating the rules. In response, many 
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observers have spoken of new American imperialism, as globalization simply appears to 
be a disguise for Americanization (Kissinger, 2001). For instance, during the USA’s 
Clinton administration, USA’s power was very obvious, due in part to a short-lived bout 
of assertive multilateralism. Concurrently, the USA also came under criticism of 
arrogance, as Hubert Vedrine, Former French Foreign Minister, spoke of USA’s 
“hyperpower,” indicating too much reliance on power.       
 The Tragedy of September 11, 2001, caused a great shock to the USA’s 
conscience, especially that the attacks came at the time the USA was at the apex of 
power, with a great sense of exclusion and security. Before the attacks, Americans could 
not be more disinterested in USA’s foreign policy or the world beyond their borders. 
There was a significant deal of complacency, and many Americans thought their 
administration did not even need to listen to others (Nye, 2002). In the preceding 
decade, the USA acted in disdain of multilateral institutions in several cases, won the 
Second Gulf War easily, spearheaded the bombing of Serbia without suffering 
casualties, hindered progress on several international agreements at stake for the rest of 
the world, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Rome Statute, and reduced the flows of 
its foreign development assistance. After the attacks, the world at large showed 
sympathy toward the USA and a great majority of countries contributed to the 
subsequent war in Afghanistan. On the USA’s home front, the attacks have led to more 
sensitivity toward concerns of other nations and common global problems, especially 
those related to terrorism and security.  
 In 2003, the USA forced the war on Iraq on the pretext of a clandestine nuclear 
weaponry program, though it failed to secure a UN authorization, and in spite of the 
opposition of most of its European allies, Russia, China and the international 
community at large. The war appeared as an outright betrayal to the most fundamental 
pillars of the notion of collective security on which the current multilateral system is 
based (Thakur, 2005). It has also caused a grave rift inside the transatlantic alliance, 
which rift still has repercussions today (Kagan, 2008). Absent the unity of the 
transatlantic alliance, together with the lack of confidence on the side of most other 
actors, multilateral cooperation was hard hit. The war was further depicted as evidence 
that America and Europe are significantly different, with the famous metaphor that 
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Americans come from Mars, while Europeans descend from Venus, which indicates that 
Americans are mired in an anarchic Hobbesian world and are inclined to use force to 
achieve their objectives, while Europeans are entering the post-historical paradise of 
Kant’s perpetual peace and seek an international order based on law. From another 
perspective, America is strong and this is why it finds it better to act alone, while 
Europe is weak and this is why it clings to order (Kagan, 2003).  
 Although the war on Iraq had serious implications on the USA’s power, 
especially in its soft aspects, and the last economic crisis shook it violently, the USA 
remains the most powerful nation on earth both in terms of material and soft power and 
the aspiration to lead. In particular, it is in the military and security domain that the 
USA’s power is most evident. The USA is the only country with nuclear and 
conventional forces of global reach. Its defense budget in 2008 amounted to USA $ 607 
billion, compared to an aggregate European expenditure of around USA $ 354.4 billion 
and out of a world total of USA $ 1464 billion. USA’s expenditure has further increased 
in 2009 to USA $ 675 billion, due to additional outlays for the operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Sipri Yearbook, 2009). Practically, USA’s military might extends 
beyond its large financial base. The USA is rightly considered the master of modern 
warfare in air, naval and ground fields (Niblett, 2009). It also boasts a sophisticated web 
of intelligence agencies, which have been reinforced after the attacks of September 11. 
In addition, a wide network of bases, bilateral and regional security arrangements and 
military alliances provide the USA with quasi-global military dominance.  
Economic power is particularly essential for sustainable total power, for it is the 
mainstay of power (Kurth, 2009). On this front, the USA is in the lead as the biggest 
state economy on earth. However, it is facing competition from a number of other 
conventional and emerging powers, especially the EU and China (please refer to Table 1 
below). Using percentage comparisons, USA’s gross domestic product (GDP) comes 
second in the world with 20.3% after the EU total of 20.7%, while China comes third 
with 12.5% (USCIA World Factbook, 2010). In effect, the USA has been leading the 
world economy in industrial, financial and technological fields since the early 20th 
century. Although it has lost its competitive advantage in several conventional 
industries lately, it has managed to capture a large market share in high-technology 
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industries and service sectors. It even invents whole new industries and services, thanks 
to its strong R&D base. Notably, on the Global Competitiveness Index 2009-2010, the 
USA ranked second after Switzerland (Global Competitiveness Report, 2009-2010). 
However, although the USA enjoys a technological edge that puts it in a leading 
position, this is specifically where it is facing the most heated competition from several 
other Northern and Southern rivals. 
Before becoming the largest debtor state, with an external debt of USA $ 13.45 
trillion in 2009, the USA was a creditor during much of the twentieth century (Kurth, 
2009). The latest financial crisis notwithstanding, Wall Street remains the most 
important financial hub in the world, with gigantic corporations in fields such as 
banking, investment and insurance. In addition, USA’s TNCs and financial institutions 
continue to figure as leading and influential investors across the globe. Furthermore, 
since the inception of the Bretton Woods system, the USA has enjoyed the unique right 
of “seigniorage,” i.e. freedom to print extra dollars at will, as well as the ability to run 
huge current-account and budget deficits, thanks to the position of the USA’s dollar as 
the world's leading reserve currency. Today, it also holds the largest voting weights in 
the Bretton Woods institutions and is the biggest contributor to the UN budget. These 
wieldy economic tools guarantee special influence for the USA, whether bilaterally or 
multilaterally. In addition, the USA is demographically vibrant, in contrast to a 
demographically stalled Europe. Today, the percentage of people in the USA under 15 
is 20% and that of people above 65 is 13%, while these percentages in Europe are 15% 
and 17% respectively (USCIA World Factbook, 2010). It is estimated that by 2030, the 
USA’s population will grow by 65 million, while the population of Europe will remain 
virtually stagnant. This is in fact the secret weapon of the USA in the face of Europe 
(Zakaria, 2008). On the 2009 Human Development Index, the USA ranks 13 after 
France and Japan and before Germany. The USA is also rich in natural resources, as for 
example, it produces 10% of the world's crude oil (though this falls short of satisfying 
half of its domestic demand), possesses the largest coal reserves and figures as a major 
producer of food and agricultural products (Niblett, 2009).  
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Table (1) 
Selection of State Power Indicators 
 US EU China India Brazil Russia Japan 
World 
Total 
Territory (thousand 
km²) 
9,827 4,324 9,597 3,287 8,515 17,098 378 510,072 
Population (millions 
– 2009) 
307 492 1,339 1,157 199 140 127 6,790 
Nuclear Warheads 
(deployed - 2009) 
2,702 460 186 60-70 0 4,834 0 8,392 
Military Expenditure 
(billion USA $ - 
2008) 
607 354.4* 84.9 30 23.3 58.6 46.3 1464 
Military Personnel 
(thousands – 2003) 
1,496 2,275 2,241 1,205 288 863 236 - 
GDP (billion USA $ 
- PPP - 2009) 
14.26 14.51 8.791 3.561 2.024 2.117 4.141 70.24 
GDP per Capita  
(USA $ - PPP - 
2009) 
46,400 32,700 6,500 3,100 10,200 15,200 32,600 10,500 
* This figure refers to all European military expenditure excluding that of Russia. 
Source: USCIA World Factbook, 2010, Sipri Yearbook, 2009 and Sipri Databases, 
2009.  
 
Less tangible but perhaps more important is the USA’s soft power or the 
attractiveness of the values that the USA stands for, especially with respect to liberal 
democracy, free markets and its open society. It is true that the two most dominant 
paradigms of globalization, i.e. democracy and capitalism, find their roots in the old 
British Empire, but today the USA is the main driving force behind their continuity and 
prevalence. Recent moves toward further economic liberalization and democratization 
across the world have further bolstered the USA’s soft power. In addition, American 
and Western cultures, based on individualism and personal freedoms, have global reach 
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and attractiveness thanks to the machinery of modern mass media and 
telecommunications. In the current information age, this kind of power is becoming 
increasingly important. In effect, it is an effective, indirect way to exercise power 
through shaping the preferences of others to get them to want what you want, which 
minimizes resistance and reduces the cost of leadership (Nye, 2002). Even with USA’s 
politics coming in the way at times, the attractiveness of the American model of life is 
still an important asset for the USA’s global reach and influence.  
After briefly elaborating on the main sources of the USA’s power, one comes to 
the most vivid question of whether this power is in decline and to what extent. Talk of 
decline has been a recurrent feature of USA’s politics since the 1950s, i.e. since the 
USA took full-fledged leadership in the international system (Zakaria, 2008). Almost 
every 10 years, it is decline time in the USA (Joffe, 2009). In the late 1950s, it was 
motivated by the Sputnik shock, when the USSR took the USA and the world by 
surprise after launching the first earth-orbiting artificial satellite of its kind. In the early 
1960s, it was the Cuban missile crisis and the ensuing confrontation that approached the 
verge of nuclear war. In the early 1970s, the decline talk was induced by the rise in oil 
prices and slow growth in the USA. In the same decade, Presidents Richard Nixon and 
Jimmy Carter invoked crises of confidence in USA’s supremacy by talking of the 
advent of a multipolar world order. In 1987, Paul Kennedy published his famous book 
"The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000," in which he predicted the downfall of USA’s power because of imperial 
overstretch and internal problems. At that time, Japan was thought to become the 
dominant superpower technologically and economically. In the 1990s, declinism took a 
pause, only to revive in full force in the first decade of the 21st century.  
Each of these predictions had its rationale, but none of them was vindicated. In 
fact, over the years, a number of writers and politicians tried to predict the rise and fall 
of powers, especially the current superpower, the USA. Some have even attempted to 
generalize on the basis of the experiences of historical powers such as Portugal, Spain, 
the Netherlands, France and Great Britain. However, most of these theoretical 
expectations were based on vague definitions and concluded with arbitrary judgments 
(Nye, 2002). In particular, they tend to subsume the notion of power into specific sets of 
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resources, while ignoring others that are no less important. All this notwithstanding, it 
seems different this time, as there is more support to the idea that we are approaching a 
new world order, taking in consideration the actual relative decline of the USA’s power, 
the actual relative rise of the rest and the perplexing implications of the current wave of 
globalization (Zakaria, 2008). Indeed, the USA seems to be in a historical low moment 
after the war on Iraq and the last global financial crash.  
 The war on Iraq proved to be a very costly war for the USA, militarily, 
economically and diplomatically (Haas, 2008). After a relatively easy invasion, the 
prolonged and bloody course of the war imposed a serious overstretch on the USA’s 
military capabilities. In addition to the damage caused by the invasion itself, the Abou 
Gharib scandal has been incalculably detrimental to the USA’s image. The USA did not 
only appear as a self-absorbed hegemon, but also and perhaps more seriously an 
incompetent self-absorbed hegemon (Kagan, 2008). Subsequently, in its first year in 
office, the Obama administration concluded a deal to withdraw USA’s forces from Iraq 
by 2011, though the transition in Iraq is not yet secure and the situation in its region 
remains volatile. Still, the USA finds itself in a critical situation today, because of lack 
of sufficient military resources to continue its security role and at the same time its need 
to reinforce its forces in Afghanistan, in a quest to achieve a crucial victory in the war 
on terrorism. Under these circumstances, the USA is ill-poised to assume any additional 
burdens in the framework of its global security umbrella, which makes its allies more 
vulnerable to unforeseen threats and casts doubts on the sustainability of USA’s global 
security role. On a related front, the war on Iraq also deprived the USA of much of the 
conventional support it used to receive from its Western allies, particularly from those 
in Europe such as France and Germany. In its own right, the war was an additional 
reason why Europe should seek an effective multilateral system, as opposed to a 
unipolar or multipolar world order (Vasconcelos, 2008). Indeed, the Iraqi episode 
delivered a severe blow to multilateralism, shook the faith in USA’s leadership and de-
legitimized the power of the USA in the eyes of the world (Thakur, 2005). 
 On the economic front, the 2008 financial crash in Wall Street was a unique 
historical event with far-reaching consequences. The uniqueness of the crash partially 
stems from its source, Wall Street, which makes it the first such incidence since World 
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War II. The crash had a devastating impact on financial markets in the USA and the 
world, and it led to a wider economic recession that is still haunting the world today. It 
was the world’s worst financial collapse since 1929 and has escalated into the worst 
economic slowdown since the Great Depression (Zakaria, 2008). Among others, the 
crash resulted in the largest bankruptcy in history by Lehman Brothers, the 
nationalization of the American Insurance Group (AIG), the acquisition of Merrill 
Lynch by Bank of America, partial nationalization of the European giant Fortis group 
before its ultimate acquisition by BNP Paribas, a revolt against investment banking, the 
loss of around USA $ 50 billion in world markets and bailouts and stimulus packages 
amounting to trillions of USA’s dollars. Paradoxically, the crash is largely attributed to 
success, rather failure, of markets, together with lack of effective regulation. However, 
besides the subsequent economic crisis, it delivered strong blows to the USA’s 
economy, the status of the USA’s dollar as the key international reserve currency, 
USA’s leadership of the free-market philosophy and indeed to this very philosophy. In 
sum, this crisis makes it clear that the economic competitiveness of the USA is in 
decline (Gelb, 2009).     
But even beyond the last financial crisis, USA’s global posture has been eroding 
over the last decade (Stewart, 2010). Economic and social dysfunctions in the USA are 
real, including those related to health care, social security, schools and tax reforms. 
Although reforms could correct most of these problems, internal politics often stand in 
the way. In fact, USA’s internal politics hinder progress toward addressing most of the 
challenges the USA faces internally and internationally (Gelb, 2009). Given its long 
history of bipartisanship, it is hard to reach internal consensus on such issues as climate 
change, multilateral cooperation and many other foreign policy issues. Other USA’s 
internal problems include the indifference of the general public to international affairs, 
leaving the foreign policy realm to a limited group of interested actors. Even after the 
shock of the attacks of September 11, USA’s public remains largely self-centric, which 
is an old American legacy (Nye, 2002). In fact, USA’s foreign policy is mostly 
determined according to two main parameters: ambivalence between power and values 
and domestic pressure groups (Kissinger, 2001).  
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With regard to the USA’s soft power, the war on Iraq, the revelations of 
wrongdoing by USA’s forces both in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the USA’s 
unilateral approach especially during the Bush administration have all drastically 
tarnished its image. It seems that the demons of ideology, internal politics and arrogance 
have disproportionate influence on governance and public debate about foreign policy 
in the USA (Gelb, 2009). In 2007, asked what the USA could do to help France under 
President Nicolas Sarkozy, one of the most openly declared friends of the USA, the 
French President replied “improve your image in the world.” Mr. Sarkozy further 
clarified that it is difficult when the country that is the most powerful is one of the most 
unpopular in the world. Indeed, polls of international public opinion show a steady 
decline in the approval of the USA in Europe and many other parts of the world 
(Vasconcelos, 2008). Rather, a true leader should lead by example, not go it alone. 
Lately, the USA’s Obama administration has made this challenge a high priority and has 
been undertaking efforts in all directions to address it. As a result, the USA has 
recuperated some of its lost credit, but the damage already done seems to go beyond 
President Obama’s worldwide personal appeal (Stewart, 2010).  
The above analysis does in fact show that the power of the USA is in relative 
decline. Today, the USA is not even close to holding the same overwhelming material 
and soft influence it had in the 1940s (Stewart, 2010). Recent global developments 
indicate that the USA was only living a unipolar illusion and that its global supremacy 
was grossly overestimated (Calleo, 2007). Lately, Americans themselves tend to speak 
more of a "unipolar moment" than a "unipolar era," which carries along a recognition 
that the world is indeed in transition. It is also clear that over the last few years, the 
USA has failed to assume its responsibilities on maintaining world order, which makes 
the demise of the current system impending (Mahbubani, 2005). The USA even turned 
its back on rules it was the main force behind, as in the case of the war on Iraq. Such 
unilateral acts create reactive resistance and could hasten the decline of the USA by 
inducing other powerful nations to attempt to balance against it (Talmadge, 2002). In a 
way, the status of USA’s power in the world today is analogous to that of empires in the 
past, but even empires eventually fall. And, throughout history, empires do not follow 
predictable life cycles. Instead, they usually collapse abruptly, albeit with some prior 
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signs, particularly monetary and fiscal. Today, the USA seems to be already on the edge 
of chaos, as there are already enough ominous signs about its future (Ferguson, 2010).      
Nevertheless, there are some, in the USA and the world at large, who deny the 
possibility of transition and express firm faith in the resilience of USA’s power (Gelb, 
2009). In fact, the supremacy of the USA is still significant, as it continues to figure as 
the most powerful nation in the world, and this is expected to be the case in the 
foreseeable future (Joffe, 2009). In addition, demand for USA’s leadership remains 
strong, as the world needs a competent leader to guarantee stability and guide the 
struggle against global challenges. Furthermore, the USA does not lack, but rather 
almost monopolizes, the aspiration to lead, albeit with some mixed signals coming from 
the EU and a nascent Chinese power projection. In fact, with the Obama administration, 
the USA is attempting to reposition itself in the global leadership seat. But, this time, it 
puts more stress on partnership than on the virtues of American power (Obama, 2009). 
In any case, and even if we agree with USA decline theories, the future of world order 
still depends on the USA and its actions more than anything else (Brooks, 2009).  
There is yet another group that tends to take a more careful approach toward 
global power shifts. The decline of the USA is more relative to others than absolute in 
nature (Zakaria, 2008). The USA’s position in the world today is not as bad as some 
claim, and predictions that other powers will joint forces to balance against the USA 
have proved inaccurate this far (Kagan, 2008). For instance, Chinese strategists tend to 
think that the current international configuration of power is likely to endure for some 
time. In particular, as long as potential challengers remain wary of each other and 
inspire concerns more than sympathy from their neighbors, the world order is expected 
to remain as it has been, with one superpower and several other great powers. The USA 
is expected to continue to grow in absolute power and to remain the world’s strongest 
and wealthiest nation, but it is expected to decline relative to others (Haas, 2008). 
Accordingly, optimistic voices in the USA argue that the USA can remain the most 
prominent – though not dominant – of several great powers (Kurth, 2009). In sum, it 
seems that the USA is about to become a first, not a super, power (Gelb, 2009). And the 
paradox of American power is that it is yet too great to be challenged by any other state, 
but not great enough to solve the problems it wants to solve alone (Nye, 2002).  
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In the midst of this analysis, one should take into consideration that the notion of 
power itself is subject to developments in the surrounding environment. Thus, to be 
accurate, the power of the USA today should be measured against an environment that 
is substantially different from what it was during the Cold War for example. Besides the 
rise of the rest, power diffusion and the complexity of current global challenges, which 
will be addressed in detail later on in this same Chapter, there are several other 
significant factors that affects power measurement, especially with regard to global 
security, politics, economics and technology. In the field of security, the weight of 
military power has significantly decreased, as its use as a foreign policy tool has largely 
subsided (Kissinger, 2001). In addition, the USA’s military might is unfit to face new 
forms of threats, including those posed by guerrilla fighters and suicidal terrorists. Thus, 
the unrivaled USA’s supremacy in the security field does not carry the same value it 
used to in the past. In politics, the gradual decline of the USA has deprived it of much of 
its leverage. In particular, resentment to USA’s power makes it harder for it to secure 
the diplomatic support of even some of the smallest states (Talmadge, 2002). As for 
economics, modern markets level the playing field for other states, the business sector 
and other non-state actors (Zakaria, 2008). In addition, the declining weight of ODA 
diminishes the potential of USA’s economic influence. Finally, the technological 
revolution amplifies the subtle, but important, component of soft power in the overall 
power mix (Nye, 2002). No doubt, the USA maintains the ability to act alone, but this 
usually comes at a cost and this cost is increasing with the technological revolution. 
Moreover, technological progress opens new horizons for other state and non-state 
actors, such as Al-Qaeda, to compete with and even threaten the USA. 
 
B. The Rise of the Rest 
In the previous section, one could see that the decline of the USA is more 
relative to others than absolute in nature. It is the rise of the rest that is the master 
phenomenon of world politics today (Zakaria, 2008). A few years ago, no one expected 
the USA to face so many challenges not only from emerging powers, but also from 
traditional allies (Kagan, 2008). More specifically, by the late 1990s, an international 
system characterized with multipolarity appeared to have risen, as China and Russia 
were taking stances to balance against the USA. From a wider perspective, the world 
today appears to be multipolar, with the USA, China, the EU, India, Japan and Russia as 
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major powers. These six major powers host over half of the world’s population, account 
for around 75% of global GDP and 80% of global defense spending (Haas, 2008). Thus, 
the list of major challengers to the USA includes China, Japan, Russia, India and the EU 
(Nye, 2002). And there are numerous other regional powers, including Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and South Africa in 
Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; 
Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in East Asia and Oceania (Haas, 2008). In 
general, the new map of world power distribution reflects a transition from the old East-
West dichotomy of the Cold War to a consolidating South-North dichotomy, which is 
being nurtured by emerging powers in the South.  
Indeed, we live at times of transition and confusion. Particularly perplexing is 
the rapidly evolving distribution of power. Yet, these are times with fewer dominant 
powers than was the case during most of mankind’s history. Even more, with the end of 
the Cold War, we seemed to have had a unipolar moment (Krauthammer, 2003). 
Eventually, this moment is giving way to a world with three dominant powers that, 
besides the USA, includes China and the EU (Khanna, 2008). China’s mix of large 
population, industrial output and financial wealth makes it a power with unprecedented 
potential. The EU is economically wealthier than both the USA and China, with 
population in between and significant military and technological power. In addition to 
these three dominant powers, there have also risen a number of other great or emerging 
powers, but these mostly belong to a second tier of power that Parag Khanna calls “the 
second world.” In general, shifts in world power distribution over the last decade could 
be viewed from two main angles: one for Western powers other than the USA, 
particularly the EU and Japan, and the other for the four newly emerging or reviving 
powerhouses, China, India, Brazil and Russia. However, considering their heavy 
weights, the EU and China deserve to be addressed each separately. Afterwards, there 
will be a collective analysis of major other powers, with focus on India, Russia, Japan 
and Brazil. 
 
1. The European Union 
 Although the EU is a major force in the Western alliance, it is the closest 
challenger to the USA, especially with respect to economic power and technological 
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prowess (Nye, 2002). While the USA’s economy is almost four times that of Germany, 
the biggest European economy, it is a little less than the size of the aggregate EU 
economy. The USA’s population is significantly less than that of the EU (please refer to 
Table 1 above for other indicators). In terms of soft power, the EU is a role model in 
regional integration and multilateralism. It sows power using its enlargement policy, 
which is based on discipline not dominance (Khanna, 2008). European cultures have 
long had a sense of appeal in the rest of the world, and the EU shares the dominant 
paradigms of the current world, democracy and capitalism. However, the colonial 
history of several European powers still leaves some sense of bitterness in former 
colonies, which in a way favors the USA and some other powers. With respect to 
military power, the EU does not lack the essential resources, but it is still far from 
projecting a strategic threat to the USA’s dominance due to lack of unity in this field. 
Only recently, there have been scattered calls for a united European army, including by 
Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France, during his country’s last chairmanship of the EU 
and by Guido Westerwelle, German Foreign Minister, during the Munich security 
conference of 2010.  
 On the other hand, the EU faces serious economic and social problems, 
compounded by demographic challenges. Expansion in the EU is not only a choice, it is 
a requirement, for without expansion the EU might die (Khanna, 2008). Labor markets 
and social security are major problems in the EU, even at the time it is the biggest 
global economic power (Zakaria, 2008). And the EU suffers from persistent internal 
divisions over crucial aspects of domestic as well as foreign policy (Glencross, 2010). 
As the experience of the failed constitution demonstrates, pro-integration elites inside 
EU countries are growing less able to sell the benefits of integration to their national 
publics, and citizens are becoming more concerned about the impact of further 
integration on their lives. The continuation of divergence on the benefits of deeper 
economic, social and political integration in the EU could leave it a fettered giant 
consumed by internal differences and competing national agendas. Unless the EU 
breaks these taboos, it will not be in place to translate its economic power to full-
fledged global power (USNIC, 2008).  
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 Henry Kissinger, former USA State Secretary in the 1970s, made a comment 
that is usually quoted in reference to Europe's global role, by asking what Europe's 
phone number is. Nonetheless, European integration has continued ever since and many 
things have changed. In December 2009, Lisbon Treaty came into force, thus bringing 
more coherence and effectiveness to the EU's external policy. Most importantly, the 
treaty creates two new positions, President of the EU Council and High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In a testimony before the USA’s Congress, 
Sally McNamara of the Heritage Foundation described the treaty as an instrument that 
transforms the EU into a superstate, reflects the EU's ambition to become a global 
power and to challenge the American leadership, poses unique threats to the special 
Anglo-American alliance and limits the margins of movement of the USA with its EU 
allies (McNamara, 2009). This is particularly concerning given the background of 
European powers balancing against the USA during the Iraq war. Nevertheless, she also 
added that the treaty was adopted without a shred of democratic legitimacy or public 
support after around eight years of controversy. In fact, whether this treaty will enable 
the EU to play a more assertive role in the world remains unclear, especially in view of 
the preservation of rotating six-month presidencies and the troika format (composed of 
the Commission, current and following rotating presidencies), the interpretative 
declarations secured by the UK to the effect of reasserting the integrity of national 
foreign policies, the preservation of the unanimity rule when deciding on foreign affairs 
and security issues and the confusion the treaty creates in distributing the roles in 
dealing with the external world (Chopin and Lefebvre, 2010). By and large, there is no 
doubt that when considering external issues, the UK, France and Germany will still play 
critical roles, for decisions on such issues without their support will carry less value.     
 One could say that the Lisbon Treaty makes the EU a superpower without teeth 
or a modest superpower. With regard to projecting power at the global level, the EU 
will never be able to compete with powerhouses such as the USA and China (Guerot, 
2010). Those who speak of the EU as a full-fledged global power fail to recognize what 
the EU truly is (Maull, 2005). Realistically, the EU is a pool of nation-states that are 
developing unprecedented integration, which makes it a “post-modern” actor in 
international relations, not a great power nor a quasi-state. In other words, the most 
likely role for the EU in world order is to be a pole and an example of international 
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cooperation. Similarly, Vasconcelos (2008) argues that, in view of its uniqueness, the 
EU is not directly comparable to any other global power. The European Security 
Strategy of 2005 states as two main objectives promoting an international order based 
on effective multilateralism and enhancing security in Europe’s immediate 
neighborhood. Logically, it is because the EU is a modest power that one of its strategic 
objectives is a world order shaped by norms and rules, not one where power prevails. 
And it is because the EU is the most advanced form of regional integration and 
multilateralism that it seeks a multilateral order that accommodates regionalism. 
However, cognizant that the EU's multilateral integration experiment is based on “unity 
within diversity,” its soft power will to a large extent depend on its ability to integrate 
Turkey and absorb migrant communities, especially Muslims. And this is largely why 
observers are very attentive to the EU’s approach toward these two issues.              
The financial crisis in Greece is but one example of the kind of economic 
challenges that the EU faces today. The crisis underlines some fundamental weaknesses 
in the institutional design behind the euro (Fenby and Stokes, 2010). Individual euro-
area economies have a single currency whose value they do not control. And the EU's 
central surveillance mechanisms do not guarantee that all member countries would 
enact economic policies consistent with the common monetary and fiscal policies, 
which exposes the euro area to beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Notably, there are other 
EU economies that find themselves under huge economic pressures, including Portugal 
and Spain, and this is not likely to be the last crisis of its kind. In this regard, one major 
problem is that if a member country faces liquidity problems like Greece did, the euro 
zone does not have a lender of last resort to extend credit lines against collateral (Dieter, 
2010). Hence, a proposal came up to establish a European Monetary Fund that would 
lend countries facing monetary crises and give teeth to EU surveillance mechanisms. 
Moreover, Dieter adds, the EU's decision to involve the IMF in the Greek crisis is a 
harbinger about the European single currency, as it deprives it of much of its respect and 
competitive value as an international reserve currency vis-à-vis the USA’s dollar.  
 
2. China 
 No doubt, the rise of China is one of the most heated subjects of world politics 
in the first decade of the 20th century. There is a famous saying by the historic French 
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emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, “let China sleeps, for when China wakes, she will shake 
the world.” It seems to be time now, as the world appears to be going through the 
shaking phase. Historically, the recent rise of China started with the economic and 
political reforms introduced by President Deng Xiaoping in 1979. By the early 1990s, it 
started a rapid course of economic development. Its export-driven development model 
has availed it a growth rate of more than 9% on average over the last three decades 
(Tellis, 2010). It is in the economic domain that China’s power is most obvious (please 
refer to Table 1 above for more indicators of China’s power). With a population of 
1,339 million in 2009 and an economic weight of 12.5% of the world, China appears to 
be coming of age to revive its past glory, which poses a number of challenging 
conundrums for the rest of the world. In particular, China has become the wealthiest 
country, with the balance of foreign assets of the People's Bank of China reaching USA 
$ 2.4 trillion in 2009, which also enabled China to become the largest foreign creditor of 
the USA. Most importantly, China is being widely touted to be the main challenger of 
the USA’s economic supremacy. According to a famous estimate by Goldman Sachs, 
the Chinese economy is projected to become as big as that of the USA by 2027, and the 
BRIC (before the inclusion of South Africa in December 2010) are expected to bar with 
the G-7 (G-8 minus Russia) by 2032 (Goldman Sachs, 2009). Notably, the Chinese 
economy was the first to recover from the current economic crisis, while the USA and 
Europe are yet struggling on their path out. China is also a nuclear power and has the 
largest army on earth. It might lack some of the power resources needed for a 
superpower, but, unlike the EU, it certainly does not lack statehood or other 
fundamental elements needed to project concrete global power.     
 There is a paradox facing the USA with regard to China, and it is basically that 
the rise of China is in fact being nurtured by the USA itself (Tellis, 2010). The USA’s 
security umbrella in Asia-Pacific, its championing of development under the mantra of 
economic liberalism and even its historical support to the Republic of China to become 
a permanent member of the UN Security Council are some of the main dimensions of 
the environment in which China rises. Thus, although China is feared, the USA finds 
itself in the awkward position of having to sustain a system that bolsters further growth 
of what is projected to be its most significant rival over time. In turn, China is exploiting 
this very system to continue its rise, while attempting to assure the rest that it only seeks 
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a “peaceful rise.” Also interesting is that for more than a hundred years, the way the 
USA and the West at large saw China was as a dream land of market possibilities, 
which dream never crossed the reality threshold (Zakaria, 2008). Instead, old dreams 
got almost reversed with Chinese products invading the world at large. Even more 
worrying is that the alternative dream today is not a pleasant one, as concerns mount 
that when China rises enough, it may not remain peaceful.  
However, some argue that the Chinese ascending curve has reached its 
breakeven point and is going to start a painful fall (Chang, 2010). It is estimated that 
38% of economic activity in China is export-driven. But, with the current economic 
crisis, global demand is falling, new protectionism is on the rise and countries 
throughout the world are putting brakes on economic globalization and entrenching 
their sovereign economic spaces. In the meantime, Chinese policy makers seem to be 
too focused on encouraging further investment, industrialization and exports, without 
doing enough to encourage domestic consumption, which nurtures imbalances in the 
Chinese economy. Moreover, China is accused of being the main player behind 
international economic imbalances that haunt the world today. In strict terms, China 
insists it is a developing country. Yet, it is the biggest creditor of the USA, continues to 
hoard USA’s dollar assets and pegs its currency to the USA’s dollar. In particular, 
China’s economic miracle is driven by a model that preys on foreign markets. And 
although its economic leap has created new welfare aspirations among its citizens, this 
is not yet adequately reflected in real life. As a result, Chinese economic policies have 
been a standing point of contention with the USA, especially in what concerns 
undervaluing its currency against the USA’s dollar to maintain the price 
competitiveness of Chinese exports.      
On the political front, China remains authoritarian with a strong one-party 
regime. The Chinese Communist Party is by far the single most influential extension of 
the communist legacy. Notably, China’s impressive rise under such an authoritarian 
regime comes as clear evidence that democracy is not a prerequisite for development, 
which indicates that the Western model of democratic governance has somehow failed 
to prevail. In fact, the Chinese experience proves that notions such as modernization and 
liberalization, along the Chinese model, have replaced Westernization (Mahbubani, 
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2005). While authoritarian regimes are generally fragile because of lack of legitimacy, 
coercive policies, centralized decision making and the prevalence of individuals over 
institutions, the Chinese regime has proven to be an exception. This has particularly 
been possible thanks to the economic miracle. However, the inherent weaknesses of 
authoritarianism could become too big to contain, if the economy goes on a declining 
trajectory (Chang, 2010). Hence, China’s internal politics and its human rights record 
are sources of concern to Western democracies and the world, especially from the 
perspective that instability in China could pose huge threats to its region and the world. 
Another source of concern is that China is in latent conflicts with some regional rivals 
and neighbors, especially India, which conflicts might erupt any time. By and large, a 
stable China is very important for the world, and a China in peace with its neighbors 
and the rest of the world is even more important.                         
 The rise of China is reshaping the world landscape, especially in economics and 
to some extent security affairs and politics. It is playing an increasing role in the 
international system and becoming more able to counteract the USA’s power. However, 
China is not likely to seek global leadership in the near future (Niblett, 2009). This is 
clearly reflected in its current foreign policy, which is largely focused on three 
priorities: protecting its security and territorial integrity under the slogan of “one China” 
(which reflects its sovereign claims over Taiwan), promoting economic development 
and earning global status through rejuvenating China (Medeiros, 2009). In fact, China 
still avoids acting like a great power and keeps on reiterating that it is a developing 
country. Hence, to be specific, China’s rise is changing the dynamics of the current 
international system, but not transforming its rules or structure. Nonetheless, as has 
been elaborated earlier, China’s economic policies are a source of concern about the 
future of the world economy. And its energy policies are drawing it into increasing 
competition with conventional and other emerging powers on limited crude oil and 
natural gas resources, especially in the Middle East and Africa. Regionally, China is in 
the process of reclaiming its historical status as a major regional power, which could 
also bring it face to face with the USA. Although China takes a peaceful global attitude, 
at least so far, it is clear that it is seeking a bigger role in shaping global norms, rules 
and institutions, which quest is mostly motivated by its need to protect and further its 
interests. Notably, the USA seems responsive and shows keenness on further integrating 
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China in the current international system, and for this sake, it demonstrates openness to 
reforming that system. For instance, China is asking for more voting power in the 
Bretton Woods institutions and the USA is showing responsiveness. In addition, Barack 
Obama, current USA President, has stated that the USA’s relationship with China is 
likely to shape the 21st Century. In this regard, the two countries seem to be 
consolidating some kind of constructive dialogue through the so-called Group of Two 
(G-2).          
 
3. Other Major Powers  
 There are several other powers that are either emerging or conventional but still 
holding onto power. Notably, the list of emerging powers includes India and Brazil, 
while that of conventional powers includes Russia and Japan (though the latter is also 
relatively a new powerhouse). India is one of three major powers in Asia-Pacific, 
besides China and Japan, and it is a growing great power at the global level. It is proud 
to be the biggest democracy on earth, a nuclear power and a central hub in information 
industries. If compared with China, it has advantages such as its English tongue and 
more demographic youthfulness. On the downside, India faces several challenges, 
including lack of central control, lack of internal security, energy insecurity, the social 
complications of its unique caste system, worrying corruption, environmental 
degradation and deteriorating quality of life (Luce, 2009). Even with all its power 
resources and potential, India remains an underdeveloped country, with almost a quarter 
of its population under the poverty line and even more illiterate people. Individually, 
India is unlikely to pose a challenge to the USA in the near future. However, its 
coalition with China and Russia (RIC) could reshape world politics if it proceeds 
effectively (Nye, 2002). Clearly, India’s foreign policy reflects a preference for the 
evolution of a multipolar world order in which India is a major player. But, certainly, it 
prefers a USA-led unipolar order to a Sino-centric order, which makes it a favorable 
ally for the USA (Zakaria, 2008). Together with Japan, India has an interest in 
balancing against Chinese influence in Asia. Lately, India’s relations with China have 
been alarmingly deteriorating over two main subjects: China’s contest of India’s control 
over the border region of Arunachal Pradesh and India’s refuge to Dalai Lama. With 
regard to the current international system, India demands a permanent seat in the UN 
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Security Council and, like China, seeks better representation in the Bretton Woods 
institutions.                                   
 Russia controls the largest state territory in the world, even after the successive 
dissolutions of the former USSR. It preceded the USA into space and holds the biggest 
nuclear arsenal on earth. Because of its relative decline after the end of the Cold War, 
Russia shows more reliance on its nuclear deterrent than its conventional military 
capabilities (Nye, 2002). This is clearly reflected by the latest revision of Russia’s 
nuclear doctrine, and it still holds true after the signature of START II agreement in 
April 2010. Another main source of Russian power vis-à-vis its European neighbors 
and, by proxy, the USA is its abundant fossil energy resources. In fact, it is mostly 
thanks to these energy resources that Russia could transcend from debt-default to 
financial abundance over the last few years (Greene and Trenin, 2009). Moreover, 
Russia boasts a highly educated population, a big number of scientists and engineers 
and vast natural resources. On the downside, Russia faces problems related to 
democracy and human rights, its energy-dependent economy, weak political and 
economic institutions, ethnic disputes, alarming corruption, social strife and dismal 
public services. In total, however, Russia remains powerful enough in relation to its 
neighbors and other global powers. Over the last few years, Russia's foreign policy 
reveals a focus on dominance in its immediate neighborhood and attempts to recuperate 
its lost power to become a major player in a multipolar world order (Trenin, 2009). In 
particular, Russia is the power most outspoken against the USA, which indicates that it 
does not lack the motivation to re-ascend to power nor the intention to challenge the 
USA (Khanna, 2008). And the most significant threat Russia poses to the USA comes 
from its tendency to ally with China, especially given the historical precedence (their 
alliance during the 1950s, before China switched sides toward the USA in the 1970s) 
and the resumption and rapid evolution of their partnership after the end of the Cold 
War. Russia also has a special partnership with India, another ascending great power, 
and both had long been allies during the later stages of the Cold War. With regard to the 
current international system, Russia uses its power resources, including its permanent 
seat in the UN Security Council, to counterbalance the USA (Nye, 2002). At the same 
time, and in addition to security issues, Russia demands a seat at the table when 
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discussing issues such as world trade, climate change and financial regulation, and it 
seeks a louder voice in the Bretton Woods institutions.  
Like the EU, Japan belongs to the rich North and the ideological West. In the 
1980s, there were projections that Japan is about to become a superpower and concerns 
that it might make a quick switch to nuclear weaponry (Nye, 2002). These projections 
did not materialize. Nonetheless, today, Japan is a great power in Asia-Pacific and the 
world, even with the rise of other powers such as China and India. It has the third 
largest economy in the world, a sophisticated industrial and technological base, very 
developed population and the most modern military in Asia. On the other side, Japan is 
tight squeezed in a very small territory; its population is small and aging and it lacks 
natural resources. It has long been a strategic ally of the USA and reckons with the 
USA’s security umbrella and USA’s role as a stabilizer in East Asia, especially with 
regard to China, its historical enemy. In turn, the USA benefits from Japan's role as a 
balancer against China, in the so-called USA-Japan-China trialogue (Kwa and Tan, 
2001). Japan also shows aspiration to more power, as it seeks a permanent seat in the 
UN Security Council and its new generations call for relaxing the constitutional 
provisions restricting its military to self-defense. Recently, Japanese American relations 
have been tense over the USA marine base in Okinawa. In addition, lately, Japan has 
shown more interest in strengthening its relations with China and even in joining an 
East Asian community together with China and India. These developments reveal a 
Japanese move away from the USA, with more efforts aimed at building more bridges 
with its neighbors.  
 Brazil is the principal regional power in South America and a rising great power 
at the global level. It is an outstanding economic performer, an influential global trader 
and it possesses a large territory that is rich with natural resources, especially newly-
found oil. Despite its lack of capacity to cater for the needs of its neighbors, Brazil 
shows keenness to become the pole of Latin American diplomacy. Its economic hub, 
Sao Paulo, is considered the most important center of airplane design and production 
after Seattle and Toulouse (Khanna, 2008). On the other side, Brazil neither has nuclear 
weapons nor the intention to, suffers from chronic public security problems and 
struggles to lift more than a quarter of its population above the poverty line. Notably, 
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Brazil’s foreign trade policy is clearer than its foreign affairs policy, which in fact 
reflects ambivalence in its political role both regionally and globally. Over the last few 
years, however, Brazil has taken a foreign policy line that is both more assertive and 
more independent from conventional great powers. From the global perspective, Brazil 
attempts to enhance its visibility as an emerging power, works through such forums as 
the BRICS and India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) to protect its interests at the 
multilateral level and counterbalance the USA in its near vicinity (Vaz, 2009). This, in 
turn, reflects a Brazilian foreign policy attitude in support of multipolarity. Like India, 
Brazil seeks a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and demands better 
representation in the Bretton Woods institutions.                              
 
C. Implications of Power Shifts  
While the USA maintains its position as the current military hegemon, it faces 
increasing military constraints, has already lost its dominance as the economic hegemon 
and current trends suggest further future power shifts (Drezner, 2008). We are truly 
living in a multipolar world, where power, whether hard or soft, is distributed 
asymmetrically across the globe (Vasconcelos, 2008). This world order is characterized 
with the emergence of new global actors, such as China, India and resurgent Russia, 
which puts pressure on the USA’s power and that of other players (Nye, 2002). Hence, 
world powers are being rebalanced without one single power center (Khanna, 2008). By 
challenging the USA’s power and making new alliances around the world, the EU and 
China have managed a power shift toward three relatively equivalent power centers: 
Washington, Brussels and Beijing. In addition, alignments, such as the RIC, BRICS and 
IBSA are increasingly consolidating themselves in the international arena with power 
balancing attitudes. Most worrying is the effect of these power shifts on the leading 
global role of the USA. Lack of adequate leadership could have significant implications 
on the world, especially that no single country or combination of countries and no 
international institution appears qualified to replace the USA in the leadership seat 
(Gelb, 2009). Notably, the USA’s administration itself admits that it needs more help in 
dealing with global challenges, as President Barack Obama made it clear in front of the 
UN General Assembly (Obama, 2009). 
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Also of particular concern here, the current situation poses challenges to the 
power base of current structures of global governance. Historically, the institutions of 
the current multilateral system, be it the UN or the Bretton Woods institutions, reflect 
the international power status in the aftermath of World-War II. Today, the formula of 
power distribution has substantially changed and there are several ascending 
powerhouses in quest for protecting their interests in global governance. It is obvious 
that the old East-West dichotomy is now giving way to an evolving South-North 
dichotomy. As a result, current multilateral institutions are growing ineffective. Indeed, 
state power shifts raise questions about the legitimacy of the current structures of 
multilateral institutions, which in turn reduce the effectiveness of these institutions 
(Hurd, 2002). Over and above, there seems to be a great deal of ambivalence about 
multilateralism, particularly from the side of the yet most dominant power, the USA 
(Patrick, 2003). Although the USA is widely acknowledged to be the first beneficiary of 
the current multilateral system, USA’s domestic politics and its foreign policy reflect 
lack of dissatisfaction with that system. Hence, the current multilateral system is under 
attack from almost all and sundry.  
International analysts posit the rise of the BRICS as an introduction to a 
transformation of global governance structures (Drezner, 2008). In particular, it is 
widely held that unless new powerhouses, such as China and India, are accommodated 
and fully incorporated in the current system, its future will remain uncertain. It is 
perhaps imprecise to rely on uncertain future extrapolations, but this remains wiser than 
relying on a status quo that is more than 65 years old. Multilateral institutions are the 
creation of powerful states. While these institutions could survive shifts in global power 
distribution in the short run, the festering of mismatches between governance structures 
and real power distribution could shake the foundations of these institutions in the long 
run. And, historically, global governance structures could not persist long after the 
decline of the power of their initiators, even when power shifts were peaceful. Thus, no 
doubt, ongoing global power shifts pose significant challenges to the current USA-
dominated multilateral system.  
Notably, emerging powers differ with respect to power potential, political 
system, economic vision, perception of risks and attitude toward the current 
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international system, which makes it complicated to go about integrating them in that 
system (Stewart, 2010). Recent trends indicate that the USA is alert to these facts, as has 
been reflected by its variable approaches to emerging powers, including the recent 
USA-India nuclear deal and the emerging G-2 forum with China. However, the end 
results of USA’s efforts in this regard are uneven and continue to fall short of meeting 
the aspirations of emerging powers. In addition, even when the USA chooses to move 
toward accommodating emerging powers, it is likely to face resistance from other 
conventional powers, such as the UK, France, Germany, Russia and Japan. Such an 
approach is also likely to face opposition from countries opposed to emerging 
powerhouses, such as Mexico in the case of Brazil and Pakistan in the case of India, and 
from developing and poor countries on the margins of the system. Thus, one ends up 
with a conundrum, the essence of which is that rewriting the rules of the multilateral 
system is an almost intractable task. Furthermore, assuming that this task could be 
concluded successfully, bringing more players to the game does not often lead to better 
understanding, effectiveness or efficiency. Anything comes at a price, and although 
better representativeness is advocated to enhance legitimacy, it could somehow 
compromise effectiveness.        
The USA’s National Intelligence Council (USNIC) projects that USA’s 
dominance will be significantly diminished by 2025 and that the principal area of 
American superiority, military power, will become less significant in an increasingly 
competitive world (USNIC, 2008). A global multipolar system is emerging with the rise 
of global heavy weights such as China and India. In addition, gaps in power will 
continue to narrow between developed and developing countries. Together with the 
dynamics of globalization and the growing influence of non-state actors, the whole 
international system, as formed after World War II, will almost succumb to history. 
Moreover, it is predicted that the notion of community of nation-states will almost no 
longer exist. Currently, all emerging powers show commitment to global institutions 
such as the UN. Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether these powers will continue to work 
with multilateral institutions to adapt their structures and functions to the changed 
geopolitical space and make them more responsive to their needs, especially as these 
powers continue their rise to become bigger players at the global level.       
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In this regard, one has to differentiate between the West, i.e. the USA and its 
Western allies, and the rest, most particularly China. There is no doubt that the rise of 
the rest has evolved on the basis of Western paradigms, as other countries have 
absorbed West-born concepts such as capitalism and Western teachings about the 
virtues of free-market economies and the importance of science and technology. In 
contrast, with respect to Western political liberalism and democracy, some of the newly 
emerging giants do not concur, especially China. Though China is growing more liberal, 
it is still communist in theory and practice. And, although democracy is commonly 
considered a global value and a prerequisite for modernity, the Chinese development 
model is an outstanding exception. This is evidence that Western liberal ideas never 
really penetrated the psychology of much of the world (Barma et al, 2007). In fact, it 
seems that with the last wave of globalization, westernization has given way to 
modernization, opposite to what Francis Fukuyama predicted in his book “The End of 
history and the Last Man,” where he contended that Western democratic governance is 
the final form of human governance (Mahbubani, 2005). In any case, it has become 
clear that the most fundamental elements of political modernization, including 
democracy, have transcended their Western origin to become universal values not 
Western per se.  
This poses the question of what would be the relationship between the West and 
the rising rest. Would the rest accept a world order revolving around the Western 
primacy of post-World War II and Western conceptions of order based most 
fundamentally on capitalism and democracy? In other words, would the rest integrate 
into the existing world order or it would instead attempt to modify this order? Related to 
these questions, what are the limits of what the West could accept in terms of adaptation 
and are these limits confined to the substance, i.e. capitalism and democracy, or they 
extend to the form, i.e. the structure and distribution of power. These are all decisive 
questions, the answers to which will shape the future. In fact, history indicates that 
USA’s hegemonic practices invite countervailing coalitions that could eventually 
further limit USA’s power, while its multilateral practices invite more respect to 
multilateralism (Nye, 2002). However, it is expected that with the rise of China, more 
countries may get attracted to China’s development model at the expense of Western 
models of political and economic development. Moreover, it is expected that with new 
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powerhouses coming to the world scene, Western traditional alliances may be at the risk 
of weakening. Hence, the future may indeed witness some kind of confrontation 
between the West and the rest.   
 It is also important to note two contradictory trends of history with respect to 
world power distribution. Firstly, there seems to be a consensus that periods when one 
or a small number of powerful states dominated tended to witness more peace and 
stability (Nye, 2002, Khanna, 2008 and Zakaria, 2008). This was the case during the 
reign of Rome, the Cold War and, to some extent, the decade following the end of the 
Cold War. On the contrary, periods when there were several powerful states or a 
transition of power were often marked with more violence and turbulence. This was the 
case during the era of power concerts in Europe from the early 19th to the early 20th 
century, where Great Britain was the principal, but not dominant, power, and during the 
transition from the multipolar world order of the early 20th century to the bipolar world 
order in the aftermath of World War II. The second trend is that multilateral cooperation 
and the dose of democracy in international relations tend to run the opposite way. In 
other words, they increase during periods of abundance of power centers and power 
transition and vise versa. For instance, there was more respect to rules of international 
order during the Cold War than today, and there is no doubt that the League of Nations 
was significantly more democratic than the UN (please refer to Chapter Five). It seems, 
then, that the world is set for more turbulence and more democracy, due to current 
global power shifts.      
It also seems that there are two main potential future scenarios: either systemic 
conflict between the West and the rest or eventual assimilation between them. On one 
hand, there are some who predict that the transition of power will be marked with 
tension, distrust and even conflict (Ikenberry, 2008). It is expected that as China rises, it 
together with other aligned countries will try to use power to redraw the rules and 
reshape the institutions of the international system, whereas the declining hegemon and 
its allies will start to see the rise of the rest as an increasing threat, thus creating room 
for confrontation. In addition, the current state of world affairs indicates a Hobbesian 
future, where scarce resources threaten of a war of all against all (Calleo, 2007). Nature 
puts increasing pressure on human needs and aspirations. And the scarcity of resources, 
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pollution and climate change seem to run opposite the dream of prosperity for all. In 
fact, it appears as if Malthus has returned once more to dismiss the Kantian notion of 
“perpetual peace.” In such a world, it will be hard to reconcile the rich North with the 
rising, poor South.  
In this regard, it is argued that the most important determinant is USA’s foreign 
policy (Zakaria, 2008). If the USA withdraws from its leadership seat, it might produce 
chaos, and if it overacts, it could motivate others to counteract, which could lead to 
instability. In particular, the outcome of the ongoing power transition will mostly 
depend on the USA’s approach toward China. In the meantime, the USA is still in the 
leadership seat and capable of shaping the environment in which China rises. If the 
USA is keen on preserving its leadership, it should strengthen the rules and institutions 
of the current West-centered order (Ikenberry, 2008). This would be a wise strategy, for 
if the defining struggle is between the USA and China, China is more probable to win, 
but if it is between China and a reformed West-centered system, the West is more 
probable to win. In general, deepening global connectivity is creating a new world order 
without the West or a parallel international system increasingly autonomous from 
Western control (Barma et al, 2007). The emerging powers in this new system have 
already started to redraw the map of global governance according to their own 
perspectives of what is legitimate and sustainable. This approach risks of exposing the 
world to serious confrontations, especially if the West chooses to act aggressively in 
order to block further development of a new world order. In this case, the West would 
find itself facing a big bloc of countries spearheaded by an economic powerhouse, 
China, and the West’s chances of winning will be meager. In addition, the relationships 
among the emerging powers are expected to play an important role. If these powers 
cooperate, the transition would be quicker and smoother, whereas if they compete or 
slide into confrontations with each other, the transition could be extended and turbulent.  
Hopefully, the shift could be gradual, in order and proceed peacefully. Factors to 
support this hypothesis include that, unlike in the past, war between great powers is 
unthinkable, mainly because all actual and emerging powers tend to benefit from the 
current system and all of them are in crisis together. Historically, moves toward global 
governance redesigns often came at staggering costs, but the good news this time is that 
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having another great war is remote. In addition, although, the emerging new world order 
is likely to be one with more rivals and even antagonists, it is also expected to be one 
with more negotiators and regional leaders with interest in keeping the peace. In fact, if 
these expectations are accurately conceived and advanced, the world would be a better 
place for all and potential confrontations would be avoided (Ikenberry, 2008). 
Moreover, the projected USA-Chinese power transition is expected to be significantly 
different from similar transitions in the past, because China faces a world order 
significantly different from those that prevailed in the past. Today, China faces a West-
centered international system that is largely open to newcomers, integrated and rule-
based. It follows, then, that the Western order is hard to overturn, but easy to join.  
The current international system is more than 65 years old. It is West-centered, 
but is gradually seeping out of Western control. Taken together, the relative decline of 
the USA and the power shift toward newly emerging powers necessitate changes in the 
current rules and structures of global governance. The main impulse behind projected 
changes is the need to accommodate the rising powers, especially China. But they 
should also be ones that protect the interests of the West, ensure future stability and 
allow for more prosperity for all. In fact, it is the West, and most particularly the USA, 
that can and should take the lead to reform and reinvigorate the current multilateral 
system. Indeed, there is hardly any doubt that reforming the current system to make it 
more reflective of the new map of global power distribution will help the system 
become more stable and effective. Nonetheless, this reform does not appear to be 
forthcoming. Instead, the current reform momentum in multilateral institutions seems to 
be trapped in gaps of divergent self-interested and short-sighted positions. Although the 
reform agenda imposes itself and holds fruits for all, the world can barely move forward 
on its essential elements.  
 
II. Power Diffusion: The Proliferation of Actors in the International System  
 Globalization dilutes conventional state power through two fundamental forces. 
One is cross-border exchanges that take place beyond the control and/or the knowledge 
of governments. The Second is that the administrators of these cross-border exchanges 
are often non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), business 
firms and terrorist groups that challenge state power (Haas, 2008). These forces imply a 
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diffusion of power away from nation-states to non-state actors. Fareed Zakaria (2008) 
describes non-state actors as “the predators of globalization.” Individuals and groups are 
being empowered, while hierarchy, central control and sovereignty are being 
compromised. NGOs are now penetrating all aspects of life throughout the world. 
Capital and business firms are travelling the world to hunt investment opportunities, 
thus rewarding some governments and punishing others. Terrorist groups, such as Al-
Qaeda, drug cartels, dissident groups, militias…etc create spaces and safe heavens for 
their activities in and across countries. Anne-Marie Slaughter has dedicated a lot of her 
work to studying the phenomenon and implications of the rising role of non-state actors 
in the international system. She argues that the concept of nation-state is “out of 
fashion,” and that starting in the 1990s, the world has been witnessing a relapse of 
“medievalism,” a back to the future model of Europe before the thirty-year war, where 
authority was shared among many players in individual geopolitical units (Slaughter, 
2004b).  
 At the time the information revolution has transformed the world into a small 
village, global challenges have changed in nature and impact and have even gone 
beyond the capacities of nation-states or international organizations (Nye, 2002). Non-
state actors make all possible use of the current environment to amplify their role and 
power. At the domestic level, they put pressure, lobby, challenge and, in some cases, 
substitute for local authorities. At the global level, they contribute to the work of inter-
governmental organizations, mentor them, motivate change and struggle to carve bigger 
stakes for themselves. Terrorist groups, organized crime organizations, militias and the 
like organizations exploit increasing global connectivity to further their hostile 
objectives, which undermines state sovereignty and raises concerns about the benefits 
and sustainability of globalization. Moreover, there are other intertwining relationships 
between different non-state actors at both domestic and international levels. For 
instance, NGOs monitor the social responsibility of business firms, while terrorist 
groups cooperate with organized crime groups. Accordingly, the following section 
provides a more detailed analysis of the nature and implications of the rising role of 
non-state actors on the international system under three main subsections: NGOs, 
private sector and other non-state actors.  
 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Imperatives of Change 
95
A. Nongovernmental Organizations   
 As a starting point, the term NGOs is meant to refer to organizations that are 
neither related to governments nor to markets. These organizations proliferate at 
different levels, domestically, regionally and globally. For the subject of this research, 
the focus is on international NGOs. These latter organizations have been playing an 
increasing role in the international system. They are involved in the entire cycle of 
international politics (Forman and Segaar, 2006). They participate in meetings and 
activities of intergovernmental organizations, in what has become a common practice; 
observe international negotiations, missions and litigation processes; influence, and at 
times initiate, new norms and rules, especially in the form of international legal 
instruments; and form global networks that can raise more awareness about global 
challenges, advocate international cooperation and put more pressure on states. In 
particular, international humanitarian organizations play a critical role in conflict areas, 
whether at grass-root level or in cooperation with national and international 
organizations. At the domestic level, NGOs partner with other stakeholders to provide 
community services and contribute to development, which in some cases goes as far as 
substituting for state authority, especially in peripheral areas inside fragile states, which 
demonstrates the evolution of new forms of lack of sovereignty.   
Most importantly, NGOs challenge state sovereignty and control over its citizens 
by creating new communitarian associations that cut across classes and cultures and 
form new communitarian identities (Slaughter, 2003). Indeed, they create new ponds of 
loyalty, other than those between national governments and their citizens, on the pretext 
that governments do not always reflect the views of their citizens (Suter, 2006). 
Consequently, domestic politics, including national positions from international issues, 
come under the influence of NGOs as distinct actors besides conventional political 
forces and interest groups. Some of the communitarian associations created by NGOs 
also cut across borders and challenge fundamental principles of the current international 
system, which is based on nation-states as the main building blocs. Over the last two 
decades, the proliferation of NGOs and the growth of their contribution to national and 
international governance have been posing conundrums, especially regarding how best 
to integrate them. On one side, governments are willing to make good use of these 
organizations within the limits of state sovereignty and legal rights and obligations. On 
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the other side, NGOs seek an ever increasing space and legitimacy and challenge the 
notion that nation-states are the principal actors in the international system.  
There are two main contributions that NGOs could add to the multilateral system 
(Edwards, 2002). One is through enhancing the quality of debate and decisions by 
sharing information and experiences, ensuring more transparency and accountability 
and introducing additional pressure for taking speedy and adequate actions to face 
global challenges. Examples of this kind of contributions include the Jubilee 2000 
movement on debt relief, the anti-personnel landmine campaign and NGO-led 
environmental certification systems such as the Forest Stewardship Council. Second, the 
inclusion of NGOs could confer an additional degree of legitimacy on the work of 
multilateral organizations and guarantee more effectiveness in the implementation of 
their decisions. NGOs' contribution to global governance not only gives voices to 
marginalized groups and increases pluralism, but also offers governments and 
multilateral institutions valuable partners (Forman and Segaar, 2006). In general, NGOs 
seem to work as links to public opinion, which involves transmitting public pressure and 
motivating public support or lack thereof. Accordingly, the support of these 
organizations to decisions is a catalyst for making them work or vise versa. This is 
particularly true for NGOs with concrete influence and strong bases, especially with the 
current information evolution giving them more outreach and impact.       
On the other side, there are two main complexities with the role that NGOs play 
in the international system (Edwards, 2002). Firstly, their legitimacy is usually 
challenged on records such as lack of formal or clear links with those they claim to 
represent, lack of accountability for their own actions, taking positions that are 
sometimes inaccurate or misleading and being active only at the policy level without 
roots in national or local bases. This, in turn, raises questions on how to structure the 
role of NGOs in the international system in a way that helps overcome, rather than 
accentuate, existing social, economic and political inequalities. Secondly, the 
proliferation of NGOs at all levels makes it impossible to give all of them an equal 
chance of participation. As a result, there has to be a selective approach toward them. 
There is also a clear lack of balance between NGOs in the North and their peers in the 
South, with Northern NGOs more in number and richer in resources, which exposes 
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Southern NGOs to domination from their Northern peers. This is clearly reflected by the 
geographical distribution of NGOs with consultative status in the UN Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC). In addition, these organizations lack common worldwide 
agendas. For instance, some NGOs are associated with anti-globalization and represent 
specific anti-globalization constituencies or interest groups. In the meantime, there are 
other pro-globalization NGOs, but these mainstream organizations do not usually attract 
equal public attention. Furthermore, NGO networks lack sustainability, as they tend to 
rely more on independent members who have their own sources of funding, which 
makes it relatively easy to dissolve as soon as goals have been achieved and facilitates 
the rapid formation of new networks around new issues (Forman and Segaar, 2006). 
Though this has some positive aspects, it could result in sudden gaps that might lead to 
relapses in some activity areas.  
 There is a lot of academic debate about the accountability of states and 
intergovernmental organizations today. Here, most of the arguments are advanced in 
support of a bigger role for NGOs as an additional accountability mechanism in the 
multilateral system. Of particular relevance here, NGOs and their advocates demand 
subjecting multilateral organizations to some sort of direct individual accountability, on 
the basis that these organizations take decisions that could affect the lives of individuals 
anywhere. In light of the fact that world politics, unlike those domestic, lack electoral 
accountability and that the tools of international legal accountability are fragmented and 
often ineffective, NGOs and their advocates contend to be honest brokers for this 
purpose and seek an ever bigger stake in the multilateral system. Thus, it has become 
common practice to challenge the legitimacy of multilateral organizations such as the 
Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, including through anti-globalization protests. 
In fact, although intergovernmental organizations are naturally subject to legal 
accountability to their member states, which are in turn subject to legal and democratic 
accountability to their citizens, there remains some accountability deficit in the 
multilateral system (Keohane, 2005). In this regard, NGOs have already become an 
active accountability mechanism and a source of concern for governments and 
multilateral institutions throughout the world. However, as has been elaborated above, 
there are many questions about the legitimacy and accountability of NGOs themselves, 
which questions restrict their potential in global governance.  
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Imperatives of Change 
98
 
B. Private Sector 
 TNCs, or international private actors, are a product of globalization. They 
bestride a world economy where state borders have become largely invisible to the 
movement of capital and where trade liberalization has removed a great bulk of barriers 
to the flows of commodities and services across borders. Only the movement of labor is 
still highly restricted. No doubt, TNCs are deepening the degree of interdependence and 
giving everyone a stake in globalization, which could be seen as a force of peace and 
prosperity. Nonetheless, markets are having an increasingly louder voice and states have 
lost full control over their national economies. Indeed, states may be able to regulate 
international economic activities, but they have grown unable to control these activities. 
They are even becoming victims of market forces, as the last international economic 
crisis eloquently shows. Moreover, TNCs have rendered nationalistic economic policies 
of the past ineffective. For instance, promoting domestic commodities on nationalistic 
bases, like some states still do, has become an outdated practice. Furthermore, TNCs are 
developing state-like structures and accumulating wealth and outreach that make them 
capable of pressurizing states, as in industrialized countries, and even manipulating 
them, as in developing countries. In fact, some of these corporations have annual 
budgets that even dwarf those of some states. In general, however, private sector actors 
are usually considered to be allies of states and multilateral institutions, while NGOs 
and the public are usually considered to be together on an opposite front.  
Naturally, TNCs tend to work in concert with state governments, but they have 
become so powerful that they do not need host states to help them open up or guarantee 
foreign markets (Suter, 2006). Even more, they can do better on their own at times and 
can even help thaw political tensions between states. To promote their public 
acceptance, TNCs have internationalized the concept of social responsibility. In turn, 
faced with many challenges, states and multilateral institutions look out to the business 
community to match its growing global reach with global responsibilities that contribute 
to global governance. Cognizant of the importance of TNCs as cross-border actors, 
multilateral institutions have been opening their doors for partnership with them. The 
pioneering experience of the UN Global Compact is a case in point. Historically, the 
Compact was launched in 2000, under Secretary General Kofi Annan, as a mechanism 
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to set global standards for corporate social responsibility and to promote the concept of 
public private partnerships (PPPs). In other words, it is a means to ensure that with their 
freedom to act globally, TNCs also have responsibilities toward the global community 
(Annan, 2002). Indeed, one of the most important developments in the international 
system over the last few years is the quantitative and qualitative shift in private sector 
participation, especially in development activities (Forman and Segaar, 2006). While 
some international organizations have a long history of involvement with the private 
sector, others have introduced similar practices more recently. This in fact marks a 
significant departure from past hostilities to business actors due to defunct communism 
and centralized economic planning.  
However, the trend of increasing private sector participation in multilateral 
relations raises concerns about its net impact on global governance (Bull et al, 2004). 
On one side, proponents argue that the multilateral system is basically reactive to 
developments in the surrounding environment, while the private sector is usually ahead 
of trends, which makes joint partnerships a logical and genuinely positive tool. They 
also see those partnerships as a constructive move to help multilateral institutions better 
deliver on their mandates, at the time rich countries are not willing to provide more 
resources for pulling the poor out of suffering. In addition, the participation of the 
private sector in deliberations of multilateral institutions carries along an important 
value added in terms of expertise and ideas, which gives these institutions more 
influence over actors that are beyond their immediate control. With respect to concerns 
about the legitimacy of private actors, proponents contend that these concerns are mere 
formal complications that should be resolved in light of the changes in the global 
environment and the need for integrating TNCs in the efforts aimed at improving global 
governance. In particular, they are of the view that partnerships between multilateral 
institutions and the private sector are a necessary extension of national PPPs. Even 
more, some of them go as far as arguing that PPPs at the multilateral level bolster the 
power, flexibility and relevance of multilateral institutions. 
On the other side, some critics see the participation of the private sector in the 
international system as de facto "privatization" of the system, propelled by the crisis of 
multilateralism (Bull et al, 2004). This group also argues that increased TNCs 
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participation in multilateral institutions undermines the legitimacy of these institutions, 
due to the lack of clear rules in this regard. In particular, they raise questions about the 
mechanisms of selecting which TNCs participate, the interference of substantive and 
geographic priorities of private sector funding with action priorities of multilateral 
institutions and the influence the private sector could have on policy coherence and 
decision making inside those institutions. In addition, opponents fear that partnerships 
with the private sector could result in fragmentation and duplication due to the creation 
of new institutional units to oversee these partnerships. Moreover, they highlight that 
competition between such institutions as UN specialized agencies on private funding 
does not go without some political implications. Notably, experience indicates that 
some agencies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), are more successful in 
raising private funding, thanks to their expansive outreach efforts, while others, such as 
the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), are lagging 
behind. Some of the critics also argue that the usual short-term objectives of global 
PPPs do not necessarily match with long-term objectives of multilateral institutions 
(Forman and Segaar, 2006). They add that public funds dedicated to PPPs may impose 
additional limitations on the ability of multilateral institutions to secure funds from the 
same donor sources.     
 
C. Other Non-State Actors               
The list of non-state actors emerging at the international level includes several 
other kinds of actors. But one could subsume those others under four main groups: sub-
state, infra-state, supra-state and rogue actors (Slaughter, 2003). The group of sub-state 
actors includes individual states in federal unions, in addition to regional and local 
administrations. Notable examples of states in federal unions include the cases of the 
USA and Canada. Federal states demonstrate increasing consciousness and activity with 
respect to national security, international trade and foreign policy issues. Self-governing 
regions within states follow the same logic and demonstrate similar interest in national 
issues. With more reliance on decentralization, regional and local administrations have 
also come to play an increasing role in deciding what is acceptable and what is not in 
terms of national foreign policy. Minorities and endogenous peoples could fall under 
this same group. Notably, these latter actors are stereotyped to be sources of external 
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pressures on national governments, but they also play larger internal and external roles 
through informal community associations at home and across borders. 
Recent experience shows that horizontal networks of infra-state actors, such as 
ministries and other governmental agencies, have been replacing hierarchical channels 
of authority inside as well as among states. In other words, such actors are increasingly 
interacting with counterparts in other countries and focal points in relevant international 
institutions directly, i.e. without going through supervisory authorities inside their 
respective countries. These networks carry along a tremendous potential of cross-
fertilization of ideas and gradual evolution of transnational consensuses over global 
challenges. By bypassing central national authorities in charge of external relations, the 
same institutions that make and implement rules at home are increasingly performing 
these same functions at the global level. This reveals a trend toward disaggregating 
governments into constituent institutions and forming trans-governmental networks of 
infra-state actors. In effect, the latter actors supplant rather than supplement the state, 
albeit without violating or openly challenging the authoritative core of the state 
(Slaughter, 2003).  
Supra-state actors are those multilateral organizations where member states 
voluntarily give up some of their sovereign authorities to the supra-state body. A 
leading example of such actors is the EU, which has been pursuing the ever most 
advanced model of regional integration. With the last major step in the course of 
European integration, the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has further distinguished itself with the 
first precedence of its type and scale in developing supra-state authorities. The main 
crux of the Lisbon Treaty is more unity in the domains of foreign affairs, security and 
defense, with a quasi-EU foreign minister. As a result, today, a Spanish citizen can 
define oneself as a Spaniard, Barcelonan, Catalan, Mediterranean or European. 
Interestingly, at the time the Spanish central government has ceded some of its 
prerogatives to regions, such as Catalonia, it has also ceded some others to the EU. The 
AU is another example following the footsteps of the EU, but with a nascent record. At 
the time these supra-state organizations are consolidating their authorities, they also 
seek more recognition and space at the global level. For instance, the 2005 EU Security 
Strategy sets effective multilateralism as one of its main external objectives. In fact, this 
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reflects an EU’s quest to secure a bigger role at the global level, on the basis of the 
defining assumption that the notion of effective multilateralism accommodates 
regionalism and opens the doors for regional organizations to have more influence at the 
international level (Vasconcelos, 2008).               
 Finally, rogue actors are those that lack legitimacy, pose threats to the 
international system and do not seek legitimate access to national or multilateral 
institutions (Slaughter, 2004b). Most important examples of these actors are terrorist 
groups, such as Al-Qaeda, organized crime groups, dissident factions and militias. Like 
others, rogue actors make good use of the advanced tools of globalization to promote 
their causes and interests. Recent precedence indicates that rogue actors could form 
coalitions with other actors, such as rogue states or organized crime groups. They also 
prey on weak states to create safe heavens for their activities. Thus, rogue actors pose 
varying challenges to world security, development and wellbeing. In this regard, the 
main question is how to face and defeat these actors, rather than how to accommodate 
them. Especially terrorist groups pose a clear danger to humanity, as their threat has 
been gaining visibility recently. This, in turn, reflects the imperative of a more effective 
multilateral system capable of facing this as well as other challenges.     
 
D. Implications of Power Diffusion 
Kofi Anan, past UN Secretary General, used to reiterate that current post-war 
multilateral institutions were built for an international world, but we now live in a 
global world. In such an environment, the notions of sovereignty and state authority, 
whether political or economic, are going downhill. In addition, the conventional wisdom 
that nation-states are the building blocs of the international system is undertaking 
substantial metamorphosis. One major force behind these changes is the evolving role 
of non-state actors at the world scene. While governments in general work with non-
state actors to capitalize on their positive impact, provided that this does not infringe on 
their fundamental sovereign rights, non-state actors are continuously challenging nation-
states and the multilateral system and seeking more room and recognition. Drawing 
upon the above analysis, the participation of non-state actors in the international system 
does not come without problems, whether related to legitimacy, integrity, policy 
coherence, quantity or quality of participation. Nonetheless, there seems to be a subtle 
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consensus on the need for cooperation with these actors through mechanisms that 
maximize their positive impact and minimize their side-effects.  
There is the argument that that when a paradigm can no longer keep pace with 
reality or when aberrations outdo theory’s ability to explain them, there emerges a need 
to move onto new approaches (Simons et al, 2007). Indeed, the increasing role of rogue 
and other non-state actors is one indication that some states are falling short on accounts 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity. In other words, while state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity are generally regarded as sacrosanct, rogue and other non-state actors 
proliferate and feed on weak states that are seldom held accountable on the 
responsibilities that come along with these notions. For instance, today, we see terrorist 
groups that take safe heavens on the territories of sovereign states, global networks of 
humanitarian organizations that are usually called upon to fill up sovereignty gaps 
caused by the inability of states to provide for the basic needs of their citizens and weak 
states that barely thrive on foreign aid. Hence, there is a need to revisit the notion of 
sovereignty to make sure all states are not only enjoying its rights, but are also held 
accountable with respect to its responsibilities. This could only be accomplished 
through an adequate revision of some of the fundamental principles of the current 
multilateral system, especially that of sovereignty.   
At the same time, the classic form of multilateralism has come under pressure, 
not only from unilateral policies of great powers, but also from global structural changes 
caused by the growing role of non-state actors and the related weakening of the notion 
of sovereignty. As a result, the current multilateral system needs transformation. In this 
regard, there are some who advocate alternative forms of multilateralism that can 
accommodate non-state actors. One alternative is the so-called "communitarian 
multilateralism" that is claimed to be already thriving (Adler, 2006). This conceptual 
model relies mostly on tendencies of collective-identity formation that derive from 
material power as well as common understandings among groups of actors. In other 
words, actors belonging to different nation-states tend to form their own informal, 
exclusive platforms of multilateral cooperation, which could be identity-defined, such as 
religious associations, or substance-defined such as global forums on security, 
environment and justice. Along similar lines, Slaughter (2004a) argues for a new world 
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order based mostly on horizontal trans-national networks of infra-state authorities such 
as institutions in charge of the environment, health and education. In addition to the 
latter networks, the structure of this contemplated world order also includes vertical 
governmental networks, i.e. supra-national institutions, besides states and networks of 
other non-state actors.  
On the opposite side, there is the argument that the state needs to be 
rediscovered (Luck, 2002). Until recently, the world order was too state centric, with 
little attention to non-state actors. As the current wave of globalization accelerated after 
the end of the Cold War, the failed promise of multilateralism has contributed to 
moving the focus to informal, sub-national and trans-national dimensions of politics. In 
such an environment, civil society, private sector and other non-state actors act as 
driving forces behind the shrinkage in state authority. This shrinkage, however, has 
gone too far, and it is time to return the state to the center stage. Although non-state 
actors can play important roles in addressing global challenges, they can only do that as 
supplements not substitutes for the state. In fact, part of the success of non-state actors 
is due to their intrinsic admission of the centrality of the state as the principal actor to 
partner with. In other words, non-state actors largely matter as much as they influence 
the policies of states, while their power and capabilities cannot be compared to those of 
states. From the legitimacy point of view, it is states that are the basic formal actors in 
international relations, while non-state actors face legitimacy deficits because of lack of 
transparency, accountability and democratic structures (Keohane, 2005). Likewise, 
international organizations play critical roles in many fields, mostly because of their 
constituent blocs, nation-states. However, international organizations do not have wills 
of their own. On the contrary, these organizations themselves and their policies are 
expressions of the wills of their member states.  
Hence, the increasing role of non-state actors is shaking fundamental principles 
of the current international system. In response, the UN and other multilateral 
institutions have been attempting to adapt. Currently, there are two main gates in the 
UN for NGOs and private sector entities to partner with the world body in different 
activities, namely the ECOSOC and the Global Compact respectively. However, these 
mechanisms reflect attempts to turn around the challenges posed by non-state actors 
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rather than to face them upfront (Ruggie, 2003). At the bottom line, the UN has a 
constitutional framework, the Charter, that it cannot override and this framework does 
not recognize non-state actors as actors in the international system. By and large, the 
same applies to the Bretton Woods institutions and other multilateral organizations. 
This, in fact, indicates a need for a holistic approach in dealing with the participation of 
non-state actors in the international system, with due consideration to the determinants 
of the current wave of globalization, its challenges and the opportunities it offers.                     
 
III. Complexity of Current Global Challenges: Global Governance Deficit 
 The previous two sections were mainly focused on actors in the international 
system, whether states or non-state actors. In turn, this section will address the 
imperatives of change emanating from the underlying global environment. While 
globalization has been changing the world, the multilateral system has not been keeping 
pace. Thus, a major factor behind the fomenting of global problems is lack of 
responsiveness at the international political level. In fact, from the Cold War era 
through to the so-called unipolar moment, the international system seems to be in a 
perennial crisis. The afore-mentioned two factors, globalization and lack of adequate 
political response to it, are putting huge pressure on the current multilateral system. In 
response, the system is in labor to adapt.  
 The background provided in Chapter One about the current international setting 
should provide a basis for the discussion of the complexity of current global challenges. 
Especially the background related to the problems of the multilateral system, 
humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty, the main forces of globalization and 
gaps in the distribution of benefits and the resulting divides are of relevance here. The 
discussion in Chapter Five on the relevance of the UN in the world today is also 
pertinent, especially from the perspective that current problems challenge the 
fundamental premises of the current system, including the role of nation-states as 
building blocs, state sovereignty and equality of states. Indeed, this same question of 
relevance is valid for the multilateral system at large. Equally important are the previous 
discussion in this chapter about the challenges posed by non-states actors and changes 
in global power distribution in the aftermath of the Cold War. Thus, for the sake of 
brevity, the focus here will be on the major implications of globalization, together with 
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lack of adequate political responsiveness to it, on the current international system. 
Accordingly, this section will include analyses on the complexity of global governance, 
lack of institutional responses, anti-globalization forces and the rise of nationalism. 
 
A. Complexity of Global Governance 
 To start, he term global governance should be read as management of 
globalization. It emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War, in an environment of 
optimism about the future, as a more appealing alternative to global government. It 
suggests that problems posed by globalization, such as poverty, insecurity and regional 
conflicts, require an international system where there is a degree of order and control 
beyond what currently exists. But, while the term globalization is relatively novel, the 
underlying phenomenon is not. In fact, it has been in existence for centuries and the 
only difference today is that it is growing thicker and quicker (Nye, 2002). In this 
regard, the changes in the nature of the current wave of globalization are mostly related 
to advances in the fields of information, communication and transportation, which 
increase the density of interdependence throughout the globe. As a result, an event at 
one end of the world could have profound effects on countries and peoples at the other 
end. Environmental interdependence is perhaps the oldest form of globalization, and the 
recent wave of globalization has only accentuated its impact, such as in the case of 
climate change. For instance, recent problems of ashes from volcanic activity in Iceland 
demonstrate how the global environment should be viewed as one integral unit. 
Moreover, there has risen some sort of globalization of health concerns, where endemics 
challenge all kinds of measures to hinder them from spreading across borders. Yet 
again, phenomena, such as the avian flu, are not novel; they only used to be less 
destructive. Historically, the first smallpox endemic was recorded in Egypt in 1350 B.C. 
and spread to China, Europe and the Americas over centuries, as connectivity was yet 
feeble. Other examples of global event linkages include news that flow in no time and 
people far from incidents developing reactions and attitudes toward them. As a result, 
globalization has contributed to the development of some kind of international public 
opinion that is putting pressure on governments and multilateral institutions.  
  In addition, actors in any part of the world could have fairly easy access and 
impact on any other part. Non-state actors, such as business corporations, NGOs and 
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terrorist groups, internationalize their activities using modern technologies. Some of 
these actors are also growing more agile in building international networks that could 
even challenge strict state controls. In particular, terrorist groups, like Al-Qaeda, are of 
special concern to the modern world. As has been detailed in Chapter One, these groups 
use globalization to enhance their outreach and further their causes. And in some cases, 
they create cooperative links with other state and/or non-state actors. Because the world 
is infested with intractable problems and political responses to these problems are 
inadequate, the threat of terrorism is becoming all the more alarming. And though still 
purely theoretical, the possibility that terrorist groups could get their hands on some 
types of WMD is so horrifying that world governments are already mobilizing to 
foreclose it.      
 Furthermore, globalization has a double-edge relationship with individuals. 
From one perspective, direct public participation in shaping global affairs has markedly 
increased due to higher connectivity. For instance, ordinary people invest huge sums of 
money in stock markets, trust funds and financial institutions across the globe, and they 
speculate, gamble and shop online. As the case of the Southeast Asian financial crisis of 
1997-1998 demonstrates, decisions of individual foreign investors could create chain-
reactions that could lead to financial and economic crises. From an opposite perspective, 
globalization has strong impact on people, as it has some irresistible cultural and social 
dimensions resulting from the flows people and ideas. In this regard, cultural interaction 
should be viewed as a two-way, two-prong process. In other words, globalization 
creates gives and takes, generalizations and exceptions, amity and apprehension…etc. 
Thus, while globalization has sometimes been equated with Americanization, it also 
creates backlashes against American culture and even contributes to attempts to change 
that culture from within. A less appealing depiction of cultural interaction is that of the 
controversial theory of clash of civilizations, which focuses on negative aspects and 
downplays those positive.         
 On one hand, globalization is often associated with privateness, due to its 
individualistic premises. It widens personal freedoms, promotes business 
entrepreneurship and opens wider doors for communication and travel. On the other 
hand, it is also about publicness, due to its effect on making peoples' lives more 
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interdependent. Notably, global linkages create GPGs, where rights and responsibilities 
could hardly be differentiated. These GPGs are public, as opposed to private goods, 
with benefits or costs, as in the case of GPBs, that extend across countries, regions and 
peoples (Kaul et al, 2002). Thus, globalization, GPGs and GPBs are inextricably linked. 
Examples of GPGs include economic wellbeing and security, while examples of GPBs 
include terrorism and environmental degradation. For instance, climate change affects 
the lives of people everywhere, but no one country has distinct rights to environmental 
preservation and responsibilities on global warming are overlapping among 
stakeholders at all levels. No doubt, the development and provision of GPGs are issues 
at the core of the multilateral system. And the tradeoff between GPGs and GPBs at any 
point of time determines whether globalization is an opportunity or threat.  
 International linkages, whether economic, political or otherwise, are growing 
increasingly complex and unpredictable. In particular, these linkages are visible in the 
economic field, due to the various forces of economic globalization. Hence, 
globalization is associated with a great deal of sophistication and uncertainty. As a 
result, people and countries around the world feel a great deal of insecurity (Kaul et al, 
2002). On one side, industrial countries make up a fearful North, living in timid 
prosperity, with even the most powerful countries growing unable to go it alone. On the 
other side, developing and poor countries view globalization as a predatory force that is 
impinging on their autonomy and providing opportunities that are hard to realize and 
risks that are similarly hard to avoid. However, all governments, multilateral 
institutions, corporations and other international actors have problems in 
comprehending, exploiting and/or combating network effects and sophisticated 
linkages. As a result, for example, international economic crises are recurring in spite of 
efforts to prevent them. In addition, responses to the challenges of globalization are 
variable (Nye, 2002). One possible reaction is to embrace change, as exemplified by 
democratization and free-market transformation in Eastern Europe after the collapse of 
the former USSR. Another possible reaction could be withdrawal from globalization, 
such as reversals of integration in the world economy to reduce the negative spillovers 
of global economic crises. A third, more balanced approach could be to accommodate 
and adapt to global forces, like in the case of countries applying free-market economic 
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policies, while maintaining relatively large governments and bolstering compensation 
mechanisms directed to less advantaged sectors.  
 
B. The Institutional Challenge: Global Governance Deficit 
 A major factor behind the fomenting of global problems is lack of political 
responsiveness to them. In fact, there is a clear lack of order in the international system 
today. And it seems that the system has only laid down the fetters of the Cold War to 
surrender to the shackles of superpower dominance, great power indifference and lack 
of vision and political will required to face the challenges of the day. Notably, until the 
early 1990s, the system was struggling its way in the midst of bipolar animosity. After a 
short bout of optimism in the aftermath of the Cold War, it turned out that the shift from 
bipolarity to unipolarity was yet another daunting challenge facing the system. Ever 
since then, the system has been struggling to readapt to the new realties of world 
politics. In the meantime, it seemed that unipolarity gave the world superpower more 
leeway of hegemonic practices, as demonstrated in the case of the war on Iraq. Thus, it 
emerged that the Cold War had one important advantage; that of relative order, where 
each of the two superpowers was wary of the other. As a result, the world witnessed an 
era of relative peace, security and stability. In contrast, unipolarity deprived the world of 
the balance needed to maintain that relative order (Kurth, 2007).  
 It is only normal that the multilateral system reacts to developments in the 
surrounding environment. However, especially over the last two decades, multilateral 
reactions to globalization have been mostly slow and ineffective. In addition, power 
shifts on the world political map and power diffusion from states to non-state actors are 
increasingly rendering the current system illegitimate - in view of its outdated power 
formula - and irrelevant to the rapidly evolving surrounding environment. Over and 
above, there seems to be a dilemma of both too much and too little or no 
multilateralism. While most arguments suggest that there is a proliferation and 
overlapping of multilateral institutions, there are others that contend to the contrary. For 
instance, Drezner (2008) argues that one of the major challenges facing the multilateral 
system today is the proliferation of institutions and arrangements, especially since the 
end of the Cold War, with the number of multilateral organizations, international 
conferences and treaties reaching around five thousands in 2003. Reasons behind this 
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include the failure of existing platforms to address global problems and lack of reform 
in these platforms. Along similar lines, Forman and Segaar (2006) argue that the current 
international political environment reflects a proliferation, fluctuation and overlapping 
of formal and informal governance structures.  
 In addition, there has been a steady increase in the number of reforms in existing 
multilateral institutions and in new institutions and new institutional arrangements, 
including hybrid arrangements involving different actors such as the Global 
Environment Facility and the Global Compact. Furthermore, there has been an 
explosion in the number of extra-institutional responses taking the form of ad hoc, 
informal forums such as the G-8 and the G-20. In particular, reliance on diverse 
multilateral responses is clear in the contexts of the global war on terrorism and WMD 
anti-proliferation efforts. Indeed, the big number of multilateral structures, formal and 
informal, could contribute to efficacy in facing the challenges of globalization. It may 
imply that formal rules regulate more of the behavior of actors, especially powerful 
ones, thus creating what could be called “institutional thickness,” i.e. deepening of 
governance rules. However, the multiplication and overlapping of structures addressing 
the same issues also raise questions as to the effectiveness, accountability and 
sustainability of global governance; pose challenges to the authority of formal 
governance structures; and encourage forum shopping and dilutes the sense of legal 
responsibility. In addition, overlaps and gaps in and between international and regional 
structures and arrangements make coordination among their activities a very 
challenging task (Jones, 2010). In particular, this results in higher transaction costs and 
imposes resource strains on stakeholders, especially the poorer ones. Furthermore, while 
new and more flexible arrangements can give existing institutions healthy competition, 
the increasing institutional density complicates the vision of reforming the multilateral 
system, as it is usually hard to eliminate or even relocate power within existing 
institutions (Stewart, 2010).     
  On the other side, multilateral institutions fail to make a difference on some 
fronts. Paradoxically, this is clearer in the economic field than in the political field, 
though the world is far more interconnected economically than politically. In fact, the 
evolution of the international economy is decided more by the acts of a small group of 
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influential states than by carefully charted multilateral actions (Setser, 2009). And this is 
even more the case at times of crisis, where especially powerful states tend to scramble 
to taking unilateral decisions to protect their own interests, which could jeopardize 
relative stability in their vicinity and beyond. With respect to politics, Fukuyama (2007) 
argues that the world today does not have enough multilateral institutions to confer 
legitimacy on collective actions. For instance, the UN failed to either endorse or prevent 
the USA’s war on Iraq. Hence, establishing new institutions that can better balance the 
considerations of legitimacy and effectiveness should be a prime task for the coming 
generations. In addition, while the world is ripe with vertical hierarchical institutions, 
such as the UN, it needs institutions that can guarantee horizontal responsibility among 
states, thus holding each state accountable for its acts or lack thereof. In other words, the 
increased interdependence among states and the differences in power and influence 
among them necessitate collective forums capable of regulating state acts and ensuring 
overall wellbeing.      
 Even more obviously, Dimitrov et al (2007) refer to a lack of multilateral 
responses in some areas of international relations. For instance, there are no formal 
multilateral rules to regulate subjects such as tactical nuclear weapons, small arms, 
deforestation, information privacy, cyber space and internally displaced persons. 
However, lack of international agreements in some areas does not imply lack of 
governance altogether, as there could be other institutional or informal arrangements to 
address them. On the contrary, the existence of specific multilateral accords does not 
guarantee the implementation and enforcement of their provisions. Nonetheless, 
international agreements are widely held to affect the behavior of states and other 
international actors, even when these agreements are not satisfactorily effective. 
Accordingly, it is clear that although the scene of world politics is predominantly 
marked with proliferation of multilateral regimes, there are some areas where states fail 
to produce multilateral responses or to enforce them. Unfortunately, this is a 
phenomenon that has been suffering from negligence, though it has considerable policy 
implications and transaction costs and as such warrants more attention.   
 The world also seems to suffer from dualism between existing formal rules of 
multilateralism and evolving new modes of international cooperation, which creates 
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dilemmas of global governance (Maull, 2005). While existing formal rules fall short of 
providing adequate responses to the needs of global governance, most new modes lack 
formal grounds and/or suffer from lack of appeal. Informal forums, such as the G-8 and 
the G-20, serve as platforms for important decisions, but lack formal grounds, which 
exposes them to legitimacy questions. Whereas a judicial organization such as the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) lacks appeal and faces charges of politicization. This 
dualism hinders the performance of global governance institutions and deprives them of 
clear future guidelines. No doubt, the world today is characterized with significant 
diffusion of authority, which results in a lack of effective institutional checks and 
balances, persistent turbulence and recurrent violence. Moreover, because of the 
fundamental nature of the dualism, the world does not seem likely to resolve the 
resulting dilemmas any time soon, which elongates and accentuates the ambiguity of the 
rules of global governance.    
 Another interesting argument to highlight here is that even the notion of 
international community is only rhetoric (Appadurai, 2002). It is neither international 
nor community. It is not international because it does not have any internationally 
recognized structure. And it is not a community because it has little to do with peaceful 
coexistence, amicable relations or solidarity. Even the UN does not serve this purpose, 
as it is merely a feeble community of states. Thus, the notion of international 
community is more an expression of aspirations and moral promises that lack factual 
manifestations. In fact, relations between states are premised on power and interests. 
When interests are at stake and power is available, states pursue their interests using all 
kind of tools, sometimes even in violation of internationally agreed rules. Thus, the 
prevailing vision of survival is mostly individualistic not collective. Hence, it seems 
impossible to adequately restructure and reform global governance. This has not only 
been the case, but is also expected to remain so. Unless interests bring the different 
strands of mankind together, there can be no meaningful change. For instance, after the 
two World Wars, the world was motivated by strong interests to establish the UN to put 
an end to the then prevailing culture of violence. Today, the interest is there, but 
unfortunately not so clear and strong as to warrant a similar response.                            
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C. Anti-Globalization Forces              
 Globalization has brought about many benefits to the world, including in terms 
of trade openness, financial integration and human development. But to many in the 
developing world, it has not delivered on its promises.  The unevenness of globalization, 
especially in economic terms, has led to sharp divides between haves and have-nots. 
This is the most influential discontent about globalization and it is very pervasive 
between and within countries, rich and poor. In addition, there are almost entire 
geographic regions characterized with rampant poverty, including sub-Saharan Africa, 
Central Asia and Andean and Central America. By and large, the West has driven the 
agenda of globalization in such a way to ensure that it receives a disproportionate share 
of its benefits, at the expense of the developing world (Stiglitz, 2002). Although the 
international community has been alert to these problems, they have been eluding 
efforts to confront them and have even increased in relative terms in some parts of the 
world. In particular, there is a lack of clarity regarding the causes of these problems and 
the best remedies to them. This, in turn, results in anger and despair, especially among 
young people, to whom information technology has given means to threaten social 
stability in their countries and beyond, including the wealthy West.  
 Globalization has not only failed to reduce poverty and inequality, but has also 
accentuated problems of economic and political instability and social strife (Ikenberry, 
2000). Economic crises, like the current one, further accentuate income gaps, threaten 
social cohesion and lead to anti-integration measures. Paradoxically, at times of crises, 
the poor usually gets poorer, while financial traders and speculators continue to stack 
profits. As a result, anti-globalization rallies are expanding in the four corners of the 
world. And migration works as a vehicle of contagion among countries, transmitting 
disappointment across borders. Although migration from poorer to richer countries 
tends to reduce inequality in home countries, it also tends to increase inequality in richer 
countries and overall world inequality (Nye, 2002). Economic crises further exacerbate 
migration’s side effects and lead to anti-globalization phenomena such as xenophobia 
and racial discrimination. Also worrisome is that globalization not been environment-
friendly (Sachs, 2008). As a result, environmental activists play an increasing role in the 
anti-globalization movement and impose pressure on governments, regional and 
international organizations to react.      
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 Historically, protests against economic policies are not new, especially in 
developing countries. Instead, what is new is the scale, spread and aggressiveness of 
protests in developed countries and at the global level, especially since the WTO Seattle 
meeting in 1999 (Stiglitz, 2002). In part, this increase comes as a result of increased 
global economic integration (Nye, 2002). While lack of integration deprives some 
countries from some benefits of globalization, it provides buffer zones that could be 
helpful socially and politically. In other words, market inefficiencies and distortions are 
not always harmful. In contrast, deeper global economic integration creates wider pools 
of gains and costs, from which emerges despair about the future. Consequently, 
disaffected people feel more inclined to mobilize against globalization. And some 
NGOs, such as Green Peace and Oxfam, play leadership roles in coordinating and 
supporting this movement. In addition, disadvantaged populations in different countries 
provide a fertile environment for fundamentalism, which makes it easier for terrorist 
groups to find safe heavens, advance their causes and recruit new adherents. 
Unfortunately, this aspect of terrorism has not been adequately integrated in 
international efforts to combat terrorism this far. Instead, the focus is on security 
measures such as police and military actions.   
  One outstanding case of anti-globalization is that of the World Social Forum 
(WSF), which was launched in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2001 to counteract the Davos 
World Economic Forum (WEF). The grassroots of the WSF go back to the great 
uprising of Seattle in 1999, which linked various anti-globalization currents and 
provided the main thrust for the emergence of something totally novel such as the WSF. 
In sum, the WSF is an open forum for social movements, networks, NGOs and other 
civil society actors opposed to neo-liberal capitalism, to debate ideas and formulate 
proposals aimed at creating a more humane, democratic and fair world. Membership of 
the forum expands to include actors from cross social, cultural and geographic 
spectrums. In addition to its annual meetings, the WSF has also introduced regional, 
national, local and thematic meetings and initiatives. Some of the WSF’s main 
objectives are countering the power of global organizations especially in the fields of 
finance and trade, opposing war mongering and growing militarization of international 
relations, resisting unilateralism and reconstructing multilateralism and world 
governance for the sake of more peace (Grzybowski, 2006). In effect, the WSF reflects 
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the growth of hostility toward globalization, and in particular wealth concentration, 
social exclusion and environmental degradation. In addition, it indicates the emergence 
of a global citizenry notion that is based on the rationale of common responsibility and 
destiny. In a way, the emergence this kind of forums is also an outcome or reaction to 
globalization. Strengthening global interdependence provides the means and motivation 
for mobilizing at a global scale against the discontents of globalization. Lately, 
however, the left movement that has long driven forums such as the WSF has been 
losing ground to neo-liberal forces. Notwithstanding all its woes, capitalism has already 
consolidated itself as the globally dominant economic paradigm. Nonetheless, the wider 
framework of globalization, beyond capitalism per se, continues to face serious threats 
from anti-globalization forces, including in terms of stability and security.  
 
D. The Rise of Nationalism 
 In addition to aforementioned anti-globalization forces, nationalism warrants a 
separate treatment as a force that has been on the rise against the dominant trend of 
globalization. It basically relates to the role nation-states play in the context of 
globalization and whether they slow, speed or manipulate it. Strongly related is the 
notion of sovereignty that has been addressed in Chapter One, especially from the angle 
of infringement on state sovereignty. In turn, the focus here is on nationalism, i.e. the 
return to nation-states to help solve problems of globalization, even as they are 
becoming less able to do so individually. To some extent, reemphasizing state 
sovereignty and authority could be a pretext for unilateralism at the time globalization 
has been running past the ability of the world to comprehend and regulate it. Instead of 
further band-wagoning with global mainstream currents, nationalistic forces push to 
withdraw from them. Thus, nationalism has serious anti-globalization and anti-
multilateralism dimensions.  
 Indeed, there seems to be a paradox of dualism in international relations between 
two fundamentally different trends, globalization and nationalism (Maull, 2005). 
Although globalization is meshing the different strands of mankind together, one of its 
byproducts is the rise of differentiation on the basis of identity. This drifting toward 
nationalism comes in response to, or rather in defense against, the perceived harms and 
dangers of globalization. And this reflects a paradox, because at the time global forces 
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require significant international cooperation, nationalistic forces are gaining more 
ground throughout the globe. In the meantime, nation-states are becoming less capable 
and/or willing to address problems with global dimensions. A partial explanation of this 
phenomenon is served by the continuing legacy of Westphalia, where formal political 
power remains strongly invested in nation-states in spite of the pressure of globalization 
to the contrary. In fact, it is mainly due to this kind of nationalism that theories, such the 
end of history, have been proven wrong. In such an environment, it is particularly hard 
to imagine how the world can move forward on solving old regional conflicts, such as 
those in the Middle East and Kashmir, addressing socio-economic and cultural 
transformations and enhancing global security. 
 The rise of nationalism is also associated with developments in the global 
environment in an intriguing way (Zakaria, 2009). First, the end of the Cold War gave 
rise to thoughts that the rest of the world would join the Western wagon, just as 
Germany and Japan did after World War II. These thoughts were proven simplistic, as 
some parts of the non-Western world resists westernization. Indeed, Westernization has 
given way to modernization (Mahbubani, 2008). Today, rather than choosing between 
Westernization and isolation, newly emerging powers appear to follow a third way. 
They integrate with the Western world according to their own terms, while growing 
more willing and capable of reshaping the existing West-centered system. This is 
expected to continue in the future, driven mostly by differences in cultural identities, 
political perspectives, needs and aspirations. Secondly, as economic booms take root, 
nationalism also tends to rise. There are two main factors to explain this relationship, 
one is the gaps that economic globalization creates between haves and have-nots, where 
have-nots usually take anti-globalization reactions. The other relates to growing national 
pride in national success stories such as raising new fortunes, boosting economic 
development and enhancing human development. Thirdly, as globalization proceeds, 
cultural differences between and inside countries become more acute. Although 
globalization carries American and Western cultural influences across the globe, there 
has also been a galvanization of distinct national identities and cultural differences in 
the non-West. Among others, nationalistic responses to Americanization could take the 
form of indifference to it or, in some extreme cases, fundamentalist attitudes. It should 
also be noted that cultural polarization does not only take place between states, but also 
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inside states. Consider for example the cases of the Scots in the UK, the Flemish in 
Belgium or the Sikhs in India. Sub-nationalistic movements and minorities inside 
nation-states strengthen as globalization provides them with easier and quicker means to 
connect and establish community structures. They also strive on political liberalization, 
which gives them more sensible political weights and recognition.                              
Nonetheless, with nationalism or not, nation-states are central to globalization 
and should remain so, otherwise it is unlikely that the world could achieve sustainable 
progress toward a more secure and fair international order or toward better global 
governance. Luck (2002) argues that the forces of globalization have pushed the focus 
too far away from the nation-state as the main player in the international system, to the 
extent of undermining the important and necessary role of the state in regulating and 
sustaining globalization. He adds that it is now time to return the state to the center-
stage. Trans-nationalism, sub-nationalism and even internationalism cannot substitute 
for nation-states. For instance, although the evolution of the notion of human security is 
welcome, it cannot be isolated from the imperative of pursuing and protecting 
conventional state security. In fact, state security may not be sufficient, but it is 
certainly a necessary precondition for overall security. Likewise, regarding multilateral 
institutions as distinct or even competitive players with their member states is 
damaging. States and the problematic world they live in are the main pivots of the work 
of multilateral institutions, and they remain the most important players in the age of 
globalization. Although the international system is vital for addressing global 
challenges, it is nation-states that ultimately provide the required resources and reflect 
the choices of their peoples. The choices and aspirations of these peoples, be it with or 
against globalization, should be respected.  
 No doubt, the private usually comes before the public. And, in the context of this 
subject, the national comes before the international. Nonetheless, catering for individual 
national interests does not have to contradict with common world interests in peace, 
stability, development, environmental protection and many other fields. The world is 
slowly but surely becoming a global society, with problems at one end echoing 
throughout the whole globe. Under these circumstances, one cannot apply the rules of 
wild nature, where the strong preys on the weak. On the contrary, the world needs to 
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further consolidate the culture of global living-together. Unfortunately, in practice, there 
are cases where tight national gains translate into wide global losses. In such cases, 
concerned players tend to take decisions that only reflect their individual national 
interests. Even worse, it seems that no one is willing to start with oneself. Even world 
leading players, be it nation-states or private players, tend to strike bad examples. In 
short, if global good continues to stumble on the rock of lack of political will, then 
global bad is likely to increase.  
 To draw some practical insights on the subject of this chapter, the field 
questionnaire conducted as part of this research had a question on challenges to 
multilateralism. Notably, this questionnaire involved a sample of 50 professionals in the 
fields of diplomacy, international organizations and academia, selected from a diverse 
set of 32 countries, including some of the most powerful and some of the least powerful 
countries (please refer to the Appendix). The participants were asked to arrange in 
ascending order four assumed challenges to multilateralism: complexity of current 
global challenges, proliferation of actors in the international system, global power shifts 
and lack of political will. To allow for proportionality, the answers were given weights 
ranging from four for coming first, three for second, two for third and one point for 
coming fourth (please refer to Chart 2 below). The outcome revealed that complexity of 
current global challenges is considered the most important challenge with 142 points out 
of 499 overall points or about 28.5% of the total. Lack of political will came second 
with 131 points or about 26.5%, global power shifts came third with 118 points or 
around 23.5% and the proliferation of actors in the international system came fourth 
with 108 points or about 21.5%. Generally, these results indicate that the sophisticated 
nature of current global challenges is the main source of the problem. To face up to this 
problem, the world needs collective political will that is clearly lacking. And, in view of 
the central role states play in this regard, global power shifts came third, followed by the 
proliferation of non-state actors, who are more of secondary actors in real life.  
 It should be noted here that two participants thought that lack of political will is 
not relevant and did not tick it at all, insinuating that there is enough political will. 
Nonetheless, this option still came second in the overall order. In addition, the 
participants were asked if they thought there are other relevant challenges to 
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multilateralism. In response, eight participants suggested some specific problem areas, 
including some that could come under the complexity of global challenges, such as 
global interdependence and the problems of the international financial architecture, 
climate change and organized crime. Participants also highlighted some other problems 
that could come under lack of political will, such as power politics, informal 
multilateralism, lack of accountability at local and international levels, lack of 
consensus in multilateral forums, North/South divisions, lack of leadership, lack of 
acceptance for gradual evolution on the side of proponents of multilateralism and lack 
of representativeness of small states in some multilateral forums. Of course, in total, this 
does not make an exhaustive list of challenges to multilateralism. Instead, the main 
focus here is on the most important such challenges.     
 
Chart (2) 
Challenges to Multilateralism 
Complexity of 
Current Global 
Challengs
28%
Proliferation of 
Actors in the 
International System
22%
Global Power Shifts
24%
Lack of Political Will
26%
  
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of a field questionnaire (see the 
Appendix).        
  
In sum, human activity is becoming global, especially from the technological 
and economic points of view. Unfortunately, globalization has been outdoing global 
governance on all fronts. Historically, this has usually been the case. Nonetheless, 
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today, globalization poses daunting challenges at an unprecedented scale. It even seems 
that the world is running against the acceptable limits of globalization (Griffin, 2003). 
In countries throughout the world, public support to international integration is fading 
on the backdrop of disaffection with its outcomes. Main reasons behind this include the 
sense of exclusion, social strife and perceived injustices. This dissatisfaction is further 
compounded by the inability to go it alone. Nationalistic and unilateral policies even by 
the most powerful states are growing unproductive and untenable. At the same time, it 
has been proven once and more that globalization will not correct itself automatically. 
Instead, it continues to create sharp divides between haves and have-nots, face strong 
anti-globalization movements and defy efforts aimed at tackling its threats. Certainly, 
globalization is creating demand for GPGs and the supply of these goods has been short 
of meeting the expectations. Hence, it is time to come together to revisit global 
governance in terms of policies and institutions in order to create an international 
system with institutions capable enough of providing GPGs. 
  
Historically, however, shocks, rather than stress, have been the primary triggers 
of change in the international system, which usually only comes after global crises 
erupt. Pressures from conflicting sources used to build up for long periods in the 
absence of adequate remedies, and when released, these pressures create chaos. Such 
was the case with the two World Wars I and II, the terrorist attacks against the USA in 
2001 and several others. Likewise, the previous cycle of globalization ended in 1914 on 
the footprints of fragmentation, lack of mutual understanding and tendency toward 
violence. Today, the international system is similarly infested with problems that hinder 
it from confronting the challenges of globalization and expose it anew to the risk of 
chaos (Evans et al, 2010). There is a clear lack of order in the system, and the world is 
becoming a precarious place because of rapid globalization and lack of adequate policy 
response to it (Maull, 2006). However, the current cycle of globalization could and 
should fare better, especially that all powers and stakeholders, conventional and 
ascending, profit from it. To turn this into a fact, there has to be a shift in the quality and 
quantity of multilateral cooperation, with the prime objective of readjusting and 
safeguarding the direction of globalization.  
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Abstract 
  
Cognizant of the imperative of reform to face evolving global challenges, 
multilateral institutions have outlined various reform agendas over time. This is the case 
of the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions, while the WTO is coming under 
increasing pressure to follow suit. Nonetheless, current reform agendas are viewed with 
a great deal of ambivalence as to their sufficiency and progress on their implementation 
has been slow at best. The grooming of the G-20 to be the hub of global economic 
governance is perhaps the most outstanding evolution in this field over the last few 
years. No doubt, the G-20 has contributed to containing the last international financial 
crisis. However, it is yet to address the underlying problems of global economic 
governance. In parallel to multilateral cooperation, academia has been active in debating 
the problems of global governance and proposing solutions for them. In this regard, 
there are three noteworthy proposals: the trans-governmental networks approach, the 
power club/executive committee approach and the twin proposals of concert of 
democracies and “global NATO.” Each of these proposals has its pros and cons. More 
specifically, the trans-governmental networks approach presents an enlightened 
perspective on the evolution of modes and nodes of multilateral cooperation. However, 
it does not warrant a true new world order, as it purports, and does not even promise 
sufficient change in world politics. In contrast, setting up global power clubs carries 
important practical benefits, including in terms of effectiveness, coherence and resource 
mobilization. Nonetheless, this idea wanes on legitimacy grounds in comparison with 
such formal forums as the UN. Finally, the twin proposals for a concert of democracies 
and a “global NATO” raise controversy, driven by biased theoretical zeal. Moreover, 
the latter proposals suffer from lack of coherence and even relevance to the very nature 
of international cooperation.  
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Chapter Three 
Current Reform Agendas and Ideas in Debate 
 
 After resting the case of the imperatives of reform, one moves to responses to 
these imperatives so far, whether in multilateral institutions or in the literature. 
Cognizant of the need for continued relevance and the basic instinct of defense against 
new threats, multilateral institutions have developed extensive reform agendas over 
time. In fact, multilateral reform is a natural ongoing process similar to human 
evolution. However, one has seen a plethora of reform agendas and proposals in 
multilateral institutions since the end of the Cold War. For the sake of this research, one 
will focus on current reform efforts in the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO 
and the G-20, with an additional focus on those major reforms related to membership, 
voting rights and other crucial functional reforms. As for reform ideas in the literature, 
their magnitude is enormous. To keep focus, the research will only address holistic 
reform proposals or those that carry substantial implications, rather than general, vague 
statements and expressions. After an extensive literature review, it appears that there are 
three such noteworthy proposals: the trans-governmental networks approach, the power 
club/executive committee approach and the twin proposals of concert of democracies 
and “global NATO.” In addition, there are some useful academic arguments related to 
reform agendas in specific multilateral institutions, which arguments will be included in 
the part on current reform agendas in multilateral institutions.     
 
I. Current Reform Agendas 
 There seems to be a fever of reforms in multilateral institutions at large. These 
reforms are mostly motivated by the general consensus that the multilateral system does 
need comprehensive reforms to cure its woes, which have become all the more 
problematic over the last few years. They extend from the UN system to global 
economic institutions, especially the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. In addition, 
the informal architecture of global economic governance has witnessed some major 
rearrangements, especially with the upgrading and transformation of the G-20 to 
become the hub of global economic decision-making instead of the G-8. Accordingly, 
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this section will address the most significant items on the current reform agendas in the 
aforementioned institutions and forums, in addition to some related, important 
arguments in the literature.      
  
A. Reform in the United Nations 
In the aftermath of the war on Iraq, the UN Millennium Review Summit in 2005 
was accompanied by public aspirations for large reforms in the UN system. Member 
states, however, demonstrated that they were not so much displeased with the 
performance of their organization (Luck, 2005). Consequently, the Outcome Document 
of the summit reflected a middle compromise that was met with mixed reactions, some 
of which described it as disappointing (de Kerckhove, 2008). In contrast, others, 
especially in formal state circles, welcomed that compromise and described it as 
ambitious. In the final analysis, the Outcome Document set the floor for yet the most 
expansive and purposeful reform agenda in the history of the world body. This reform 
agenda relates to all the UN principal organs, its specialized agencies and Secretariat. 
Moreover, it extends beyond structural aspects to touch on thematic and cross-cutting 
activities. In particular, reforms in the Security Council receive special glamour, for 
they are the most sensitive politically, the most far-reaching and the most contentious. 
These reforms relate, among others, to the membership, the veto right and the Council’s 
working methods. On the contrary, reforms in the General Assembly are mostly 
procedural in nature, with focus on the Assembly’s agenda, working methods, mandates 
and the role of its rotating presidency. Likewise, reforms in the ECOSOC are focused 
on its agenda, procedures and methods of work. In addition to the existing UN organs, 
the Outcome Document established some new organs, the most important of which are 
the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) as a principal organ and the Peacebuilding 
Commission. The document also launched major reforms in the structure and 
management practices of the Secretariat. Given the focus of this research, Security 
Council reforms and those other reforms related to the relationship between the Council 
and the General Assembly will be addressed in further detail in this subsection.  
This subsection will shed light on proposals of reform in the Council, with 
special focus on the functional aspects of its work and the latest developments in the 
reform process (please refer to the detailed analysis in Chapter Five on the question of 
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representative legitimacy in the UN Security Council). According to the mandate 
granted by the 2005 Millennium Review Summit, negotiations on Security Council 
reform have commenced in February 2009, with focus on five key issues: categories of 
membership, the question of veto, regional representation, size of an enlarged Council 
and its working methods and the relationship between the Council and the General 
Assembly. In May 2010, the facilitator of the negotiations presented a first draft of a 
negotiation text that is basically a summarized compilation of all state positions. 
Though preliminary, this is a significant move toward the more arduous task of inking 
down a consensus agreement. In fact, the culmination of the reform process into the 
negotiating stage is largely due to efforts by those UN member states seeking new 
permanent seats, such as the Group of Four (G-4) (India, Japan, Germany and Brazil), 
besides the support that the rationale of reform enjoys in many parts of the world.       
The veto right is generally viewed in non-veto member states as a symbol of an 
undemocratic and unjust world order (Please also refer to Chapter Five). The report of 
the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change described it as an 
anachronistic relic in a world marked with democratic transformation (UN, 2004). In 
contrast, proponents argue that the veto is one important reason why the UN could 
overcome the turbulences of the Cold War and survive until today (Luck, 2003). It 
provides great powers with an invincible guarantee that their interests could be 
safeguarded. In practice, however, the veto has crippled the Council in many instances 
where international peace and security were at stake. This is particularly evident in the 
case of old conflicts such as the one in the Middle East. Moreover, the veto has 
discredited the world body and deprived it of much of the formal and public support it 
needs to carry out its mission. Notably, although the Council is considered the most 
prestigious multilateral organ and UN member states scramble for its two-year non-
permanent seats, it needs political support and material resources from the UN 
membership to help it maintain international peace and security. With some member 
states questioning the legitimacy of the veto and the effectiveness of the Council, it 
finds it increasingly difficult to secure the cooperation and resources it needs to 
discharge its hefty mandate.    
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Fortunately, the resort to the veto has been on decline since the end of the Cold 
War (Weiss, 2003). However, a backdoor to the veto is removing items off the 
Council’s agenda altogether in diplomatic compromises at the behest of permanent 
members with the veto providing a fallback cushion. In addition, the veto remains a tool 
that is sometimes abused by permanent members to protect their distinct interests at the 
expense of the needs of the UN collective security system. This was particularly evident 
during the Cold War epoch. However, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change concluded that there are no practical means to abrogate the veto, because 
the five permanent states would not give it up (UN, 2004). Instead, the panel invited the 
permanent states to restrict the use of veto to cases where vital interests are at stake and 
to refrain from using it in cases of genocide and gross violations of human rights. In 
addition, the panel recommended that under any reform package, the veto should not be 
extended to other member states. It also proposed the so-called “indicative voting” 
procedure, i.e. the right of any member state to call for an initial public voting where the 
veto is ruled out, provided that such a procedure has no legal force and that a second 
formal session of voting would follow under the veto and other normal rules. Basically, 
these proposals are meant to increase the accountability of permanent states and to take 
a step forward in containing the use of veto.  
In contrast, one proposal in the ongoing negotiations is to gradually abolish the 
veto right. In the meantime, it is also proposed to use such intermediate steps as 
introducing a new rule to the effect that negative votes of permanent states could be 
specified as non-veto votes; limiting that right to cases falling under Chapter VII of the 
Charter on threats or breaches of international peace; precluding it in cases involving 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, terrorism, the election of the Secretary General, 
enforcement of ICT judgments, admitting new members, suspending and expelling 
members; requiring permanent states to explain why they cast vetoes; and introducing 
the possibility of overruling vetoes by resolutions in the Council or the General 
Assembly (UN, 2010a). Notably, the permanent states stand firmly against extending 
this right to new permanent states. However, the African group is asking for two new 
permanent seats with veto right until that right is totally abolished and some other 
member states support this position. In contrast, the G-4 is ready to accept permanent 
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seats without veto right until the question of its extension to new permanent states has 
been decided as part of a future comprehensive review.                
The revised Security Council negotiation text contains several other positions 
and proposals aiming at the veto right (UN, 2010b). In response, permanent states refuse 
any tinkering with their veto privilege. No doubt, producing a negotiation text is a 
staunch step ahead on the path to Security Council reform. However, in view of the 
sensitivity of the subject and the wide divergence among the proposals included in the 
text, it seems insurmountable to reconcile these proposals together. The real debacle in 
this regard, and with respect to UN reform in general, is that no Charter amendment can 
pass without having two-thirds majority vote in the UN General Assembly and the same 
in national ratifications, including those of the five permanent states. Thus, in theory, 
reforms could be defeated by a single veto. In practice, however, it never happened 
before that one or more permanent members stood against a Charter amendment after 
being adopted by the General Assembly, obviously because the political cost of such an 
action would be disproportionately high. This, in fact, indicates that there always 
remains a possibility to press reforms against the will of some of the permanent states, 
which becomes even more possible if the permanent five fail to strike joint common 
positions on these reforms. Yet, looking at the map of different state positions, one sees 
a great deal of fragmentation. While the AU is demanding two permanent seats with 
veto right, the G-4 can live with permanent seats without veto right, and both groups 
face resistance from the so-called Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group. In such an 
environment, it is relatively easy for reform opponents to practice divide and rule tactics 
to derail the whole process. 
As has been mentioned earlier, the composition of the Security Council as it 
stands today reflects the power map and political realities in the aftermath of World War 
II, albeit with the addition of four non-permanent seats in 1965. Instead, the structure of 
the Council should reflect current power distribution for the sake of effectiveness and 
legitimacy. Cognizant of this fact, there seems to be a general consensus on the need to 
enlarge the membership of the Council in both its permanent and non-permanent 
categories. There are also several proposals concerning the so-called regional 
representation, in view of the basic UN principle of equitable regional representation. 
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However, there is no agreement on what should be the size of the enlarged Council nor 
on the names of states to take new permanent (whether with or without veto) or non-
permanent seats. Proposals concerning the size of the enlarged Council range from 21 to 
26 seats, with the number of new permanent seats ranging from one to six (UN, 2010b). 
One main criterion behind these proposals is maintaining an agile Council. Nonetheless, 
some states contend that a Council with 21-26 members would be too large to be 
effective (Weiss, 2008). On the other side, ambitious players, including the G-4 and the 
African Group, insist on the legitimacy of their demands for new seats. Even more 
difficult is deciding on which states take permanent seats. For instance, the G-4 has 
regional opponents such as Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico, Italy, Spain and South Korea. 
And within the African group, there is a heated competition between South Africa, 
Nigeria and Egypt, which states also have opponents from within their region. To a 
lesser extent, there is another competition on which regions would be assigned 
additional non-permanent seats, especially among Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
Eastern Europe. Over and above, permanent states have starkly different positions on 
the quests of different states and regions for new seats, especially permanent ones. 
Hence, positions on the size of the enlarged Council and which states take new seats are 
no less divergent than those on the veto right.         
In the framework of this research, a field questionnaire was administered on a 
sample of 50 professionals in the fields of diplomacy, international organizations and 
academia, selected from a diverse set of 32 countries, including some of the permanent 
five and some of the least powerful countries (please refer to the Appendix). This 
questionnaire included two questions related to the Security Council, concerning the 
enlargement and the veto power. Firstly, in an attempt to measure the level of support to 
enlarging the Council, 33 participants or 66% expressed strong agreement and 12 
participants or 24% expressed simple agreement, which makes an overwhelming 
majority of 45 participants or 90% of the sample in support of enlargement. In contrast, 
only two participants or 4% were neutral, three participants or 6% disagreed and no one 
expressed strong disagreement. Obviously, this wide support to enlargement derives 
from the recognition that the Council's membership structure today does not reflect the 
real distribution of power in the world. And this is not only an issue of fairness and 
legitimacy, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, an issue of effectiveness, as 
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the lack of representation of some of the important players could deprive the Council of 
some of the means it needs to carry out its mission. 
Secondly, the questionnaire sought the views of the sample participants on 
whether the veto right should be abrogated, maintained or extended to potential new 
permanent members. To allow for proportionality, the answers were given weights 
ranging from three for coming first, two for second and one for third (please refer to 
Chart 3 below). The summation of points shows the abrogation of the veto altogether to 
be the most favorite option with 113 from 297 overall points or around 38% of the total. 
In contrast, extending this right to potential new permanent members came second with 
104 points or around 35%. Finally, the option of keeping the status quo came third with 
80 points or around 27%. No doubt, this is a very sensitive issue that relates to the 
dearest interests of some countries, especially the current permanent five and future 
potential ones. But the veto right has increasingly become the focus of criticism from a 
great majority of countries and other stakeholders, in view of its role behind recurrent 
paralysis in the Council. The results of questionnaire reflect just that with a simple 
majority supporting the abrogation of the veto. However, this option seems practically 
impossible, given the public determination of the permanent five to oppose it. In 
contrast, keeping the status quo seems more pragmatic, though it does not help solve the 
problems caused by the veto. Finally, extending this right to potential newcomers may 
be justified on the ground of fairness, but this faces opposition from the permanent 
members and might even further complicate the problems of the Council. It should be 
noted, however, that one participant only ticked this last option, indicating that he 
thought this is the only warranted way forward of reform.   
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Chart (3) 
Suggested Reform Options for the Veto 
Keeping the 
Status Quo
27%
Extension to New 
Permanent 
Members
35%
Abrogation
38%
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of a field questionnaire (see the 
Appendix).  
 
In addition to the questions of veto and enlargement, the relationship between 
the Security Council and the General Assembly is another important subject that 
receives little attention in the literature. Reading through the revised Security Council 
negotiation text, several member states refer to the unique posture of the Assembly with 
its universal, equal membership, the importance of ensuring the general mandate of the 
Assembly in all matters of international cooperation and the need to reverse the 
marginalization of the Assembly and the encroachment on it by the Council (UN, 
2010b). This seems to be an issue of great importance and convincing rationale, 
especially given recurrent failures of the Council on subjects of international peace and 
security. No doubt, enhancing and ensuring respect to the powers of the Assembly is in 
line with democratic values. Nonetheless, great powers, especially those enjoying the 
veto privilege, prefer to act through the Council. This helps them maximize their own 
influence on the direction of the world body, avoid the bureaucratic demands of doing 
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business in the Assembly and ensure the focus and effectiveness of debate. In addition, 
some states have repeatedly expressed positions to the effect that endorsements of using 
force should come solely from the Council (Weiss, 2003). In a way, this is a reflection 
of a desire to regulate the use of force, but it could also be a pretext to marginalize the 
Assembly. In contrast, proposals to enable the Assembly to interfere in the area of peace 
and security do not have to contradict with the primary authority of the Council in this 
area, for they are by nature limited to cases where the Council fails to act promptly to 
prevent or put an end to hostilities.  
In fact, the Charter provides that the General Assembly may call the attention of 
the Security Council to situations that are likely to threaten international peace and 
security, but the former cannot make any recommendation concerning matters on the 
agenda of the Council. Nonetheless, the historical Assembly’s resolution 377 of 1950, 
the “uniting for peace” resolution, came as an exception to this Charter rule. This 
resolution authorizes the Assembly, in cases where the Council fails to discharge its 
primary responsibility on maintaining international peace and security, to consider the 
matter and make appropriate recommendations to member states, including the use of 
force when necessary. Notably, in the course of the ongoing negotiations, some member 
states emphasize the importance of the uniting for peace procedure in cases where the 
veto hinders action by the Council (UN, 2010b). Historically, resolution 377 was used 
three times to authorize the use of force (the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, the Soviet 
intervention in Hungary in 1956 and the Congo conflict in 1960). In total, the procedure 
was invoked to hold 10 Assembly emergency special sessions, most of which dedicated 
to the Arab Israeli conflict. Although these sessions can only issue recommendations, 
not resolutions as in the case of the Council, those recommendations have to undergo a 
two-thirds majority test in the Assembly, which endows them with heavy moral and 
political power and unique legitimacy. At times, they also serve an important cause, 
which is overturning vetoes made against the interests of at least two-thirds of the UN 
membership.  
The above-mentioned and other UN reform efforts reflect the least common 
denominator of member state positions on the need to reform the world body, in light of 
developments in the surrounding environment and new challenges facing the 
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organization. The magnitude and potential impact of this reform agenda are viewed with 
some degree of satisfaction, but actual progress and end results have been failing the 
expectations. Thus, there is a general feeling of ambivalence about the current UN 
reform process. Indeed, the process is complex, time-consuming and vulnerable to 
external factors, most importantly changes in the surrounding political environment, 
such as those related to the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the process is focused on 
the institutional problems of the world body, i.e. the structures and working methods, 
within limits prescribed by member states. In contrast, political problems, i.e. problems 
related to member state policies, are perhaps even more important. In fact, this kind of 
problems receives little attention in multilateral institutions, where individual country 
policies are treated as matters of state sovereignty. For instance, the problems of Iraq 
war in 2003 were mostly political in nature, and an enlarged and reformed Security 
Council, as per the current reform process, could at best have done a little more to 
prevent the war. The real problem here is that the UN is often too involved in the 
process that it neglects the consequences (Weiss, 2008). In particular, enlarging the 
Security Council is a subject that receives special attention in public policy circles, 
because it touches on sensitive and dear state interests and is considered to be more 
realistic in comparison with the issue of the veto right. In turn, this latter issue seems to 
be traded off for gaining the support of permanent states to enlargement and other 
reforms. Nonetheless, enlargement per se, does not hold any reliable promise of 
improving decision making in the Council or enabling it to make more progress in 
facing global security challenges. Notably, the current Council reform process gives 
little attention to such important dimensions as accountability to the general UN 
membership.   
Certainly, the reform process and its results are all dependent on the UN 
membership and fall within the limits of institutional and constitutional appropriateness 
endorsed by the membership. Nonetheless, some ideas elaborated in the literature 
deserve to be highlighted here. One such idea is to move from the current voting 
system, based mostly on the one-state, one-vote principle, to a weighted voting system 
that reflects real power distribution, similar to the system used in some EU institutions. 
And one approach to put this idea to practice is to use the so-called entitlement 
quotients (EQs), which are calculated using a formula that incorporates equal 
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sovereignty weights, besides percentages of world population and contributions to the 
UN budget over some specified period (Schwartzberg, 2003). In this framework, it is 
thought that introducing such a system could enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of UN organs, such as the General Assembly and the Security Council, and that with the 
new system, the veto should be abolished and the decisions of the General Assembly 
should enjoy binding force similar to that of the resolutions of the Security Council. An 
alternative approach is to use a weighted voting system that incorporates such factors as 
population, economic size and contribution to the UN budget and peacekeeping 
(Fearon, 2008). This alternative goes even further to suggest the creation of a new 
security organ to replace the Security Council and to restrict membership in this new 
organ to democratic countries. In general, the idea of weighted voting rights does not 
lack rationale, but it goes against the interests of a great majority of the UN 
membership, which makes it largely infeasible.  
In contrast to the rhetoric of reform in multilateral institutions, where the 
political aspects of reform receive little attention, the literature deals extensively with 
the role that the political will of member states play in international cooperation. No 
doubt, this is a subject of great importance, but addressing it is a thorny exercise that 
goes beyond this research. On one side, there can hardly be any significant progress in 
dealing with global problems, if nation-states do not cooperate in good faith. On the 
other side, nation-states are at the center-stage of the multilateral system; they are the 
actors that created multilateral institutions and the ones that prescribe the guidelines of 
cooperation in these institutions, whether in their founding documents or their evolving 
day-to-day work.  
 
B. Reform of Global Economic Governance 
 Over the last few years, institutions of global economic governance have 
witnessed a particularly strong reform momentum. This is largely due to the current 
international economic crisis, the scale of which is judged by some as unprecedented 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Zakaria, 2008). Bretton Woods institutions 
have either passed or are on their way to pass important amendments to their quota and 
voting systems. In addition, these institutions have introduced some new policies and 
programs to face the crisis. The WTO has also introduced some policy tools in response 
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to the economic crisis and the overstretching of the Doha Round of trade negotiations, 
but institutional reform is yet largely absent from the organization’s agenda. Though an 
informal forum, the upgrading of the G-20 and grooming it to replace the G-8 as the hub 
of international economic decision making is widely touted as the most significant 
reform in the field of global economic governance. Accordingly, the following section 
will address the most significant reforms in the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO 
and informal forums of global economic governance. 
The last financial crisis unfolded so gravely that it gave rise to calls for a new 
Bretton Woods system, including from politicians such as Nicolas Sarkozy, the French 
President, and Gordon Brown, former UK Prime Minister (Helleiner, 2010). These calls 
were partially justified by the fact that the crisis turned out to be the worst since the 
Great Depression, which at the time led up to the 1944 Bretton Woods conference. In 
response, in its 2010 spring meetings, the World Bank passed a decision on its quota 
and voting systems, giving more weight to developing and transition economies. This 
decision came in response to persistent demands made by developing countries, 
especially the BRICS. According to the decision, there would be a 3.13% increase in the 
voting power of developing and transition economies, thus bringing their total to 
47.19%, which sums up to a total shift of 4.59% since 2008, when phase one of the 
process was concluded, in addition to a total shift of 6.07% in the voting power of these 
same economies in the affiliated International Finance Corporation (IFC) since 2008. 
Similarly, in its 2006 autumn meetings in Singapore, the IMF adopted an initial ad hoc 
increase in the quotas of the then so-called most underrepresented countries, China, 
South Korea, Mexico and Turkey, by 1.8% of total quotas at the time. In the 2008 
Spring meetings, the IMF also approved a new formula to guide the assessment of the 
adequacy of member states’ quotas, tripled the so-called basic votes for all member 
countries from 250 to 750 each after the erosion of the percentage of these votes to total 
votes over the years and launched a second round of quota system review that is now 
expected to be finalized in the near future.  
Notably, the quota and voting system in the IMF are subject to revision every 
five years, while those of the World Bank do not have a specific periodical discipline. 
Revision is based on a formula used for calculating shares, incorporating measures of 
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GDP, economic openness, variability of the current account, capital flows and the stock 
of international reserves. However, decisions to alter quota distribution are usually met 
with resistance from countries on the losing side, typically developed countries that 
usually have to sacrifice shares and votes to emerging countries. There are also some 
other problems with quota systems (World Bank, 2009a and IMF, 2009). First, there is 
the erosion of the weight of basic votes, due to consecutive increases in shares, which 
mostly affects the participation of small countries in decision making. Second, the quota 
systems in the two Bretton Woods institutions are linked, with the World Bank using 
the formula developed by the IMF, although the missions and functions of the two 
institutions are substantially different. Third, the fact that the World Bank does not have 
automatic revisions of its quota system leads to more voice gaps in that institution.  
 It is true that since the 2007-2008 crisis, one has seen some innovation in global 
financial governance, but reform has been limited and hopes for a new Bretton Woods 
have been disappointed. Indeed, what is needed is more than those reforms already done 
or scheduled in quota and voting systems (World Bank, 2009a and IMF, 2009). One 
problem that is usually flagged by developing countries is the monopoly on the top 
posts in the two institutions, where the president of the World Bank comes from the 
USA, while the director of the IMF comes from the EU. Second, the 85% special-
majority required for decisions on such subjects as constitutional amendments, capital 
increases and adding new members to boards grants the USA a veto privilege, in view 
of holding more than 15% of the votes in the two institutions. Third, the executive 
boards of the two institutions have enclaves of appointed members (five appointed by 
the biggest shareholding countries, the USA, Japan, Germany, France and the UK) and 
country-specific elected members (three from China, Russia and Saudi Arabia), whereas 
the rest get elected to represent variable groups of member states. These are problems of 
concern for the rest of the membership, especially developing countries that lament their 
lack of representation.  
With respect to the functions of the two institutions, the Committee on IMF 
Governance Reform highlighted one major problem area, which is the need to extend 
the Fund’s surveillance mandate beyond exchange rate policies to macroeconomic 
policies, safeguarding measures and financial flows, including through monitoring 
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capital account movements (IMF, 2009). The Committee also referred to the importance 
of enhancing the Fund’s effectiveness and accountability, increasing its financial 
resources, reinforcing its capabilities and expertise, especially in areas such as 
macroeconomic coordination and financial and capital account issues, in order to enable 
the Fund to ensure global financial stability. In addition, the Committee made 
recommendations on ensuring timelier decision-making through reinvigorating the 
Council of Ministers and Governors and on the need for clearer division of labor 
between the Executive Board and the Fund’s management. On the other side, the High-
Level Commission on World Bank Group Governance underlined the historical 
challenge the World Bank is facing with respect to the need to bridge persistent 
developmental gaps, including by making the best use of its cross-country development 
experience (World Bank, 2009a). For this sake, the Commission highlighted 
weaknesses related to insufficient institutional accountability, inadequacy of strategic 
planning, lack of resources, lack of aid effectiveness and mission creep. The 
Commission also recommended elevating the representation in the Bank’s board to the 
level of ministers, more delegation of authority on operations to the management, the 
establishment of an advisory council to support the board and strengthening internal 
management.                                 
In particular, there are many reasons to worry about the future of the IMF and to 
fear that the Fund might slip into obscurity if it does not undertake needed reforms 
(Dieter, 2006). Consequently, calls for IMF reform have been building up over the last 
few years. In this regard, there are two issues that require immediate attention. One is 
the governance structure of the Fund, where members belonging to the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) control the Fund’s policies and 
programs, while the countries most affected by its policies are primarily developing 
countries on the receiving side. The second issue is the need for the IMF to provide a 
reliable safety net against financial crises by guaranteeing satisfactory levels of crisis 
prevention and management. For this purpose, the Fund needs to review its policies and 
lending tools, otherwise alternative financial governance structures will continue to 
evolve and vulnerable countries will keep on developing their own mechanisms both 
individually and in groups. For instance, one might consider the cases of East Asia and 
Latin America, two important regions that have turned their backs on the Fund after 
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suffering severe financial crises. If this course of action continues, the Fund might find 
itself marginalized in the midst of an alien environment. Moreover, the IMF faces a 
crisis of relevance and credibility, which stems from three major sources. One is bias 
and political interference in the Fund’s work, especially at times of financial crises. 
Second, Fund policies, based on outworn market efficiency presumptions, have, in 
several cases, resulted in deepening recessions rather than helping overcome them 
(Stiglitz, 2002). Third, general IMF policy recommendations, have not only fell short of 
generating sufficient benefits for developing countries, but have also backfired 
frequently as a result of mounting socioeconomic and political pressures. It is on this 
backdrop that Michel Camdessus, former managing director of the IMF, wonders if the 
Fund’s policies could be humanized (Camdessus, 2001). He further suggests that three 
values should be at the core of IMF reform: global responsibility, solidarity to alleviate 
and eradicate poverty and global citizenship. Along similar lines, it is argued that the 
reform process ongoing in the IMF is focused on finding better ways for doing what the 
Fund already does, but does not address the fundamental question of what would be the 
optimum role of the Fund in the global economy today, which subject requires 
leadership and vision from the key stakeholders (Dodge and Murray, 2006).    
On another side, the World Bank has been expanding its development mandate 
and activities, with eyes on the dream of a world free of poverty. The Bank has also 
accumulated experience and expertise that make it a true repository of knowledge in its 
field. Nonetheless, it seems that developments in the surrounding environment have 
taken their toll on the Bank. Hence, there is very little agreement on whether the Bank 
has been successful in its mission (Weaver and Park, 2007). On one hand, proponents 
boast about statistics indicating decreases in absolute poverty and improvements in 
economic growth and human development. On the other hand, critics challenge these 
claims and provide evidence to support their arguments that the Bank has failed in 
fostering equitable, sustainable growth or human development and has even contributed 
to the deepening of poverty in some parts of the world. The Bank has also become a 
usual target of anti-globalization protests, like its twin institution, the IMF. In fact, both 
insiders and outsiders have come to share a common perception that the Bank is in 
crisis. The most important dimension of this crisis is the legitimacy of the institution, 
especially in view of charges such as lack of democracy in its governance structures, 
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ideological rigidity, pervasive corruption within its aid programs and lack of 
transparency and accountability mechanisms. A second important dimension of the 
crisis is lack of effectiveness, as the Bank suffers from mission creep, implementation 
gaps and a history of mixed loan results. In response, there has been a significant 
decline in demand for Bank lending from middle-income countries, which, in fact, 
raises questions about the very raison d’être of the Bank. Hence, the debate about 
whether to reinvent or rescue the Bank has gained momentum over the last few years. 
And, over the coming few years, the Bank is likely to come under increasing pressure to 
undertake major reforms, but the reform course is likely to face difficulties related to 
politicization and lack of agreement on its specifics.                       
It is important to see the differences between the Bretton Woods institutions and 
the WTO. The latter is widely viewed as the most successful forum of multilateral 
cooperation in the world today (Birkbeck and Melendez-Ortiz, 2009). It is also 
considered a particularly indispensable multilateral institution, given the forces of 
global integration, the formidable volume of trade flowing across borders and the need 
for rules to regulate these flows (Birkbeck and Monagle, 2009). This is partially why 
reform signals in the WTO are weaker than those in other multilateral institutions. Yet, 
there are reasons to worry about the future of the WTO. For instance, trade has been 
evolving from a technical to a politicized subject of strategic importance. As a result, 
trade wars between different economic powerhouses, both industrialized and emerging, 
have been on the rise. In parallel, the work of the WTO has been receiving more official 
and public attention than that of the Bretton Woods institutions. In addition, one could 
see a pattern of aggravating North-South rift in the institution since its launching in 
2005 (Laidi, 2008). This is an obvious difference between the WTO and the Bretton 
Woods institutions, where rules give a few industrialized economies an unpopular 
sweeping control. Indeed, confrontations in the WTO derive from some major sources, 
the most important of which is the relatively even playing field, where developing 
countries have succeeded in projecting a united, strong front, unlike in the Bretton 
Woods institutions.   
Evidently, over the years, developing countries have grown uncomfortable with 
rich countries imposing binding liberalization agendas that reflect the interests of these 
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latter countries, such as trade in services, intellectual property rights, environmental 
considerations and labor standards, while the most pressing interests of developing 
countries, such as agriculture and social security, usually suffer from lack of attention, if 
not strong resistance, from the North. As a result, developing countries have been 
entrenching their collective weight with a new mighty companion, China, which 
contributed significantly to the tumultuous failure of the WTO ministerial meeting in 
Seattle in 1999 and subsequent failures and confrontations. In this light, one could even 
argue that trade liberalization no longer refers to competition between economies, but 
confrontation between social systems (Laidi, 2008). In fact, the WTO was the target of 
the burst of the anti-globalization movement in Seattle and continues to face special 
opposition from an emerging aggressive global public opinion, largely shaped by rising 
civil society actors. This further kindles the North-South divide inside the organization, 
as the two sides hold divergent positions on civil society demands in areas such as the 
global environment, labor standards and human rights. And the malaise of the WTO 
gets further exacerbated by some public tendency to view trade negotiations with 
apprehension, in view of the fact that its benefits are rarely immediate, while its costs 
are sometimes instantly felt.                                  
The Doha Round of trade negotiations has overstretched its timeframes several 
times and continues to lack a clear time horizon. In response, the WTO has introduced 
some reactive policy responses to reinvigorate global trade, such as the so-called aid for 
trade initiative, which is aimed at facilitating foreign aid flows to developing countries 
to help them develop trade-related skills and infrastructure needed to participate and 
benefit from the international trading system. In addition, the institution has undergone 
some light functional and administrative reforms over the last few years, in order to 
consolidate its viability and sustain the progress of the multilateral trading system 
(Birkbeck and Monagle, 2009). Unfortunately, the detrimental implications of the 
current economic crisis have translated into new protectionism measures in many parts 
of the world, thus further complicating the picture and imposing higher hurdles in the 
face of the Doha Round. The World Bank indicates that some 78 protectionist measures 
have been proposed or implemented by developed and developing countries since the 
inception of the crisis (World Bank, 2009b). Hence, lately, there has emerged a buildup 
of calls for wider, substantial WTO reform. And most of these calls are concentrated on 
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flaws in the negotiation methodology, the so-called single undertaking approach. It has 
become obvious that this methodology has several limitations and stands in the way of 
resolving some of the critical items on the agenda of trade negotiations (Tarasofsky and 
Palmer, 2006). For instance, liberalization in the agricultural cluster is a typical case of 
the disadvantages of the single undertaking approach. Agricultural policies, such as 
trade barriers and subsidies, touch on such vital interests as food security, poverty 
alleviation, rural development, the environment and health. It is not clear how 
concessions in these areas could be traded off against liberalization in areas such 
industrial goods and services. As a result, reaching a compromise on these issues has 
been eluding member states. Instead, what the WTO needs is a more focused and better 
integrated approach of liberalization.  
Perhaps an even more compelling argument on the need for WTO reform is that 
of Dadush (2009). He argues that the organization has been a stalwart of progress in 
world trade, but it has become clear lately that it failed to sustain the process of trade 
liberalization and introducing new trade rules. The current economic crisis has further 
accentuated the problems of the organization, as the importance of rules usually 
becomes more obvious at times of slow growth and rising protectionism. Here, the case 
of WTO reform is thought to go beyond the Doha Round, i.e. the conclusion of that 
round cannot undo the need for reform. On the contrary, finalizing the Doha Round 
would even highlight the need for more reforms to meet evolving challenges. Most 
importantly, the organization needs to adopt a more flexible approach to trade 
negotiations, with due consideration to the needs of individual countries and groups. In 
addition, the organization needs to move from its dysfunctional focus on reciprocal 
multilateral concessions to assisting its members to enact autonomous trade reforms, 
promoting cooperation among groups of members that establish new rules or open new 
market opportunities in important sectors, mainstreaming and making good use of the 
momentum created by regional trade agreements, consolidating liberalization efforts 
that have already fruited and/or that require modest steps to widen their pools and 
revisiting its idealistic principles of the most-favored nation and nondiscrimination in 
line with developments taking place outside the organization.                                  
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 Birkbeck and Monagle (2009) have developed a compilation of past and 
prospective reforms in the WTO since its establishment in 1995. They base their work 
on the premise that there is nothing more harmful for an institution than standing still or 
going backward, especially at the time the world is moving fast toward the future. After 
more than 65 years of promoting open international trade, the WTO needs to protect and 
build upon its inheritance. Indeed, it is incumbent to further strengthen the institution so 
that it can better cope with the evolving political and economic environment, address 
the sustainable development challenge of our generation and support the aspiration for 
new achievements. The aforementioned compilation stems from official statements of 
member states, the WTO Secretariat and academic contributions. It includes reforms in 
areas such as WTO management and internal administration; strategic direction, policy 
orientation and decision making; negotiation methodology; monitoring, assessing and 
evaluating performance; dispute settlement; international cooperation and coordination; 
public outreach; capacity building; and research and development. This compilation 
reflects an expanding consensus on the need to undertake some reforms in the 
multilateral trading system, especially in areas such as the structure and methodology of 
trade negotiations.   
 In general, there is hardly any doubt that the financial crisis that started in the 
USA in 2007 delivered a severe blow to the USA’s economy before spilling out to 
European and other markets. It even shook the USA’s status as the leading world 
economy and cast doubts on the fundamental premises of the free-market economy 
(Gelb, 2009). Fortunately, the crisis also gave strong impetus to preceding appeals for 
better regulation and surveillance of financial markets. In addition, it exposed the 
imbalances in the structures of global economic governance and propelled the grooming 
of the G-20 to replace the G-8 as the hub of global economic policy setting (Dieter, 
2009). Of course, one notable difference between these two forums is the expanded 
membership of the latter, where the BRICS are members. Thereafter, the reformed G-20 
succeeded in projecting a united front facing the crisis, which served an important 
reassurance of markets (Sester, 2009). It has also made some progress in dealing with 
old problems, including the regulation and surveillance of financial markets and reforms 
of the Bretton Woods institutions. Consequently, the biannual G-20 summits have come 
to attract more global attention than the G-8 annual summer retreats.  
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 Unfortunately, there are a number of challenges that the renovated G-20 faces. 
First, past experiences indicate that economic decision making is more of a national 
subject than an international one (Sester, 2009). Thus, the move from the G-8 to the G-
20 is no guarantee that economic decision making will change course in the future, 
especially given the fact that the two forums are by and large loose informal ones. 
Second, the G-20 has this far fell short of addressing the root causes behind recurring 
financial and economic crises, including the too-big-to-fail corporations, global 
structural imbalances and beggar-thy-neighbor foreign exchange and economic policies 
(Dieter, 2009). Notably, calls for deeper reforms and new regulations of financial 
markets have been opposed with the counter-argument that what is needed is only better 
implementation of existing regulations. In the meantime, the main factors behind the 
high vulnerability of the world economy to financial crises continues unabated. Third, 
although the G-20 marked a positive shift in international cooperation in the economic 
field, some outsider countries continue to challenge its legitimacy and demand 
admission. Of course, rich economies carry a special responsibility in reforming the 
international financial system, but emerging economies have a special interest in an 
adequately regulated financial system. Hence, the voices of these economies should be 
heeded. Fourth, even with its current membership structure, reaching consensus about 
global economic issues has become more complicated by the bigger pool of the G-20 in 
comparison with the G-8. Fifth, like the G-8, the G-20 lacks any clear mechanism to 
ensure that agreed policies are implemented in good faith, which also derives from its 
underlying informal nature. Sixth, the consolidation of the G-20 and the momentum and 
prestige it acquired gave rise to voices of concern in the UN over the increasing 
marginalization of the organization in international economic decision-making (Jones, 
2010). These are voices of discontent that should be taken seriously, in view of the long 
experience, universality and legitimacy invested in the UN.   
 In particular, it seems that the biggest challenge facing the G-20 is global 
rebalancing, especially given the current state of turmoil in the world economy 
(Dobson, 2009). Of course, rebalancing between the USA and China is at the core of 
global rebalancing. At the time market demand in the USA is hitting historical lows, 
fast-growing economies such as China, Southeast-Asian and Latin-American economies 
need to reduce their reliance on export-led growth and stimulate domestic demand to 
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sustain their growth. The EU also needs to move forward with required structural 
reforms in the euro zone. The G-20 should address this challenge through enacting the 
policies required to put the world economy on the track of balanced, robust and 
sustainable growth (Blustein et al, 2010). In addition, The G-20 should work in earnest 
to conclude the Doha Round of world trade negotiations. Commitments to the effect of 
combating protectionist measures are important but not sufficient to reinvigorate world 
trade. Instead, finalizing the Doha Round should be at the forefront of the agenda of the 
group, for it not only provides a strong cushion against protectionist trends, but also 
constitutes an important step toward sustainable recovery from the current crisis and 
holds more fruits for developing countries than the already declining official 
development assistance. Moreover, the relationship between the G-20 and the UN 
should be mainstreamed, with full respect to the universal mandate of the UN. In fact, 
each of the two forums has its unique advantages and potential, and they need not be on 
opposite tracks.  
 The previously mentioned field questionnaire conducted as part of this research 
attempted to measure the level of satisfaction with the performance of the current 
multilateral system (please refer to the Appendix). In response, 12 out of 50 participants 
or 24% of the sample expressed unqualified satisfaction, while no one expressed strong 
satisfaction. On the other side, 24 participants or 48% of the total, which is exactly two 
folds the number of those satisfied, expressed unqualified dissatisfaction and no one 
expressed strong dissatisfaction. Otherwise, the number of neutral responses was 14 or 
28%. These results reflect a clear dissatisfaction with the performance of the current 
system. However, remarkably, no one was either strongly satisfied or strongly 
dissatisfied. In a way, this indicates either a general trend of disappointment with 
multilateral institutions or, in the latter case, sympathy with the system and 
determination to maintain it. In fact, especially over the last few years, some multilateral 
institutions, such as the UN, have come under severe criticisms, while others, such as 
the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, have become increasingly unpopular.            
The field questionnaire also sought some practical insights on the current reform 
agendas in multilateral institutions. Asking the participants about their level of 
satisfaction with the current reform agendas in the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions 
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and the WTO, 11 out of 50 participants or 22% of the total expressed unqualified 
satisfaction with these reform agendas, while no one expressed strong satisfaction in 
this regard. On the opposite side, 22 participants or 44% of the sample expressed 
dissatisfaction with the current reform agendas, among whom two participants or 4% 
expressed strong dissatisfaction. On the borderline, 17 participants or 34% of the total 
were neutral on the subject. Notably, one participant expressed satisfaction with the 
reform agendas themselves, but dissatisfaction with the progress and implementation of 
reforms. And it is worthy of attention that no respondent was strongly satisfied with the 
current reform agendas. Generally, these results reflect a clear propensity to think 
negatively of the current reform efforts in the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions, 
considering them both inadequate and ineffective.               
 
II. Reform Ideas in Debate 
 Coming to reform ideas in the academic field, there are torrents of sources on 
the reform of the international multilateral system at large. Indeed, the imperatives of 
reform are clear, given the developments in the surrounding global environment, but the 
real conundrums lie in the specifics of needed reforms and how to go about 
implementing them. However, it seems that a great part of the literature presents reform 
demands without clear perspectives as to how to put them to practice. In contrast, this 
section will analyze three specific reform proposals that are worth contemplation, for 
they either employ holistic reform approaches or carry substantial implications. These 
proposals are the trans-governmental networks approach of the new world order of 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, former Director of Policy Planning at the USA’s State 
Department, the power club/executive committee approach and the twin proposals of 
concert of democracies and “global NATO.”   
 
A. The Trans-Governmental Networks Approach 
 Anne-Marie Slaughter introduces an intriguing perspective on reform; the so-
called trans-governmental networks approach (Slaughter, 2004a). She sets out from the 
point that global governance is indeed in crisis, in light of the perceived general erosion 
of authorities and capabilities of intergovernmental organizations and regimes across the 
globe. In particular, she argues that multilateral institutions created in the aftermath of 
World War II have become outdated. Hence, these institutions need to be reformed, 
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reinvented or even replaced. In the meantime, there are small steps in the direction of 
reform. However, efforts to advance critically needed reforms are usually faced with 
insurmountable hurdles. In this regard, Slaughter speaks of a globalization paradox, 
where the world needs more government but fears it, which makes global government 
both unfeasible and undesirable. The would-be size and scope of such a government 
could threaten individual liberties and the diversity of peoples to be governed makes it 
unimaginable to put them under the rule of one political unit. Besides, no state would 
accept to give up decision-making power and coercive authority to central powers far 
from home. In other words, the current nation-state system needs substantial reform, but 
it inherently resists this reform, which puts the system in a dismal situation.     
 In response, Slaughter contends that there is a revolution of global governance 
already taking place underneath the surface, with nation-states communicating 
horizontally through presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers and other infra-state 
agencies. Multilateral institutions, such as the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions and 
the WTO, in their own right, represent vertical, supra-state networks and create their 
own cross-cutting, horizontal networks of infra-state agencies. Slaughter argues that 
horizontal, infra-state networks are substituting for hierarchies of authority inside 
nation-states and multilateral institutions. Technocrats in charge of such subjects as 
security, justice and health interact with their counterparts directly, without going 
through supervisory authorities in their national governments. These networks debate 
relevant issues, coordinate policies and form important consensuses about international 
problems. Thus, Slaughter argues, the same agencies that manage domestic subjects 
come to manage these same subjects at the global level, which reflects a trend toward 
disaggregating governments into their constituent parts. Slaughter further argues that 
these networks supplant rather than supplement the nation-state system, though without 
openly challenging or violating the sovereignty formally invested in this system 
(Slaughter, 2003). In parallel, NGOs and TNCs also form their own global networks and 
others in collaboration with governments and multilateral institutions. Thus, the world is 
becoming a sophisticated network of networks that include governmental agencies, 
multilateral organizations, NGOs, TNCs and other actors.  
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 Governance through transnational networks is yet a nascent mode of governance 
(Slaughter, 2004c). It is more evident in some regions than others and does not often 
include all countries. Its effectiveness is asserted on the ground, though not clearly 
demonstrated. Nonetheless, it has gone global and has been spreading in many areas 
over the last few years. Hence, it is considered a feasible and effective tool to address 
global problems. For instance, the EU is a pioneer in using the network approach to 
governance. This is partially the outcome of the EU dilemma of the need for more 
uniformity at the time greater centralization of power is politically inappropriate and 
probably undesirable (Slaughter, 2004a). As a result, the EU has developed vast 
networks of ministers, judges, legislatures…etc. to govern common EU affairs. At the 
global level, the USA has frequently advocated channeling multilateral cooperation in 
many areas through networks of government officials rather than traditional multilateral 
mechanisms. Historically, governmental networks established for limited purposes, such 
as postal and telecommunication cooperation, have existed for over a century. And more 
recently, such networks have consolidated their identity and autonomy in some areas 
under the auspices of forums such as the G-8, the G-20, the Commonwealth and the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.  
 Most importantly, Slaughter advances transnational networks as a potential 
solution to current crises of global governance (Slaughter, 2004a). Given their past 
record, governmental networks have effectively served several purposes, including 
forging convergence on some subjects, introducing regulatory principles and standards, 
distilling and disseminating reliable information and best practices, allowing for 
individual national particularities and preferences, enhancing compliance with agreed 
rules, promoting capacity building in various fields and enhancing cooperation through 
networked national focal points. Furthermore, Slaughter suggests that governmental 
networks could be enhanced to serve more purposes that could better global 
governance, provided the following advantages: these networks induce and enforce 
compliance with their standards, have a record of propensity for self-regulation, develop 
their own strong internal communication networks, have selective membership 
schemes, generate reasonable solutions to complicated problems and act as engines of 
continued trust and cooperation even at times of conflict.  
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Although the functional units of governmental networks are part and parcel of 
sovereign governments, these networks lack formal legitimacy of their own. However, 
legitimacy could have another form; practical legitimacy. The latter indicates the level 
of public appeal of a given entity based on its effectiveness on the ground. Slaughter 
suggests that the achievements and advantages of intergovernmental networks are 
enough evidence of their practical legitimacy (Slaughter, 2004c). Indeed, at the time the 
record of cooperation among nation-states provides a mixed picture, the record of 
governmental networks provides a more positive image. At the domestic level, public 
service agencies within governments develop goodwill of their own. In comparison with 
politically elected governments, these agencies receive special recognition and 
sympathy, in view of the result-oriented nature of their work and their relative proximity 
to the public. Yet, governmental networks at the end are components of the nation-state 
system. Although they could bypass political hierarchy complications at the 
international level, which gives them a relative practical advantage, they can not cross 
some threshold of political boundary lines.                
Slaughter chose "A New World Order" as a title for her book, indicating that 
trans-governmental networks are a force of change from the current world order to an 
evolving new one. She contends that governmental networks can help address the so-
called tri-lemma of global governance, where a global government is needed, but is 
considered infeasible, which deprives the world of a means to better governance and 
accountability in the multilateral system. In this regard, governmental networks are 
thought to offer a flexible and fast way of doing business, coordinating national 
government policies and initiating and monitoring collective actions aimed at 
addressing common problems. However, as Slaughter herself admits, the new world 
order defended here is basically an expression of a different conceptual framework of 
the existing infrastructure of world order using a three-dimensional web of links 
between state institutions: horizontal networks, linking infra-state units across borders 
and vertical networks, bringing together both national governments and the 
supranational institutions they choose to establish. Together horizontal and vertical 
governmental networks make up the skeleton of global governance in the conceived 
new world order. In particular, Slaughter highlights the accountability advantages of 
governmental networks, as these networks add an additional layer of accountability 
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besides those of nation-states and multilateral institutions. Although governmental 
networks are made up of infra-state actors, these actors interact with a wide range of 
non-state actors, especially NGOs and TNCs, which brings the voices and contributions 
of other stakeholders onboard.              
In fact, the increasing influence of governmental networks is widely 
acknowledged. Back in the 1970s, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye studied trans-
governmental networks in detail (Slaughter, 2004a). They distinguished the activity of 
these networks from wider transnational cooperation and defined it as “sets of direct 
interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely 
guided by the policies of the cabinets of chief executives of their governments.” They 
further argued that trans-governmental networks are one integral aspect of 
interdependence in the age of accelerated globalization. To be clear, their main 
objective was to elaborate on the different ways through which infra-state cooperation, 
besides other traditional transnational modes of cooperation, could help multilateral 
organizations play a more effective role in global governance. More recently, in his 
book, "The Paradox of American Power," Nye argues that to achieve their objectives, 
most governments find it increasingly necessary to coordinate their activities through 
such means as bilateral and multilateral agreements, informal structures and delegation 
of authority to formal intergovernmental institutions. Yet, some attempts for better 
participation in global governance do not involve states as actors, but brings together 
components of states and/or nongovernmental actors, alongside the necessary, but 
imperfect, interstate institutional architecture (Nye, 2002). Thus, it appears that trans-
governmental networks are not truly a novel phenomenon and have for long been 
contributing to global governance through the nation-state system.  
Notably, governmental networks are decentralized and dispersed without clear 
structures or material power capabilities. In addition, the increasing role of these 
networks disaggregates state sovereignty from within nation-states and disaggregates 
the international system into countless, loose and soft hubs of governance. Moreover, 
these networks are made up of technocrats, i.e. appointed officers who lack electoral 
legitimacy or direct accountability to the pubic, which indicates their lack of reliability. 
Furthermore, the contribution of governmental networks could at times contradict with 
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domestically popular policies or traditions, which could expose their work to political 
resistance. It is also feared that the flexibility and informality of governmental networks 
could be a backdoor to turn around formal constraints of traditional mechanisms of 
international cooperation, which might alienate nation-states and international 
organizations. Another concern refers to the disadvantage of weak states in 
governmental networks. These states lack technical capacity and financial resources, 
which may lead to their exclusion from influential governmental networks. Over and 
above, like others, governmental networks could suffer from corruption, special interest 
groups and political pressure. And, given the fact that the accountability of these 
networks is mostly civil, not political, in nature, corruption and the like risk factors 
might exacerbate more than in the case of traditional governance structures.  
In addition, it is hard to imagine that governmental networks could be separated 
from sovereign governments, letting aside the idea that these networks could compete 
with those governments on sovereignty grounds. In fact, the formal legitimacy of 
governmental networks is derived from the nation-state system and their work is subject 
to direction from their respective political authorities. Rightly, these networks might 
supplant constituent governments through informal communication, but network 
members will probably remain restricted by the general policy lines of their respective 
governments and wary of the political appropriateness of their actions. Civil servants 
participating in these networks are also directly subject to political guidelines and 
limitations. Hence, relying on the informal aspect of the work of governmental 
networks, as a leeway to better international cooperation, provides no sufficient 
guarantee of effectiveness. In practice, however, they could be useful auxiliary actors on 
which decision-making authorities could lean to do better informed jobs. But, even in 
this very context, they could also be used as legally correct means to dilute, relegate or 
elongate decision-making processes. At the bottom line, it is nation-states that undertake 
foreign policy and multilateral cooperation. And the role of governmental networks, 
even as detailed by Slaughter herself, can be useful, but not sufficient to address global 
problems. In contrast, nation-states remain the most vital actors in the multilateral 
system and problems such as environmental pollution, nuclear proliferation and poverty 
can only be faced holistically through their gate.                                                               
 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Current Reform Agendas and Ideas in Debate 
150
B. The Power Club/Executive Committee Approach 
 Another major proposal to address the predicament of global governance is the 
so-called power club or global executive committee approach. Typical examples of this 
approach include the G-8 and the G-20. There is also a plethora of other less powerful G 
groupings, including the G-77 (group of developing countries in the UN), the Group of 
24 (G-24) (group of developing countries in the Bretton Woods institutions), Group of 
15 (G-15) (group of developing countries along lines similar to those of the G-8) and 
the G-2 (the USA and China). Most of these groupings existed long before the end of 
the Cold War, but it seems that the exacerbation of problems of global governance in 
the aftermath of the Cold War gave renewed momentum to this mode of governance 
both in real world politics and in the literature. This is particularly true for the last three 
years, as one has seen the G-8 transforms into the G-20 after the proposal of the leading 
20 (L-20) of Paul Martin, former Prime Minister of Canada, and several other like 
proposals. In this regard, it should be highlighted that the last international financial 
crisis and its tremors were major propellers behind the consolidation of the reformed G-
20 in November 2008, as the depth of the crisis exposed the dysfunctions of the current 
architecture of global economic governance. 
 Schneckener (2009) defines global governance clubs as groupings of states, at 
times with the involvement of multilateral organizations, exercising global governance 
functions in one or more fields beyond the immediate circles of their members. Their 
areas of work could include exchanging information and expertise, coordinating 
positions, mobilizing resources, setting norms and standards, carrying out concrete 
actions and setting up political frameworks or regimes to deal with specific problems. 
Given this definition, governance by clubs takes a middle position between two typical 
forms of multilateralism from the institutional perspective. One is formal 
multilateralism, represented by the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions and regional 
organizations, such as the EU. And the second is informal multilateralism, represented 
by groups of like-minded members pursuing particular interests such as the so-called 
coalitions of the willing. Notably, some clubs purport to act for the global common 
good, though their membership schemes could be limited and selective. However, not 
every club actually exercises or even seeks to exercise global governance functions. In 
contrast to the G-20, which acts as a global governance hub, there are various alliances, 
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cartels and groups that are publicly declared to seek the interests of their members, such 
as the NATO and the Organization of Petrol Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
In fact, a large part of the current debate about global power clubs or executive 
committees is focused on the defense and/or justification of the transition from the G-8 
to the G-20. It highlights the three most quoted criticisms of the G-8: lacking legitimacy 
because of limited and selective membership, ineffectiveness in implementing 
agreements and lacking the power base needed for solving global problems. Notably, 
these problems continued until even after the proliferation of G-8 plus formats to 
include dialogues with the G-5 (China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa), 
selected African countries and the AU and the MEF. In response, several alternative 
proposals have been made, including enlarging the G-8 to G-13, G-14 or G-16; 
substituting the G-20 or some other forum for the G-8; or resorting to smaller clubs such 
as the G-2 or G-3 (G-2 plus the EU). In particular, Paul Martin, former Prime Minister 
of Canada, fueled active debate when he advocated a move from the G-8 to what he 
termed the Leading 20 (L-20) (Martin, 2007). He argued that in spite of its positive 
contribution, the G-8 has failed to develop critically needed global public policy for the 
21st Century. Consequently, a summit meeting of the 20 most important countries in the 
world, along the lines of the then G-20 of ministers of finance, could make a significant 
breakthrough. At the time, which was even before the exacerbation of the last 
international economic crisis, the L-20 was envisaged as a forum that could build on the 
strengths of informality and flexibility of the G-8, while drawing on the experience of 
the UN. Henceforth, it took around a year before the proposal was put to practice in 
November 2008 at the behest of the USA’s administration. 
Nonetheless, part of the debate is generic in nature and focuses mostly on club 
or executive committee governance as a general approach to global governance. And 
arguments of this kind are basically meant to advocate creating some kind of a core 
group of global governance, with an all-encompassing mandate, not one limited to 
economic governance. Notably, the main rationale behind these arguments is that 
current multilateral institutions lack representativeness and effectiveness, while 
proposals to address structural imbalances and flaws in the system are at best elusive. In 
other words, current multilateral institutions do not, and are not expected to, meet the 
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standards of effective representativeness of the most willing and able states, which 
deprives the world from a system capable of addressing the challenges ahead. For 
instance, it is argued that current proposals to reform the UN Security Council and 
enlarge it by admitting emerging powerhouses, such as India and Brazil, as permanent 
members are unlikely to see daylight (Rosencrance, 2006). Moreover, structural 
imbalances in the Bretton Woods institutions, and most particularly the de facto veto of 
the USA in these institutions, could at best be only marginally mended. Hence, it is 
proposed to set up a concert of great powers, with representation limited to members 
who possess the economic and military power needed to carry out concrete measures. In 
particular, candidates include the USA, the EU and Japan on the side of traditional 
powers and China, India and Russia on the side of rising powers.  
Obviously, the latest shifts in great power balances give feasibility for the 
proposals of clubs of great powers, on the basis that with the relative decline of the 
USA’s power over the last few years, the USA needs more help from others. In this 
regard, it is hoped that in spite of their differences, an agglomeration of great powers, 
traditional and rising, could be drawn similar to the concerts of power in Europe in the 
19th century. Indeed, a new concert of great powers could be in the best interest of these 
great powers and a good recipe for effective global governance, given the current 
international political environment (Rosecrance, 2006). In contrast, resorting to 
unilateral policies would be unproductive and could bring more trouble and chaos to the 
world. Along similar lines, Bell (2006) suggests that a conflict-limiting concert of great 
powers under the USA’s leadership is necessary to maintain order in the world and help 
avoid the evolution of a complex multipolar world order that current forms of 
multilateralism would be incapable of managing. In general, one of the high-priority 
tasks for would-be concerts of great powers is devising cooperation mechanisms 
capable of combating transnational groups and forces that threaten established order, 
with particular focus on terrorist networks.              
The advantages and disadvantages of governance by clubs could be measured 
along the scales of legitimacy, effectiveness, coherence and resource mobilization 
(Schneckener, 2009). Legitimacy is usually measured against such criteria as 
participation, fairness, transparency and acceptance of decisions by others. On all these 
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fronts, global governance by clubs lose to formal governance epitomized by the UN, the 
Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO. Effectiveness and problem-solving capacity 
mostly depend on the collective power of members, the degree of internal coherence 
and the surrounding environment. Here, the comparison is reversed, as formal 
governance forums are generally more cumbersome than power clubs, where in the 
latter the focus is kept on the most capable members. Coherence is generally enhanced 
when the like-mindedness of the members is maintained and decisions are free of 
contradictions. Here again, the rule is that the larger the forum and the wider the agenda, 
the more are the complications of consensus building and decision making, which 
complications get reflected in the solidarity among members and the precision of 
decisions. Resource mobilization refers to raising the financial, human and technical 
resources needed to implement political decisions. Although formal multilateral forums 
have more resources in their general pools, selective clubs can mobilize greater and 
faster resources. This is partially due to the fact that within power clubs, members 
usually have more control over their resources, which also better guarantees the most 
efficient use of these resources.  
In light of the above analysis, formal multilateral structures appear to have a 
clear advantage with respect to legitimacy, while power clubs and informal structures 
appear to have clear advantages with respect to effectiveness, coherence and resource 
mobilization. However, it is imprecise to view these four scales as independent from 
each other, for legitimacy could be both a subject and a source of effectiveness, while 
effectiveness, coherence and resource mobilization are all closely intertwined. In fact, it 
seems that this is all about trade-offs between formality/legitimacy on one side and 
informality/effectiveness on the other side. Nonetheless, it should be noted, formal 
multilateral institutions could lose legitimacy over time, while informal forums could 
fall short of meeting effectiveness aspirations. Besides, legitimacy and effectiveness 
should not be mutually exclusive, and there could, and should, be approaches to 
capitalize on both of them. Ultimately, the most important criterion of success of any 
multilateral forum is the willingness of its members to agree on common actions and 
their ability to implement them on the ground.  
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Current Reform Agendas and Ideas in Debate 
154
There is no doubt that great powers could gain more from cooperation than from 
confrontation and that the whole world could be much better off with great powers 
taking a cooperative approach toward global challenges. For instance, great powers 
share common objectives such as world peace, economic prosperity and combating 
terrorism, which are all reasons to come together. Nonetheless, legitimate questions 
arise as to whether members of power clubs would act for world common good even 
when this contradicts with their own distinct interests and whether there are reliable 
guarantees to this effect. In fact, the power-clubs approach risks the possibility of 
proliferation of forums and fragmentation of the multilateral system, without guarantees 
of common good. In contrast, the UN may indeed seem to be a loose institution, but it 
remains the best available forum to ensure the world common good. Moreover, a given 
power club might be best fit to address some specific problem, but its membership 
might not be inclusive enough to address other problems. As a result, we have seen 
some reproduction of power clubs and informal groupings such as those dealing with 
the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. Furthermore, setting up new forums to 
address specific problems may guarantee better effectiveness, but it will surely impose 
some coordination costs, which could be avoided in the case of established forums. 
Over and above, one of the most detrimental effects of the proliferation of power clubs 
is further dilution and marginalization of existing formal multilateral institutions, which 
might lead to slowly rendering these institutions irrelevant.  
In addition, the approach of power clubs overemphasizes the recent shifts in 
power balances, while ignoring two other important variables. One is the proliferation 
of actors beyond the nation-state system, whether at the international or domestic levels. 
It is not only state power shifts that matter, but also power diffusions from states to non-
state, sub-state, infra-state and other actors. Indeed, this is one prime difference between 
the world in the 19th century and today. Today, it is hard to imagine how states alone, 
even if in concerts, could address global problems. The second variable is the 
complexity of global challenges and opportunities, where forces of globalization 
transcend state boundaries and erode the conventional notion of state sovereignty. 
Notably, the challenges and opportunities of globalization have become transnational in 
nature, and as such require transnational approaches. This is a reality that faces both 
state and non-state actors and that requires creative adaptation approaches. For instance, 
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if we take the example of climate change, it turns immediately clear that in order for 
states to address global warming, they need to work in tandem with non-state actors to 
design and implement solutions for this problem. 
 
C. Concert of Democracies and Global NATO  
 Last, but not least, are the proposals advocating the establishment of some sort 
of concert or league of world democratic states, with a parallel proposal to the effect of 
transforming the NATO into a global security organization. In particular, the USA’s 
presidential elections campaign in 2008 gave staunch support to these proposals, as 
Senator John McCain ran with a commitment to establish a league of democracies that 
“would form the core of an international order of peace based on freedom and that could 
act where the UN fails, among others, to relieve human suffering in places like Darfur 
in the Sudan.” To some extent, these proposals shed light on the Community of 
Democracies (CoD), consolidated in a meeting of ministers from over 120 states in 
Warsaw in June 2000, at a joint initiative from Madeleine Albright, the then USA 
Secretary of State, and Bronislaw Geremek, the then foreign minister of Poland. After 
10 years and five biennial ministerial meetings, the last of which held in Lisbon in 2009, 
the CoD has developed its internal governance structure, created a democracy caucus in 
the UN and introduced an independent body of international experts to provide 
recommendations as to which states meet the CoD’s membership criteria. Notably, 
these latter recommendations help decide which states earn themselves invitations to 
CoD biennial ministerial meetings, which have resulted in a noticeable downsizing of 
participation in these meetings. Like the CoD, the most cardinal principle of the 
proposed concert or league of democracies is the qualification of prospective members 
as democratic states that share a commitment for collective action. However, 
paradoxically, advocates of such new forums seem to ignore the existence and 
experience of the CoD altogether, perhaps because what they seek is so different from 
what the CoD offers. Most alarmingly, there are suspicions that such proposals might be 
meant to kill the UN, through creating a parallel multilateral institution that is more 
responsive to the needs of their advocates (Piccone, 2008). 
In general, advocates of the need for a concert or league of democracies share 
some kind of frustration with the inability of the UN to act to address threats to 
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international peace and security caused by regimes that abuse their own peoples and 
take hostile attitudes toward other states. Hence, they suggest a concert of democracies 
that acts as “an alternative forum for the approval of the use of force in cases where the 
use of veto in the UN Security Council prevents free nations from keeping faith with the 
aims of the UN Charter” (Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006). They further suggest that the 
new forum should have three main functions: to help democratic states face their mutual 
security challenges, motivate economic growth and development and promote 
democracy and human rights (Daaldar and Lindsay, 2006a). However, these proposals 
lack clarity as to how objectives could be implemented, especially the areas of 
democracy, human right and economic development. Instead, their main focus seems to 
be on security, namely that of the so-classified democratic states. In this regard, some 
advocates suggest that the NATO should become a “global NATO”, by opening its 
doors to any democratic state and transforming it into a global alliance capable of 
addressing global security challenges (Daaldar and Lindsay, 2006b). Indeed, the new 
strategic concept of the NATO, adopted in Lisbon in November 2010, reflects an 
expansion of the substantive range of its operations and their geographic span. 
Nonetheless, the NATO remains by and large a military alliance serving the security 
interests of its members, not one with a true global mandate. 
 In addition, advocates argue that a concert of democracies would be effective, 
because democratic states have the greatest militaries, economies and technological 
bases. And such a forum would also be legitimate, because democratic states are 
governed by democratically elected governments (Piccone, 2008). Consequently, such a 
forum would be qualified to spread democracy and human rights throughout the world. 
Indeed, a multilateral forum of democracies could help enhance democracy and human 
rights, if it is designed to do so. Notably, Keohane (2006) argues that proponents of the 
current multilateral system should begin to reconstruct its legitimacy on a 21st century 
basis, i.e. with more emphasis on democratic principles than on sovereignty. However, 
the framework of Keohane’s argument is international, not national, and its essence is 
that the current system needs reform to meet three basic criteria: inclusiveness, 
effectiveness and accountability. In other words, all valid interests should be 
represented; the system should be capable of taking effective action, even against strong 
members; and the decision-making process should be transparent and open to criticism 
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from both insiders and outsiders. In contrast, the suggested forum seems to ignore 
democracy in global governance, while stressing on democratization within nation-
states, albeit without a clear strategy.   
Keith Griffin (2003) argues that economic globalization is rendering state 
boundaries increasingly irrelevant, which weakens the notion of state sovereignty. As a 
result, the world needs global governance institutions capable of managing economic 
globalization, addressing economic inequalities, combating unilateral actions and 
providing global public goods. And these institutions need to be democratic and 
accountable to people throughout the world. Likewise, many others refer to lack of 
democracy in the international system, with their eyes on such subjects as the veto right, 
sophisticated decision-making mechanisms and lack of implementation, enforcement, 
transparency, accountability and reliability. In contrast, those advocating a concert or 
league of democracies seem to base their argument on the premise that lack of 
democracy inside nation-states is the main problem facing global governance. Even 
more, advocates of great-power clubs often refer to excess democracy in multilateral 
institutions such as the UN as one of the major problems. In particular, they point to 
large pools of membership, demanding bureaucracy and complications of consensus-
building as major hurdles to effectiveness. 
Remarkably, the field questionnaire that makes part of this research revealed 
significant support to democratizing global governance (please refer to the Appendix). 
From 50 participants, 21 or 42% of the sample thought that state democracy could be 
adapted to the global setting, with even eight participants or 16% expressing strong 
agreement to this proposition. On the opposite side, 19 participants or 38% of the 
sample disagreed, and only two participants or 4% were in strong disagreement. On the 
borderline, eight participants or 16% of the sample expressed neutrality about this idea. 
Notably, the literature shows that reference to democracy in international relations is 
usually met with apprehension or even considered idealistic. However, the issue here is 
not whether we could see a world government emerging, but rather whether global 
governance could be made more democratic using the fundamental values of modern-
state democracy. And the results of the field questionnaire support this latter hypothesis. 
At least, some democratic notions, such as inclusiveness and accountability, are 
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increasingly required in our world today, and there is growing understanding that 
enhancing such notions in the international system could bolster its performance.            
 
 No doubt, democracy has become a global value and promoting it should be a 
high priority inside states as well as at the international level. However, it is not clear 
how promoting democracy inside states could contribute to international cooperation. 
On the contrary, national democratic processes could, at times, stand in the way of 
better multilateral cooperation. For instance, a national democratically elected 
parliament could block or at least dilute international cooperation on some specific 
issue. In fact, this is even an intrinsic element of the current multilateral system, in view 
of the fact that sovereign nation-states are the building blocks of the system. And, even 
if we concur with the rationale behind proposals for a concert or league of democracies, 
one should wonder about the criteria of democracy and the authority that is going to 
apply them. Questions also arise as to how to guarantee the impartiality and 
effectiveness of a global organization aiming at promoting democracy inside nation-
states. It also remains to be said that although the international community plays an 
important role and carries a moral responsibility on the respect of democracy and 
human rights, democratization needs to be home grown and owned in order for it to be 
sustainable. In addition, the notion of human rights is subject to cultural particularities 
that need to be watched and respected. In other words, there can be no one size fits all in 
this regard.  
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Potential Future Scenarios 
159
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
Potential Future Scenarios 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Potential Future Scenarios 
160
 
Abstract 
  
 The future course of the multilateral system will principally depend on the 
actions of the yet superpower, the USA, as well as those of other traditional and 
emerging powers, including China, the EU, Russia, India and Brazil. The potential 
scenarios to be analyzed here include effective multilateralism, multilateralism à la 
carte and an international system dominated by multipolarity, in addition to two other 
extreme scenarios: global government and global chaos. Indeed, there is a great deal of 
uncertainty in such an analysis and there are no clear cutting lines between those 
potential scenarios, due to the many, different and sometimes even contradictory 
dynamics of the current momentous transition of world order. However, based on 
current trends and the reading of foreign policies of the major players, effective 
multilateralism does not seem any near in the horizon. One fundamental reason behind 
this is that there continue to be intractable difficulties blocking the road to reforming the 
multilateral system to make it more effective and responsive to the needs of its 
stakeholders. Hence, on one side, the USA shows an increasing propensity to 
multilateralism à la carte, among others as a means to bypass the complications of the 
current system to get things done and as an approach to help extend and maximize the 
projection of its remaining power and influence. On another side, emerging powers are 
demanding deep reforms, with special focus on the need to represent their rising weights 
in the institutions of the system. In parallel, these powers are also seeking multipolarity 
as a means to force their multilateral reform demands ahead. Unfortunately, it is neither 
in the interest of traditional powers nor of a significant majority of states to concur with 
the reform demands of emerging powers, for this would cost them directly in terms of 
relative status in multilateral institutions. As a result, the world seems closer to 
multilateralism à la carte and multipolar power politics than to effective 
multilateralism. 
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Chapter Four 
Potential Future Scenarios 
 
Now that it is clear that multilateralism has been always in some kind of crisis, 
but is currently undergoing a critical phase of its evolution, it seems wise to wonder 
about its potential future scenarios. Indeed, current trends presuppose a decline of 
formal multilateral institutions. But hopes remain that these unpromising trends could 
change course and that “effective multilateralism,” saliently championed by the EU, 
takes hold. Otherwise, there could be two other potential scenarios, the first is 
“multilateralism à la carte,” predicted by Richard Haas, President of the Council on 
Foreign Relations in the USA. A close analogue is “multi-multilateralism,” advocated 
by Francis Fukuyama, author of The End of History and the Last Man. Secondly, the 
world might witness a relapse in multipolar power politics akin to those of the interwar 
period. Two other remote, extreme scenarios are those of global government and global 
chaos, which could practically be excluded, but remain theoretically possible. Of 
course, two or more of these scenarios could overlap and coexist. Besides, the quest of 
which scenario is more likely to take effect depends on a number of determinants and 
uncertainties, including the actions of the yet sole superpower, the USA, actions of other 
traditional and emerging powers, the role of the great majority of states and the 
contribution of non-state actors. This chapter will attempt to elaborate on the aforesaid 
scenarios, before moving onto underlining the major determinants that will most 
probably guide us into the future.   
 
I. Effective Multilateralism  
 Effective multilateralism would be the best scenario along the scale of potential 
courses of action analyzed here. In essence, it refers to having a multilateral system that 
functions effectively in addressing both international challenges and opportunities. It 
should be noted, however, that effectiveness is not synonymous with legitimacy and that 
the notion of effective multilateralism basically refers to a system that is effective from 
the functional point of view. Nonetheless, it needn't be overemphasized that legitimacy 
contributes to effectiveness and vise versa. Unfortunately, it seems that steering a way 
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toward effective multilateralism is faced with many difficulties and uncertainties, 
especially given the diversity of actors, both formal and informal, and the huge 
magnitude of rules, principles and norms governing international cooperation. Notably, 
nation-states, the building blocs of the system, vary widely in their approaches to 
multilateralism. On one side, they seem inclined, by default, to act through multilateral 
forums, as a means to enhance their reach and potential. On the other side, they could 
choose to act unilaterally; especially when doing so helps them achieve individual 
objectives and does not come at unaffordable costs. At the end, the multilateral system 
is tied to the behavior and interests of nation-states, and it is only through their 
collective will that the system can make any progress in any field. In their own right, 
however, multilateral forums strive to contribute to global governance in spite of the 
limitations on their roles. At least, these forums provide nation-states with settings and 
incentives to cooperate to achieve win-win objectives.  
Thus, a fundamental  question here is whether the international community 
could create an effective multilateral system. There can be no certain answer to this 
question, but one hopes that nation-states and other actors in the system demonstrate 
sufficient willingness and capacity to act collectively for this purpose. If this is the case, 
then determining and agreeing on the needed reforms could become within closer reach. 
And, consequently, the international community could ultimately set off on the road of 
building an effective multilateral system adequately equipped to meet current 
challenges. This research argues that constructing such a system is possible, especially 
in view of the fact that no individual actor can face global challenges on its own. In fact, 
states are increasingly pressurized to seek cooperation with other states and actors and 
to go through multilateral forums. At this point, it is important to consider the potential 
scope of an effective multilateral system. Would it be a formal, informal or a mixed 
system? And, would organizations such as the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions and 
the WTO continue to act as main engines of cooperation? Or, the organizational chart of 
an effective multilateral system would witness some variations? 
In just as much effectiveness does not have to be legitimate, it does not have to 
be formal. In fact, informal modes of cooperation could contribute significantly to 
formal cooperation, by paving the way for progress and saving time and effort. Besides, 
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there is no legal or customary rule that restricts this kind of cooperation. On the 
contrary, the notion of sovereignty of nation-states implies that they enjoy full freedom 
in their foreign policy acts, provided that they do not violate obligations they have 
previously subscribed to. Nonetheless, the informal component of multilateralism 
should be measured carefully to ensure that it does not render the system loose or make 
it incoherent or inconsistent. In other words, the central core of the current system, most 
fundamentally represented by the UN, should remain protected and empowered. From 
many aspects, the UN is indispensable for effective global governance, particularly in 
view of its unique legitimacy and inclusiveness (Tharoor, 2003). In addition, enhancing 
the role of the UN offers a number of other advantages, including the use of its 
accumulated expertise and established platforms of cooperation, coordination and 
burden sharing. Nonetheless, some voices suggest relying more on loose, informal 
structures and using the UN on a case by case basis, provided that certain criteria of 
feasibility are met, in order to keep focus with respect to actors involved and issues 
discussed (Wright, 2009). Clearly, this kind of arguments is advanced in the name of 
further effectiveness, but seems to underestimate the legitimacy effect on effectiveness. 
It also threatens of further marginalization of the UN, which might deal a blow to the 
system, because the UN remains the only universal forum of multilateral cooperation 
enjoying unequivocal legitimacy.  
Some others argue that for effective multilateralism to be realized, 
considerations of power distribution and individual leadership should be downsized and, 
in their place, considerations of partnership and common good should be made the 
guiding ones (Alexandroff, 2008). Thus, it is understood, a fundamental principle of 
effective multilateralism should be the willingness to act collectively and share burdens. 
Of course, concerns of legitimacy should not be ignored altogether so simplistically. In 
fact, these concerns continue to haunt the current system, where the sole superpower has 
demonstrated lack of enlightened leadership in the recent past and has lately shown 
signs of power fatigue; emerging powers such as the BRICS demand a more even 
playing field at any cost; and non-state actors are gaining influence and challenging 
state authority and legitimacy. In such an environment, where different actors have 
fundamentally different agendas, the task of instilling effective multilateralism seems an 
intractable one. Even more worrying, with increasing challenges to legitimacy coming 
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mostly from emerging powers and non-state actors, the current system might be set for 
further loss of effectiveness. 
In addition, one should wonder how democratic should the sought multilateral 
system be. In fact, the general line of thinking is tilted toward considering democracy in 
international relations an unfeasible and/or unnecessary factor (Wright, 2009). Some 
even contend that it is a mistake to think that nation-state democracy could be 
transcended to the multilateral system, because the necessary political and social 
conditions are not in place and are not expected to be met in the foreseeable future 
(Buchanan and Keohane, 2006). On the contrary, it is suggested that there is a need to 
address the democracy deficit in the system and to readapt it to the realities of the 21st 
century (Keohane, 2006). In particular, the current system needs reform to meet three 
basic criteria: inclusiveness, effectiveness and accountability to the best possible level. 
However, an example usually drawn to oppose this argument is the failure of the 
League of Nations, which was by far more democratic than the current UN, to maintain 
international peace or even survive in the midst of the turbulent interwar period. In 
contrast, the UN Charter integrated a delicate power balance formula and solemnly 
acknowledges that some states have special responsibilities and should receive special 
privileges in exchange. Due to this formula, the UN managed to survive the long 
confrontation of the Cold War (Luck, 2003). In this regard, one should also highlight 
that it is for the common good to have an inclusive, effective and accountable 
multilateral system, even if such a system would be short of typical nation-state 
democratic parameters.              
No doubt, effective multilateralism is a dear hope for all those who believe in 
multilateralism and common human destiny. Hence, one could trace torrents of 
demands and appeals for an effective multilateral system in official UN documents. In 
particular, groupings, such as the NAM and the G-77, as well as other groupings of less 
powerful states and these states themselves individually figure strongly among those 
calling for effective multilateralism. This implicitly reflects the special interest of these 
actors in a rule-based, well-functioning multilateral system, given their relative power 
disadvantage vis-à-vis great powers. In addition, emerging powers, such as China, India 
and Brazil, have an old tradition of advocating an effective multilateral system. Now 
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that these powers have further developed their power bases and entered in various 
engagements with traditional powers, such as the USA and Russia, it remains to be seen 
if they will keep on the same track or readjust their positions to achieve more easily 
attainable gains. Last but not least, calls for effective multilateralism resonate strongly 
in the circles of an emerging global public opinion, as evident in international media 
and discourses of NGOs.    
Lately, the EU has risen to be the most salient champion of effective 
multilateralism. Notably, in its 2003 security strategy, the EU adopted a distinct vision 
of an international order based on effective multilateralism (EU, 2003). Ever since, 
effective multilateralism has become mainstreamed in the EU's foreign policy. Notably, 
the 2003 strategy indicates that it is the EU's perspective that its security and prosperity 
increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. As a result, the document 
underlines that the development of a stronger international society, well-functioning 
international institutions and a rule-based international order are priority EU foreign 
policy objectives. And it expresses commitment to upholding and developing 
international law, as an important means to achieving these objectives. Most 
importantly, however, the strategy states that "the fundamental framework for 
international relations is the UN Charter. The UN Security Council has the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the 
UN, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European 
priority." Hence, it is clear that the EU's perspective on effective multilateralism 
revolves around a central core that is the UN, i.e. stressing the formal dimension of 
multilateralism.  
 Having a powerful actor as the EU backing the demands for an effective 
multilateral system is an encouraging fact. But, it should be noted, other powerful actors 
do not pronounce themselves against that objective. On the contrary, great powers, 
including the USA, have strong interest in effective multilateralism. Nevertheless, these 
powers tend to use the multilateral system to the extent that it serves their immediate 
interests. And experience shows that when interests of great powers contradict with 
multilateral rules, these powers could violate those rules without fearing the 
consequences (Brooks, 2009). This is a sad but true fact of international politics, where 
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foreign policy is usually mandated by interests not principles. Ultimately, however, no 
one can violate the rules without bearing some price, albeit sometimes affordable. For 
instance, USA’s violations of human rights in the course of the global war on terrorism 
were in stark contradiction with USA’s international obligations, and ultimately the 
USA paid a price for these violations in terms of its image. 
 Still, a question arises as to why such a powerful actor as the EU seems so 
deeply committed to effective multilateralism and parts itself from traditional great 
powers. As has been elaborated in Chapter Two, a factor of great importance in this 
regard is that the EU is not a conventional power. Rather, it is the product of the most 
advanced exercise of supranational integration. In particular, the Lisbon Treaty of 
December 2009 brought to the union more effectiveness and coherence in its foreign 
policy. However, the treaty was adopted in spite of lack of public support after around 
eight years of controversy. In addition, the EU continues to suffer from chronic 
divisions on internal and external issues. And European great powers, such as the UK, 
Germany and France, continue to play decisive roles as individual actors both regionally 
and globally. Thus, no matter how powerful economically, politically and strategically, 
the EU still lacks the ability to project unified power such as that of the USA or China. 
In fact, it is argued that unless the EU manages to break the taboos of divergence on the 
benefits of deeper economic, social and political integration, it would not be able to 
transform into a full-fledged global power (USNIC, 2008). It also seems that the EU's 
strategic choice of effective multilateralism has some ideological roots. This is most 
clearly reflected in Robert Kagan's book Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe 
in the New World Order, where Kagan assimilates Europe to Venus and America to 
Mars, indicating that Europeans are ideologically inclined toward an effective 
international order based on law, while Americans lean more toward using force to 
achieve their targets. In fact, this comparison partially relies on differences in history, 
culture and capabilities, which in turn shape the strategic choices of the two sides.        
 Cognizant of these facts, the EU remains confined to the limits of an ambitious 
regional organization seeking special recognition within an effective multilateral system 
that accommodates its aspirations. Hence, the EU's security strategy underlines that 
regionalism strengthens global governance and that regional organizations contribute to 
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a more orderly world. In addition, the EU seems to promote effective multilateralism as 
an alternative to multipolar power politics, especially at the time it continues to lack the 
basic attributes of sovereign power projection (Vasconcelos, 2008). In fact, resurgence 
of multipolar power politics, such as those of the interwar period, is one potential future 
scenario to be analyzed later on, in light of shifts in the world power map over the last 
two decades. In response, the EU looks determined to build a network of strategic 
partnerships with traditional and emerging powers in order to avoid multipolarity and 
ensure the development of an effective multilateral system. Furthermore, the EU 
continues its attempts to mend its traditional cross-Atlantic alliance with the USA, with 
a belief that acting together, the two sides could be a formidable force behind 
constructive change in the world.   
 
II. Multilateralism à la Carte and Multi-multilateralism 
 The two concepts of multilateralism à la carte, of Richard Haas, and multi-
multilateralism, of Francis Fukuyama, have one common fundamental basis, which is a 
multi-layered multilateral system with many different and overlapping formal and 
informal structures. In essence, this refers to a world of multiple forms, levels and 
scopes of multilateral structures. Actors in these structures could include states, non-
state actors, international organizations and even new actors such as community 
organizations, sub-state and infra-state actors. And their mandates are case-specific and 
make up an optimum mix of foreign-policy tools for a country like the USA. In fact, an 
important factor in understanding the two said concepts is that both were basically 
suggested in the course of thinking of the best possible designs of the USA’s foreign 
policy in the future. It is also noteworthy that both concepts are meant to give more 
space and recognition to multilateral cooperation, as opposed to unilateral policies that 
tarnish the image of the USA and harm the whole international community. However, 
multilateralism à la carte gives the UN no special status and implies that some issues 
could be wholly addressed outside the world body, while multi-multilateralism takes a 
more aggressive approach and views the UN as an organization that has grown too 
unwieldy and unsalvageable.  
 As for multilateralism à la carte, Richard Haas underlines what he sees as a 
historical shift in world order from unipolarity led by the USA to the so-called 
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nonpolarity, i.e. a world order dominated by many actors exercising different kinds of 
power (Haas, 2008). Thus, from one side, Haas excludes the continuation of unipolarity, 
on the basis that the USA has been undergoing a relative decline in power together with 
an absolute decline in influence. As a result, the USA needs more help from others and 
unipolarity can no longer be sustained. From the other side, Haas also excludes the 
evolution of a multipolar world order. In essence, multipolarity is an order where a few 
great powers set the rules of international relations and enforce them on the would-be 
violators or otherwise one where a few great powers compete along some balance of 
powers, which does not exclude the possibility of conflicts or breakdowns. In this 
regard, even with the existence of powers such as the USA, the EU, BRICS and Japan, 
Haas argues, the emerging world order is one that is fundamentally different from 
classic cases of multipolarity. Today, conventional state authority is facing challenges 
from above by international organizations, from below by such actors as terrorist and 
dissident groups and from the sides by non-state actors such as NGOs. These multiple 
challenges are driven by globalization, where cross-border flows take place beyond the 
control of nation-states and strengthen the capacity of non-state actors. As a result, 
states have lost their monopoly and even their control in many domains. In other words, 
states can no longer rule alone, need help from other actors, while at the same time 
facing challenges from these other actors.                               
 In fact, world politics at any point of time are a mix of anarchy and order. The 
real question, then, is about the balance between the two and the general trend. In the 
meantime, recurrent failures and lack of reform in the multilateral system reflect an 
anarchic balance and a negative trend. Indeed, reform in multilateral institutions has 
been a slow process with unsatisfactory results, which exposes the system to critical 
challenges that could further erode its effectiveness and legitimacy. Thus, Haas argues, 
an optimum foreign policy mix for the USA would be one based on multilateralism à la 
carte. According to this proposed paradigm, multilateralism would have to become less 
formal and less inclusive, i.e. configured on the basis of loose, selective and situational 
forums such as the already proliferating G groupings. Because it would become 
increasingly difficult to get all relevant actors to agree on any given subject, the USA 
would have to cooperate with fewer actors (Haas, 2008). He further suggests 
establishing a core group of actors committed to multilateralism à la carte as a general 
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paradigm, to help facilitate movement at times of need. Nonetheless, formal forums, 
such as the UN, would still play a role according to Haas, albeit on a case-by-case basis 
and when deemed feasible. But, in order to be more effective, multilateral forums, such 
as the UN Security Council, would need to be reconstituted to better reflect the 
distribution of power in the world. In contrast, Haas suggests, established alliances, such 
as the NATO, would lose importance, because they lack the flexibility required to face 
today’s challenges.  
 Francis Fukuyama presents a more radical and controversial proposal, multi-
multilateralism. He starts from the basis that the world today lacks effective multilateral 
institutions that could confer legitimacy on collective action, quoting the famous 
example of Iraq (Fukuyama, 2007). In addition, he argues that the world is so diverse 
and complex that it cannot be managed through one global body. Instead, there is a need 
for diverse forms of multilateral forums. In particular, Fukuyama calls for establishing 
new multilateral institutions that could boost effectiveness and legitimacy and hold 
members accountable for their acts. Most importantly, however, Fukuyama takes an 
aggressive attitude toward the UN by advocating a kind of competitive multilateralism, 
where many multilateral forums compete and overlap in working on common subjects, 
and where the UN is not only treated as one equal platform, but also discredited as an 
ineffective body that suffers from existential problems and lacks response to these 
problems. He further argues that the USA should use its power and resources either 
through the proposed multi-multilateral forums or unilaterally to achieve moral 
objectives, such as reacting to gross violations of human rights, combating terrorism, 
supporting development and spreading democracy, as means to further reduce threats to 
international peace and security.    
In general, it seems that theories, such as multilateralism a la carte and multi-
multilateralism, are meant to draft strategies for the USA to make the best possible use 
of the current state of world order. In both cases, the underlying principle revolves 
around the idea that in a world where the USA can no longer do as it desires, it should 
adopt a flexible multilateral approach aimed at maximizing its influence in order to 
protect its national interests. And, intrinsically, the two theories appear to make two 
common, fundamental assumptions; one is that world politics are slowly, but surely, 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Potential Future Scenarios 
170
heading toward anarchy and chaos. While the second is that nation-states are losing 
ground to non-state actors due to power diffusion and that they can no longer reverse 
this trend. However, neither of these two assumptions justifies the outcome. On the 
contrary, with respect to the balance between anarchy and order, one needs only wonder 
should the world prepare for chaos instead of attempting to prevent it. In fact, this is one 
of the main objectives of the alternative theory of effective multilateralism. With respect 
to power diffusion, states do continue to act as repositories of legitimate power and 
linchpins of international cooperation. Although, globalization does shake the power of 
states, they remain the most decisive actors in global governance (Zakaria, 2009). 
Hence, there is an argument that the world needs to return the nation-state to the center 
stage of world politics in order to help address global challenges in cooperation with all 
other relevant stakeholders (Luck, 2002). 
Several other authors expect the future to look like a loose tapestry of 
multilateral forums, similar to those of multilateralism a la carte and multi-
multilateralism. John Ikenberry (2008b) suggests that changes in the global hierarchies 
of leadership and power may drive more efforts toward reforming existing institutions 
and establishing new ones, which indicates that the world is likely to see more informal, 
regional, bilateral and even domestic organizations. And Zakaria (2008) suggests that 
with the decline of USA’s power, the USA will grow less capable of providing 
superpower solutions to global problems. As a result, order à la carte, where problems 
are being addressed by various structures, is expected to become a dominant trend. 
There are also arguments that some specific forums, such as the G-20, or new similar 
forums may come to play more dominant roles in global governance in the future 
(Alexandroff, 2008). Indeed, over the last few years, one has seen a proliferation of 
informal multilateral, regional and bilateral structures such as the G-20, BRICS, the 
Union for the Mediterranean and the G-2. In parallel, one also notices a trend toward 
avoiding the binding frameworks of formal multilateral institutions by opting for 
informal and ad hoc forums, including case-specific international conferences and 
hybrid forms of multilateral cooperation involving international organizations, states 
and non-state actors.    
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Thus, in general, informal, selective, subject-specific multilateral forums are 
expected to be more extensively used in the future. In fact, once more, there is nothing 
peculiar about the existence of such forums. On the contrary, informal multilateral 
cooperation is an old mode of world politics, even as old as the nation-state system 
itself. In addition, the very nature, magnitude and diversity of informal, multilateral 
forums reflect some of the basic features of international relations, including the 
keenness of nation-states to work multilaterally and their continuing search for means to 
overcome the problems of the multilateral system. However, world politics are 
becoming looser and more anarchic with the proliferation of such forums without a core 
hub or general framework, together with the increasing marginalization of formal, 
multilateral institutions. Certainly, the main source of concern here is not the existence 
of multiple forms of cooperation per se, but the overall degree of coherence and 
consistence in the system. Notably, theories such as multilateralism à la carte and 
multi-multilateralism seem to ignore the need for some central hub in the system. And 
there is no organization better qualified to play that  role other than the UN, given its 
unique inclusiveness, legitimacy and expertise. Indeed, informal, multilateral 
cooperation should be confined to the boundaries of contributing to the effectiveness of 
formal, multilateral forums, not used as a tool to bypass these latter forums. And this 
brings us back to the theory of effective multilateralism as a more appropriate 
conceptualization of how best the world could be governed.  
Other than multilateralism a la carte and multi-multilateralism, a more careful 
approach is attempting to strike some delicate balance between considerations of 
effectiveness and legitimacy. The essence of this approach is that the sole superpower, 
the USA, needs a robust multilateral system that includes not only formal institutions 
and agreements at its core hub, but also informal rules and standards of legitimacy 
(Brooks and Wohlforth, 2009). Because formal institutions, such as the UN, suffer from 
lack of focus on subjects and lack of pressure on the main actors, there is a need for 
some kind of principled reform in the latter institutions to bring about more 
effectiveness without creating paralyzing consequences (Wright, 2009). This reform 
should rely on a mix of global, regional, bilateral and at times ad hoc tools, used on a 
case-by-case basis, to create an international order that is appropriate, flexible and 
effective. In particular, regional, bilateral and ad hoc forums could be used as initial 
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tools to increase effectiveness in existing global forums. And, in the long run, existing 
multilateral institutions should be reformed to reflect better balance of powers and new 
selective forums may need to be established to facilitate cooperation on such 
challenging issues as arms control, climate change and the world economy. In this 
context, it is also suggested that having some mini-multilateral forums could guarantee 
more effectiveness in dealing with some specific subjects, such as sanctions against 
violators of international peace and security.  
 
III. The Return of Multipolarity 
 Unipolarity, multipolarity and other like terms refer to the underlying power 
balances of world politics, not the dynamics of the multilateral system per se. However, 
the possibility of resurgence of multipolarity is so significant that it warrants being 
addressed separately vis-à-vis alternative paradigms such as effective multilateralism 
and multilateralism à la carte. This is particularly essential given the historical fact that 
mutlipolarity was usually marked with power concerts that could typically be set up by 
some great powers to balance against other power concerts, such as the case of world 
politics from the early 19th century to the early 20th century. Alternatively, multipolarity 
could underlie a chaotic world order, where great powers, whether in concerts or 
individually, are involved in confrontations, such as the case of world politics during 
World Wars I and II. Along these lines, one needn't go back to the analysis in Chapter 
Two on global power shifts. Instead, the basic conclusion that the USA is in decline 
relative to others and needs more help than before could be a good starting point for 
addressing the potential of multipolarity in the future. Still, it should be acknowledged, 
the USA is widely expected to remain the most influential global power for the 
foreseeable future.    
Remarkably, there are authors who argue that multipolarity has already become 
real or that it is inevitable in the future. For instance, Vasconcelos (2008) contends that 
we are already living in a multipolar world order, with power distributed 
asymmetrically throughout the globe. Similarly, Kagan (2008) believes that 
multipolarity has already taken place since the late 1990s. In addition, Khanna (2008) 
argues that the world power balance is moving toward three main centers in 
Washington, Beijing and Brussels. Perhaps even more impressively, the USNIC 
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predicts that a multipolar world order is in the making, with the rise of such heavy 
weights as China and India (USNIC, 2008). Furthermore, a study by the EU Institute of 
Strategic Studies expects multipolarity to become a fact, with the rise of new global and 
regional players such as China, India, Brazil, Iran and Indonesia (Gnesotto and Grevi, 
2006). Other related arguments include that of Mahbubani (2008) who suggests that the 
current world order is bound to demise with the rise of the Eastern hemisphere. In fact, a 
fundamental feature of theories of multipolarity is their focus on state power as opposed 
to the wider, diluted range of state and non-state powers in theories such as 
multilateralism à la carte. However, this narrower focus does not lack rationale, in view 
of the fact that even with the rise of non-state actors, nation-states remain the sole 
repositories of sovereign power and the main engines of change in international 
relations. 
If scenarios of multipolarity turn true, then talk of multilateralism, whether 
effective or à la carte, would become secondary at best, for in a multipolar world order, 
power dictates the path, depending on traffic among the great powers involved. In this 
regard, history indicates that multipolarity could involve great powers joining hands to 
set rules and keep order, while respecting each other’s interests. It is on this background 
that mutlipolarity is sometimes advocated as a means to counteract USA’s power, resist 
unilateral policies and a step toward effective multilateralism. Otherwise, lacking 
agreement, great powers could indulge in confrontations or even wars. In general, 
however, periods of multipolarity were marked with lack of stability. And this is 
particularly why there are concerns that a multipolar world order is in the making 
currently. In fact, great powers crave for further power and fight for it. And in a world 
divided along power lines, the game becomes a zero-sum one, where the gains of one 
great power often come at the expense of others. Hence, multipolarity is usually 
associated with confrontations and clashes.  
History also indicates that having more than one dominant power usually gives 
more space for international cooperation. Indeed, the international political environment 
is different today, with globalization pulling the strings of the globe tight together and 
interdependence widening and deepening throughout the world. In addition, and perhaps 
even more importantly, all major players, traditional and emerging, stand to gain from 
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globalization. And these are all good reasons for major players to, at least, attempt to 
maintain the current order (Zakaria, 2009). However, these factors do not rule out the 
possibility of disorder. For instance, globalization did not prevent Russia from invading 
Georgia in 2008. In addition, globalization involves subtle wars on natural resources 
and markets. Thus, there are some fears that when a rising giant like China reaches a 
more advantageous status in terms of power capabilities, the world might be exposed to 
turbulent confrontations, mostly between China and the USA (Ikenberry, 2008a). 
Moreover, terrorist groups and other rogue actors project a doomsday threat to 
globalization. Hence, to be precise, globalization lessens the potential of disorder, but it 
definitely does not forestall it altogether.  
Now, assuming that a multipolar world order is emerging, one needs to look at 
the potential main players in that order. For instance, Parag Khanna (2008) argues that 
the global power balance is slowly but surely moving toward a trilateral balance 
involving the USA, the EU and China. Obviously, he classifies some other BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia and India) as second-tier or second-world countries, along with many 
others. In contrast, several others argue that the latter three countries are also emerging 
as great powers (Drezner, 2008). In any case, for the first time in history, the dominant 
power centers in a multipolar world order could be so much heterogeneous in terms of 
cultural heritage, political regime and foreign policy attitudes. Even in the case of the 
USA and the EU who belong to the wider West, there are some salient historical and 
cultural nuances between them. Notably, at the time the USA and India are federal 
unions, the EU is a regional bloc and all others are unitary sovereign states. In addition, 
while the USA shows propensity toward forming alliances and coalitions, the EU works 
more through consensus-building, especially at the internal level, and advocates the 
establishment of an effective multilateral system. At the same time, Russia seems to 
struggle to recuperate some of its lost power and other emerging power centers tend to 
defend the old legacy of multilateralism. Thus, the emerging multipolar balance seems 
unique in its complexity and internal contradictions, which is one more reason for 
concern. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how these divergent powerhouses could strike a 
peaceful balance.    
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While multipolarity would serve the interests of emerging powers, it is not 
welcome in almost all other circles, including of course the USA. Remarkably, fears 
about the decline of the USA are rampant in USA’s thought circles, although some deep 
believers in the USA’s power continue to rule out the possibility of mutlipolarity (Joffe, 
2009). In addition, fears about the resurgence of multipolarity are clearly reflected in 
European thought circles. This is understandable given the EU ambition for an effective, 
rule-based multilateral system that recognizes the rising role of regional blocs, as 
opposed to a system dominated and steered by multiple state powers, especially at the 
time the EU continues to suffer from lack of internal cohesion and project a mixed 
picture of global power capabilities. Though less obvious, middle-size and small states 
are also strong advocates of a multilateral system capable of managing global power 
shifts and restraining great powers, and this is repeatedly reflected in statements by 
these states before multilateral forums. In particular, it is feared that multilateralism 
could be stalled by the dynamics of the transition toward multipolarity (Vasconcelos, 
2008). Indeed, the world today requires collective reactions to global problems not 
individual or selective ones. In contrast, in a multipolar world order, the involved great 
powers would be naturally interested in their own good and motivated by desire for 
more power, which does not help global or regional causes. 
 
IV. Some Other Extreme Scenarios 
In addition to potential scenarios highlighted above, there are two other 
scenarios that seem more theoretical than realistic, global government and global chaos. 
In a way, these two scenarios are causally linked under one common framework, where 
global government is proposed to maintain world order and prevent global chaos. 
Indeed, it is argued that the world has been suffering from lack of order since the end of 
the Cold War (Kurth, 2007). Notably, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the 
vacuum that resulted from the collapse of the former Soviet Union gave rise to chaos in 
several parts of the World. More recently, September 11 attacks and the war on Iraq and 
their later tremors marked some serious breaches of order accompanied with some grave 
violations of international law. Currently, with the relative decline of the USA, it has 
become clear that the unipolar world order proclaimed in the early 1990s cannot 
persevere for long. Thus, we are living in a world in transition. Nevertheless, this state 
of affairs does not justify speaking of the two aforesaid scenarios as potential ones, for 
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there seems to be little witness in support of them. Instead, a more careful calculation 
indicates that excluding the use of mass destruction weapons by terrorists, unexpected 
global natural catastrophes or grave strategic miscalculations on the side of great 
powers, global chaos remains a remote possibility and global government to contain it 
remains an unrealistic scenario.     
Historically, the idea of global government has deep roots in utopian works such 
as those of Immanuel Kant, Dante and Alfred Tennyson. Recently, the end of the Cold 
War, the lack of order that followed it and the relative decline of the USA seem to have 
given further fuel to this line of thinking. Thus, there is visible support to this idea in the 
academia today. In particular, the absence of another power or combination of powers 
believed to be capable of replacing the USA in the global leadership seat portrays global 
government as a possibly plausible scenario. Such a government could carry priority 
tasks such as maintaining peace and security, promoting overall wellbeing and 
responding to the accountability demands of global public opinion, especially those of 
NGOs in their capacity as global public opinion champions. Along these lines, there are 
some calls for a globally elected parliament, disbanding the UN Security Council and 
transforming the UN General Assembly into a world government (Monbiot, 2004). 
Similarly, there is an argument that a global government along nation-state governance 
guidelines is inevitable (Wendt, 2008). However, on the opposite side, it is argued that 
the idea of a global government is impractical (Craig, 2008). It is also argued to be both 
unfeasible and undesirable (Slaughter, 2004a). In essence, it is a remote, unsubstantiated 
possibility that nation-states would be willing to give up their sovereign authority to a 
supra-national global body. And recent experiences, including in the yet most successful 
regional integration model of the EU, suggest that nation-states remain generally 
reluctant to concede sovereign prerogatives to supra-national authorities.  
 The other theoretical scenario is that of falling into global chaos. Again, here, 
the relative decline of the USA over the last few years, together with its consequential 
relative withdrawal from the global leadership seat and the relative rise of emerging 
powers that share very little with the USA, shape the rationale behind this ominous 
prediction. In particular, it is feared that with the gradual emergence of new great 
powers, especially China, the world might relapse into global economic failures and 
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violent confrontations such as those of the 1930s and 1940s (Ikenberry, 2008a). An 
even worse scenario would be that of terrorists having access to mass destruction 
weapons and using them on a wide a scale. Yet, one of the most pessimistic scenarios is 
that of the so-called clash of civilizations, where the nation-state system gets overtaken 
by divisive cultural identities that lead the world to violent confrontations along cultural 
and religious lines. Notably, there are also some regional-specific chaos theories, 
especially for conflict-stricken regions such as the Middle East, East Asia and North-
West Asia. Indeed, the current transition of world order is not secure and modern 
technology transforms non-state actors into potent players at the global level. In such an 
environment, the absence of a global power capable of maintaining order could lead to 
chaos. However, on the contrary, the transition the world is going through needn't be 
violent, especially that the main players at the current stage stand to gain from 
globalization and have significant interests in world stability (Zakaria, 2009 and 
Khanna, 2008). In addition, although non-state actors are emerging more powerful, their 
roles remain by and large secondary to those of nation-states. And even in the case of 
terrorist groups that could be meant to take the world back to the dark ages, the threat 
remains mostly hypothetical and there are already efforts underway to prevent it. 
 The field questionnaire undertaken as part of this research was also used to draw 
some practical insights on the subject of this chapter. Notably, that questionnaire was 
addressed to a sample of 50 contributors in the fields of diplomacy, academia and 
international organizations, drawn from 32 different countries (please refer to the 
Appendix). The participants were asked to arrange, in ascending order according to 
probability, five suggested potential scenarios of the multilateral system: maintaining 
the status quo or lack of clear direction; multilateralism à la carte or multi-
multilateralism; effective multilateralism; re-emergence of multipolar international 
politics; or global chaos. Obviously, these scenarios start from the present state of the 
system and move on to scenarios suggested by some authors or defended by some 
players, such as multilateralism à la carte or multi-multilateralism, effective 
multilateralism and multipolarity. To allow for proportionality, the answers were given 
weights ranging from five for coming first, four for second, three for third, two for 
fourth and one point from coming fifth (please refer to Chart 4 below). The results show 
maintaining the status quo or lack of clear direction to be the most probable scenario 
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with 193 out of 738 overall points or around 26% of the total. The next three scenarios 
in order were multilateralism à la carte with 170 points or around 23%, multipolarity 
with 147 points or about 20% and effective multilateralism with 116 points or about 
16%. Expectedly, the worst-case scenario of global chaos came last with 112 points or 
around 15%. Here, it should be noted, three participants chose not to tick this last 
scenario at all, indicating their viewpoint that it is not possible. Indeed, current trends 
indicate that the multilateral system is more likely to take some form of multilateralism 
à la carte or, failing that, return to multipolarity. Though valiantly defended in Europe, 
effective multilateralism seems to be a weak scenario. While global chaos is more of a 
ghost to avoid, because it could inflict massive damage on all.               
 
Chart (4) 
Potential Future Scenarios of Multilateralism 
Maintaining the 
Status Quo
26%
Multilateralism a 
la Carte
23%
Effective 
Multilateralism
16%
Re-emergence of 
Multipolarity
20%
Global Chaos
15%
  
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of a field questionnaire (see the 
Appendix).  
 
IV. Major Determinants for the Future 
 After articulating potential scenarios of multilateralism over the foreseeable 
future, it appears of essence to attempt to map and examine the major determinants that 
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could decide which scenario is closer to reality. Of course, this is another risky exercise, 
given the complexities and uncertainties involved. Hence, for the sake of clarity, one 
needs to exclude some external factors such as large-scale military confrontations and 
disasters, whether natural or manmade. Although such factors could interfere in the 
course of multilateralism, they are only exceptional ones that should not guide the 
discussion here. Instead, this subsection will start with the foreign policy attitudes of the 
USA, the yet greatest global power, toward the multilateral system. Afterwards, it will 
consider the influence that other great powers, both traditional and emerging, could 
have on the system. It will also address the roles of non-state actors, with especial focus 
on NGOs as catalytic forces of change.  
 
A. The United States of America 
There seems to be a consensus that the USA’s foreign policy will be the most 
decisive factor with regard to the future of the multilateral system. In fact, this is only 
logical, given the fact that the USA remains the most powerful actor on earth. Even with 
the decline in USA’s power relative to others, it is still widely agreed that it possesses 
the power it takes to lead the world further into the 21st century (Zakaria, 2009 and 
Ikenberry, 2008b). Furthermore, it seems doubtful that any other power or combination 
of powers could substitute for the vital leadership role of the USA or even challenge this 
role over the foreseeable future (Joffe, 2009). However, the role of the USA in this 
regard is in fact double-edged. On one side, if the USA assumes a global leadership role 
in favor of multilateral cooperation and the global common good, the future perspective 
would look positive. On the other side, if it withdraws from the leadership seat or 
focuses on achieving narrow self-interests, the multilateral system would be exposed to 
stumbles and world peace might become at stake. Hence, it is vividly hoped that the 
USA would play the role of an enlightened leader that harnesses world efforts to build a 
safer and better future for all.  
In fact, adopting a foreign policy approach based on an effectively functioning 
multilateral system is not only in the interest of the world, but also in the best interest of 
the USA. Especially after the unilateral policies of the USA’s Bush administration 
alienated its strategic allies and eroded its influence, the USA needs a robust foreign 
policy based on multilateralism (Lyons, 2007). In addition, now that the global power 
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balance is undergoing significant changes, the USA is becoming less capable of 
pursuing hegemonic policies and needs more help from others. In this light, Brooks and 
Wohlforth (2009) suggest some general principles to help the USA spearhead an effort 
to build a better multilateral system, including making sure that reforms give rise to 
reciprocal gains and carry benefits for all, ensuring that reforms provide global public 
goods, relating proposed reforms to widely accepted components of the current system 
as opposed to speaking of a complete overhaul of the system, strategically exploiting 
inconsistent objections to proposed reforms and entering in dialogue with other actors to 
try to persuade them of the need for change. Similarly, Niblett (2009) recommends that 
the USA fosters a more constructive dialogue with others, recognizes new constraints 
on its foreign policy, attempts to understand its opponents and to accommodate its 
allies, focuses on governance and processes more than rulers and groupings, strengthens 
multilateral cooperation as a necessity and seeks leadership by example. Nye (2002) 
also suggests that the USA should maintain international rules and institutions, promote 
global commons, preserve the balance of power in important regions, form coalitions 
and mediate disputes, foster an open world economy and help economic development.  
However, theories such as multilateralism à la carte and multi-multilateralism 
inherently imply that the USA should seek its self-interests in the first place and even if 
this comes at the expense of the common good. Of course, focusing on narrow national 
interests is a sovereign right of any country, but it could carry serious implications on 
the external front, especially if the country involved is such a great power that the USA 
is today. Moreover, USA's focus on seeking its national interests implies a deal of 
withdrawal from the global leadership seat. And it is this possibility of withdrawal that 
worries the rest of the world most, especially in view of its potential costs in terms of 
stability. In contrast, even if we look at the state of world affairs from a narrow USA’s 
perspective, it seems that reforming the multilateral system to make it more responsive 
to USA needs helps achieve USA’s national interests more than marginalizing or 
ignoring the system altogether. In fact, multilateral institutions help great powers more 
than they restrict them, for these institutions offer some indispensable advantages, 
including in terms of legitimacy, outreach, coordination, burden-sharing in addition to 
their large pools of knowledge and expertise (Brooks, 2009). Historically, these 
institutions were designed to protect the interests of great powers and have been used by 
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them more than anyone else. And in the current age, where state boundaries are growing 
irrelevant, threats come from state as well as non-state actors and opportunities are 
scattered throughout the globe, no state can go it alone and any actor might need help 
from any other. 
No doubt, the Obama USA’s administration has been working hard to repair the 
image of the USA in the world. It has also taken a foreign policy line favoring 
diplomacy over violence and conciliation over confrontation. In particular, the 2010 
USA’s national security strategy marked a welcome shift toward multilateralism in 
comparison with its two preceding strategies of 2002 and 2006 (USA, 2010). Most 
importantly, the new strategy focuses on soft power, i.e. nonviolent power tools such as 
diplomacy, development and culture. It also conditions preemptive defense against 
imminent threats on exhausting diplomatic means beforehand and limits the use of 
military power to combating Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. In addition, the new strategy 
emphasizes the importance of global alliances and partnerships, including with 
emerging powers. Nonetheless, real politics throughout the lifetime of the current 
USA’s administration reflect an increasing tendency toward multilateralism à la carte. 
For instance, the renovated G-20 now acts as a central hub of economic global 
governance. And, in the WTO, the USA has been pushing the slate away from the 
official course of the Doha Round to bilateral and plurilateral tracks. In contrast, with 
regard to more politicized issues, such as the files of Iran and North Korea, nuclear 
proliferation and climate change, there appears to be hybrid USA’s approaches, 
balancing the use of informal and formal multilateral forums.   
In general, it appears that although the current USA’s administration has 
acknowledged the vital role of the UN and other multilateral institutions, it does not 
treat these institutions as central pillars of multilateral cooperation. In other words, the 
USA’s foreign-policy approach toward multilateral institutions has become case-
specific, in line with the theory of multilateralism à la carte. It seems that besides the 
enduring USA’s ambivalence toward multilateralism, lack of effectiveness in 
multilateral institutions and barriers to reforms of global governance are giving further 
impetus to USA’s reliance on ad-hoc multilateral forums (Stewart, 2010). Thus, in 
practice, multilateralism à la carte has become a de facto line of USA’s foreign policy 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Potential Future Scenarios 
182
over the last few years. This approach encourages the proliferation of multilateral 
forums, formal and informal, and gives rise to problems such as duplication of work, 
forum-shopping and lack of implementation and enforcement. It also fails to respond to 
the needs of other countries and the aspiration for a global multilateral system that 
serves all at equal footing. Instead, the USA needs to strike a balance between formal 
and informal multilateral forums, and this balance should not undermine the objective 
of a rule-based multilateral system.  
 
B. Other Great Powers 
 Some other great powers, traditional and emerging, also play an important role 
in directing the evolution of the multilateral system. In particular, the foreign policies of 
these countries and their approaches toward the multilateral system could either 
reinforce or further marginalize the system. In addition, the relationships between these 
powers and the USA and the intra-relationships between these other powers themselves 
could have significant effects in this regard. Notably, the list of other great powers could 
include Russia and Japan as traditional powers and the EU, China, India and Brazil as 
emerging ones. Fortunately, to varying degrees, the foreign policies of all these powers 
reflect a strong support to multilateralism. While the EU spelled out an elaborate vision 
in support of effective multilateralism, China, India and Brazil are known for their 
traditional advocacy of a fair and effective multilateral system. And now that Russia is 
struggling to reassert itself as a global power, it shows more inclination toward 
multilateralism. Notably, India and Brazil are vigorously seeking permanent seats in the 
UN Security Council, the EU is seeking special recognition in the UN and Russia is 
doing its best to join the WTO. However, it is still worth investigating how the rising 
profiles of these countries could impact on their foreign policies and to what extent their 
support to multilateralism is sustainable.      
Reading through official state discourses, it is clear that some traditional and 
emerging powers, in particular Russia and China, seek a multipolar world order, as a 
means to counteract USA’s hegemony (Vasconcelos, 2008). Remarkably, the former 
president of Russia and current president of China, Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao, issued 
a statement in 2005 advocating the development of a multipolar world order, with a 
view that such an order is an important means to better multilateralism (Jintao, Hu and 
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Putin, Vladimir, 2005). In practice, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, established 
in 2001 by China and Russia with Central Asian States, has been poised as a platform 
for coordination against the dominance of the USA in that region. However, it seems 
that Russia, in particular, is aggressively reasserting itself and seeking a role in a 
multipolar world order (Trenin, 2009). In contrast, China takes a more subtle approach 
and its leaders tend to underestimate the catch-up propaganda, which helps reassure the 
USA and the West about China's intentions. Even in academic circles, Chinese 
strategists speak of their expectation that the USA’s global dominance will continue in 
the foreseeable future (Kagan, 2008).  
As for India and Brazil, apart from issues of global economic governance, 
multipolar power politics are less evident in the foreign policies of these two countries. 
While India is indeed asserting itself as a great power, it continues to have security 
concerns, especially with neighboring China and Pakistan, which make it more 
dependent on the USA’s security umbrella (Zakaria, 1998). Notably, the two countries 
signed a unique nuclear deal in 2005 and there is support in Indian and USA’s circles to 
the idea that India could be a natural ally of the USA, in view of their shared democratic 
values. However, India continues to take a cautious foreign policy approach that limits 
its participation in global governance (Matussek, 2010). Even with regard to subjects 
with regional dimensions, such as Afghanistan and Iran, India is generally reluctant to 
take more assertive stances. This reflects a lack of clarity inside India as to which road 
its foreign policy should take and whether it should join the ranks of great powers or 
keep on the side of developing countries. Concerning Brazil, it is indeed asserting itself 
as the superpower in Latin America and vigorously seeking a diversified set of strategic 
partnerships across the globe. However, Brazil's foreign policy remains principally 
focused on its region (Vaz, 2009). In essence, as a country between the center and the 
periphery on the world power map, Brazil's current foreign policy is focused on two 
main pivots, development and multilateralism (Femesh, 2010).      
Besides individual moves, most emerging powers also use different groupings to 
assert themselves and promote their increasing interests in global governance. Examples 
of this include the BRICS, RIC (Russia, India and China) and IBSA (India, Brazil and 
South Africa). While RIC has been overshadowed by the BRICS, given the membership 
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overlap between the two forums, IBSA is poised more as a platform of trilateral and 
wider South-South cooperation than a global power bloc. Nonetheless, one of the main 
pillars of IBSA is coordination on international issues, such as the reform of the UN and 
the Bretton Woods institutions (Sotero, 2009). Notably, the three IBSA member 
countries seek permanent seats in the UN Security Council. In contrast, the BRICS’ 
forum is widely touted as a forum reshaping world politics. Historically, the term BRIC 
(before the inclusion of South Africa in December 2010) emerged in a Goldman Sachs' 
report in 2001, before the launch of the BRIC’ forum in 2006 with a meeting of foreign 
ministers, in the footsteps of similar RIC meetings. Later on, the BRIC introduced 
annual summit-level meetings as of 2009. Notably, the heated controversy around the 
bloc goes back to a 2003 Goldman Sachs’s estimate that the BRIC’ economies could 
bypass the world’s richest economies (G-8 minus Canada and Russia) by 2041, before 
this same estimate was updated in 2009 to predict that they could bar with the G-7 by 
2032 (Goldman Sachs, 2009).       
No doubt, over the last few years, the BRICS’ forum has grown into a successful 
body with significant influence vis-à-vis older Western forums such as the G-8. Most 
importantly, the final communiqué of 2010 BRICS Summit stated that “We underline 
our support for a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order, based on 
international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and 
collective decision-making of all States” (BRICS, 2010). Thus, multipolarity figures 
strongly on the agenda of the BRICS, as a fundamental pillar of their vision of 
multilateralism. In general, BRICS’ statements also reflect strong emphasis on sharing 
experiences, coordinating policies and promoting a more representative and effective 
multilateral system, with special focus on global economic governance. However, there 
continues to be doubts about the future potential of the BRICS, especially given the 
fundamental differences between its members, including in terms of cultural 
backgrounds, political regimes and economic performance. In addition, relations 
between the two most important members, China and India, have witnessed increasing 
tension over the last few years because of their historical border dispute. In fact, apart 
from objecting to some elements of the current world order, the BRICS does not present 
a concrete vision of how the future should look like (Weiss, 2009). By and large, this 
reflects the transitory phase that these countries are undergoing, besides their reluctance 
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to assume more responsibilities in global governance at the time they dedicate most of 
their attention to meeting domestic challenges. Even China, the best performer in this 
group, still vociferously insists that it is yet a developing, indebted country.   
On another level, the grooming of the G-20 to replace the G-8 as the hub of 
global economic governance stands as evidence to the evolution of global power 
balances. In fact, this step looks only logical, given the membership of all the BRICS in 
the renovated G-20. And its timing was also revealing, as it was in the midst of the 
current international economic crisis, which has mostly been blamed on the West and 
the USA in particular. For obvious reasons, the BRICS feel more accommodated in the 
G-20, although it is an informal, loose forum that lacks clear legal framework or 
adequate enforcing mechanisms. In contrast, in the UN, several countries with G-20 
membership claims and many other developing and poor countries are outspoken 
against the G-20. As a result, talk of the indispensability of the UN is in force in 
different corners of the world today, including in the UN, where the theme of 2010 
general debate in the General Assembly was focused on reaffirming the central role of 
the UN in global governance. Noticeably, there seems to be a rising rivalry between 
formal multilateral institutions, such as the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions, and 
the G-20 and other G groupings, the fuel of which is a feeling that such G groupings 
lack representativeness and legitimacy and usurp functions legally mandated to formal 
multilateral bodies (Jones, 2010).  
To a lesser extent, the G-2 is also an important forum that could have significant 
influence in world politics, as it includes the current superpower and a predicted future 
superpower. Similar to the G-20, the G-2 reflects a new emerging pivot of power 
balancing. However, the G-2 seems a lot more welcome than the G-20, partially due to 
the interest of the USA and the wider international community in guaranteeing a 
peaceful rise of China as well as the contribution that this forum could have to bettering 
multilateral cooperation on a host of subjects. Still, the G-2 embodies a love-hate 
relationship that is advancing on the basis of interests. And although the positions of the 
two sides seem finely balanced, this balance is prone to easy breakdowns due to the 
complexity and sensitivity of the issues at stake (Prasad and Gu, 2009). If not 
controlled, such breakdowns could escalate and cost the world dearly in terms of 
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stability and wellbeing. Hence, like typical of cases of power balance, the emerging 
balance between the USA and China could either motivate better global governance or 
instead hasten and exacerbate potential damage.  
Overall, the foreign policy orientations of emerging and traditional powers other 
than the USA could have a significant impact on the future course of multilateralism. In 
this regard, whether the EU could secure the support of other powers to its elaborate 
vision of effective multilateralism or not is an important question, particularly in view 
of the rising role of the EU as a unique supranational regional institution. In addition, 
for emerging and traditional powers to reinforce and enhance the performance of the 
multilateral system, it is necessary to steer foreign policies that, firstly, heed the call for 
help from the USA in a way that does not undermine the role of formal multilateral 
institutions. In other words, these powerhouses should be forthcoming in assuming 
bigger roles in support of global governance, while at the same time resisting the 
increasing informal trend of USA’s foreign policy. Otherwise, the current proliferation 
of multilateral forums, with the noticeable increase in the reliance on informal ones, 
may gain further momentum, which could further marginalize formal multilateral 
institutions such as the UN. Secondly, these powers need to manage their internal and 
external conflicts and avoid would-be divide and rule tactics in order to come out with a 
common front and ensure against strains on their resources and ascent to power. In 
contrast, if conflicts, such as those between China and both India and Japan, exacerbate, 
this will only serve elongating the current transitory phase and may even change the 
emerging world power map.  
Thirdly, emerging powers should maintain their traditional support to effective 
multilateralism, though this may require them to forego some immediate temptations 
and benefits. While the USA and the West at large recognize the need to accommodate 
the interests of emerging powers, if these powers fall for immediate palliatives, such as 
special recognition in formal multilateral forums or special status in informal ones, this 
would send a signal that they view multipolarity as an end not as a means to better 
multilateral cooperation. In turn, the gains emerging powers have achieved this far, such 
as in the reinvigorated G-20 and the Bretton Woods institutions, should not dilute their 
demands for effective global governance. Notably, reforming the multilateral system to 
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meet the aspirations of emerging powers is faced with resistance from both rival 
developing countries and traditional great powers (Weiss, 2008). However, emerging 
powers should persevere in their struggle for a holistic reform of the multilateral system, 
for this is the most secure and sustainable form of reform, especially at the time these 
powers are in transition and their ascent is surrounded with challenges. In contrast, 
leaning toward multipolarity could cost emerging powers the support they currently 
have from states supportive to their causes, which might as well deal a serious blow to 
the case for reform. Fourthly, the global power status of all powerhouses depends to a 
large extent on their ability to face their respective internal challenges. Notably, 
emerging powers, such as China, India and Brazil have daunting internal challenges 
ahead. The success or failure and the speed at which these powers manage those internal 
challenges will certainly impact on the evolution of the global power map and the 
related transformation of world order.  
 
C. Secondary Players 
 In addition to the roles of the USA and other traditional and emerging powers, 
there are two sets of secondary players that could affect the future course of 
multilateralism. Specifically, the participation of regional powers, developing and poor 
countries and the net impact of non-state actors could both play important catalytic 
roles. Firstly, regional powers, developing and poor countries are indeed more 
concerned about their own problems and immediate needs than what could be called 
high-traffic politics between the great powers. In addition, the intellectuals of these 
countries are largely absent from the ongoing debate on the evolution of the multilateral 
system. Nevertheless, some of them are better engaged in the system, especially in 
institutions such as the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions. This is particularly the 
case of regional powers such as Turkey, Iran and Egypt in the Middle East; South 
Africa and Nigeria in Africa; Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela in Latin 
America; and Australia, Indonesia and South Korea in Asia Pacific.  
For logical reasons, the great majority of what could be called second-tier 
countries should even have more interest in the betterment of the multilateral system 
than great powers, due to the formers' relative lack of power to impose their will. 
Indeed, some small countries even depend on multilateral institutions, such as the UN 
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and its system, for their political and economic viability (Weiss, 2008). However, on the 
other side, political and developmental problems in these countries, together with other 
problems in the multilateral system expose them to the wills of rich and powerful 
countries and do not usually allow them adequate action on the international level. This 
is even more the case today that the level of official development assistance (ODA) is 
falling short of achieving the MDGs. Nevertheless, one sees the role of developing 
countries increasing in a multilateral institution such as the WTO. And although this has 
been a source of further impasses, it gives a clear indication that developing world is 
getting closer together in this specific field (Laidi, 2008). Similarly, some of these 
countries contribute to the blockage in the UN on such critical issues as UN Security 
Council reform. This is particularly true for those who view as detrimental any special 
status achievement by emerging powers seeking permanent membership. Ultimately, 
the great majority of developing countries are translated into a great majority of voting 
rights in institutions such as the UN and the WTO. And if these countries manage to 
better coordinate their positions, they would constitute a stronger bargaining force that 
could be used to protect their interests, including their need for rule-based, effective 
multilateral institutions.    
 Secondly, although non-state actors, such as NGOs and TNCs, do not participate 
as basic players in the multilateral system, they are growing more capable of influencing 
the system and world politics at large. On one side, NGOs are contributing to what 
could be called emerging global public opinion, which has an increasing influence on 
states domestically and internationally. In essence, they are acting as external 
accountability agents that combat perceived negative policies and motivate and support 
better multilateral cooperation in a variety of fields (Keohane, 2005). For instance, 
NGOs active in the environmental field form lobbies that are increasingly influential. In 
contrast, TNCs have a different agenda, advocating more global economic integration, 
resisting more controls on their activities and putting pressure on states to achieve these 
objectives. However, it is technological and economic integration that is bringing the 
world together more than anything else. In this sense, and whatever the differences in 
agendas are, TNCs constitute a significant force, especially in the global economic field. 
And although their influence does not necessarily lead to better multilateral cooperation, 
it is one that stimulates more liberalization and more multilateralism. Hence, it is argued 
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that TNCs are an emerging force of privatization in world politics, with resources that 
could help rectify the failures of the multilateral system (Bull et al, 2004).  
 To sum up, the future course of the multilateral system principally depends on 
the actions of the yet superpower, the USA, as well as those of other traditional and 
emerging powers. Indeed, there is a great deal of uncertainty in this analysis and there 
are no clear cutting lines between the aforementioned potential scenarios, due to the 
many, different and sometimes even contradictory dynamics of the current momentous 
transition of world order. However, based on current trends and the reading of the 
foreign policies of the major players, effective multilateralism does not seem any near in 
the horizon. One fundamental reason behind this is that there continue to be intractable 
difficulties blocking the road to reforming the multilateral system. Hence, on one side, 
the USA shows an increasing propensity to multilateralism à la carte, among others as a 
means to bypass the complications of the system and as an approach to help extend and 
maximize the projection of its remaining power. On another side, emerging powers are 
demanding deeper institutional reforms in the system, with special focus on 
accommodating their rising global weights. In parallel, these powers are also seeking 
multipolarity as a means to force their multilateral reform demands ahead. 
Unfortunately, it is not in the interest of traditional powers in general nor in the interest 
of the great majority of states to concur with the reform demands of emerging powers, 
for this would cost them directly in terms of relative status in multilateral institutions. 
As a result, the world seems closer to multilateralism à la carte and multipolar power 
politics than to effective multilateralism.  
Most importantly, unless the USA lends its support to the vision of adequate 
reform in the multilateral system, while emerging powers join hands with such other 
supportive powers as the EU and come up together as a strong, coherent and persistent 
force behind this vision, historical multilateral institutions, such as the UN, would be 
sacrificed and the whole world would have to bear the consequences. It needn’t be 
overemphasized here that the best approach to address global problems should be 
predicated on reforming the formal multilateral system and making it the central hub of 
all forums addressing global governance. In this regard, it is incumbent on middle-size 
and small states to support effective multilateralism; for it is in their best interest in the 
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long-run. Perhaps blocking needed institutional reforms could serve the interests of 
some of these states in the short-run. Nonetheless, lack of reform in the multilateral 
system is in turn contributing to the proliferation of informal multilateral forums, where 
these states do not even have voices. Thus, blocking needed reforms does not stop the 
powerful current of change; it only diverts it and makes it more detrimental to all. 
Finally, though not basic players in the nation-state system, non-state actors, most 
particularly NGOs, could play an important catalytic role in support of more effective 
and accountable multilateralism. In addition, TNCs have been so far the main 
beneficiaries of globalization, and as such they should be brought onboard and 
requested to contribute their share to better global governance.                                      
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Abstract 
 
The UN emerged from the debris of the League of Nations. Its founders took the 
experience of the League of Nations as a starting point. They chose to maintain the 
same basic structure and transplanted the notion of collective security. However, they 
changed the decision-making mechanism significantly, most importantly by abolishing 
the general rule of unanimity and replacing it with a carefully designed great-power 
unanimity rule. In addition, the UN Charter marked an augmentation in the authorities 
of the council at the expense of the assembly, thus making the Security Council the 
powerhouse of the organization. Remarkably, it is widely argued that it is mainly due to 
these differences that the UN is still alive today. Yet, throughout its life, the world body 
has suffered from lack of effectiveness. The main reasons behind this include lack of 
political will of member states, lack of equity and consistency in the system, democracy 
deficit, lack of enforcement, political and administrative inefficiency and lack of 
resources. Nevertheless, as the core embodiment and prime symbol of the international 
multilateral system, the UN is being staunchly advocated as an indispensable body. 
Notably, it offers a stable platform for addressing the challenges of globalization, 
represents international legitimacy in its most salient form, is the only international 
organization of its kind enjoying global membership, has already developed some kind 
of institutional resilience in serving its members, functions on the basis of burden 
sharing, undertakes a vital developmental mission, sets rules of order in international 
relations and acts as a repository of world conscience. As for the future outlook of the 
organization, it is argued here that it will largely depend on developments in two main 
areas: one is the crisis of representative legitimacy that has been dividing the 
organization, and the other is the trend of increasing marginalization that risks rendering 
the world body irrelevant.           
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Chapter Five 
The United Nations and the International Multilateral System 
 
The UN is the prime symbol of multilateralism and the most representative 
embodiment of its achievements, challenges and setbacks. It is, as Paul Kennedy sees it, 
the parliament of man, which, as Shashi Tharoor sees it, was invented to save humanity 
from hell. In effect, the origins of the current international multilateral system date back 
to the establishment of the UN in 1945. Since then, the multilateral system has 
outgrown the UN and its wide system of specialized agencies, programs and funds. 
Nonetheless, the system remains so UN-centered that its very survival is dependent on 
it. Along these general lines, this chapter starts with a short historical background of the 
UN. Then, it moves on to analyzing its mission, structure and functions; its main 
strengths, along with the reasons why it could be seen as indispensable; and its main 
weaknesses, along with the factors behind lack of effectiveness. Finally, the chapter 
analyzes two main challenges that the UN is facing today, namely the questions of 
legitimacy and relevance.  
 
I. Historical Background 
 The forces of human propensity to conflict and human quest for peaceful 
coexistence are two contradictory forces that have largely shaped the history of mankind 
since humanity itself started. This is clearly reflected in the relics of early civilizations 
such as the Pharaonic, Mesopotamian, Greek and Roman civilizations. More recently, 
the Great War, the thirty-year war in Europe that ended up with the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, had given rise to a plethora of calls, most of which were in fact 
rhetorical, to put an end to repeated bloody struggles and find a way to lasting peace 
(Kissinger, 1994). The nation-state concept that emerged from the Treaty helped to 
reduce conflicts, but fell short of providing a sustainable environment for peaceful 
coexistence. From the late 18th through the early 19th centuries, the Napoleonic wars 
ravaged Europe and left atrocities and agonies throughout the continent. Several other 
smaller-scale wars followed, including the Crimean war, the Prussian-Austrian and 
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Prussian-French wars. Ultimately, the 20th century witnessed two of the bloodiest wars 
in the history of mankind, World Wars I and II.  
The eruption of World War I was clear evidence that ad-hoc balances and 
concerts of powers that marked the 19th century could not constrain the tendency to use 
military power to accomplish national expansionist objectives at the expense of others. 
The war left unprecedented devastation, as it employed modern mass warfare tools. It 
further shook the pillars of the modern Western civilization and uprooted communities 
and regions throughout the world. Ultimately, the war led to moving the center of world 
power, especially in its economic aspects, across the Atlantic to the USA, along with 
newly emerging powers such as Japan and Australia (Kissinger, 1994). In the aftermath 
of the war, world’s governments, most particularly victor powers, launched the first 
significant attempt in the history of mankind to establish a formal association of nation-
states, the League of Nations. The founding document, the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, drafted by a special commission, was later on adopted as the first part of the 
Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919.    
 The Covenant of the League of Nations contained a set of rules constraining the 
use of force, binding all its member states to peaceful settlement of disputes and 
providing that the League of Nations would take collective action against any state that 
violates these rules. Its doors were opened to all states after removing a short-lived ban 
on the defeated Central Powers that was imposed by the victor Allied Powers. Indeed, 
the Covenant was engineered around the same old concept of power concerts and did 
not otherwise bring about any fundamental alteration to usual world politics at the time 
(Kennedy, 2006). This was clearly reflected in the structure of the League of Nation, 
with an Assembly that includes all but colonized states meeting in neutral Geneva, 
while the central decision-making body, the Council, began with four victor powers 
(Great Britain – France – Italy – Japan) as permanent members, then changed several 
times, most importantly to include Germany as a fifth permanent member and introduce 
non-permanent membership, on a rotating regional basis. 
The League of Nations made some notable successes, including in encouraging 
international cooperation in technical fields such as postal communication, civil 
aviation, drug trafficking, labor standards…etc. It also helped resolve several territorial 
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conflicts in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere. In addition, it introduced a novel 
system for the protection of the rights of minorities and was inspecting the situations in 
colonies through reports made by imperial powers. Yet, the League of Nations was 
suffering from pitfalls that ultimately led to its clamorous collapse. Most importantly, 
the powerhouses in the center stage, Great Britain and France, had fundamental 
differences about the mission of the organization. In addition, the other powerhouses in 
the Council, Japan, Italy and Germany, had perilous territorial ambitions that 
undermined the credibility of the organization. Furthermore, other would-be balancers, 
especially the USA and the USSR (with the exception of the period from 1934 to 1939), 
were out for different reasons (Kennedy, 2006). Thus, although the League of Nations 
was based on the same old concept of power concerts, its power base was suffering 
from grave imbalances and complications.    
Although the League of Nations marked a metamorphosis in world political 
thinking and setup and its establishment gave rise to optimism and idealistic aspirations, 
less than two decades later, it turned out to be an inadequate exercise in the face of war 
mongering and ideological hatreds. As a result, a domino effect of failures led to the 
outbreak of World War II, starting with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. 
Had the powerful states stood firmly against that incidence from a permanent member 
in the Council of the organization, perhaps would-be violators, Italy and Germany, 
could have been deterred (Kissinger, 1994). After the Nazi party took power in 
Germany in 1933, it seemed determined to obliterate the Treaty of Versailles. In the 
same year, Japan joined Germany in walking out of the League of Nations. Shortly 
afterward, Italy delivered another severe blow to the system by invading Ethiopia in 
1934 and walking out to join the ranks of Germany and Japan. In the meantime, talks on 
disarmament collapsed and the international scene was set for weapon buildups that 
amassed war clouds. 
A number of other similar incidents preceded the outbreak of World War II, 
including the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, followed by the forced welcoming of 
Nazi forces in Vienna in 1938, then Germany’s annexation of Czechoslovakia in the 
same year. Ultimately, World War II erupted with the Nazi invasion of Poland in 
September 1939. In the course of the war, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
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France, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece all fell under the control of the Axis 
powers. But, in a move that changed the course of events, the USA joined the war after 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. By April 1945, Benito 
Mussolini was assassinated and Adolf Hitler had committed suicide, and both Germany 
and Italy surrendered. Only Japan did not surrender until the USA’s nuclear bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.       
World War II is thought to be the most devastating and fatal in the history of 
mankind. It is estimated that around 60 million human-beings were killed in that war. It 
also marked the first and last time nuclear weapons were used offensively, in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. This unfortunate incidence has been a subject of debate ever since, 
especially with respect to its ethical justification and whether it was practically 
necessary to defeat Japan (Kennedy, 2006). The war also had some far-reaching 
implications on the distribution of power in the world, as European traditional powers 
were violently displaced, and shortly afterwards Europe became divided by the so-
called iron curtain between the West led by the USA and the East led by the USSR. 
Thus, the USA and the USSR emerged as the two most powerful states. Due to its 
geographical exclusiveness and relatively larger power base, Great Britain continued to 
play a leading role in power politics for several years, before ultimately succumbing to 
the USA as the sole Western pole.            
Obviously, the League of Nations failed to act to prevent or to stop the war, 
except on one last symbolic move against the Soviet invasion of Finland in winter 1939. 
Subsequently, it collapsed completely and was formally wound up in 1946, with an 
intrinsic belief that it was part of the problem. Until the end of the war, world leaders 
had no time to reflect on the failed organization, as all efforts were focused on the war 
machinery. Nonetheless, thinkers, internationalists and politicians in different countries 
started contemplating the postwar world order as early as shortly after the outbreak of 
the war. Notably, USA president Franklin Roosevelt delivered a historical speech in 
1941, in which he proposed four freedoms that he thought everyone should be able to 
enjoy: freedoms of speech and expression, religion, from want and from fear. This 
historical concept found its way through to the Charter of the UN in 1945 and continues 
to resonate today (Kissinger, 1994). 
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The concept of united nations appeared officially for the first time in the 1942 
Declaration of the UN, signed by the 46 states that formed the Allied camp, which 
declaration also stated the aims of the Allied powers in World War II.  From August to 
October 1944, representatives from the USA, USSR, UK and China, meeting at 
Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, formulated the first official proposal for a new world 
organization, the “General International Organization,” to replace the League of 
Nations. In February 1945, the leaders of the USA, USSR and UK met in Yalta, Crimea, 
where they finalized plans for defeating and occupying Germany and coordinated their 
respective positions on voting in the then future Security Council and on membership in 
the then future General Assembly, especially with regard to the 16 constituent republics 
of the USSR. The essence of the deal was for the great powers (USA, USSR, UK and 
China) to enjoy permanent membership and a great-power unanimity rule, the veto 
power, while the USSR withdrew its demand of membership for all its constituent 
republics, except Ukraine and Belarus (Kennedy, 2006). 
From 25 April to 26 June 1945, representatives from the 46 states that had 
signed the 1942 Declaration of the UN met in San Francisco to draft the Charter of the 
UN. Discussions were open-ended, but naturally the foreign ministers of the big four 
powers (USA, USSR, UK and China) played a dominant role. Most heatedly was the 
issue of the extent of powers that the permanent members in the Security Council were 
to be granted. Small states tried to restrict the exercise of veto power and expand the 
role of the General Assembly at the expense of the Security Council. However, the will 
of power prevailed, as the big four managed to enforce their essential demands at the 
end. In addition, at pressure mainly from Great Britain, France was granted a fifth 
permanent seat in the Security Council. On 26 June 1945, the San Francisco conference 
concluded with signing the UN Charter by 51 states, including five additional states that 
were invited to participate in its proceedings.  
Expectedly, the negotiations in San Francisco were highly influenced by the yet 
ongoing mass devastation of World War II. In particular, the approach of big powers in 
the negotiations reflected a common understanding that the League of Nations was too 
liberal and too democratic and that these were major reasons behind its failures 
(Kennedy, 2006). Consequently, as it appeared from the Yalta conference, the big 
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powers were intent on making the Security Council a powerful club and on carving a 
privileged status for themselves in this club. Hence, they insisted that the new 
organization should be designed in line with the criteria of power distribution and the 
need for effectiveness. Most importantly, they were keen to build a new international 
security system that provides reliable guarantees for the immediate future. In turn, it 
was a high imperative for all participating states to have all the great victor powers, 
including the USA and the USSR, join the new organization at any price, otherwise the 
new security system would again lack the needed power backing as was the case with 
the League of Nations.  
No doubt, the founders of the UN used the League of Nations as a starting point. 
They chose to maintain the basic structure of the League of Nations, with an assembly 
and a council. In addition, they transplanted the notion of collective security from the 
League of Nations. However, on the other hand, they changed the decision-making 
mechanism significantly, abolishing the general rule of unanimity of the League of 
Nations and replacing it with a carefully designed great-power unanimity rule. Over and 
above, the UN Charter marked an augmentation in the authorities of the council at the 
expense of the assembly, which applies for example to the power of imposing economic 
sanctions (Grigorescu, 2005). Hence, the Security Council has come out as the highest-
profile and most powerful formal intergovernmental structure in the history of mankind. 
In short, one could say that at the time the League of Nations relied more on egalitarian 
notions, the UN, though it maintained the notion of sovereign equality of states, is based 
more on the notion of power. Yet, it is widely argued that it is mainly due to these 
differences that the UN survived until today, while the League of Nations was doomed 
to failure.     
In fact, the UN Charter provided for a new international security system that 
made a clear distinction between big, powerful states and small, weak states, with big 
states granted exclusive prerogatives in exchange for special responsibilities toward 
small states. Although all the great powers at the time were somehow convinced of the 
need for a new security system that can save humanity from recurrent aggressions, they 
wanted to keep exclusive margins of freedom in case their interests come in conflict 
with Charter’s commitments. Thus, it was implicitly understood, if a permanent state 
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decides to challenge the system, there would be little to do to constrict its behavior. In 
such a case, the only way to act would be for the remaining permanent states to come 
together against the violator, which scenario might lead to an exacerbation of instability 
or even devastating wars if the violating state does not give in.  
Overall, one could say that the UN Charter has three main pillars (Kennedy, 
2006). One is the new international security system based on peaceful settlement of 
disputes, using collective efforts in the fields of diplomacy, arbitration and if necessary 
military force to deter aggressions and/or defeat the aggressor. The second pillar derives 
from the understanding that economic development is needed to enhance stability and 
security. Accordingly, the UN, together with the Bretton Woods institutions, has 
important roles in backstopping development and fostering the world economy. Thirdly, 
the Charter provides for promoting the dialogue of cultures and civilizations and the 
amity among different peoples. This third pillar is based on the premise that humanity 
has a common destiny, that war begins in the minds of human-beings and that, if they 
wish, different strands of mankind can coexist in peace and have constructive and 
mutually beneficial exchanges. 
 
II. UN Mission, Structure and Functions 
It is a risky exercise to attempt to summarize any of the articles in the UN 
Charter, but, for convenience, one could provide brief references and reflections on 
some articles, especially those related to the purposes and principles, the structure, the 
Security Council, the General Assembly and the ECOSOC. The first chapter of the 
Charter elaborates on the purposes and principles of the organization in a lucid manner. 
The list of purposes starts with the maintenance of international peace and security 
through measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of peace and the settlement of disputes that might 
lead to breach of peace through peaceful means, in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law. Here, the language reflects the center stage of peace and 
security in the world body and a strong resolve to ensure against all kinds of threats to 
international peace. The list also includes developing friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
achieving international cooperation in solving economic, social, cultural and 
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humanitarian problems and promoting respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all. 
The first chapter also states seven guiding principles for the organization and its 
members in the pursuit of the aforementioned purposes. The leading principle is the 
sovereign equality of all member states, a principle that was tempered by the great-
power unanimity rule from the outset and that has increasingly come under challenge 
due to the weakness of some states and the infringement of globalization on national 
sovereignty. The six other key principles include a commitment by all states to fulfill 
their obligations under the Charter in good faith, to settle their disputes peacefully, to 
refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the organization, to give the organization every 
assistance in any action it takes and refrain from giving assistance to any state against 
which the organization is taking preventive or enforcement action. Finally, in an attempt 
to strike a balance between the organization and its building blocs, the last principle 
provides that, with the exception of the enforcement measures under Chapter VII, 
nothing in the Charter shall authorize the organization to intervene in the internal affairs 
of its member states. Noticeably, new concepts, such as the responsibility to protect, a 
concept already endorsed by General Assembly, and human security, have risen against 
the principle of noninterference in internal affairs. 
The third chapter of the Charter identifies six principal organs of the 
organization: The General Assembly, the Security Council, the ECOSOC, the 
Secretariat, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Trusteeship Council. The last 
organ was meant to oversee the governance of colonies, but has already become 
obsolete after decolonizing all areas under its consideration. Particularly, the General 
Assembly and the Security Council occupy central positions and play pivotal roles in 
the machinery of the UN. The membership of the Security Council started out with the 
current five permanent seats as well as six non-permanent seats occupied by the general 
membership on the basis of geographical rotation as well as contribution to international 
peace and other UN purposes. In 1965, and with the increase in the UN general 
membership due to decolonization, the Charter was amended to increase the non-
permanent membership to 10 seats. As for its mandate, the Charter invests in the 
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Council prime responsibility on the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Over and above, the Council has been playing an increasingly bigger role in 
international relations since the end of the Cold War. Notably, there has been a gradual 
augmentation in the mandate of the Council, as it has been adopting resolutions 
widening the scope of its functions and addressing, in more detail, issues such as human 
rights, humanitarian law, gender, energy and climate change.  
Usually, the Security Council is in the center of focus in the UN. One could 
attribute this focal status to three main reasons (Luck, 2003). The first is that the 
Council, by the very nature of its functions, is the UN organ addressing the most 
sensitive security and political issues in international relations. In this respect, positions 
taken by the Council, or lack thereof, could make or break peace and stability in any 
part of the world. Secondly, the Council is truly the central powerhouse of the UN, 
especially in view of its limited two-tier and highly selective membership and its 
mandate to issue resolutions that are binding on all member states. Moreover, the 
resolutions of the Council under Chapter VII, on threats and breaches of peace and acts 
of aggression, could include sanctions and legitimize the use of force. Thirdly, the 
voting procedures of the Council include the infamous permanent-five unanimity rule 
on substantial issues. This rule has been a source of contention and objection since the 
preparatory proceedings of the San Francisco conference. Ironically, the rationale 
behind this provision in Article (27) on voting in the Security Council was meant to 
ensure that no great power could go it alone, but it has been misused and transformed in 
practice into a prerogative of any individual permanent member to block the system, 
which is corroborating the shortcut name of this rule, the “veto power.” Until 2008, the 
veto power was used in 263 cases, all of them raised by individual permanent states, 
which further confirms its image as an obstacle to maintaining international peace and 
security. Perhaps more vexatious, the veto power poses a quasi-insurmountable obstacle 
to reforming the UN, as the Charter states that any amendment to it has to be agreed by 
the permanent five. Fortunately, however, the tendency to use this power has been on 
decline since the 1995 (please refer to Table 2 below). 
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Table (2) 
The Number of Times the Veto Power Was Used 
Period China France Britain US USSR/Russia Total 
Total 7 18 32 82 124 263 
2008 1 - - - 1 2 
2007 1 - - - - 2 
2006 - - - 2 - 2 
2001-2005 - - - 8 1 9 
1996-2000 2 - - 2 - 4 
1986-95 - 3 8 24 2 37 
1976-85 - 9 11 34 6 60 
1966-75 2 2 10 12 7 33 
1956-65 - 2 3 - 26 31 
1946-55 1* 2 - - 80 83 
* This veto was made by the Republic of China (Taiwan).  
Source: Global Policy Forum, www.globalpolicy.org  
 
On the other side, the General Assembly was meant to be a forum for the general 
membership. It could be assimilated to a world parliament with membership from 
governments (Kennedy, 2006). The Charter authorizes the Assembly to discuss any 
matter within its scope and to make recommendations that are included in documents 
called resolutions. These resolutions lack binding force, because they lack enforcement 
mechanisms similar to those available for the Security Council. Nonetheless, 
Assembly's resolutions set normative grounds for international relations and enjoy a 
significant moral authority. The Charter also requires all UN organs to present annual 
activity reports to the Assembly and authorizes the latter to consider and adopt the 
annual budget of the organization and to make recommendations for promoting 
international cooperation in political, legal, economic, social and cultural fields. In 
particular, the Assembly has a special mandate in economic and social matters. Still, it 
does not enjoy any kind of monopoly on these issues, as it addresses them in 
cooperation with the ECOSOC. Furthermore, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the 
WTO more recently, have been intentionally distanced from the UN from the outset. 
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And, especially since the end of the Cold War, the role of the UN system in economic 
matters has become all the more marginalized.      
Although the General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to 
situations that are likely to threaten international peace and security, the Assembly 
cannot make any recommendations concerning matters on the agenda of the Council. 
Thus, under normal circumstances, the Assembly can discuss but not decide on issues of 
peace and security. There is only one exception to this general rule, by virtue of the 
General Assembly’s resolution 377 of 1950, the “uniting for peace” resolution. This 
resolution authorizes the General Assembly in cases where the Security Council fails to 
exercise its primary responsibility on maintaining international peace and security, 
usually because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, to consider the matter 
and make appropriate recommendations to member states, including the use of force 
when necessary. The first and most famous case where the uniting for peace procedure 
was used was during the Korean War. This far, the Assembly held 10 emergency special 
sessions under this procedure, most of which dedicated to the Arab Israeli conflict.  
The ECOSOC is another important UN organ, made up of 54 states elected by 
the General Assembly on geographical rotation basis. The ECOSOC’s main focus is on 
coordination and policy dialogue with respect to economic, social and cultural issues. It 
reports to and takes instructions from the General Assembly on its activities. 
Notwithstanding the differences in mandates, the ECOSOC was created along lines 
similar to those of the Security Council. However, unlike the Security Council, the 
ECOSOC largely lies outside the circle of contentious power politics. This is mainly 
due to the “softness” and “lightness” of its mandate, while the crux of international 
economic and developmental management is entrusted to the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Notably, the ECOSOC is unique in its consultative mechanism with NGOs. 
It is the only UN principal organ that has such a mechanism and remains the main 
access point for NGOs’ contributions to the work of the UN. The ECOSOC’s mandate 
also refers to making recommendations to the General Assembly on promoting the 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, after establishing the 
UNHRC in 2006, to succeed the Human Rights Commission, the main focus of these 
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issues has moved to the new Council. And, ever since, the UNHRC has come to enjoy 
more clout and prestige in this area. 
Other important organs of the UN include the ICJ, the UN Secretariat and the 
newly established UN Peacebuilding Commission. The statute of the ICJ is attached to 
the UN Charter as an integral part of it. The Court is based in the Hague, the 
Netherlands, and it most importantly offers a judicial resort for UN member states that 
agree to take their disputes to it, thus serving an important role in maintaining 
international peace. The UN Secretariat is the administrative organ in charge of 
overseeing the daily functioning of the organization. The Charter states that the 
Secretary General, the highest-ranking international servant, is to be appointed by the 
General Assembly upon recommendation from the Security Council, which largely puts 
this important position in the hands of the five permanent members. Most outstanding 
among the functions of the Secretary General is the authority to bring to the attention of 
the Security Council any matter that could threaten international peace and stability. 
Finally, the Peacebuilding Commission is a new subsidiary organ that was established 
in 2005, as one of the outcomes of the 2005 UN Millennium Review Summit, to serve 
as an advisory body on post-conflict peace consolidation, recovery, reconstruction and 
development. Most importantly, the Commission is intended to prevent countries rolling 
out of conflict from relapsing into chaos.          
Over the years, the UN has developed a wide and complex network of 
specialized agencies, programs and funds that are sometimes referred to as the UN 
system or family. This network includes such components as the IAEA, the FAO, the 
WHO and the UNESCO. It also includes programs and funds such as the UN 
Development Program, the UNEP and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). A quick 
look at this network reflects the extensive scope and range of activities in which the UN 
is involved as well as the overwhelming bureaucratic structure of the world 
organization. It is common knowledge that the UN system suffers from overlapping 
missions, heavy reliance on donors and competition for limited resources (Weiss, 2008). 
Nonetheless, this prolific network serves a clear indication to the centrality of the 
development task in the UN, as most of its agencies, programs and funds are mainly 
development-initiated and oriented. No doubt, the UN system has played a vital role in 
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helping newly independent countries establish more practical independence. And it has 
always been a critical element in building the capacities of developing countries in 
political, economic, administrative and other areas.  
 
III. Is the UN Indispensable and Why 
 The UN came to existence at a time humanity at large were determined to put 
strict controls on the use of force in international relations. Today, there is hardly any 
doubt that the UN has carried out a unique role in advancing international peace and 
cooperation throughout its life. Thus, on one side, there is strong support to the idea that 
the UN is indispensable (Tharoor, 2003). On the other side, there are arguments to the 
contrary, the most extreme of which is that the UN should be killed and replaced by 
another organization more responsive to the needs of some states (Piccone, 2008). 
Notably, one could trace such anti-UN voices in both academia and politics. They were 
at an all-time height in the period preceding the USA’s war on Iraq, on the ground of 
lack of effectiveness and reform (UN reform and effectiveness will be dealt with in 
further detail later on). Later on, similar voices resurged during the USA’s presidential 
election campaign in 2008, where Senator John McCain, backed by neoconservatives 
and a number of thinkers, such as Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer and Ted 
Lindberg, campaigned with a foreign policy program aiming at establishing a new 
international organization to be called the league or concert of democracies, which 
organization would only include democratic states and would act when the UN fails, 
especially in humanitarian crises. The main driving force behind this thinking is to give 
the USA a free hand to use military force when it deems necessary, which could 
somehow blow the collective security concept on which the UN is based and could 
ultimately lead to killing the UN itself (Piccone, 2008). 
There are also other less radical voices calling for another world organization to 
work side by side with the UN or putting the UN under pressure of competition from 
other international organizations, in what they call “competitive multilateralism”  
(Wedgwood, 2005). Other voices call for the UN to be used as a tool on a case by case 
basis when deemed feasible (Wright, 2009). The rationale of such calls is that there are 
many international and regional organizations that could substitute for the UN. 
Actually, these organizations are already playing an increasing role in partnership with 
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the UN in all kinds of activities, especially conflict resolution, peacekeeping and human 
rights. They also contend that using parallel paths to international cooperation could 
help the UN itself. The list of candidate organizations includes the NATO, the CoD, 
humanitarian organizations, regional organizations and informal coalitions such as the 
G-8 and other ad-hoc informal forums.  
Richard Haas, the President of the Council on Foreign Affairs in the USA, 
thinks that as the unipolar world order is reaching its end, the world is increasingly 
becoming nonpolar and that “multilateralism à la carte” is most likely to be the order of 
the future (Haas, 2008). This basically indicates that multilateral cooperation could 
become less formal, more selective, more ad-hoc and based on a case by case basis. 
According to this theory, there could also be some kind of core group of nation-states 
and non-state actors that could somehow call the shots in international affairs. This 
vision is also shared by some others who think that the most effective approach to 
regulate international relations is through a concert of great powers (Rosecrance, 2008). 
Along similar lines, Francis Fukuyama proposed the idea of “multi-multilateralism” 
(Fukuyama, 2007). He argues that the world is too diverse and complex to be dealt with 
by a single world organization. Rather, it needs comparably diverse organizations to 
provide global governance in security, environment, development and other areas.  
In contrast, there is the viewpoint that the UN is indeed indispensable, which 
viewpoint is shared by a great majority of politicians and academics in both the South 
and the North. One important starting point to consider the indispensability of the UN is 
the recognition that it is relatively manageable to agree on the necessity of change, but 
very demanding to reach a mutually acceptable consensus on the parameters of needed 
change. Clearly, there are several factors why the UN could be seen as indispensable. 
Firstly, as interdependence among countries intensifies due to the forces of globalization 
and as the list of international problems and challenges increases, the benefits of the UN 
become all the more important. In other words, there are many problems currently being 
tackled by the UN and that can hardly be addressed by any other organization, because 
they require continuous attention. Even if some actors would think that they are less 
vulnerable to the problems of globalization than others, there is no doubt that it is in the 
best interest of the whole international community to coexist in a world where such 
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problems are being dealt with in a holistic and consistent manner by such a unique 
organization as the UN. 
Secondly, as the only world organization of its kind, the UN represents formal 
international legitimacy in its most salient form. Resolutions and decisions issued by 
UN organs and affiliates enjoy the power of this legitimacy, whether or not they are 
practically enforceable. For all its perceived imperfections, the UN sets norms and 
contributes to setting laws that respond to our need for an ordered world (Weiss, 2008). 
In effect, the UN demonstrates a collective will made up of the individual wills of its 
members and expressed in UN formal communications and its day-to-day activities. 
Accordingly, agreements reached in the UN entail collective responsibilities on 
implementation as well as legal and/or moral implications for lack of commitment to 
them. Nonetheless, at times, some member states manipulate the legitimacy coverage of 
the UN to achieve their own interests, while at others they treat the world body with 
contempt. This is particularly true for leading member states, although they are the ones 
that benefit most from the UN. In fact, institutions such as the UN enable great powers 
more than they constrain them (Brooks, 2009). Take for example the case of the five 
permanent states in the Security Council, they are privileged by the UN Charter, and if 
they decide to move against wills expressed in the UN, they can do so without fearing 
the repercussions. Even more, some of the most severe blows to the UN come from 
these privileged states.   
Thirdly, the UN is the only overarching international organization with global 
membership. Its 193 members bestow upon it a unique degree of inclusiveness. Besides 
states, the UN system is home for a sophisticated and at times overlapping network of 
specialized agencies, programs and funds. It also gives space for participation and 
partnership in all kinds of fields, with regional organizations, NGOs, humanitarian 
organizations, the international business sector and other stakeholders. In particular, the 
UN Charter contains a separate chapter on cooperation with regional organizations. This 
kind of cooperation is most apparent in areas of peace and security, where the Charter 
authorizes regional organizations to undertake efforts to achieve pacific settlement of 
regional disputes, either voluntarily or after reference from the Security Council, while 
keeping the Council fully informed of these efforts. In fact, the UN is a network of 
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networks that include other international, regional and national organizations and 
stakeholders. In its own right, this inclusiveness enhances the legitimacy of the UN 
(Tharoor, 2003). Inclusiveness also further bolsters the effectiveness of the UN through 
offering the largest possible pool of joint resources in political, economic, cultural and 
other fields. Undoubtedly, this helps member states achieve commonly agreed 
objectives more easily, which is particularly true with respect to world public goods, 
such as world peace and the global environment, for which responsibilities and benefits 
are sophisticatedly intertwined.          
Fourthly, usually institutions, such as the UN, develop some kind of institutional 
resilience, i.e. once an institution is in place, it tends to develop deep roots that cannot 
be removed easily (Brooks, 2009). Although this kind of resilience could turn into 
resistance to needed reforms, it gives institutions lively stamina and immunity against 
threats to their survival. There are several sources of institutional resilience, including 
the development of rapport and habits for working together by member states. There is 
also an accumulative side to the UN work, as past programs, experiences and 
achievements usually make it easier to realize further progress on related subjects. For 
instance, the experience of the UN in peacekeeping makes it the international 
organization best poised to undertake further peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the 
UN is a huge reservoir of information that is appropriately shared with its member states 
and partners. This reservoir combines different strands of information from different 
sources, which offers complementarities that go beyond any individual state. It also 
saves huge resources through making it possible to avoid duplication of work thanks to 
the sharing mechanisms.  
Fifthly, international organizations, such as the UN, provide stable platforms for 
burden-sharing (Brooks, 2009). There could very well be some disagreements on how to 
share these burdens, but not on whether cooperation should take place at all. Thus, 
having an international organization such as the UN in place offers some immediate 
gains. In contrast, if a given state wants to launch international cooperation on some 
specific subject on an informal basis, the issue of participation of other partners comes 
up as the first most important challenge, besides the details of the type, level and time of 
participation. In addition, as a standing global association of states, the UN offers stable 
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platforms for policy coordination and coherence needed to achieve win-win results with 
respect to almost all kinds of issues. Certainly, the challenges that the world is facing 
today are too complicated and demanding for any individual state to face them on its 
own or using spontaneous ad-hoc platforms.   
Sixthly, it is hard to imagine that least-developed and developing countries could 
let go of the UN (Weiss, 2008). Soon after their independence, these countries became 
UN members on equal footing with other member states. Practically, new member states 
lacked many of the basic requirements needed to exercise true independence and 
sovereignty. In response, the UN has played a vital developmental role in support of 
Third-World countries since the early decolonization years. Today, especially the 
UNDP is playing an important UN-wide coordinating role in this domain at the 
domestic level, which helps achieve needed complementarities and avoid duplication of 
resources with other UN-System members. In fact, the UN has been doing a vital job at 
the domestic level in least-developed and developing countries, especially in areas such 
as institutional building, development and economic reform. In some extreme cases, the 
UN existence at the domestic level seems even vital for the survival of state authority 
and stability.  
Seventhly, a flash back on the state of world affairs before World War I reveals 
a clear history lesson: the world is in need of an association that sets rules of order in 
international relations. The UN was established at a time the world had been torn by war 
and strife, after two consecutive devastating World Wars. Before the UN, the world was 
infested with horror caused by, among others, recurrent violent conflicts, fascism, 
racism, genocide and nuclear destruction. With the UN, the world has become a much 
better place, thanks to the rules of the UN Charter regulating international behavior and 
setting the floor for international cooperation for the common good. In particular, the 
UN marked a qualitative advancement from the League of Nations on further 
strengthening the notion of collective international security thanks to managing a 
delicate balance that all states subscribed to. Thus, the UN came to existence as the best 
possible international organizational structure to save humanity from hell (Tharoor, 
2008). It is true that the UN has been facing challenges and receiving the brunt of 
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criticism for international problems, but it remains the only means within hands to face 
up to future uncertainties and seek a peaceful, just and prosperous tomorrow. 
Eighthly, the UN serves as a repository of world conscience, thanks to including 
every country on earth and integrating partners from everywhere (Tharoor, 2003). It is, 
as Paul Kennedy likes to call it, a world parliament of state governments. Every newly 
independent country seeks the membership of the UN, as the most fundamental 
confirmation of independence and the formal gate to join the comity of nations. Though 
often slammed as ineffective, the UN General Assembly is a unique place for airing 
national viewpoints and discussing all kinds of world problems. It is also the prime 
stage entrusted with setting normative rules of global conduct in international relations. 
The human rights machinery of the UN, with the newly established UNHRC at its core, 
has developed a sophisticated set of institutional and legal tools to protect human rights 
everywhere. With notions such as the responsibility to protect and human security, the 
UN has further consolidated its human face. Thus, although the UN is basically an 
intergovernmental organization, its value goes beyond governments and touches on the 
lives of people everywhere. Historically, civil society played a symbolic consultative 
role at the UN founding conference in San Francisco (Jenkins, 2003). And, currently, 
NGOs from all over the world participate actively in the meetings and activities of the 
UN, thus bringing to the world body voices of people from everywhere. These and other 
voices make the UN the only repository of world conscience.  
The sum of these and other would-be factors make the UN such a unique and 
indispensable organization. It is these factors that stand behind the success stories of the 
world body since its birth. And it is these factors that motivate wise people from around 
the world to defend the continuity of the UN. One saw several bouts of aggressive 
attacks on the organization, but these attacks never prevailed, because they were mostly 
motivated by short-sighted individualistic interests that overlook the long-term interests 
of the collective whole. As Dag Hammarskjold once said, the UN was not created to 
take humanity to heaven, but to save it from hell (Tharoor, 2003). No doubt, the UN has 
succeeded in this as well as many other noble missions for the good of all humanity. 
However, to serve the whole community of states does not always meet the expectations 
of some individual states. And this is why an intrinsic part of the UN mission is to 
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restrict the freedom of movement of individual states for the betterment of the collective 
whole, as mandated by the UN Charter itself. Besides, the value of the UN is, in fact, 
much more than its material value as a world organization. It is also, and perhaps even 
more importantly, its moral value as a repository of world conscience and symbol of 
mankind’s hopes for a better future.  
A field study undertaken as part of this research largely supports this conclusion 
(please refer to the Appendix). This field study revolved around a questionnaire to a 
sample of 50 respondents in the fields of diplomacy, academia and international 
organizations, coming from 32 different countries. In response to a question about how 
the participants see the future role of the UN in world order, six of them or 12% 
expected it to play a very significant role and 25 participants or 50% expected it to only 
play a significant role. In contrast, 10 participants or 20% were neutral, while nine 
participants or 18% expected it to be insignificant and no one expected it to be very 
insignificant. In other words, 62% of the sample participants were of the view that the 
UN could play an important role in global governance in the future. In contrast, only 
18% suggested that its role could be dispensable. Clearly, these results reflect strong 
faith in the UN, in spite of its past failures and daunting future challenges. They also 
indicate expectations, or probably hopes, that the UN could boost its effectiveness and 
have a more tangible impact on international cooperation. Knowing the nationalities of 
the participants, the results also attest to the indispensability of the UN for many small 
and medium-size powers hoping for more equitable participation in global governance.            
 
IV. What and Whose Problems: Lack of Effectiveness or Lack of Means to  
Effectiveness 
 In the final analysis, the UN is an intergovernmental organization. It has no will 
of its own. Instead, its will is the sum of wills of its individual member states. However, 
UN’s critics seem to often overlook, on purpose or by mistake, this fundamental 
characteristic of the world organization. The general public also tends to fall in this 
same trap. In contrast, one should differentiate between the roles of the UN as a stage 
and as an actor (Tharoor, 2003). On one hand, the UN is a stage on which member 
states are the main actors driving the organization. From this perspective, member states 
discuss, agree or disagree and ultimately bear the responsibility for the orientation the 
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organization takes. One the other hand, the UN is also an actor, through its Secretary 
General, staff and agencies. The job of the UN as an actor is to execute the policies 
agreed on its stage. Thus, mistakes of action or lack thereof are those of the UN 
membership, while mistakes of implementation and follow-up could fall on the 
shoulders of the Secretariat. Unfortunately, member states themselves sometimes 
contribute to this confusion by blaming the UN for their own mistakes and using it as a 
scapegoat for their own failures. 
 It should be clear that when the UN lacks effectiveness, it is mostly because it 
lacks the means needed for effectiveness (Jaguaribe, 2002). From among these means, 
the first and most important is the political will of the membership. Throughout its life, 
the UN has been struggling to strike a balance between sovereignty and power, between 
state prerogatives and international cooperation. This is also a struggle between 
unilateralism and multilateralism, and it is intrinsic, persistent and unavoidable 
(Kennedy, 2006). In fact, one salient paradox of the UN is that since it was created, it 
can function effectively only when it has the support of its member states, especially the 
great ones. However, to varying degrees, member states tend to violate the rules of the 
Charter, if they see contradiction between their own interests and the interests of the 
whole membership. Most unfortunately, the organization gets paralyzed when a great 
power, such as a permanent state in the Security Council, uses the veto power to block 
draft decisions that otherwise enjoy majority support. Though this often comes at a 
price, it is usually affordable from the perspective of the violator. For instance, this was 
the case of the USSR with regard to the Korean War in 1950 and the USA with respect 
to the war on Iraq in 2003. In contrast, when a smaller member state violates the rules, it 
is more vulnerable to pay a higher price. The damage done could be huge in either case, 
but great violators usually cause as great damages.  
Secondly, the UN is sometimes accused of lack of equity. Although the UN 
Charter established the principle of "sovereign equality of all its members," the UN is, 
in fact, made up of countries that are very unequal in size, wealth and power. This is not 
likely to change soon. In response, the UN attempts its best to bridge these gaps and its 
life has been a constant struggle to strike a balance between the considerations of 
realism and the need to address these gaps or at least compensate for them by making 
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the voice of the small, poor and weak more audible (Annan, 2002). Nonetheless, it is 
becoming increasingly common to dismiss the notion of sovereign equality, and instead 
advance the notion of relative power, be it military, economic or political, thus making 
some states more equal than others and putting the basic principle of sovereign equality 
in doubt (Boutros-Ghali, 2005). Particularly, the end of the Cold War was a turning 
point in this regard, as the West-East rivalry subsided and was replaced by a North-
South divide, where the South feels increasingly marginalized. In a way, the end of the 
Cold War brought about an international system where there is the USA and there is the 
rest (Thakur, 2005).     
Especially, Southern countries and NGOs from throughout the world tend to use 
the injustice rhetoric more often to object to what they argue to be lack of equity in the 
system and bias in positions of other member states, especially those with veto power. 
In fact, the ongoing debate about the Security Council revolves around charges of 
injustice and inequity (Luck, 2003). However ruthless this might seem, politics in 
general, and international politics in particular, are dictated by practical interests, not 
considerations of justice. Hence, as the practice goes, there is no space for justice if it 
comes at the expense of concrete national interests. Still, to have problems of inequity in 
the system or bias or inconsistency in state actions does not help the UN respect its 
principles or achieve its objectives. In fact, these problems tarnish the legitimacy of the 
organization, which in turn further reduces its effectiveness. And, although questions of 
justice are always relative, the sense of injustice on the side of affected countries and 
their peoples produces negative implications on the credibility of the world body and on 
international cooperation at large.   
For instance, newly emerging powerhouses describe the current structure of the 
Security Council as inequitable and demand that the permanent membership cluster be 
enlarged to include them. In response, permanent members express agreement to 
enlarging the non-permanent membership cluster as well as adding a few new 
permanent members without veto power. Lacking a compromise, the membership 
structure of the Security Council continues in odds with real power distribution in the 
world. For another example, the Security Council has issued many resolutions to force 
North Korea to give up its nuclear weaponry program and took similar positions against 
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a suspected similar Iranian program, while ignoring the case of the Israeli nuclear 
arsenal. Usually, the justification made for this kind of exceptions revolves around 
differences in geostrategic environments or special circumstances. Admittedly, such 
differences should be taken in consideration, but they should not compromise the 
ultimate objective of global nuclear disarmament and should not showcase greater 
member states as road blocs in the face of international order based on law.  
Thirdly, and strongly related to the issue of equity, is the issue of democracy in 
UN governance. Perhaps the main difference here is that this is more about calls for an 
outright abrogation of the veto power. Besides, it is also about the criticism that the UN 
lacks legitimacy, effectiveness and accountability (Keohane, 2006). Hence, the UN 
needs to be reformed according to the realities of the 21st century, with more focus on 
democratic principles than on the legacy of sovereignty. No doubt, it seems convoluted 
that an organization that lacks democracy intervenes in the internal affairs of its member 
states on democratic grounds, against this organization’s own rules on noninterference. 
As a result, there are demands for more democracy in the multilateral system, and this is 
a challenge that the UN has been attempting to address (Annan, 2002). In a similar vein, 
the world body needs adaptation to the underlying power realities and imperatives of 
globalization (Boutros-Ghali, 2005). Some of the most outspoken in this regard are the 
NAM and the AU, as both call for a gradual erosion of the veto power. However, this 
kind of calls comes in contradiction with the power-balance philosophy around which 
the UN was configured. In addition, some of those standing behind these calls lack 
credibility, as they themselves are not truly representative of their own peoples.  
More radical democratization calls include calls for establishing a 
democratically-elected global parliament to ensure that all peoples are represented in the 
international arena directly, for disbanding the Security Council and for moving the 
authorities of the Council to a democratically-reformed General Assembly (Monbiot, 
2004). This kind of calls comes from such groups as anti-globalization activists, 
communists and anarchists, and it seems to completely lack touch with real politics. 
Other more realistic calls for democratization come from a big majority of member 
states and resonate in the UN ongoing reform agenda. These calls include the need to 
enlarge the Security Council, revitalize the General Assembly and reform the working 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
The United Nations and the International Multilateral System 
215
methods of UN organs, especially the Security Council, to allow for more transparency 
and participation. Fortunately, there has been some progress with respect to working 
methods lately, including in the Security Council.  
Fourthly, there is the problem of lack of enforcement in UN organs, including its 
powerhouse, the Security Council. Although Article (25) of the Charter is very clear on 
the responsibility of all member states on implementing the resolutions of the Security 
Council, as it states that “the members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter,” 
implementation is, in practice, usually subject to practical considerations that could 
curtail it. This is because the Charter gives the Security Council huge formal powers, 
but does not give it enough control over the tools required to translate these powers to 
reality (Hurd, 2002). In practice, the power of the Council is contingent on cooperation 
of member states in terms of contribution in peacekeeping forces, enforcement of 
sanction regimes, contribution in military and financial resources…etc (Monteiro, 
2002). In other words, implementation of Council's resolutions depends to a large extent 
on individual member states’ perceptions of the legitimacy and usefulness of these 
resolutions. The stronger these perceptions are, the more the resolutions are 
implementable.    
Notably, Brahimi report on UN activities in peace and security indicates that the 
organization is ill-equipped to wage war. And when enforcement action is needed 
according to Chapter VII of the Charter, the mission is usually subcontracted to 
coalitions of states willing to take action under UN authorization. Instead, the UN is 
better at alternatives other than using force, including long, slow processes of 
mediation, negotiation, litigation, peacekeeping and reconciliation (UN, 2000). In 
addition, because the Charter gives the five permanent states a privileged status together 
with higher responsibilities, the conduct of these states could either enhance or reduce 
the symbolic power of the Council. Particularly, when permanent states resist the 
temptation to do as they desire and show commitment to go through the UN legitimacy, 
they strike good examples for the rest of the membership and motivate them to 
contribute more to the purposes of the UN and vice versa. Unfortunately, rogue 
practices do take place in real life from both great and small member states.  
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The General Assembly, the ECOSOC and other UN organs are in a much worse 
situation with regard to implementation and enforcement. Although the General 
Assembly is the only global forum in which all states have equal voices, with the 
exception of the UN budget, resolutions of the Assembly only carry a recommendatory 
weight that does not guarantee implementation and lack any power of enforcement. In 
addition, there has been a huge build-up of Assembly’s mandates, some of which are 
overlapping, while some others are outdated. In response, the Assembly has launched a 
mandate-review process aiming at rationalizing its activities. The ECOSOC, UNHRC 
and other organs are not in any better position. In general, decisions of UN organs act 
more as recommended guidelines than binding statements. And they are usually subject 
to the political consideration of individual member states, with the end result that these 
decisions are only implemented to the extent that member states wish.  
Fifthly, a criticism usually directed at the UN is inefficiency, be it political or 
bureaucratic. Usually, the General Assembly faces charges of political inefficiency, 
because of its unwieldy inclusiveness and rules of procedures. In fact, the main reason 
why some states, especially greater ones, think that it is better to do business outside the 
UN is because they think that a universal forum such as the General Assembly wastes 
time, suffers from conflicting interests and distracts the attention from core issues to 
other less important ones (Wright, 2009). In addition, taking global problems to a forum 
such as the General Assembly gives space for countries that hardly contribute to their 
solutions, while diluting the pressure on the major players who have the capabilities to 
make a difference. In fact, the rationale of some theories about the future of 
multilateralism, such as “multilateralism à la carte” and “multi-multilateralism,” is 
based on this very argument of inefficiency. For instance, some writers contend that 
having mini multilateral institutions to address international security issues related to 
Afghanistan, Iran or North Korea could be better than resorting to the UN (Brooks, 
2009). And it is not only in theory that one notices this kind of thinking, rather it is 
already taking shape in practice with respect to various international issues, including 
peace and security in specific countries, nuclear nonproliferation, global climate and the 
international economy. Arithmetically, this approach could be more effective in 
addressing pressing challenges in the short-run, but certainly it is less democratic and 
undermines the authority and effectiveness of the UN in the long-run. 
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Sixthly, the bureaucratic inefficiency of the huge UN administrative machinery 
is one of the main problems of the world body. The causes and syndromes of this 
problem are manifold and deep-rooted. This is not unique to the UN, as big 
organizations and old institutions in general suffer from this same problem to varying 
degrees. However, the bureaucratic problems of the UN seem intractable, given the 
unparalleled huge structure of the organization as well as the trend of erosion of its 
independence and competence over time (Thakur, 2003). In response, several Secretary 
Generals drafted reform plans, including Kofi Annan who proposed two packages of 
structural reforms in 1997 and 2002. Unfortunately, some of these reform proposals 
were undermined and some others never saw daylight. The Outcome Document of the 
2005 UN Millennium Review Summit gave further impetus to efforts by the Secretary 
General in this area, paved the way for the creation of an Ethics Office upon a proposal 
from the USA and strengthened the capacity and independence of the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services. Nonetheless, more remains to be done in order to address the many 
ailments of UN management.     
In this regard, one critical problem is lack of authority and leadership, as the top 
UN official, the Secretary General, usually has his hands tied up by member states 
(Weiss, 2008). On the contrary, for the UN to work effectively and efficiently, the 
Secretary General should be allowed more flexibility in the management of the 
organization under the supervision of the General Assembly (UN, 2004). Running huge 
machinery such as the UN requires the authority to take quick decisions, the lack of 
which could incur irreparable harms. Thus, delegating more authority and investing 
more confidence in the Secretary General could make a difference. In addition, the 
General Assembly should play a bigger role in the appointment of the Secretary General 
to guarantee the independence and integrity of the appointee. Article (97) of the Charter 
authorizes the Security Council to nominate the Secretary General to the General 
Assembly for appointment. However, what happens in practice is more of a selection of 
the Secretary General by the Security Council, which the General Assembly cannot but 
accept (Weiss, 2008). Hence, the Secretary General is usually exposed to the political 
manipulation of the five permanent states from the very outset. In particular, whether a 
Secretary General could renew his/her term is usually dependent on the satisfaction of 
the permanent states with his/her performance.  
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Another problem is lack of coordination among the organs of the UN system, 
especially with regard to development activities. In fact, the post-World War II 
international order was designed on the basis of decentralization and organizations, such 
as the UN and organs of its system, were meant to serve as wide columns connected 
with thin rows, not as one integrated matrix (Ruggie, 2003). Thus, the UN chart is more 
of an organized confusion than a sound system, and it reflects an image of a feudal 
kingdom with feudal barons (Weiss, 2008). This is partly because different UN organs 
and affiliates have been established and are being governed by different national 
authorities in UN member states such as foreign affairs, justice, health, education and 
labor authorities. The main driving force behind this structure was a need to maximize 
the scope of technical expertise, while minimizing politicization. It was believed that 
such a structure would be more deeply rooted in domestic societies and would buy the 
UN stronger public support, which was a major concern for countries such as the USA 
at the time of UN birth.  
In this regard, the end result is having a UN system that seems destined to suffer 
from fragmentation. The report of the High-Level Panel of the Secretary General on 
System-Wide Coherence states that the work of the UN system on development and the 
environment suffers from fragmentation, inefficient and ineffective governance, 
unpredictable funding, policy incoherence, duplication and operational ineffectiveness. 
In addition, the report adds, cooperation inside the system is hindered by competition 
for funding, mission creep and outdated business practices (UN, 2006a). Article (63) of 
the UN Charter authorizes the ECOSOC to enter in agreements with specialized 
agencies to bring them in relationship with the UN and to coordinate their activities, in 
consultation with the General Assembly. However, this article does not provide an 
effective recipe to the problem of lack of coherence, does not authorize merging or 
consolidating agencies and does not refer to the role of the Bretton Woods institutions 
or the more recent WTO, which organizations lie at the core of global economic 
governance today.  
Of course, there are institutional structures that are meant to ensure effective 
coordination and policy coherence between the UN and its network of specialized 
agencies at national, regional and global levels. Most importantly, these structures 
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include the Chief Executives Board (CEB) that brings together the heads of the World 
Bank, the IMF, the WTO and all other UN programs, funds and specialized agencies. 
Nonetheless, given the rigid structural design of the UN and the complex nature of 
global issues, there remains a strong need for more coordination and policy coherence. 
Member states, especially donor countries, usually complain about these problems. In 
addition, developing countries stand to pay a price for duplication of procedures and 
lack of policy coherence. Nonetheless, proposals to the effect of more consolidation of 
activities are usually met with fierce opposition, mostly coming from developing and 
poor countries. Ironically, some major donor countries have also at times blocked 
moves for more consolidation of the system, because of having nationals, serving as 
barons of some would-be affected organs (Weiss, 2008).       
Seventhly, lack of resources figures strongly as one of the main administrative 
problems of the UN. The world body does not only lack material resources, such as 
those needed for maintaining international peace and security, as has been mentioned 
earlier, it also lacks financial resources needed for internal management and for 
delivering on its various mandates. And the larger UN system lacks resources needed to 
deliver on its very demanding developmental tasks. Specialized agencies, programs and 
funds in general strive on donor funds and compete fiercely for them, which subjects 
them to donor preferences and conditionalities (Weiss, 2008). In response, the report of 
the High-Level Panel of the Secretary General on System-Wide Coherence suggests that 
for the UN system to be better equipped to achieve the MDGs, the organization needs 
sustained funding at the national level and secure central funding for the UN bodies that 
demonstrate commitment to reform (UN, 2006a).  
The UN Secretariat lacks adequate financial resources needed to do its job. Even 
more, some countries are repeatedly in arrears to the world body, including some of the 
main contributors. To face up to this challenge, the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN 
Millennium Review Summit contains a pledge by member states to provide the 
organization with adequate funds on a timely basis, stresses that member states have to 
meet their obligations toward the expenses of the organization and urges the Secretary 
General to make the best and most efficient use of resources (UN, 2005). However, 
shortly afterward, member states were bitterly divided over management reforms 
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proposed by the Secretary General. Consequently, and in a historical move, major 
contributing states imposed spending caps in the 2006 biennial budget. Thus, for the 
first time in its life time, budgeting has even become an area of power politics inside the 
world body (Frohlich, 2007).     
As for human resources and staff quality and ethics, the Charter attempts to 
guarantee the highest possible standards of international public service in the world 
body. The Secretary General is required to seek the best qualified personnel, while 
respecting the equitable distribution of staff quotas among member states. Member 
states are required to respect the impartiality of UN staff. Nonetheless, lacking needed 
resources, the Secretariat finds itself forced into staff shortages, including in some of the 
most important departments such as that of peacekeeping (UN, 2000). In addition, the 
moral quality of UN personnel has been repeatedly tarnished by such incidents as the 
Oil for Food Program scandal and the legal and ethical violations of some members of 
UN peacekeeping missions. In fact, audits and investigations over the last few years 
have revealed substantial mismanagement, fraud, corruption in administering 
peacekeeping missions and widespread sexual abuse by members of these missions 
(Schaefer, 2009). However, the Oil for Food case was particularly damaging, as the UN 
faced historical accusations of corruption, incompetence and lack of accountability. In 
this regard, the 2005 Volcker Commission report concluded that the Iraqi government 
siphoned around USA $ 11 billion through smuggling and received illicit payments 
amounting to around USA $ 1.8 billion in oil surcharges and inland transportation fees 
(Gordon, 2007).  
In response to these problems, the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN 
Millennium Review Summit provided for creating an Ethics Office that was established 
shortly afterward. In addition, the Office of Internal Oversight Services has been 
enhanced and an independent Audit Advisory Committee has started its work in early 
2008. Furthermore, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has taken additional 
measures to ensure the enforcement of its zero-tolerance policy on sexual abuse. These 
are some of the constructive reform moves, but further measures remain to be taken by 
all concerned, including the Secretariat and member states, to ensure the effective and 
efficient functioning of the Secretariat. In fact, the Secretary General, in his report on 
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investing in the UN, admits that although previous reforms have generated some 
significant improvements, they addressed the symptoms rather than the causes of UN 
administrative problems. He further indicated that the UN today is vastly different from 
its early stages and that its expanded range of activities necessitates an equally 
expanded overhaul of the Secretariat if the organization is to deliver on its ever 
increasing and demanding mandates (UN, 2006b).  
 
V. Today’s Main Challenges: The Questions of Legitimacy and Relevance 
 From all the challenges facing the UN, the question of legitimacy based on 
representation seems to be especially intractable, while the issue of relevance given new 
developments in the surrounding environment seems to be substantially existential. This 
is mostly because the UN, as it stands today, reflects the parameters of the world at the 
time it was established more than 65 years ago. Over the last few decades, the 
distribution of power in international politics has shifted eastward and southward, with 
newly emerging powers, such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa, playing an ever 
increasing role in global governance. Still, these newly emerging powers are more or 
less excluded from formal global governance structures, most particularly the UN 
Security Council. In addition, at the time forces of globalization have unprecedentedly 
increased the level of interdependence among all states, these forces have carried along 
global opportunities and challenges that are substantially different, more and bigger and 
that require global approaches yet hardly in place in the UN or elsewhere. 
 
A. The Question of Legitimacy  
 For a multilateral institution to be considered legitimate, it has to satisfy three 
basic criteria: inclusiveness, effectiveness and accountability (Keohane, 2006). Critics 
of the UN often lambast it for lack of representative legitimacy, i.e. lack of equitable 
representation. Since the inception of the UN more than 65 years ago, world politics 
have undergone radical changes. In parallel, calls for changes in the membership of the 
Security Council and the ECOSOC have been resurfacing throughout. Lately, calls to 
enlarge the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent classes have 
become a salient feature of the debate on UN reform. At the time the UN was 
established, the Security Council was carefully configured to be the power hub of the 
organization and of multilateralism at large, with prime responsibility on maintaining 
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international peace and security. It was agreed that great powers at the time would 
assume disproportionate responsibilities, and so they should receive exclusive 
privileges, i.e. the right to veto power. Most influential great powers at the time 
included Great Britain, France and Germany, while emerging powers included the USA, 
USSR, China and Japan. Ultimately, an exclusive approach prevailed, as it was decided 
that powers on the losing side in World War II would not be granted the same 
privileges, thus Germany and Japan remained outside the core club. 
 As the number of newly independent countries multiplied due to decolonization 
between the 1940s and the 1960s, the South came to play a more dominant role in world 
politics. Being vulnerable former colonies, newly independent countries rushed for UN 
membership and followed through by establishing two main platforms for projecting 
their collective power in the world body, the NAM and the G-77 in the 1960s. Thus, in 
addition to the East-West rivalry of the Cold War, another dichotomy became 
increasingly dominant in the world arena, the so-called North-South divide. And, while 
the East-West rivalry subsided with the collapse of the former USSR, the North-South 
divide survived and further consolidated itself in spite of the interconnecting forces of 
globalization. Today, the North-South divide has become a vivid fact in the UN system, 
including in the most technical organs such as the WHO and the Universal Postal Union 
(UPU) (Weiss, 2008). This divide is also prevalent in almost all multilateral forums, 
where the NAM and the G-77 play the role of coordinating the positions of the poor 
South vis-à-vis the rich North.   
Throughout its life, the UN Charter was amended three times, including two 
times to enlarge the membership of two out of its six main organs, the Security Council 
and the ECOSOC, with the last time in 1973, i.e. around 37 years ago*. In the early 
1960s, the South rallied for expanding the membership of the Security Council to reflect 
the new world realities, where the number of developing countries more than doubled 
from 51 in 1945 to 113 in 1963. Notwithstanding the resistance from great powers, the 
South successfully passed resolution 1991 (XVIII) in the General Assembly in 1963. 
                                                 
* There have been five amendments of the UN Charter, the first three on 31 August 1965 to increase the 
membership of the Security Council from 11 to 15, increase the voting majority required from 7 to 9 and 
enlarge the membership of the ECOSOC from 18 to 27. The fourth amendment was on 12 June 1968 and 
related to Article (109) on amending the Charter. The fifth and last amendment was on 24 September 
1973 to enlarge the membership of the ECOSOC from 27 to 54.     
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Part A of this resolution related to the expansion of the Security Council from 11 to 15 
members, increasing the required voting majority from seven to nine and specifying the 
regional distribution of the 10 non-permanent seats. Remarkably, Part A of the 
resolution was opposed by France and the USSR, while the USA and the UK abstained 
and only China supported it.  
Resolution 1991 (XVIII) set the floor for an irreversible course toward the 
enlargement of the Security Council. None of the five permanent states could assume 
the political cost of blocking an amendment that had been endorsed by two-thirds 
majority in the General Assembly. By 31 August 1965, the four permanent states, other 
than China, ratified the amendment, and the threshold of 76 ratifications needed for the 
amendment to enter into force was secured. Besides the collective pressure of the great 
majority of Southern states and other non-veto member states, the politics of the Cold 
War, lack of a common position on the side of the great powers and the precarious 
financial situation of the world body at that time all contributed to the success of this 
move. Remarkably, the financial crisis of the UN at the time was mostly due to default 
on budget contributions from countries including the USSR and France. Nonetheless, 
the main driving force behind the move was the equity rationale of the call for better 
representativeness, and considerations of effectiveness or real power distribution could 
not stand in the way (Luck, 2003).       
Shortly afterward, calls for further changes in the membership of the ECOSOC 
emerged. In 1971, the question of doubling the ECOSOC membership gained further 
momentum, at the behest of the South, with outstanding support from the USA. In fact, 
the USA was the only permanent state to support this move in both the ECOSOC and 
the General Assembly, while France and the USSR were again the staunchest objectors. 
The USA accepted the rationale that the membership of the ECOSOC was yet 
disproportionate to the UN general membership, 135 member states at the time. On the 
other side, France held that the ECOSOC’s authority is not necessarily a function of its 
membership and distribution of seats and that the ECOSOC’s membership was already 
too large. Similarly, the USSR contended that the concept that ECOSOC’s work can be 
improved through enlargement was unfounded. However, once more, by 24 September 
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1973, the move to double the membership of the ECOSOC was appropriately in force 
(Luck, 2003).      
After the end of the Cold War, and by 1993, the membership of the UN further 
increased to 184 from 113 in 1963. In the meantime, calls for further enlargement of 
both the Security Council and the ECOSOC had continued, but the end of Cold War 
significantly shifted the focus toward the Security Council. As has been mentioned in 
Chapter One, the end of the Cold War seemed to have ushered in a revitalization of the 
UN in particular and of multilateralism at large. Most conspicuously, the Security 
Council made some audacious and swift moves, among others, on liberating Kuwait 
after its invasion by Iraq in 1990. Consensus, under enhanced USA’s leadership, 
became the order of the day (please refer to Table 2 above on the use of the veto). In 
addition, the notion of sovereignty came under revision and suffered from withdrawal in 
the face of the USA-sponsored new notion of humanitarian intervention, which notion 
largely shaped the debate on the international intervention in Somalia in 1992. 
Consequently, member states outside the Council felt a stronger impulse to get onboard, 
among others, to promote their distinct interests and share in the fruits of the new 
successes (Weiss, 2003). 
As a result, the General Assembly established the so-called Open-Ended 
Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation and Increase in the 
Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council 
(hereafter the Open-Ended Working Group on Security Council Reform) in 1993. 
Discussions in this Group have so far focused on two main clusters, one on 
membership, expansion, the veto and voting and the other on working methods and 
decision-making procedures. Ever since, the group has not been able to break the 
deadlocks of discussions, especially those in the first cluster, because of the wide gaps 
in positions and procedural complications in the process. Fortunately, however, with 
regard to the second cluster, the debate has induced the Council to voluntarily introduce 
some improvements on its working methods, particularly to enhance transparency and 
participation in its activities.  
The war on Iraq is commonly quoted as a landmark in the course of 
multilateralism at large and of the UN in particular. While the UN was significantly 
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paralyzed during the Cold War, the military action against Serbia without UN 
authorization in 1999, together with the war on Iraq in 2003 in contempt of the world 
body, are two major indications to the marginalization of the UN in the post-Cold War 
era (Kochler, 2006). Notably, as has been mentioned in Chapter One, the war on Iraq 
has been used by many writers and politicians to proselytize a new new world order, 
where the new world order is considered the one proclaimed after the end of the Cold 
War. One central pillar of this argument is the decline of USA’s power, especially in its 
soft aspects. Another important pillar is that the war motivated other powerhouses and 
even USA’s allies to attempt to constrain USA’s power (Weiss, 2003). Indeed, the war 
on Iraq was so grave that it continues to give credibility and impetus for newly 
emerging powerhouses to project their power and seek a more leveled playing field in 
the UN Security Council in particular and in global governance at large.  
Henceforth, the climate was conducive to establishing the UN High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change, which, among others, contributed to further moving 
the debate on Security Council reform. In an attempt to help reach a breakthrough in the 
debate, the panel proposed two models of reform. Model A provides for six new 
permanent seats without veto and three new two-year term non-permanent seats to be 
shared by the regional groupings. In contrast, Model B provides for no new permanent 
seats, but proposes a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new 
two-year non-permanent and non-renewable seat. Although the panel regarded the veto 
as an anachronistic vestige of the past, it concluded that there is no practical means of 
changing the status quo, obviously because of the assumption that the five permanent 
countries would not give it up (UN, 2004). Instead, the panel proposed limiting the use 
of this right to cases where vital interests are at stake and invited the veto powers to 
refrain from using it in cases of genocide and large violations of human rights.   
The Outcome Document of the 2005 Millennium Review Summit stated that 
“we support early reform of the Security Council as an essential element of our overall 
effort to reform the UN in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and 
transparent, and so to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and 
implementation of its decisions.” In 2007, and after several further reports, it was 
decided to launch negotiations on the subject in due time. Ultimately, negotiations 
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started in February 2009, with focus on five key issues: categories of membership, veto 
power, regional representation, size of an enlarged Council and its working methods, 
together with the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly. 
According to its agreed schedule, the final stage of the negotiations should be text-
based, a move that indicates approaching the more arduous task of inking down a 
consensus agreement.  
Throughout the debate and negotiations, there have been several key deadlocks, 
especially with regard to the veto power, the size of the Council and conflicts of 
interests among member states. Historically, the veto power has received the brunt of 
criticism from non-veto member states as a symbol of an undemocratic and unjust world 
order. On the other side, veto proponents contend that it is a major factor behind the 
survival of the UN until today (Luck, 2003). In any case, there is very little hope to 
reach agreement on whether the veto right should be abolished, extended to new 
members or even restricted in use. As for the size of an enlarged Council, the main 
bargain seems to be between legitimacy and effectiveness. And there seems to be two 
camps, one advocating the viewpoint that enlarging the Council to reflect the growth of 
the membership and the new world realities could enhance its legitimacy, which in turn 
could further bolster its effectiveness (Hurd, 2002). On the other side, there is the 
viewpoint that though enlargement of the Council is plausible to reflect better diversity 
and enhance its legitimacy, it should be kept to minimum, should be measured against 
the effectiveness of the Council and should reflect the real distribution of power in the 
world (Weiss, 2003). Some member states also oppose the permanent membership bids 
of some others, such as in the case of Italy with respect to Germany. In general, 
positions held by different member states and groupings seem irreconcilable, which 
indicates that serious negotiations would be virtually immovable, especially given the 
practice of divide-and-rule tactics by reform opponents (Thakur, 2005).  
 
B. The Issue of Relevance 
 There is an argument that we need a new UN for this new century (Slaughter, 
2006). The reasons behind this kind of argument are many, but most importantly 
include the implications of globalization on the UN mission, the ailments of the 
Westphalian notions of nation-state and sovereignty, the proliferation of actors in 
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international relations and the ramifications of the current unipolar world order on the 
UN. With respect to the implications of globalization, it is doubtless that the last wave 
of globalization has changed the world landscape and forced a redefinition of global 
opportunities and challenges. As has been detailed in Chapter One, the change in the 
global landscape has also been driven by change in paradigms, with neo-liberal 
capitalism and democratic governance becoming the dominant ones. On one hand, neo-
liberal capitalism has gradually deprived the UN of its development mission, as it has 
undermined its endeavors to promote a more just world economic order (Boutros-Ghali, 
2005). On the other hand, the prevalence of democracy as a universal value comes in 
contrast to democracy deficits in the UN and other institutions of global governance 
(Keohane, 2006). As a result, the UN and its organs have been losing ground and 
credibility and suffering from lack of support.   
Globalization has also brought about an unprecedented degree of 
interdependence among states, thus creating torrents of new opportunities and 
challenges. The Report of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
states that “the UN was created in 1945 above all else to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war - to ensure that the horrors of the World Wars were never 
repeated. More than 65 years later, we know all too well that the biggest security threats 
we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond states waging aggressive war. 
They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and 
violence within states; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and 
biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The threats are from 
non-state actors as well as states and to human security as well as state security” (UN, 
2004). The perceived inability of the UN to effectively address new pressing 
international challenges has resulted in a loss of confidence in the world body (Wright, 
2009). And although the UN has somehow managed to develop some innovative 
approaches to the challenges of globalization, the world body has only succeeded in so 
doing by maneuvering around its constitutional constraints, not through addressing 
these constrains upfront (Ruggie, 2003).  
The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 laid down an international system based on 
the notion of sovereign nation-states, which notion was enshrined in the UN Charter. 
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Accordingly, the UN and the larger international order are based on nation-states as the 
building blocs and basic players, while today the most chronic problems facing mankind 
require transnational approaches that are short of supply in the UN (Weiss, 2008). This 
lack of action was often referred to by former Secretary General Kofi Annan as 
“problems without passports.” In essence, it reflects some kind of tension between 
intergovernmentalism and transnationalism (Cronin, 2002). It also indicates a deficit of 
global governance and stands as one root cause behind recurrent failures of the UN and 
other global forums on several fronts. Righteously, the UN was not intended to meet 
modern transnational challenges such as terrorism, global warming and nuclear 
proliferation. Nonetheless, if the UN fails to adapt itself to these new challenges, it will 
risk fading into irrelevance (Thakur, 2003). In other words, the price of continued 
relevance and survival for the UN is reform, the burden of which, in fact, falls on 
member-states not the UN as a distinct entity.  
A second set of challenges facing the UN occur within national boundaries such 
as national strife, civil wars and mass violations of human rights. These problems could 
very well affect peace and security across borders and undermine basic human values. 
They also raise controversy about the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, which is 
enshrined as one of the most essential principles of the UN Charter, “sovereign equality 
of all its members” as spelled out by Article (2) of the Charter. As a result, since the end 
of the Cold War, the notion of sovereignty has been subjected to gradual erosion. 
Instead, new notions, such as humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect and 
human security, have been gaining ground. In reflection of this trend, the Report of the 
UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change states that “whatever 
perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the 
notion of state sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a state to 
protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international 
community” (UN, 2004).  
Paradoxically, the redefinition of the notion of sovereignty violates the letter of 
the same Charter Article (2) on “noninterference in domestic affairs.” In an attempt to 
resolve this conflict, some authors make the argument that the Westphalian system as it 
stands today is profoundly flawed and needs fixing. Thus, the world is left with one of 
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two options: either replace the old system with a new one responsive to the need of 
globalized governance or fix it in a way that could bind countries to respect their 
external as well as internal obligations (Simons et al, 2007). Another more startling 
argument is that to govern effectively, states need to cooperate with each other and at 
the same time to reserve the right to intervene in the affairs of other states (Slaughter, 
2004c). In the UN, this far, there has been a polarization on issues related to 
humanitarian intervention and there is hardly any hope that member states could reach a 
consensus reconciling humanitarian intervention with state sovereignty (Evans and 
Sahnoun, 2001). Consequently, the UN is bogged down in paralysis vis-à-vis mass 
violations of basic human rights inside member states and at the same time ambivalence 
toward acts of aggression on the sovereignty of these member states on the pretext of 
humanitarian responsibilities.  
A more balanced approach toward the contentious issues of state sovereignty 
and intervention is that the multilateral system has to transform in order to adapt to the 
need to prevent instability and conflicts inside states (Acharya, 2006). Here, it is argued 
that multilateral institutions are, among others, engines of normative change. 
Historically, the current multilateral system has led the process of defining and 
legitimizing a set of sovereignty norms, including territorial integrity, equality of states 
and nonintervention, which are all norms enshrined in the UN Charter. But, as the 
normative environment evolves, the system needs to keep pace with this evolution. 
Since the establishment of the UN, the world setting has changed significantly, with 
increasing global interdependence, the emergence of new trans-national challenges, 
systemic changes affecting global power distribution, the increasing importance of 
human rights, the rule of law and the expansion of the global civil society. These 
changes invite collective approaches from multilateral institutions. Hence, the system is 
naturally coming under increasing pressure to move beyond some of the sovereignty 
norms it itself promoted, especially that of nonintervention. Whether or not the system 
is capable of responding to the impulse of change is a decisive question for its future.  
A third set of challenges relates to qualitative and quantitative shifts in the size 
of global stakeholders. Remarkably, the last two decades have witnessed a proliferation 
of actors in the international system, which is infringing on the role of nation-states as 
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the basic players at the international, regional and domestic levels. This development 
could be assimilated to a return of “medievalism,” when authority was shared among 
many different players inside individual geopolitical spheres (Slaughter, 2003). The new 
rising actors include NGOs that have exploded in number and have come to advance 
distinct interests, through monitoring, challenging and at times confronting with 
governments. NGOs are also involved in a fierce quest to further consolidate their 
legitimacy and secure more recognition as independent players at the international level. 
TNCs are also new powerful actors that lead a global economy where national barriers 
have subsided in the face of transnational economic activities, especially those related to 
capital flows. States attempt to regulate and direct the activities of TNCs, but cannot 
control them. In some extreme cases, TNCs possess unparalleled power in the face of 
some small and least-developed countries. Other actors in the international system 
include regional organizations, international networks of state officers, local authorities 
and illegal actors such as dissident and terrorist groups.  
In response, the UN has been striving to accommodate non-state actors in its 
system. In addition to the imperative of these efforts on practical grounds, they also 
contribute to promoting the notion of democratic global governance. Historically, the 
participation of NGOs in the UN commenced with the UN birth at San Francisco 
conference (Jenkins, 2003). Henceforth, the role of NGOs in the international system 
has been developing, which has become especially clear since the end of the Cold War. 
This historical relationship brings to the UN an important civil-society approach to 
global challenges. As a result, there is a large and growing network of NGOs in the 
ECOSOC today. In 2004, a UN panel of eminent persons published a report on the 
relationship between the world body and NGOs. This report recommended wider 
participation by NGOs in all aspects of UN activities at headquarters and national 
levels. In addition, former Secretary General Kofi Annan pioneered the establishment of 
the Global Compact, the first partnership of its kind between the UN and the global 
business community. The Compact was launched in 2000 on the basis of the notion of 
global corporate citizenship, which indicates that with rights to operate at the global 
level come responsibilities toward the global community (Annan, 2002). All these 
efforts notwithstanding, there continue to be difficulties related to the vast number of 
NGOs and their diverse agendas as well as constitutional and legitimacy dilemmas 
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related to the participation of non-state actors in the international system. Moreover, 
there seems to be a subtle confrontation between state and non-state actors on 
legitimacy and authority. In fact, this confrontation is one important dimension of the 
UN ongoing struggle to develop true, mutually beneficial partnerships with non-state 
actors for better global governance. 
A Fourth and final set of challenges relates to changes in world power politics. 
Former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali argues that the crisis of the UN is not 
connected with September 11 or the war on Iraq, it actually started with the end of the 
Cold War and was mainly driven by changes in power distribution and the emergence of 
one superpower, which caused difficulties for the international community in managing 
the new order (Boutros-Ghali, 2005). In the midst of American pride, in his famous 
1990 article, “The Unipolar Moment,” Charles Krauthammer described the talk about 
the UN as a guarantor of a new post-Cold War order as mistaken, adding that the UN is 
a guarantor of nothing and can hardly be said to exist (Krauthammer, 2003). 
Notwithstanding the initial shock, September 11 and its developments further 
showcased the USA’s supremacy militarily, economically and politically. In contrast, 
the Iraq episode was significantly damaging, as the USA provoked a crisis of UN 
authority and legitimacy, and the world body was pictured as having betrayed its 
fundamental objective of preventing military aggressions, especially by major powers 
(Thakur, 2005). In fact, the USA seems to exercise ambivalent engagement with the rest 
of the world. And its foreign policy reflects a tug of war between championing universal 
values such as democracy and human rights and protecting its distinct national interests 
by all means (Jaguaribe, 2002).                 
As has been mentioned earlier, while the UN suffered from paralysis during the 
Cold War, it has been suffering from marginalization since the end of that war (Kochler, 
2006). The emergence of coalitions of the willing at the behest of the USA, such as 
those used for Iraq and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, is a clear indication to this effect. 
Also attesting to the increasing marginalization of the world body is the tendency of the 
USA, the current global superpower, to address global challenges through informal 
forums such as the G-20, G-8 and more recently the G-2. Major factors behind this 
trend include the desire to avoid the binding nature and unwieldy bureaucracy of formal 
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structures such as the UN. Unfortunately, this marginalization is expected to continue in 
the future, as proselytized by theories such as “multilateralism à la carte” of Richard 
Haas, President of the USA’s Council on Foreign Relations, and “multi-multilateralism” 
of Francis Fukuyama. The crux of responsibility in this regard falls on the shoulders of 
UN member states. If they manage to renovate the world body, insist on going through 
it and fulfill their commitments toward it, then there will be little space for any 
individual state to undermine rule-based multilateral cooperation.  
How would the future of the UN look like? This is a question that concerns 
everyone. Historically, the UN was created for the post-war world and this is deeply 
rooted in its constitution, structure and working culture. Today, however, the world has 
significantly changed, with power shifts and the new imperatives of globalization 
putting increasing pressure on the world body. In particular, this research contends that 
the challenges of representative legitimacy and relevance to the surrounding global 
environment are expected to have particular decisive impacts on the future of the UN. 
Lack of power balance in the world body deprives it of much of its legitimacy and 
effectiveness, and developments in the surrounding environment are outdoing its rules 
and capabilities, which is increasing the marginalization of the organization. Thus, 
firstly, the UN needs to put the representation in its power structures in line with real 
power distribution in order to protect its legitimacy and enhance its effectiveness. The 
ongoing exercise for this purpose falls short of finding a clear path. However, 
amendment to membership happened in the past, is needed today and could very well 
impose itself in the future depending. It is argued here that unless new powerhouses are 
fully integrated and accommodated in the UN system, the future of the system will 
remain unpromising.  
Secondly, the governing rules and working methods in the UN need to be 
revisited to enable the world body to face up to the challenges of the day. This exercise 
has to take into consideration four main factors. First, increasing global interdependence 
has brought about new global challenges that necessitate transnational approaches. 
Thus, there is a need to empower the UN with the mandate and means required to 
effectively address the new challenges. Second, the notions of sovereignty and 
noninterference in internal affairs have to be reconciled with the imperative of 
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preventing mass atrocities and grave violations of human rights at the domestic level. In 
fact, the legitimate prerogatives of state authority and the universal values of human life 
and dignity are not, and should not, be taken as mutually exclusive. Third, the role of 
non-state actors in the international system has been increasing. Although states and 
intergovernmental institutions have been developing new partnerships with these actors, 
there remain significant practical and legal difficulties that need to be squarely 
addressed, so as to ensure the optimum use of these partnerships. Finally, the UN was 
engineered around the concept of power concerts. Today, however, the prevailing world 
order is unipolar and this is expected to continue in the foreseeable future. 
Consequently, the world body should be reconfigured to manage this new world order, 
including by holding all states accountable for their acts or lack thereof. Of course, these 
are all major challenges that require vision, will and a lot of effort and time. However, 
sooner or later, the international community will have to face them, otherwise problems 
of the UN would further foment and its role and contribution to global governance 
would continue to decrease. In fact, it is the future of the UN that is at stake, and to 
secure this future, such major challenges as legitimacy and relevance have to be faced in 
a holistic manner.                        
  
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Case Study of the United Nations General Assembly 
234
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six 
Case Study of the United Nations General Assembly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Case Study of the United Nations General Assembly 
235
 
Abstract 
  
The UN General Assembly is no doubt a unique forum of international 
cooperation, particularly in view of its representativeness and status as the main 
deliberative, norm-setting and policy-making organ of multilateral cooperation. 
However, apart from the moral weight, the Assembly lacks any reliable power of 
enforcement. Moreover, over the last few years, it has been losing ground to other 
forums inside as well as outside the world body. Notably, the current reform process of 
the Assembly, launched in 2005, is predicated on the so-called "revitalization", i.e. 
reform within the basic dimensions of the current chartered powers and functions. 
Unfortunately, the reform process has not made any difference on the ground. Even 
more, the very resolutions the Assembly has issued in this regard lack implementation 
and follow-up. Furthermore, paradoxically, some of the other UN reforms have 
contributed to further marginalization of the Assembly. In contrast, it is argued here that 
the role of the Assembly in global governance should be enhanced through a number of 
means, including enabling it to perform its mandate to the letter and spirit of the 
Charter, providing it with a mechanism to enforce its resolutions on all member states 
without exception and concluding the current reform process as soon as possible. Along 
these same lines, a field questionnaire conducted as part of this research reveals strong 
support to empowering the Assembly to serve a bigger role in global governance, 
including with respect to issues of international peace and security if the Security 
Council fails to act timely and appropriately. In an attempt to pinpoint the best-fit role 
for the Assembly, the results of the questionnaire indicate preference for it to serve as 
the highest hub of global governance, as opposed to a clearing-house of international 
cooperation or a parliament of man.  
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Chapter Six 
Case Study of the United Nations General Assembly 
 
 The UN General Assembly, hereinafter the Assembly, is a unique body of 
multilateral cooperation. It is the only forum with a holistic mandate, covering political, 
security, economic, social and cultural subjects of international cooperation. It also 
enjoys a global membership with 193 member states, besides observers and partners 
from throughout the world. Another intrinsically fundamental feature of the Assembly is 
its leveled membership, where all members have equal status, rights and obligations. 
Not least, it enjoys unique esteem from the international community at large, 
particularly in view of its representative legitimacy and even membership. Nonetheless, 
the Assembly is generally viewed as a body without teeth, lacking binding force and 
enforcement mechanisms. In fact, reading the UN Charter, it seems that the Assembly 
was designed to be a platform for the public, whereas the UN Security Council, 
hereinafter the Council, was designed to be a club for the powerful. This differentiation 
is also reflected in the academia, where the Assembly receives very little attention 
compared to the Council. This chapter will attempt to shed more light on the Assembly. 
It will start with a background on the powers and functions of the Assembly, with focus 
on the provisions of the Charter and the major later alterations. Afterwards, it will take a 
closer look at the structure and working culture at the Assembly. Subsequently, there 
will be an analysis of the main dimensions of the current reform process and its 
outcomes. Finally, this chapter will address the question of what could be the optimum 
role of the Assembly in global governance, drawing upon the results of a field study on 
a sample of 50 respondents in the field of international relations.   
 
I. Basic Background 
 The Assembly could be assimilated to a world parliament with membership 
from governments (Kennedy, 2006). In fact, a close look at the Assembly reveals that it 
is more a parliament of world governments than an executive body. In this regard, the 
UN Charter articulates the powers and functions of the Assembly in detail (please refer 
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to Annex 1). Article (10) grants the Assembly a sweeping mandate with respect to all 
matters within the scope of the Charter, including those related to the powers and 
functions of other organs, together with the right to make recommendations to member 
states and/or the Council, with the exception of issues pending on the agenda of the 
Council. Notably, Assembly's recommendations are called resolutions, just as those of 
the Council. However, as the terminology reflects, recommendations are 
pronouncements of positions that lack binding force, while the resolutions of the 
Council enjoy binding force on all member states. Remarkably, the Charter does not 
even refer to the implementation of Assembly's resolutions and does not grant it any 
enforcement tools similar to those at the hands of the Council such as sanctions and 
military action. Nonetheless, Assembly's resolutions are generally viewed as morally 
binding, especially in the light that all member states own them on equal footing. Even 
if some states take positions against some resolutions in the course of their debate, these 
resolutions are ultimately issued by the Assembly at large and should, at least 
theoretically, be implemented by all member states. In addition, Assembly's resolutions 
set norms of international relations, which in turn make up one of the main sources of 
international law, as rightfully acknowledged by the statutes of the ICJ.  
 With respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
Assembly has the right to consider the general principles and make recommendations to 
member states and/or the Council. The Assembly can also consider any specific 
question of international peace and security and make similar recommendations. 
Nonetheless, Article (12) prevents it from issuing recommendations on any such 
questions while they are under Council’s consideration. Even more, in case the 
Assembly considers specific questions that are not on the agenda of the Council and on 
which action is deemed necessary, these questions should be referred to the Council 
either before or after Assembly’s consideration. The only waiver to this prohibitive rule 
is if the Council itself refers a dispute or a situation to the Assembly. It should be 
stressed, however, that the language of Article (12) does not forestall the right of the 
Assembly to debate subjects on the agenda of the Council. In addition, Article (11) 
empowers the Assembly to call the attention of the Council to situations that are likely 
to endanger international peace and security. In general, the Charter sets a clear division 
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of work between the Assembly and the Council in the area of peace and security, with 
the Council charged with the prime responsibility in this area and the Assembly only 
performing a supportive role, unless when the Council itself chooses to invite the 
Assembly for a bigger role.           
Notably, there is only one exception to this general division of work, which is 
the so-called “uniting for peace” procedure, introduced by the Assembly's resolution 
377 in 1950 (please refer to Annex 2). In essence, this resolution authorizes the 
Assembly, in cases where the Council fails to discharge its primary responsibility on 
addressing cases of threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression, often due to 
lack of unanimity by the permanent members, to consider the matter and make 
appropriate recommendations to member states. These recommendations could include 
the use of force if necessary in cases of breach of peace or act of aggression. In addition, 
the resolution attempted to address calls at the time for better military readiness in the 
UN. While acknowledging the primary responsibility of the Council in this area, 
resolution 377 invited member states to contribute standby military resources to support 
the implementation of the recommendations of the Council or the Assembly for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The resolution also established two 
subsidiary bodies; the Peace Observation Commission and the Collective Measures 
Committee, which both only short lived and did not make any significant contribution.  
Remarkably, resolution 377 was proposed by the USA and adopted on 3 
November 1950 with 52 votes with and only five votes against (the then USSR, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and the USSR’s semi-independent republics of Ukraine and Belarus). 
The backdrop to this move was that with the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and 
the assignment of China’s permanent seat to the defeated Republic of China (Taiwan), 
the USSR started boycotting Council’s meetings through the outbreak of the Korean 
War in 1950. This was done with a legal interpretation that the absence of the USSR 
would paralyze the Council in cases requiring the concurrence of the permanent 
members. Nonetheless, the Council issued resolution 83 of 1950, authorizing the use of 
force against North Korea in the absence of the representative of the USSR. 
Consequently, there was a lot of controversy about the legality of the resolution. 
However, resolution 83 was put to practice with support from the USA along with a 
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great majority of member states. Ultimately, the USSR resumed its participation in the 
Council to block any further moves against North Korea. Afterwards, the USA sought a 
blanket mechanism to ensure that differences with the USSR would not deprive it of 
achieving its targets with respect to North Korea in particular and international peace 
and security in general, which mechanism took the form of resolution 377.   
Any member state can invoke the uniting for peace procedure with support from 
seven members of the Council or a majority of the UN membership. Consequently, the 
Assembly gets seized with the matter immediately, and if not in session, an emergency 
special session is convened within 24 hours. The first and most successful case of resort 
to this procedure was during the Korean War, where the Assembly passed resolution 
498 of 1 February 1951 on the interference of the People’s Republic of China in Korea, 
against the opposition of the then USSR. Notably, this case involved an enforcement 
action against China, with resolution 498 inviting military intervention against what it 
qualified as Chinese aggression against Korea. Afterwards, the Assembly held 10 
emergency special sessions under the same procedure. The first such session was held 
against the objections of France and Great Britain after Egypt suffered a trilateral 
Israeli, British and French attack on its soil, in what came to be called the Suez Canal 
crisis of 1956. This session passed resolution 1000 of 5 November 1956 establishing the 
UN Emergency Force to monitor the frontline between Egypt and Israel. The nine other 
emergency special sessions handled situations in Hungary (1956), Lebanon (1958), the 
Republic of Congo (1960), the Arab Israeli War of 1967, Afghanistan (1980), Palestine 
(1980-1982), Namibia (1981), the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights (1982) 
and finally the still ongoing 10th session on the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian 
territories (1997 to date). Notably, the last special session is particularly different, as it 
has dragged on for too long and has even been unlimitedly extended in 2006, still 
without taking any material action to date, which makes it more like a special forum 
with intermittent meetings to examine escalations related to the Israeli occupation of the 
occupied Arab territories.       
Clearly, the uniting for peace resolution was driven by the USA in the context of 
its Cold War rivalry with the then USSR, with the aim of better ensuring the ability to 
secure legitimate UN coverage for intervention in cases of threat or breach of 
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international peace (Kranso and Das, 2008). Ultimately, a great majority of member 
states supported this move, for the obvious reason that they wanted the extra insurance 
it provides against paralysis in the Council. In fact, this resolution provides a unique 
guarantee that differences among permanent members would not paralyze the UN as a 
whole. It also stands out as the most prominent move ever toward shifting the balance 
between the Assembly and the Council (Kennedy, 2006). Perhaps even more 
importantly, resolution 377 contains important de facto Charter amendments that 
evolved in use to become a last-resort window of opportunity for the great majority of 
states. Although the procedure was introduced by a superpower, less powerful states 
make up a big majority of those that have invoked it to date thanks to the overwhelming 
representation. Nevertheless, the procedure was not integrated in the Charter through its 
established amendment process. Instead, it was produced in an Assembly’s resolution 
that lacks the constitutional power of the Charter and the enforcement tools of the 
Council. Hence, resolutions issued under this procedure do not enjoy any extra weight 
compared to standard Assembly's resolutions. And this means that recommendations 
issued through the uniting for peace procedure could only be implemented to the extent 
member states want. In other words, this procedure cannot help face threats to 
international peace and security, unless the general membership and most importantly 
the permanent members come together for this end. And, of course, this is even more 
the case if the violator is itself a permanent member or a great power.        
Apart from the area of peace and security, the Assembly holds special power 
with respect to the budget of the organization. It could even be said that this is the area 
where the Assembly plays its most influential role at all, due to the relative monopoly of 
the Assembly in this regard and the material importance of financial aspects to UN 
activities. All member states contribute shares to the UN regular biennial budget 
according to a formula that integrates the basic concept of the capacity to pay, as 
reflected by the relative shares of member states in world GNI, with adjustments for 
factors such as per capita income, external debt and a maximum ceiling and a minimum 
floor. Hence, member states participate in the budget process on equal footing with a 
general sense of collective ownership. And the outcome of the process is usually 
adopted by consensus, rather than being voted. Besides the regular budget, the 
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Assembly also adopts other separate budgets for peacekeeping operations and ad-hoc 
international tribunals, with the former employing a modified scale of assessments that 
classifies member states into levels of income, assigns higher shares to permanent 
members and allows for voluntary contributions by wealthy states.  
Notably, the scale of assessments used for budget contributions was amended in 
2000, taking the ceiling down from 25% to 22%, which ceiling only applies to the USA. 
This step was welcomed by states favoring the reduction of USA’s influence in the 
world body. Over the last few years, however, the scale of assessments was subject to 
calls for further revisions to ensure that it reflects actual, real capacity to pay. In 
addition, the UN has been suffering from large budget arrears, including from some of 
the significant contributors. Even the USA, the highest budget contributor, is sometimes 
in arrears, due to internal complications that reflect some lack of support to the world 
body. Perhaps even more importantly, the budget process usually bits the wealthy 
member states against the less developed ones, with the former expressing 
dissatisfaction with the one state, one vote rule of the Assembly at the time they 
contribute most of the budget, while the latter accuse the former of attempting to dictate 
the budget guidelines and to deprive them of programs that support their development 
plans. As a result, a former USA permanent representative to the UN has suggested that 
the UN scale of assessments should be replaced by voluntary financing (Bolton, 2010). 
At the time the budget process is almost the only domain where the great majority of 
developing countries can coordinate positions to achieve some material gains, this kind 
of suggestions come as an indication that there are some who would like to dominate 
the process in a way that might even render the UN less united and less meaningful to 
the great majority of its members.                    
Other than the budget, Article (15) of the Charter requires all UN organs to 
present annual activity reports to the Assembly. This, in fact, reflects the general 
mandate granted to the Assembly in article (10) with respect to all areas within the 
scope of the Charter. Naturally, the general membership seizes the procedure 
established by Article (15) to present their positions, appraisals and misgivings about 
the work of all UN organs, especially those where they are not participating. However, 
it should be highlighted, this is more a procedural than a substantive exercise. And this 
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has been particularly the case with respect to the Council’s reports, which tend to make 
brief listings of items on its agenda for the bare sake of informing the Assembly, while 
avoiding indulging into much substance, so as not to open the door for the Assembly to 
play a bigger role in supervising Council’s activities. In addition, given the fact that 
Assembly's resolutions lack any binding force, UN organs’ reports to the Assembly are 
more invitations to talk than means to make a real difference.  
The Charter also authorizes the Assembly to initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the promotion of international cooperation in political, legal, 
economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields. Particularly, Chapters IX and X 
detail specific Assembly’s powers and functions in the areas of international economic 
and social cooperation. Generally, the Charter reflects a strong focus on the mandate of 
the Assembly in these matters. Still, the role of the Assembly here is precisely to 
address these matters in cooperation with the ECOSOC. And, it should be highlighted, 
although the latter is a subsidiary body of the Assembly, it can make direct 
recommendations to member states and specialized agencies or work directly with the 
Council. Notably, there have also been calls for reform in the ECOSOC, including 
expanding its mandate, enlarging its membership and enhancing its effectiveness.  
With respect to human rights, the Assembly is required by the Charter to assist 
in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. In the past, the 
Assembly used to discharge this task through its subsidiary Commission on Human 
Rights (UNCHR). But, in 2006, and as one of the outcomes of the 2005 Millennium 
Review Summit, the UNCHR was upgraded to a subsidiary organ of the Assembly, the 
UNHRC. No doubt, this move has given human rights more importance and visibility in 
the world body. However, it has also deprived both the Assembly and the ECOSOC of 
parts of their Charter powers and functions. It should also be noted that, today, member 
states that stood behind this move criticize the nascent UNHRC for several reasons, 
especially its record of admissibility to states that have poor records of human rights and 
the strong lobbies of these states inside it.       
As for the Bretton Woods institutions, they precede the UN in existence and, 
together with the more recent WTO, have been intentionally distanced from the UN 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Case Study of the United Nations General Assembly 
243
from the outset. Of course, there are channels of coordination between the two sides, but 
these three institutions of global economic governance are recognized to be primary 
authorities in their respective areas, whether development, finance or international trade. 
Notably, this division of work has always hinged on the controversial premise that there 
should be a separation between the political and technical areas of international 
cooperation. Over and above, lately, the G-20, revamped in late 2008, has come to the 
fore as the main platform of global economic decision-making. Expectedly, this move 
has been raising criticisms in the UN. In addition to being an additional channel of 
international authority, the nature of the G-20 as a selective, informal forum further 
kindles objections and raises questions about its potential value-added.  
Remarkably, the 2006 report of the High-Level Panel of the Secretary General 
on System-Wide Coherence suggested that for the UN system to achieve the MDGs, the 
organization needs to deliver as one. Consequently, the report set the floor for needed 
reforms to ensure more coherence and sustainable funding at the national and central 
levels (UN, 2006). The main driver of these reforms is the UNDP, with its national 
offices throughout the world. And one has already started to see the outcomes of this 
reform process be it in human-resources development, technical assistance or gender 
activities. No doubt, UN development activities need more coherence and better 
funding, but the increasing influence of the UNDP due to this reform process has further 
chopped off some of the competences of the Assembly and the ECOSOC. And this was 
somehow meant by donor countries, as they have better control on their funding in the 
UNDP than in the Assembly or the ECOSOC.  
On another front, the Assembly elects non-permanent members of the Council 
and the ECOSOC, in addition to taking decisions on the admission, expulsion and 
suspension of members. Notably, decisions on the election of non-permanent Council 
members receive a lot of clamor. Although the Council is largely dominated by the 
permanent five members, the general membership still views non-permanent 
membership as a sublime objective of national esteem and pride, which in fact is an 
important source of legitimacy to the Council, notwithstanding its failures and shackles. 
In addition, the Assembly selects the UN Secretary General. But, more precisely, the 
Assembly only plays a marginal role in this regard, confined to appointing the Secretary 
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General upon recommendation from the Council. In contrast, the Council almost 
monopolizes the process, which is also subject to the concurrence of the five permanent 
members. As a result, this process has usually been subject to criticism from the general 
membership on grounds of lack of transparency and lack of inclusiveness.              
 
II. Working Culture 
This section will attempt to depict a picture of typical work at the Assembly, 
drawing on the researcher’s past experience and an overlook of the resolutions issued by 
the Assembly in its 64th session. When one visits the Assembly, especially during the 
main part of its regular session from September to December of each year, one finds the 
premises of the UN headquarters usually bustling with life, including formal meetings, 
side meetings and press conferences. Given its quasi-global membership, the agenda of 
the Assembly is usually expansive and the number of resolutions it issues is 
overwhelming. In general, member states seize these sessions in earnest to present their 
views on the state of world affairs, with particular focus on issues of special interest to 
them. They also attempt to promote their foreign policy agendas and give them 
international endorsements at the Assembly. In terms of output, discussions provide 
grounds for consensuses on issues of international cooperation, coordination of policies, 
burden sharing and solidarity. In addition, in view of its status as the highest UN policy 
organ, an integral part of the work of the Assembly is providing guidelines for the work 
of the other UN organs. To a lesser extent, these guidelines also apply to external 
stakeholders, including other international and regional organizations. And, in the 
process, discussions usually feature intense negotiations, lobbying, formation of blocs, 
convergence of positions and exchange of support.      
Given the large scope of Assembly’s agendas, member states typically undertake 
extensive prior preparation and coordination at the domestic level, involving their 
national institutions and stakeholders. Consequently, representatives of member states 
would indeed be speaking for their whole countries at the Assembly. And, naturally, 
different member states could have different approaches to the same issues and some of 
them could even take hostile attitudes toward others. Thus, in the midst of debate, there 
could be elongated disagreements and even deadlocks, with the bargaining balance 
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usually involving blocs taking positions against others, including the EU, the NAM, 
Latin America, the African, Asian and Arab groups. It should also be noted that apart 
from the dividing lines of these blocs, member states are officially divided into five 
main regional groups: Western European and others, Africa, Asia, Eastern European 
and Latin America and the Caribbean. Besides, there are some great individual powers 
that usually play decisive roles, such as the USA, the UK, France, Russia, China and 
India. Such member states act as linchpins within their groups and could influence the 
general membership. Other member states tend to take less assertive approaches and to 
keep lower profiles for reasons that range from limited power of influence to lack of 
expertise and qualified personnel.   
Notably the Assembly has many subsidiary organs, including committees, 
commissions, boards, councils, panels and working groups. But, most importantly, it 
has six main open-ended, subsidiary committees on: disarmament and international 
security; economy and finance; social, humanitarian and cultural issues; special political 
and decolonization issues; administrative and budgetary issues; and legal issues. Each of 
these committees has a cluster of multilayered meetings, where discussions usually start 
at an informal-informal level, then move on to a formal-informal level, before 
ultimately reaching a final formal-formal level. All through, member states have the 
chance to express their positions with respect to items on the agenda. However, not all 
member states attend committee meetings, especially at the early levels. Moreover, only 
a limited number of them usually participate actively in the discussions, which are 
usually dominated by great powers, regional powers, member states holding the rotating 
presidencies of regional groups and those with specific interests at stake. In the process, 
member states could submit draft resolutions and seek co-sponsorship or support for 
them from other member states. Consequently, draft resolutions would have to undergo 
extensive examination and refinement, before ultimately being adopted by the 
respective committees. Afterwards, committee resolutions are communicated to the 
Assembly, which could affirm, decline or endorse them with amendments.                           
Taking the work of the Assembly in its 64th session from September 2009 to 
September 2010 as a sample could provide some useful insights. In particular, a close 
look at the agenda and the resolutions issued during that session gives indicators of the 
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nature of the items considered and how the Assembly pronounces itself on them. The 
agenda of the 64th session included 172 items that were classified under nine clusters: 
international peace and security; economic growth and sustainable development; 
development in Africa; human rights; humanitarian assistance; justice and international 
law; disarmament; drug control, crime prevention and combating international 
terrorism; and organizational, administrative and other matters. Those agenda items 
were allocated to the plenary session of the Assembly and its six main committees 
according to the substantive nature of each item as well as past practice. Notably, there 
could be several subsidiary items under each main agenda item. And, in the context of 
preparing the agenda, the main question is usually where a given subject fits, not 
whether or not it should be discussed at all. In other words, the Assembly serves as a 
platform for considering any issue of relevance to international relations, which in fact 
is a feature established by the Charter and customary practice. .  
Chart (5) below reflects the division of the aforementioned 172 agenda items on 
five consolidated clusters, excluding the first eight items, which are mostly procedural 
in nature. For logical reasons, organizational, administrative and other related issues 
feature as the widest section of the agenda, with 40.2% of its total size. Second in line is 
the compilation of the two clusters on international peace and security and on 
disarmament, with 31.7%. Notably, peace and security issues are mostly a prerogative 
of the Council. However, some specific issues and conflicts are usually kept outside the 
Council on purpose for political reasons, such as the Middle East conflict, which has 
been for several decades dominated by individual USA’s brokerage. In contrast, 
disarmament issues are considered indirect peace and security issues, and as such they 
fall more within the mandate of the Assembly as well as the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, which is organically linked to the Assembly. In general, 
and notwithstanding the primary responsibility of the Council on peace and security 
issues, these issues usually harness utmost attention from member states in the 
Assembly, due to their political sensitivity.  
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Chart (5) 
Distribution of the United Nations General Assembly's Agenda Items 
(64th Session) 
Organizational, 
Administrative & 
Other Issues
40.2%
Human Rights & 
Humanitarian Aid
4.9%
Peace, Security & 
Disarmament
31.7%
Economic Growth 
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13.4%Legal Issues & 
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9.8%
 Source: Own elaboration, based on official documents and data on the UN website.  
 
The third largest section, with 13.4%, is that of economic growth and 
development, including a single-item cluster on African development, a theme that 
enjoys cross-cutting differentiation in the work of the world body. As has been 
previously noted, most of the work of the Assembly in these areas is done in tandem 
with the ECOSOC, and both organs struggle to assert themselves in a world overtaken 
by free-market dynamics. International legal issues, including international law and 
justice, cross-border crimes and terrorism come fourth with 9.8% of the total size. 
Remarkably, international terrorism comes under international legal issues, which 
reflects the main focus of the Assembly’s work in this area, whereas the political 
aspects of terrorism are mostly handled by the Council. International cooperation in the 
areas of human rights and humanitarian assistance comes in the fifth and last rank with 
4.9% of the total. This meager size relative to the importance of these issues owes in 
part to the establishment of the UNHRC, as a subsidiary organ of the Assembly, in 
2006. Admittedly, Chart (5) employs a quantitative approach that does not reflect the 
sensitivity of some specific subjects here and there. Nonetheless, this chart presents a 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Case Study of the United Nations General Assembly 
248
reasonably sound picture of the usual relative weights that the different clusters of 
issues usually occupy on the agenda of the Assembly.         
The resolutions that the Assembly issued during the 64th session amounted to 
301 resolutions, which is a little less than double the number of the main agenda items. 
These resolutions are either issued by the plenary session immediately or through 
recommendations from the aforesaid six subsidiary committees. And they could fit 
under one, two or more agenda items. Chart (6) below reflects the distribution of the 
301 resolutions on the same substantive clusters in Chart (5) above. It should be noted, 
however, that there were three resolutions each falling under two different clusters and a 
fourth  resolution purely procedural in nature. Subtracting the procedural resolution and 
adding three extra references, the number of resolutions translates into 303 references to 
substantive agenda items. At face value, the distribution in Chart (6) is different from 
that in Chart (5). One major factor behind this is that some agenda items do not produce 
any resolutions, whether because they are meant only for member states to take note or 
because they involve specific actions such as elections. But, this is also a reflection of 
the interests of member states, as some states would be more willing to propose 
resolutions on some items more than others. Consequently, unlike in Chart (5), peace, 
security and disarmament issues jump up to the first rank in Chart (6) with 30% of the 
total number of resolutions. This is slightly lower than the 31.7% these issues occupied 
in terms of agenda items. In particular, items related to the Middle East, independence 
of colonized territories and disarmament produce many resolutions, most of which pass 
through voting. Indeed, this corroborates the idea that peace and security issues usually 
feature as top priorities for member states, given their strategic, political and sometimes 
even existential value to some member states. 
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Chart (6) 
Distribution of the United Nations General Assembly's Resolutions 
(64th Session) 
Organizational, 
Administrative & 
Other Issues
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 Source: Own elaboration, based on official documents and data on the UN website.  
 
Resolutions on economic growth and development, including the  environment, 
come second with 24.1% of the total number of resolutions, up from 13.4% of the total 
number of agenda items. Notably, for around two decades, these issues have been 
subject to a tug of war between developed and developing countries over their inclusion 
on the agenda. But the great majority of developing countries usually manages to force 
its will to some extent and keep most of these issues on the agenda, especially those 
related to economic and sustainable development. In response, however, developed 
countries attempt to dilute resolutions in these areas as much as possible, 
notwithstanding the common knowledge that they usually end up making no difference 
on the ground. Organizational, administrative and other issues come third with 23.4% of 
the total. While some agenda items under this cluster are used as bases for more than 
one resolution, this is the cluster where the majority of items that do not produce any 
resolution exist, and this is mostly why 40.2% of the agenda items produce only 23.4% 
of the resolutions. Nonetheless, these issues are clearly of significant importance to the 
general membership. Particularly, items related to UN reform, the budget and finance of 
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different UN missions, offices and international tribunals receive paramount attention 
from the general membership.  
Resolutions on human rights and humanitarian issues figure fourth with 15.8% 
of the total number of resolutions, which is more than three times the 5% size of these 
items on the agenda. After peace and security issues, this is the second highest cluster in 
terms of resolutions passed through voting. In particular, resolutions related to human 
rights in specific countries and some other general, but contentious issues, such as the 
right to development, defamation of religions, racism and xenophobia, are significantly 
politicized and involve too wide divergences to pass by consensus. Although the 
establishment of the UNHRC has partially downsized the importance of these issues in 
the Assembly, they remain visible on the agenda, raise a lot of interest and sometimes 
even kindle public confrontations. Finally, international legal issues, including 
terrorism, moved down one step to the fifth rank with 6.6% of all resolutions, 
comparing to the fourth rank in terms of agenda items with 9.8%. Concerning terrorism 
specifically, the Assembly only issued one resolution during the 64th session, and it was 
adopted by consensus. In fact, the role of the Assembly in this area is mostly 
concentrated on negotiating the draft comprehensive anti-terrorism treaty, while the 
Council is considered the main UN authority on combating terrorism. From a wider 
perspective, however, global counter-terrorism efforts are marked with national, 
regional and global measures that fall completely outside the reach of the UN.      
Remarkably, out of 301 resolutions, only 69 were subject to voting, i.e. less than 
a quarter of all resolutions, while the rest passed by consensus, i.e. without any single 
state objecting to them. Indeed, according to the working culture at the Assembly, 
consensus is the favorite way of doing business. However, the principal side-effect of 
this approach is that the sponsors of any resolution would have to accommodate all 
objections to the best possible extent, which ends up diluting the content and perhaps 
even distorting the original message. In contrast, resolutions that are considered 
inacceptable to any member state are destined to voting. And, usually, the sponsors of 
any resolution would not agree to submit it to voting, unless they are sure it would pass. 
Thus, the major advantage of voting is lessening the dilution of resolutions and helping 
preserve their focus. In general, the decision-making process is usually subject to trade-
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offs and deals that could include exchange of support, besides political pressure and 
carrot-and-stick tactics.  
 
III. Reform Agenda 
 The current reform agenda in the Assembly was launched by the UN 
Millennium Review Summit in 2005. It has “revitalization” as its key word, which 
implies that the Assembly was vital at some point of time in the past and needs to be 
made more vital today. Indeed, the Assembly was more vital before the end of the Cold 
Wart, but this is only a relative fact, for the Assembly has always been a toothless 
forum. In any case, revitalization has been on the agenda of the Assembly since the end 
of the Cold War. In the latest episode, the 2004 report of the High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change described the Assembly as a universal body of unique 
legitimacy that should be better used to reach global consensuses on issues of great 
contemporary importance (UN, 2004). Most importantly, the panel identified two main 
keys to strengthening the role of the Assembly: focus and structure. In more detail, the 
panel thought that the main areas of Assembly’s reform should be reviewing its 
mandates in the light of current world realities, streamlining its agenda to keep focus 
and avoid repetition and reforming its committees to make them more efficient in terms 
of structure and more focused in terms of agenda. Partially, this comes in response to 
the misgivings of some of the powerful states about what they describe as pointless 
debates and redundancy in the Assembly. The panel also endorsed a recommendation 
by a preceding similar panel on establishing a better mechanism to enable systematic 
engagement with NGOs.  
Afterwards, the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN Millennium Review 
Summit reaffirmed the central role of the Assembly as the main representative, 
deliberative and policymaking body of the UN as well as its role as a standard-setter and 
codifier of international law (UN, 2006). The document also called for the full and 
speedy implementation of previously agreed measures on strengthening the role and 
authority of the Assembly and its president and strengthening the relationship between 
the Assembly and the other principal UN organs. In addition, the document reflected the 
demands of many member states to exploit the full potential of the supervisory role of 
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the Assembly over all the other UN organs, and in particular to put an end to the so-
called encroachment of the Council on the Assembly. In general, the reform process in 
the Assembly has been limiting itself to making it more visible, efficient and effective 
in discharging its mandate as prescribed by the Charter, without any reference to 
making it more powerful or expanding its mandate. At face value, this reflects 
satisfaction on the side of the general membership with the main dimensions of the 
current role of the Assembly. At the bottom, it also reflects the limits of feasibility of 
real politics of member states. 
In light of the reform process, there are two themes of significant importance for 
the revitalization of the Assembly: its working methods and its role and authority, 
including the role of its president, the role of the Assembly in the appointment of the 
Secretary General and the relationship between the Assembly and other principal organs 
in general and the Council in particular. Firstly, and though mostly procedural in nature, 
the working methods of the Assembly seem to take a central stage in its current reform 
process. The most important dimension in this regard is the so-called mandate review. 
The 2005 Summit Outcome Document called for a review of all the mandates that are 
older than five years, whether originating from resolutions by the Assembly or other UN 
organs (UN, 2005). The main rationale behind this was the need for more focus on the 
most relevant issues, besides the imperative of optimizing the use of UN resources. 
Consequently, a working group was set up and undertook a comprehensive review of all 
those mandates during the 60th-62nd sessions of the Assembly. And one major 
contribution of this working group was the establishment of an online registry of the 
relevant mandates.  
Ultimately, an inconclusive resolution was adopted in September 2008, 
acknowledging the difficulty of differentiating which mandates are associated with 
which budget resources, because of the inter-linkages of mandates and resources. As a 
result, the general membership could not decide on which mandates should be 
abolished. Over and above, the process did not lack politicization, as some member 
states showed tendency to take advantage of it to abolish the mandates that they oppose, 
including some mandates related to the Middle East conflict, economic development 
and human rights. Given this problem, it is clear, the political will is the most important 
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determinant, as member states are the ones that propose items on the agenda, adopt the 
agenda, sponsor resolutions with specific mandates and renew these mandates. Thus, 
whether or not the review process could have been concluded successfully, achieving 
any tangible progress would always depend on the political will of the general 
membership. On the positive side, however, ever since the 2005 Millennium Review 
Summit, the general membership has become more mandate-conscious and the issue has 
become a standing additional factor in Assembly’s discussions, albeit within the known 
limits of what is acceptable and achievable.  
As for the role and authority of the Assembly, the reference to this subject in the 
2005 Summit Outcome Document encapsulates the more substantive aspirations of the 
general membership. There are three elements of special importance in this regard: the 
role of the president of the Assembly, the role of the Assembly in the appointment of 
the Secretary General and the relationship between the Assembly and the other principal 
organs in general and the Council in particular. Firstly, there has been a strong drive 
toward enhancing the role of the president of the Assembly and providing his/her office 
with the means required for this end. Notably, the Charter only refers to electing the 
president for each session, without any further clarifications. However, the president 
plays an important de-facto role in directing the work of the Assembly and representing 
it before the other organs and the outside world. With respect to the current reform 
process, among the tasks that the general membership seems to support vehemently are 
the organization of thematic debates at the initiative of the president and convening 
periodic meetings joining the presidents of the Assembly, the Council and the 
ECOSOC. For this purpose, the Assembly issued resolution (A/RES/64/301) in October 
2010, which welcomed the establishment of a voluntary trust fund to support the office 
of the president, besides the regular resources of the budget.  
With respect to the role of the Assembly in the appointment of the Secretary 
General, the current practice is such that after considering different candidates, the 
Council usually recommends a low-profile personality to the Assembly for 
appointment. Because this is considered a substantive issue, the candidate nominated by 
the Council must have the support of the five permanent members. Hence, these five 
states practically dominate the process, with even other Council’s members barely 
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playing a marginal role. In turn, and due to political considerations, the Assembly never 
declines to appoint the single recommended candidate, which limits its role to rubber-
stamping the choice of the Council. The debate about this issue has been resurfacing 
throughout the UN lifetime. In this regard, member states seem to have different 
interpretations of Article (97) of the Charter, which states that “the Secretary General 
shall be appointed by the Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council.” While a 
great majority of member states think that Article (97) is not fully respected in real 
practice, the permanent five members insist that the established practice is consistent 
with the article. During the current reform process, a great majority of member states 
has come anew to call for a bigger role for the Assembly in the process. More 
specifically, they demand that the process be all-inclusive, more transparent and respect 
the rules of regional rotation and gender equality. As a result, in October 2010, 
resolution (A/RES/64/301) of the Assembly invited its president to consult with 
member states to identify potential candidates and then ultimately forward the results of 
these consultations to the Council. The resolution also called for ensuring that the 
Assembly has sufficient time for considering the candidates ahead of the due 
replacement date. It remains to be seen, however, if this resolution will be put to 
practice in the next selection process and how.  
 Finally, strengthening the relationship between the Assembly and the other 
principal organs is perhaps the most contentious demand of the great majority of non-
permanent member states. Notably, the Charter states that there are six principal organs: 
the Assembly, the Council, the ECOSOC, the defunct Trusteeship Council, the ICJ and 
the Secretariat. On one side, non-permanent member states call for the full 
implementation of Charter provisions on the supervisory role of the Assembly over all 
the other organs. On the other side, the permanent members insist that the Charter did 
not subordinate any organ to the other. Resolution (A/RES/64/301) of October 2010 
reflected the least common denominator in this regard. Most importantly, the resolution 
reaffirmed the role and authority of the Assembly, including with respect to issues of 
international peace and security, as prescribed by the Charter. In addition, it called for 
more cooperation, coordination and exchange of information among the principal 
organs, including through periodic meetings among the presidents of these organs. It 
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also encouraged the Secretary General to report more often to the Assembly on his 
activities, in an attempt to assert the authority of the Assembly over the Secretariat.     
Normally, the main focus of the controversy over the relationship between the 
Assembly and the other organs is the Council, where non-permanent member states 
denounce what they describe as the encroachment of the Council on the Assembly. In 
contrast, the permanent members stress that the mandates of the two organs are distinct 
and that there is no room for enhancing the role of the Assembly at the expense of the 
Council. In fact, one has seen an expansion of the scope of work of the Council over the 
last few years. This is particularly obvious with respect to new challenges that are 
considered to be related to international peace and security in fields such as human 
rights, humanitarian aid, gender equality, energy and climate change, which are all 
fields that fall most directly within the mandate of the Assembly. In contrast, in the core 
area of peace and security, the Assembly can hardly make any difference in cases where 
the Council fails to act. There is no doubt that the Charter distinguishes the Council as 
the primary authority in this area, but it also provides windows for the Assembly to 
complement the role of the Council. Unfortunately, these windows are rarely allowed, 
even in cases where the Council is paralyzed, because of the tendency of the five 
permanent members to avoid going to the Assembly as opposed to doing business in 
their favorite, permanent club. Even more, the Council is accustomed to ignoring 
Assembly's resolutions reflecting the will of the general membership on some specific 
issues. The reluctance of the Council to give more space for the Assembly and its 
tendency to ignore the latter's resolutions alienate the general membership, while failing 
to act discredits the UN as a whole, not only the Council, before the world.  
After more than five years from launching the last reform process in the 
Assembly, many resolutions have been passed, but the main points of disagreement 
remain unresolved. Although issuing resolutions indicates general agreement on 
elements of reform and entails responsibilities as to implementation, many member 
states continue to complain about lack of implementation of Assembly's resolutions, 
including some of the very resolutions on its revitalization. In an attempt to address 
these complaints, a working group was established to investigate the matter. In May 
2008, this working group issued a chart of the revitalization resolutions’ provisions that 
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have not yet been put to practice. And resolution (A/RES/64/301) of October 2010 
requested this working group to undertake a comprehensive review of that chart and 
invited the Secretary General to provide updates on the implementation of the 
provisions addressed to the Secretariat. In fact, this whole saga brings up the problems 
related to the large size, endless debates and lack of binding force in Assembly's 
resolutions. But even more importantly, it indicates a clear lack of political will on the 
side of some member states to indeed revitalize the Assembly.  
Moreover, paradoxically, the current reform process itself has led to some 
erosion of the authority of the Assembly, due mainly to the creation of new organs and 
newly introduced reforms in development activities. For instance, the establishment of 
the UNHRC in 2006 came in response to demands by many Western countries 
spearheaded by the USA, in an attempt to better enforce universal human rights. And 
although the UNHRC was ultimately established as a subsidiary organ of the Assembly, 
it has in practice chopped off some of the Assembly’s authority in this area, human 
rights. Consequently, today, we see many countries demanding that the subsidiary 
relationship between the UNHRC and the Assembly be respected. Another example is 
reforms introduced after the 2006 report of the High-Level Panel on System-Wide 
Coherence. Most importantly, these reforms include gradual decentralization of the 
administration and policy guidance of UN development activities (UN, 2006). 
Accordingly, nation-wide offices of the UNDP have been further enhanced to serve as 
national coordination hubs of all UN development activities. At the central level, the 
UNDP headquarters have similarly become the core hub of policymaking and funding 
of UN development activities throughout the world. 
 
IV. Optimum Role 
It seems that the Assembly is facing double jeopardy, losing ground to other 
forums inside as well as outside the world body, while the UN as a whole is facing 
marginalization at the global level. In particular, this trend has started to gain force with 
the end of the Cold War. From the outset, the sudden change in global power politics, 
with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, led to imbalances in the world body 
(Boutros-Ghali, 2005). After a short-lived euphoric stage, new political realities started 
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to take root and the dominance of one superpower turned out to be detrimental to the 
UN. Now that there is a lot of controversy about the decline of the USA and whether the 
world order is still unipolar and for how long more, there is an obvious fact: a less than 
unipolar world order could leave more space for multilateral cooperation. 
Unfortunately, even the relative decline of the USA does not help the UN much. Instead 
of relying more on the only global multilateral forum of its kind, the UN, the USA 
seems to favor new informal, selective multilateral forums that could help achieve its 
objectives at the lowest possible cost.           
On the economic level, the collapse of the philosophy of central economic 
planning opened the way for a sweeping victory by the counter philosophy of free-
market economy, which led to radical changes in the rules of global economic 
governance. Ever since, the whole world, the UN and its Assembly included, has been 
moving gradually toward further reliance on free-market mechanisms. Along the way, 
wealthy member states have been pushing for further whittling away at the mandate of 
the Assembly in economic and social areas to the benefit of external forums. Notably, 
this readjustment of roles serves the interests of wealthy member states in several ways, 
including moving the focus of development issues to forums where they have a better 
bargaining balance, rationalizing development programs and minimizing the financial 
resources they have to deploy for them. In contrast, developing member states have 
been resisting further marginalization of the role of the Assembly in these areas, using 
their overwhelming voting majority. Nonetheless, this resistance has been largely 
ineffective due to, among others, the fact that from the practical point of view, it is the 
wealthy minority that provides financial lifelines for development programs. In the 
meantime, globalization has been accelerating and its divides between the haves and 
have-nots have been widening and sharpening, thus posing dangers to globalization 
itself and to international stability.         
Nonetheless, the Assembly remains one of the most highly esteemed organs of 
the UN, second in line only to the Council. While membership in the Council is limited 
to 15, the Assembly enjoys a quasi-global membership with 193 member states. Thus, 
for the great majority of UN member states, the Assembly is the highest-profile global 
forum of its kind. Hence, each member state sends some of its best diplomats to 
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represent it before the UN headquarters in New York. And each of them considers its 
contribution to the work of the Assembly with maximum interest and care. They all 
know that resolutions issued by the Assembly lack any reliable power of enforcement, 
but they continue to view the Assembly as an indispensable platform for the expression 
of state positions and views about issues of international cooperation. In fact, the 
Assembly is considered to be the most supreme source of international legitimacy. In 
particular, the process of examining resolutions attests to this fact, with member states 
resorting to different tools and means in earnest in order to pass the resolutions that they 
sponsor, co-sponsor or consider worthy of support, while at the same time attempting to 
block those that they consider inacceptable or detrimental.  
Of course, the political will of UN member states, as reflected in UN official 
documents, is what matters most at the end. In other words, it is member states that steer 
the path of the UN and chart its future development. However, member states move 
within the boundaries of political feasibility, which usually forces them to apply least 
common denominators rather than the best possible remedies to problems. In addition, 
unlike business corporations, political organizations, such as the UN, are generally slow 
in responding to external change impulses. Furthermore, historical experience indicates 
that reform in the UN is usually a complicated process that could possibly end up failing 
to resolve some of the most critical issues. Nonetheless, reform remains a must if the 
world body is to adapt to the evolution of the surrounding environment. And, sooner or 
later, the forces of change may impose themselves and feed into some kind of action. 
Attempting to look at how the Assembly could contribute to addressing the current 
challenges of global governance, one may use a perspective that is different from the 
political one of the general membership. Indeed, this is a luxury of research, but it is 
also about how research contributes to change in the real world and why politicians 
listen to intellectuals. 
It is clear that powerful countries do not favor such large forums as the 
Assembly. In contrast, these countries prefer to do business in smaller forums, such as 
the Council, or selective, informal forums such as the G-20. In this regard, it is indeed 
worth pondering why these countries continue to encourage democratic schizophrenia 
between national and international structures. Claims against such forums as the 
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Assembly often include time waste because of its huge size and dilution of agreements 
because of the need to reconcile the positions of more parties. In contrast, smaller 
forums, especially those where powerful countries enjoy unparalleled privileges, help 
do business swiftly and more effectively. However, one could have strong rebuttals to 
these claims. First, marginalizing such global forums as the Assembly defies the 
credibility of calls for universal democratic values. While applying state democracy at 
the international level does not seem feasible, a greater deal of democratization is 
demanded by a great majority of states and this could make a substantial shift in global 
governance. Certainly, all states are affected by decisions on global governance to 
varying degrees and all of them have legitimate rights to participate in these decisions. 
Second, this phenomenon is also counterproductive in terms of effectiveness. One major 
advantage of the UN is burden-sharing and this could only be best guaranteed in the 
Assembly. Third, as for time waste, it seems sufficient to say that if national problems 
deserve enough investment in terms of time and effort, then global problems deserve the 
same kind of treatment at least. Fourth, admitting that agreements reached in informal 
forums could be more practical, they are not as legally secure as those reached in formal 
forums such as the UN. Fifth, the Assembly offers otherwise excluded members the 
chance to raise problems that they face. And there is ample evidence that in our 
globalized world today, no single country is negligible in terms of its potential negative 
impact on its neighbors or even the whole world. Sixth, the UN at large has some 
expertise and experiences that are hard to find anywhere else. 
Hence, it is contended that the role of the Assembly in global governance should 
be enhanced. Contrary to common wisdom, this does not necessarily require Charter 
amendment. Rather, it needs political will, which if in place could easily pave the way 
for any necessary Charter amendment. In any case, enhancing the role of the Assembly 
could be realized through a number of basic means. First, the Assembly should be 
enabled to perform its mandate to the letter and spirit of the provisions of the Charter. 
Thus, powerful member states, such as the permanent five, should cease to block 
elements of the Assembly’s legitimate mandate to protect individual or selective 
interests. In particular, the Assembly should be better empowered to intervene in cases 
of peace and security if the Council fails to act timely and appropriately. Second, 
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member states should commit to enforce the Assembly's resolutions on all without 
exception. The moral value of these resolutions is indeed well-grounded, but this needs 
to be complemented with binding force. Third, the current laggard reform process in the 
Assembly should be concluded as soon as possible in order to improve its efficiency and 
effectiveness. Ultimately, if need arises, Charter amendment to enhance the role of the 
Assembly should be considered.    
As part of this research, there was a field study on a sample of 50 professionals 
in the fields of diplomacy, international organizations and academia, drawn from a 
diversified set of 32 countries, including some of the permanent five and some of the 
least developed countries (please refer to the Appendix). The field study was undertaken 
through a questionnaire that sought the personal views of the sample participants in 
response to eleven questions about the current multilateral system. Six of these 
questions are about the UN and three deal exclusively with the Assembly. For the 
moment, the three questions about the Assembly are worth consideration. Firstly, asking 
the participants if they think the Assembly should play a bigger role in global 
governance, 38 participants or 76% agreed, while eight participants or 16% were 
undecided and only four participants or 8% disagreed. Indeed, these results reflect a 
strong cross-cutting support to the notion that the Assembly should be enhanced. 
Notably, 18 participants or 36% even expressed strong agreement to this suggestion, 
while 20 participants or 40% were satisfied with unqualified agreement. On the negative 
side, only one participant strongly disagreed with the idea, i.e. 2% of the sample, while 
three participants or 6% simply disagreed.  
Secondly, moving on to the more specific theme of peace and security, the 
sample participants were asked for their views on whether the Assembly should be 
further empowered to step in if the Council fails to deliver. The support to this 
proposition was less than that to the previous general one, with 32 participants or 64% 
in support. Still, this remains a clear majority in support of such a controversial 
suggestion. And, remarkably, strong support to it came from 20 participants or 40%, 
while 12 participants or 24% were in simple agreement. On the other side, seven 
participants or 14% were neutral, and the number of those disagreeing was 11 
participants, including eight or 22% in disagreement and three or 6% in strong 
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disagreement. The reading of these results indicates strong overall support to 
empowering the Assembly to play a bigger role in the area of peace and security, while 
respecting the primary responsibility of the Council. To some extent, this reflects the 
positions of the permanent five members, especially their insistence that authorization 
of sanctions or use of force in cases of breach of peace should remain within the strict 
confines of the Council. In particular, the 40% of participants in strong support to a 
bigger role for the Assembly in this area reflects larger despair on the side of a wide 
range of stakeholders with the Council. Expectedly, this is the case of participants 
coming from countries with acrimonious conflicts that the Council has failed to resolve 
so far, whether because of complexity or lack of means. It is also the case of those 
coming from less powerful or marginal countries that feel some sort of double standards 
or lack of justice in the work of the Council. 
Thirdly, the questionnaire sought the views of the sample participants on what 
role they consider most appropriate for the Assembly by asking them to put in order 
three suggested alternatives: global governance platform, i.e. the highest global 
decision-making forum; parliament of man, i.e. a parliament of states with legislative 
and supervisory powers; or a clearing house of global governance, i.e. a mechanism to 
enforce the necessary complementarities in international cooperation. Notably, these 
options reflect the historical debate on the Assembly and the more current arguments on 
transforming the UN into a world government. It should also be noted that one 
fundamental assumption in this regard is that all member states would fully implement 
the pronouncements of the Assembly under any of the three alternative scenarios. 
Hence, there is no need to speak of Charter amendment. To allow for proportionality, 
the answers were given weights ranging from three for coming first, two for second and 
one for third (please refer to Chart 7 below). The analysis of the results indicates that 
being a global governance forum is the most appealing alternative, with 108 out of 294 
overall points or about 37% of the total. The alternative of clearing house of global 
governance came second with 94 points or about 32%, while that of global parliament 
came last with 92 points or around 31%. Clearly, the differences between the three 
alternatives are very tight, which reflects some deal of confusion, albeit understandable 
given the interference between the alternatives and the complexity of the subject. It is 
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also worth noting that although the alternative of a clearing house of global governance 
came second, two sample participants only ticked it, indicating that they think it is the 
only viable alternative.  
 
Chart (7) 
Roles of the United Nations General Assembly 
Global 
Governance 
Platform
37%
Parliament of 
Man
31%
Clearing-House of 
Global 
Governance
32%
  
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of a field questionnaire (see the 
Appendix).  
 
Looking at the results in more detail, the alternative of global parliament 
received the least points, although the functions of the Assembly today significantly 
resemble those of parliaments. Perhaps this is because the main problem of the world 
today is lack of effective governance, not parliamentary supervision per se. Besides, the 
parliamentary aspects of the Assembly’s work are not visible enough, with its 
supervisory role over other UN organs mostly low-profile and bureaucratic, and its 
semi-legislative, norm-setting role fairly technical in nature. On the contrary, the 
alternative of global governance platform received the strongest support, in spite of the 
obvious lack of enforcement power in the Assembly and the wide dismissal of the idea 
of global government as an infeasible and undesirable one. Hence, it is clear, the 
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Assembly continues to be viewed as a governance platform rather than a parliamentary 
one. Finally, the second most popular alternative, clearing-house of global governance, 
is obviously closer to governance than parliamentary functions. However, it is softer in 
nature than the two other alternatives, given the fact that coordination of international 
policies is already one of the important tasks of the Assembly today, albeit without 
tangible difference on the ground.  
Notably, the above three questions imply a need for some enhancement in the 
powers and functions of the Assembly. And this is particularly the case with respect to 
the three aforementioned alternatives on its optimum role. Of course, any enlargement 
in the mandate of the Assembly would require amending the Charter, and this is perhaps 
the most secure way to ensure that the desired results would take root. However, those 
three questions were intentionally drafted in a general language, without any reference 
to amending the Charter. There are three main justifications for this approach: one is 
that amending the Charter for the purpose of enhancing the role of the Assembly does 
not really figure on the agenda of the world body today, neither does it seem to receive 
reliable support from the general membership. Second, and perhaps even more 
importantly, the decisive determinant here is indeed the political will, not the legal 
imperative. To put it otherwise, if there is a will, there is a way. And if there is enough 
will to reform the Assembly and make it a powerful central stage of global governance, 
then amending the Charter would not stand in the way. Third, enhancing the role of the 
Assembly does not always have to go through Charter amendment. On the contrary, 
some of the most critical demands in the current reform process are already covered 
either by the Charter or specific resolutions, including with respect to the intervention of 
the Assembly in cases where the Council fails to act, the supervisory role of the 
Assembly over all the other UN organs and its role in the selection process of the 
Secretary General.                
The field research also revealed some additional comments on the predicaments 
of the Assembly and how they could be treated (please refers to the Appendix). In 
addition to supporting the need for a strong Assembly, some participants underlined the 
problems of lack of binding force in Assembly's resolutions and consensus voting in the 
UN in general. And, in response, one participant suggested that all Assembly's 
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resolutions be made binding on all member states without exception. Another 
participant proposed that the application of consensus decision-making be limited to 
areas of utmost importance such as use of force and imposing sanctions. Once more, 
these comments echo the calls for enhancing the role of the Assembly in global 
governance. In particular, they assert the argument that the Assembly should be made 
more effective by ensuring the implementation of its decisions and streamlining its 
decision-making process.             
To sum up, the Assembly is no doubt a unique forum of international 
cooperation, particularly in view of its representativeness and status as the main 
deliberative, norm-setting and policy-making organ of multilateral cooperation. Respect 
for the Assembly is clearly reflected in the attitudes of the UN general membership, 
whether in terms of participation or esteem. By virtue of the Charter, the Assembly has 
mandate on all issues of international cooperation, including peace and security. 
However, apart from the moral weight, the Assembly lacks any reliable power of 
enforcement, whether internally or externally. Moreover, over the last few years, it has 
been losing ground to other forums inside as well as outside the world body. Notably, 
the current reform process in the Assembly, launched in 2005, is predicated on the so-
called "revitalization", i.e. reform within the basic dimensions of its current chartered 
powers and functions. Indeed, this reflects the least common denominator of real 
politics inside the Assembly. Unfortunately, the reform process has not made any 
tangible difference on the ground. Even more, the very resolutions the assembly has 
issued on revitalization lack implementation and follow-up. Furthermore, paradoxically, 
some of the other UN reforms have contributed to further marginalization of the 
Assembly, including the establishment of the UNHRC and reforms related to system-
wide coherence. 
In contrast to current trends, a field questionnaire as part of this research reveals 
strong support to empowering the Assembly to serve a bigger role in global governance, 
including with respect to issues of international peace and security if the Council fails to 
act timely and appropriately. And, in an attempt to envisage what role could be best-fit 
for the Assembly, the results of the questionnaire indicate preference for it to act as a 
central hub of global governance, as opposed to a clearing-house of international 
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cooperation or a parliament of man. Indeed, the Assembly has the basic characteristics 
of a would-be effective platform of global governance, if member states commit to 
making it so. The basic steps on such a road could be to enable the Assembly to exercise 
its whole mandate, empower it with enough tools to enforce its decisions on all member 
states without exception and conclude the current reform process as soon as possible. 
Admittedly, the vast size of the Assembly restricts its pace of movement. It could also 
lead to dilution of decisions because of consensus-building compromises. But, the 
outcomes of its often cumbersome decision-making process certainly reflect the 
collective will of the international community better than in most other forums, which 
makes these outcomes more democratic and legitimate. In practical terms, such 
legitimate outcomes would also enjoy the widest possible support in terms of 
implementation, which helps boost the effectiveness of global governance.      
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Afterword 
  
The international multilateral system has been facing challenges ever since its 
inception after World War II.  One could even say that the system has been always in 
some kind of crisis. Yet, since the end of the Cold War, the system has been witnessing 
some tectonic metamorphoses, together with some unprecedented challenges. And, 
especially over the last few years, these metamorphoses have accentuated, mainly due to 
driving forces such as the consequences of the war on Iraq and the latest international 
economic crisis. The main motivation behind this research is to examine in detail the 
current state of the system, with a view to shedding light on its main determinants and 
drawing some practical recommendations for the future. Naturally, to undertake this 
task, one has to underline the basic elements of the historical legacy of the system. And 
because this is a dynamic subject, one also has to highlight the main trends of evolution. 
This afterword is principally intended to recapitulate the main arguments and 
suggestions presented in the research. And, in order to be concise, this will take a 
numbered form as follows: 
First, the technological revolution has brought about unprecedented connectivity 
and interdependence. In parallel, there has been globalization of challenges and 
opportunities. And, in particular, there has been proliferation of transnational 
challenges, increasing sense of common human destiny, globalization of values and 
paradigms and an evolving global public opinion. Consequently, global governance has 
become a sophisticated exercise and the world has become a place marked with chronic 
problems, including lack of governance and lack of order. Moreover, globalization has 
brought along strong antagonists, whether at the international level, such as anti-
globalization movements, or at the national level such as nationalistic movements. 
Undoubtedly, these movements challenge the core of globalization, highlight its 
malfunctions, put its benefits at risk and some of them even threaten of plunging the 
world into chaos. 
Second, as stated earlier, the world setting today is fraught with problems in all 
areas of international relations. In security, not even the most powerful of countries feel 
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reasonably safe and the notions of national and collective security have undergone 
shocks that mandated their redefinition to address new challenges, such as terrorism, 
besides old festering challenges such as weapons of mass destruction, increasing 
internal conflicts and intractable interstate ones. In the economic domain, vicious circles 
of financial and economic crises have been haunting the world, which has led to 
reversals and retreats in economic globalization in some areas. In addition, globalization 
continues to create sharp divides between haves and have-nots, and its promise of better 
living standards for all has turned out to be futile, which further puts globalization at 
risk. Another major problem area is that of global environmental degradation, caused 
mostly by irresponsible depletion of vital resources and continuing growth of 
population. As a result, the world seems to be going along an ominous course, 
especially with the cycles of natural disasters accelerating and accentuating.                 
Third, national interests always come first and only after satisfying them to the 
best possible level, can come international or global interests. In fact, this is only 
natural, as the private always comes before the public. Even inside countries, local 
interests usually have priority over national ones. Thus, more precisely, the problem in 
international politics is the lack of a system similar to state systems, one that is capable 
of delimiting the lines between what is private and what is public and ensuring overall 
wellbeing. Perhaps even more importantly, it seems that no one wants to move first and 
strike good example for others, even at the level of super and great powers. However, 
global interests do not have to come at the expense of national ones. Indeed, this is a 
problem of process not principles. In other words, global governance can be improved 
to serve global causes better without contradicting with national interests, if the 
necessary political will is in place. And, while multilateral institutions lack wills of their 
own, member states make up the collective will of these institutions. Thus, it is clear, 
the responsibility on lack of effective global governance falls on nation-states. Unless 
nation-states provide adequate backing to multilateral cooperation in any specific area, 
there can be no progress in this area.      
Fourth, multilateral institutions, such as the UN, are the most sublime 
embodiment of the human aspiration for mutual security, stability and prosperity. And, 
in practice, all countries benefit from the system somehow. While powerful countries 
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are the main players and tend to view the system as a tool to promote their interests, 
marginal countries form a far bigger mass and tend to view it as a means to protect their 
fundamental rights and middle-size countries form some kind of middle class with 
mixed interests. Hence, all countries have interest in the continuation of the system and 
all of them show some keenness to maintain it and enhance its effectiveness. 
Nonetheless, the system has been in some kind of crisis ever since its establishment. 
And, today, it is facing many more dire challenges, including problems related to lack 
of representative legitimacy, growing irrelevance and lack of order in the surrounding 
political environment.  
Fifth, given the current state of affairs in the multilateral system, there are 
several imperatives of change. First, the world has seen some significant shifts in power 
over the last two decades. Emerging powerhouses, such as the so-called BRICS and 
some other prominent regional powers, demand bigger stakes in the system. These 
powerhouses should be accommodated or the system will continue to lack legitimacy 
and effectiveness. Second, power has become diffuse among state and non-state actors 
such as NGOs and TNCs. These new actors are playing an increasingly influential role 
in world politics and are challenging state authority and the legitimacy of the 
multilateral system. Thus, the system needs to find a consensual formula for the 
integration of these actors, one that ensures the maximization of their positive 
contributions and the minimization of any related drawbacks. Third, the very nature of 
international challenges has changed. Today, globalization has brought along 
proliferating challenges that are truly global. In the meantime, the business as usual 
practice of improvising partial means to address these challenges has proven ill-advised. 
The multilateral system needs to undertake a holistic review of its approach to the 
challenges of the day and, where necessary, to amend its governing functional and legal 
frameworks for that purpose.  
Sixth, the UN is the core hub of the multilateral system, and it is largely viewed 
as an indispensable organization. Over its lifetime, it has had many successes and has 
managed to survive many shocks. However, the UN was created for another world, that 
of post World War II. This is still clear in the distribution of power inside the world 
body and its rules and working methods. Ultimately, today, it is facing bitter criticisms 
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and even some existential attacks. Its recurrent failure to address serious challenges 
have discredited it, forced it into increasing marginalization and imposed high costs in 
terms of overall global wellbeing. But from all the challenges facing the UN today, 
there are two that seem particularly decisive for its future. One is the challenge of 
representative legitimacy, where shifts in real power distribution in the world are 
rendering the power formula inside the UN outdated and untenable. And the other is the 
challenge of relevance to the current world setting, given the sophisticated nature of 
globalization and the ongoing shifts in world order. It is feared that unless the UN 
manages to face up to these challenges with adequate political will, it would face further 
marginalization over the coming years. Hence, the world body is in the focus of calls for 
reform today.  
Seventh, reform has been a lasting item on the agendas of all the major 
multilateral institutions since their establishment, which appears to be an ongoing 
struggle to catch up with developments in the surrounding environment. Unfortunately, 
by nature, reform in the multilateral system is a complicated, time-consuming and 
resource-consuming process. In the meantime, the forces of globalization have been 
evolving fast, which further widens the gap between the system and the real world. In 
addition, reform processes are subject to the test of the political will of member states, 
which usually forces these processes into a least-common-denominator approach. The 
conventional preference for consensus on reform decisions usually dilutes reform 
agendas and could even leave out some of the most essential elements of needed 
reforms. Across the board, this applies to the UN system, the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the WTO. Moreover, the tendency of opponents to suggested reforms to employ 
divide-and-rule tactics, together with the propensity to tie several reform elements in 
packages, could easily derail or stall whole reform processes.  
Eighth, in parallel to reform processes in different multilateral institutions, talk 
of reform has been gaining new ground in academic circles over the last few years. 
However, most academic work focuses on needed reforms without tackling the more 
challenging question of how to implement them. In contrast, there are three noteworthy 
suggested reform approaches: the trans-governmental networks approach, the power 
club/executive committee approach and the twin proposals of concert of democracies 
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and “global NATO.” Each of these approaches attempts to steer a path to effective 
global governance. Nevertheless, none of them presents a convincing case. It is true that 
trans-governmental networks are playing an increasing role in global governance, but 
the proclamation of a new world order driven by such networks seems exaggerated and 
it is even doubtful that they could lead to significant change in world politics. In turn, 
power clubs or executive global committees could get more things done faster, but such 
forums snag on lack of inclusiveness and sustainability, which are also basic 
foundations for effectiveness. Finally, the proposals of concert of democracies and 
“global NATO” are principally driven by exclusive, parochial ideology, raise more 
controversy than support and even suffer from lack of coherence and relevance to the 
current global environment.  
Ninth, so far, practical responses to evolving world politics have taken trends 
that do not augur well for the multilateral system. Most importantly, there has been an 
increasing propensity to rely on selective, informal multilateral forums such as the G-
20. And this has been principally driven by the USA, the yet sole superpower. Faced 
with its decline relative to others, the USA seems to have readjusted its foreign policy in 
favor of informal multilateral cooperation. This approach helps raise support for the 
USA from capable partners, while preserving and prolonging its supremacy. In fact, this 
goes in line with theories such as multilateralism à la carte and multi-multilateralism, 
which are most likely to shape the future. Another potential scenario would be a relapse 
into multipolar power politics. This scenario is mainly driven by emerging powers from 
the South, especially the BRICS who openly seek a multipolar world order as a means 
to better multilateralism. While this could be a feasible approach to effective 
multilateralism, it risks getting stalled at the intermediate stage of multipolarity, 
especially with the continuing unwillingness on the side of traditional great powers to 
accommodate emerging ones in multilateral forums such as the UN Security Council. A 
third alternative scenario would be effective multilateralism, sought most vehemently 
by the EU. Basically, this is a scenario of inclusive, formal and more responsive 
multilateralism. It is also one where the UN occupies the central stage and one that 
accommodates regional organizations. However, this appears to be more a hope than a 
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realistic scenario given the fact that current trends impose intractable difficulties on the 
way to constructing such a system. 
Tenth, nation-states are the principal players in the multilateral system. 
Accordingly, the potential future course of the system depends in the first place on the 
policies of member states. In particular, the policies of traditional powerhouses, such as 
the USA and Russia, and those of emerging ones such as the EU, China and India, are 
crucial in this regard. The policies of these powerhouses are also decisive to better 
ensure against the potential of global chaos and harness globalization for common good. 
But, one needs to distinguish the role of the USA. Notwithstanding its relative decline 
recently, the USA is expected to remain the sole superpower in the foreseeable future. 
Hence, it is the most qualified player to lead the world into the future. Besides nation-
states, non-state actors, such as NGOs and TNCs, also play important catalytic roles. 
These actors have been further consolidating themselves over the last few years, and 
their future relationships with nation-states and the multilateral system will undoubtedly 
influence the potential course of global governance.    
Eleventh, it is widely accepted that a global government along the lines of state 
governments in neither desirable nor feasible. What is needed instead is to reform the 
multilateral system so that it satisfies three basic criteria: effectiveness, 
representativeness and accountability. Effectiveness is needed to address the challenges 
of the current age and to capitalize on its opportunities for overall good. It is also a 
foundation for what is called the functional legitimacy of the system, i.e. its ability to 
make a difference on the ground. In turn, representativeness is essential to ensure that 
the power formula inside the system conforms with real power distribution, which is a 
prerequisite for sufficient formal legitimacy. Representativeness is also a basic 
requirement for the stability, sustainability and effectiveness of the system, as its lack 
exposes it to counterbalancing acts and deprives it of some of the contributions of the 
disaffected actors. Finally, accountability is necessary to guarantee that the system 
works for all the stakeholders on equitable footing and to provide checks and balances 
on its performance. In particular, mechanisms of accountability include the integration 
of NGOs in the system, with these organizations relaying the voices of world public 
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opinion and putting pressure on nation-states and multilateral institutions to act more 
responsibly and transparently. 
Twelfth, the UN General Assembly is a unique multilateral forum, in view of its 
quasi-global, even membership and its status as the main deliberative, norm-setting and 
policy-making organ of multilateral cooperation. However, the Assembly is largely 
viewed as a talk-shop that lacks enforcement tools. In addition, its current reform 
process is confined to the so-called revitalization, i.e. reform within the existing 
parameters. Still, this process has not yielded tangible results, if not counterproductive 
ones. In turn, the UN Security Council, the club of the powerful, has recurrently 
suffered from paralysis and failure and continues to face intractable hurdles on its way 
to reform. In this regard, reform in the Assembly could be the key to addressing 
problems of global governance more effectively, including those related to peace and 
security. More specifically, the role of the Assembly should be enhanced through such 
means as enabling it to discharge its full mandate, committing all member states to 
implementing its decisions without exception and concluding its current laggard reform 
process as soon as possible. If the world manages to effect these changes, it will have 
laid down a strong foundation for the way forward with reform.     
Thirteenth, the UN General Assembly is undoubtedly the best available 
multilateral forum against the standard of representativeness. This representativeness 
provides it with unique legitimacy, which is essential for effectiveness. And the wide 
participation of state and non-state actors in its work makes it a better accountable 
forum. Nonetheless, some great powers show propensity to avoid the Assembly in 
preference for such smaller forums as the UN Security Council and the G-20, where it is 
relatively easier and more efficient to do business. Besides being prejudicial, this kind 
of attitudes is also unjustifiable. Marginalizing such a unique forum as the Assembly 
defies the values of democracy and equality and deprives the multilateral system of 
better burden-sharing and effectiveness. In addition, informal forums, such as the G-20, 
do not provide legally secure outcomes and do not guarantee sustainable progress. 
However, it should be highlighted, this is not to argue against the roles of multilateral 
forums other than the Assembly. On the contrary, it is acknowledged, each of these 
forums could contribute a share in its specific area. Instead, the main argument here is 
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that we need a properly ordered multilateral system, where the UN, and especially its 
Assembly, acts as a core hub.  
Fourteenth, a field questionnaire, administered on a sample of 50 participants 
related to the subject of this research from 32 countries, reveals a number of indicative 
results. First, it reflects general dissatisfaction with both the performance of the 
multilateral system and its current reform efforts. Second, the participants thought that 
the main challenges to the system are, in order, the complexity of current challenges, 
lack of political will, global power shifts and the proliferation of actors. Third, 
concerning the most likely future course of the system, the participants considered 
maintaining the status quo/lack of clear direction as the most probable scenario, 
followed, in order, by multilateralism à la carte/multi-multilateralism, re-emergence of 
multipolarity, effective multilateralism and global chaos. Fourth, though controversial, 
there was a simple majority in agreement with the possibility of adapting state 
democracy to the international setting. Fifth, most participants expected the UN to play 
a significant role in global governance in the future. Sixth, with respect to the UN 
General Assembly, most participants were of the view that its role should be enhanced, 
including in the area of peace and security if the UN Security Council fails to act. 
Seventh, it was also clear that the Assembly continues to be largely viewed as a global 
governance body, rather than as a parliamentary forum or a coordination hub. More 
specifically, the participants thought that the Assembly should serve as the highest 
global decision-making platform. Eighth, a big majority were in support of enlarging the 
Security Council. Ninth, choosing from three suggested options for dealing with the 
veto right, there was a clear preference for abrogating it outright, followed by extending 
it to potential new permanent members and keeping the status quo. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex (I) 
United Nations Charter Articles on the General Assembly 
 
CHAPTER IV 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
Composition 
Article 9 
1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.  
2. Each member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.  
Functions and Powers 
Article 10 
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the 
present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the 
present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to 
the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such 
questions or matters.  
Article 11 
1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing 
disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with 
regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.  
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, 
or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in 
accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may 
make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states 
concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is 
necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either 
before or after discussion.  
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3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations 
which are likely to endanger international peace and security.  
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the 
general scope of Article 10. 
Article 12 
1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the 
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any 
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so 
requests.  
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the 
General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of 
international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and 
shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if 
the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal 
with such matters.  
Article 13 
1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the 
purpose of:  
a. promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the 
progressive development of international law and its codification;  
b. promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, 
and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.  
2. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General Assembly with 
respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1(b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.  
Article 14 
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend 
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it 
deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, 
including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter 
setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.  
Article 15 
1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the 
Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the 
Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.  
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2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the 
United Nations.  
Article 16 
The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international 
trusteeship system as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the 
approval of the trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic.  
Article 17 
1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.  
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by 
the General Assembly.  
3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary 
arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the 
administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making 
recommendations to the agencies concerned.  
Voting 
Article 18 
1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.  
2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-
thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: 
recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, 
the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the 
members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the 
Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1(c) of Article 86, the admission of 
new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of 
membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the 
trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.  
3. Decisions on other questions, Composition including the determination of additional 
categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a 
majority of the members present and voting.  
Article 19 
A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial 
contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the 
amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for 
the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a 
Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the 
control of the Member.  
 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Annexes 
291
Procedure 
Article 20 
The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special 
sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-
General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the 
United Nations.  
Article 21 
The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President 
for each session.  
Article 22 
The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for 
the performance of its functions. 
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Annex (II) 
The Uniting for Peace Resolution 
 
Resolution 377 (V)  
A 
The General Assembly  
Recognizing that the first two stated Purposes of the United Nations are:  
"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and 
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to 
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace", and  
"To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace",  
Reaffirming that it remains the primary duty of all Members of the United Nations, 
when involved in an international dispute, to seek settlement of such a dispute by 
peaceful means through the procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter, and 
recalling the successful achievements of the United Nations in this regard on a number 
of previous occasions,  
Finding that international tension exists on a dangerous scale,  
Recalling its resolution 290 (IV) entitled "Essentials of peace", which states that 
disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations is primarily responsible 
for the continuance of international tension, and desiring to contribute further to the 
objectives of that resolution,  
Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of 
the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the 
veto,  
Reaffirming that the initiative in negotiating the agreements for armed forces provided 
for in Article 43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Council, and desiring to ensure 
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that, pending the conclusion of such agreements, the United Nations has at its disposal 
means for maintaining international peace and security,  
Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf 
of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in the two 
preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United 
Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and 
security,  
Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its 
rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance 
of international peace and security,  
Recognizing that discharge by the General Assembly of its responsibilities in these 
respects calls for possibilities of observation which would ascertain the facts and expose 
aggressors; for the existence of armed forces which could be used collectively; and for 
the possibility of timely recommendation by the General Assembly to Members of the 
United Nations for collective action which, to be effective, should be prompt,  
A 
1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent 
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for 
collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression 
the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency 
special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefore. Such emergency 
special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any 
seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations;  
2. Adopts for this purpose the amendments to its rules of procedure set forth in the 
annex to the present resolution;  
B 
3. Establishes a Peace Observation Commission which, for the calendar years 1951 and 
1952, shall be composed of fourteen Members, namely: China, Colombia, 
Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay, and which could observe and report 
on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of 
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Upon 
the invitation or with the consent of the State into whose territory the Commission 
would go, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in 
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session, may utilize the Commission if the Security Council is not exercising the 
functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the matter in question. Decisions 
to utilize the Commission shall be made on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
members present and voting. The Security Council may also utilize the Commission in 
accordance with its authority under the Charter;  
4. Decides that the Commission shall have authority in its discretion to appoint sub-
commissions and to utilize the services of observers to assist it in the performance of its 
functions;  
5. Recommends to all governments and authorities that they co-operate with the 
Commission and assist it in the performance of its functions;  
6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities, utilizing, 
where directed by the Commission, the United Nations Panel of Field Observers 
envisaged in General Assembly resolution 297 B (IV);  
C 
7. Invites each Member of the United Nations to survey its resources in order to 
determine the nature and scope of the assistance it may be in a position to render in 
support of any recommendations of the Security Council or of the General Assembly for 
the restoration of international peace and security;  
8. Recommends to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member 
maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped 
that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the 
Security Council or the General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such 
elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized in 
Article 51 of the Charter;  
9. Invites the Members of the United Nations to inform the Collective Measures 
Committee provided for in paragraph 11 as soon as possible of the measures taken in 
implementation of the preceding paragraph;  
10. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, with the approval of the Committee 
provided for in paragraph 11, a panel of military experts who could be made available, 
on request, to Member States wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the 
organization, training, and equipment for prompt service as United Nations units or the 
elements referred to in paragraph 8;  
D 
11. Establishes a Collective Measures Committee consisting of fourteen Members, 
namely: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico, 
Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the 
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United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, and directs the Committee, in 
consultation with the Secretary-General and with such Member States as the Committee 
finds appropriate, to study and make a report to the Security Council and the General 
Assembly, not later than 1 September 1951, on methods, including those in section C of 
the present resolution, which might be used to maintain and strengthen international 
peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, taking 
account of collective self-defense and regional arrangements (Articles 51 and 52 of the 
Charter);  
12. Recommends to all Member States that they co-operate with the Committee and 
assist it in the performance of its functions;  
13. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish the staff and facilities necessary for the 
effective accomplishment of the purposes set forth in sections C and D of the present 
resolution;  
E 
14. Is fully conscious that, in adopting the proposals set forth above, enduring peace will 
not be secured solely by collective security arrangements against breaches of 
international peace and acts of aggression but that a genuine and lasting peace depends 
also upon the observance of all the Principles and Purposes established in the Charter of 
the United Nations, upon the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council, 
the General Assembly and other principal organs of the United Nations intended to 
achieve the maintenance of international peace and security, and especially upon respect 
for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and on the 
establishment and maintenance of conditions of economic and social well-being in all 
countries; and accordingly  
15. Urges Member States to respect fully, and to intensify, joint action, in co-operation 
with the United Nations, to develop and stimulate universal respect for and observance 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to intensify individual and collective 
efforts to achieve conditions of economic stability and social progress, particularly 
through the development of under-developed countries and areas.  
ANNEX 
The rules of procedure of the General Assembly are amended in the following respects:  
1. The present text of rule 8 shall become paragraph (a) of that rule, and a new 
paragraph (b) shall be added to read as follows:  
"Emergency special sessions pursuant to resolution 377 A (V) shall be convened 
within twenty-four hours of the receipt by the Secretary-General of a request for 
such a session from the Security Council, on the vote of any seven members 
thereof, or of a request from a majority of the Members of the United Nations 
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expressed by vote in the Interim Committee or otherwise, or of the concurrence 
of a majority of Members as provided in rule 9."  
2. The present text of rule 9 shall become paragraph (a) of that rule and a new paragraph 
(b) shall be added to read as follows:  
"This rule shall apply also to a request by any Member for an emergency special 
session pursuant to resolution 377 A (V). In such a case the Secretary-General 
shall communicate with other Members by the most expeditious means of 
communication available."  
3. Rule 10 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:  
". . . In the case of an emergency special session convened pursuant to rule 8 (b), 
the Secretary-General shall notify the Members of the United Nations at least 
twelve hours in advance of the opening of the session."  
4. Rule 16 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:  
". . . The provisional agenda of an emergency special session shall be 
communicated to the Members of the United Nations simultaneously with the 
communication summoning the session."  
5. Rule 19 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:  
". . . During an emergency special session additional items concerning the 
matters dealt with in resolution 377 A (V) may be added to the agenda by a two-
thirds majority of the Members present and voting."  
6. There is added a new rule to precede rule 65 to read as follows:  
"Notwithstanding the provisions of any other rule and unless the General 
Assembly decides otherwise, the Assembly, in case of an emergency special 
session shall convene in plenary session only and proceed directly to consider 
the item proposed for consideration in the request for the holding of the session, 
without previous reference to the General Committee or to any other Committee; 
the President and Vice-Presidents for such emergency special sessions shall be, 
respectively, the Chairman of those delegations from which were elected the 
President and Vice-Presidents of the previous session."  
302nd plenary meeting  
3 November 1950 
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Appendix 
Questionnaire Results 
 
As part of this research, there was a field questionnaire administered on a sample 
of 50 professionals in the fields of diplomacy, international organizations and academia. 
The prime focus of the questionnaire was on the international multilateral system, and 
more specifically the UN, the core hub of the system. Its main purpose was to draw 
some practical insights from professionals in fields of direct relationship with the 
subject. Notably, the area of international relations is largely dominated by some 
governments and think tanks. In contrast, the voices of the great majority of the 
concerned stakeholders are rarely heard. In response, the questionnaire attempts to 
provide some real gauge of opinions through a reasonably wide spectrum of 
participants. It adopts an opinion-poll approach and its results are analyzed using simple 
arithmetic rules, as compared to quantitative models (Cochran, 1977). In part, this is due 
to the high risk of quantifying variables in the area of international relations. In addition, 
the opinion-poll approach is more common in this specific area and offers some 
advantages in terms of flexibility and practicality. It should also be noted that although 
the sample was meant to reflect the opinions of reasonably diverse participants in a 
balanced manner, it is not argued to be adequately representative of all the concerned 
stakeholders. In this regard, the political sensitivity of the subject imposed some 
restrictions. In response, the researcher attempted to use direct contacts in the 
diplomatic community in Portugal and other familiar circles to improve the input.  
The distribution of the 50 participants is as follows: 44 diplomats, three officers 
of international organizations (two from the AU and one from the LAS) and three 
academics (two from Universidade Nova de Lisboa and one from Instituto Português de 
Relações Internacionais (IPRI)). Clearly, there was a focus on diplomats, which is 
partially due to the nature of the subject, where diplomats are usually well informed. In 
addition, diplomats represent sovereign states, which are the main building blocks and 
decision makers in multilateral institutions. As for the geographical distribution of the 
sample, 10 participants were drawn from each of Egypt and Portugal, while the 
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remaining 30 were drawn from 30 other countries (please refer to the list underneath). 
The geographical focus on Egypt and Portugal is mainly due to the relative easiness of  
research in both countries, given the Egyptian nationality of the researcher and 
undertaking the research in a Portuguese institution, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. 
Nonetheless, together with the 30 other countries, this makes up a moderately 
diversified set with sources from the five continents of the world. In addition, the 
sample reflects opinions from different kinds of countries, with participants from 
permanent members in the Security Council, Western countries, emerging powers, 
developing countries and least-developed countries (LDCs).  
 
List of Respondents 
 
 Country Number of Participants
Fields of 
Participants 
1 Argentina 1 Government 
2 Botswana 1 Government 
3 Chile 1 Government 
4 Colombia 1 Government 
5 Egypt 10 
8 Government 
and  
2 International 
Organization 
6 France 1 Government 
7 Germany 1 Government 
8 Ghana 1 Government 
9 Japan 1 Government 
10 Latvia 1 Government 
11 Libya 1 Government 
12 Luxembourg 1 Government 
13 Maldives 1 Government 
14 Mauritius 1 Government 
15 Mexico 1 Government 
16 Nepal 1 Government 
17 Netherlands 1 Government 
18 Nigeria 1 Government 
19 Palestinian Territories 
1 Government 
20 Poland 1 Government 
21 Portugal 10 
 7 Government 
and 
3 Academia 
22 Russia 1 Government 
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23 Senegal 1 Government 
24 Slovakia 1 Government 
25 South Africa 1 Government 
26 Sri Lanka 1 Government 
27 Sudan 1 International Organization 
28 Tanzania 1 Government 
29 Tunisia 1 Government 
30 Turkey 1 Government 
31 UK 1 Government 
32 USA 1 Government 
 
The field questionnaire was carried out during the year 2010. And it included 
meetings with 10 persons from Egypt, Portugal and the USA, both in Egypt and 
Portugal, in addition to forty questionnaires administered by correspondence. It should 
be highlighted that the participants were asked for their personal – as opposed to official 
– views. And out of 50, 27 participants requested that their names remain confidential. 
However, the completed questionnaire forms will be made available to the supervisors 
and the jury, with due regard to the demands for confidentiality. The questionnaire form 
is copied underneath. It has 12 questions: one for basic data, five on the multilateral 
system at large and six on the UN in particular, with special focus on the General 
Assembly and the Security Council. 
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Questionnaire Form 
 
1. Basic Data: 
- Name (Optional): 
- Nationality:     
- Professional Field:   Government (     )   Academia (     )   Civil Society (     )   Other (     ) 
2. What Do You Think about the Performance of the Current Multilateral System: 
- Very Satisfied (     )          
- Satisfied (     ) 
- Neutral (     ) 
- Unsatisfied (     ) 
- Very Unsatisfied (     ) 
3. What Do You Generally Think about the Current Reform Agendas in the UN, the Bretton 
Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organization:  
- Very Satisfied (     )          
- Satisfied (     ) 
- Neutral (     ) 
- Unsatisfied (     ) 
- Very Unsatisfied (     ) 
4. Please Arrange the Following Challenges to Multilateralism in Ascending Order (1-2-3…etc.): 
- Complexity of Current Challenges (     ) 
- Proliferation of Actors in the International System (     ) 
- Global Power Shifts (     ) 
- Lack of Political Will (     ) 
- Others: Please Specify: 
5. Please Arrange the Following Potential Scenarios of the Multilateral System in Ascending 
Order According to Probability (1-2-3…etc.): 
- Maintaining the Status Quo/Lack of Clear Direction (     ) 
- Multilateralism à la Carte/Multi-Multilateralism1 (     )  
- Effective Multilateralism2 (     ) 
- Re-emergence of Multipolar International Politics (     ) 
- Global Chaos (     ) 
6. Do You Think that State Democracy Could be Adapted to the Global Setting: 
- Strongly Agree (     )          
- Agree (     ) 
- Neutral (     ) 
- Disagree (     ) 
- Strongly Disagree (     ) 
7. How Do You See the Future Role of the UN in World Order:  
- Very Significant (     ) 
- Significant (     ) 
- Neutral (     ) 
- Insignificant (     ) 
- Very Insignificant (     ) 
                                                 
1 i.e. resorting to the UN only when deemed necessary on a case by case basis, while relying more on 
informal multilateral cooperation.      
2 i.e. effective functioning of the international multilateral system, with a reformed UN at its core. 
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8. Do You Think that the UN General Assembly Should Serve a Bigger Role in Global 
Governance: 
- Strongly Agree (     )         
- Agree (     ) 
- Neutral (     ) 
- Disagree (     ) 
- Strongly Disagree (     ) 
9. Do You Agree that the UN General Assembly Should Be Further Empowered to Step in if the 
UN Security Council Fails to Deliver on International Peace and Security Issues: 
- Strongly Agree (     )          
- Agree (     ) 
- Neutral (     ) 
- Disagree (     ) 
- Strongly Disagree (     ) 
10. Please Arrange the Following Argued Roles of the UN General Assembly in Ascending Order 
According to your Approval (1-2-3): 
- Global Governance Platform3 (     ) 
- Parliament of Man4 (     ) 
- Clearing House of Global Governance5 (     ) 
11. Do You Think that the UN Security Council Should Be Enlarged: 
- Strongly Agree (     )          
- Agree (     ) 
- Neutral (     ) 
- Disagree (     ) 
- Strongly Disagree (     ) 
12. Please Arrange the Following Reform Options of the Veto Power in Ascending Order (1-2-3): 
- Should Be Abrogated (     ) 
- Should Keep the Status Quo (     ) 
- Should Extend to New Permanent Members (     ) 
Please Add Any Further Comments Here: 
 
 
                                                 
3 i.e. serving as the highest global decision-making forum.  
4 i.e. becoming a global parliament of states with legislative and supervisory powers.  
5 i.e. being empowered to enforce complementarity of all efforts in any specific area. 
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Questionnaire Results 
Questions 2-6 
 
 Country Field (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 Argentina Gov. Unsatisfied Unsatisfied 2-3-4-1 1-2-5-3-4 Neutral 
2 Botswana Gov. Unsatisfied Unsatisfied 1-4-3-2 3-2-5-4-1 Agree 
3 Chile Gov. Satisfied Neutral 3-2-4-1 1-2-3-4-5 Disagree 
4 Colombia Gov. Neutral Unsatisfied 3-2-4-1 1-3-4-2-5 Disagree 
5 Egypt Gov. Neutral Neutral 1-3-2-4 2-1-4-3-5 Neutral 
6 Egypt Gov. Unsatisfied Neutral 2-3-1-4 2-1-3-4-5 Strongly Agree 
7 Egypt Gov. Unsatisfied Very Unsatisfied 
4-3-1-2 1-3-4-2-5 Agree 
8 Egypt Gov. Neutral Unsatisfied 1-3-2-4 3-1-4-2-5 Agree 
9 Egypt Gov. Unsatisfied Very Unsatisfied 
1-2-3-4 2-4-5-3-1 Disagree 
10 Egypt Gov. Satisfied Satisfied 3-2-1-4 1-3-4-2-5 Agree 
11 Egypt Gov. Neutral Satisfied 3-2-1-4 2-3-4-5-1 Disagree 
12 Egypt Gov. Satisfied Unsatisfied 3-4-2-1 1-2-5-3-4 Disagree 
13 Egypt Int’l Orgs. 
Unsatisfied Neutral 1-3-2-4 5-4-2-3-1 Disagree 
14 Egypt Int’l Orgs. 
Satisfied Satisfied 2-4-1-3 5-3-1-4-2 Agree 
15 France Gov. Neutral Satisfied 3-1-4-2 1-3-4-2-5 Agree 
16 Germany Gov. Neutral Neutral 2-1-3-4 2-1-4-3-5 Disagree 
17 Ghana Gov. Neutral Unsatisfied 1-3-4-2 1-3-4-5-2 Neutral 
18 Japan Gov. Neutral Satisfied 1-3-2-4 3-5-2-4-1 Disagree 
19 Latvia Gov. Neutral Neutral 2-4-1-3 3-2-4-1-5 Neutral 
20 Libya Gov. Satisfied Unsatisfied 2-3-4-1 1-3-4-2-5 Satisfied 
21 Luxembourg Gov. Unsatisfied Neutral 1-3-4-2 2-1-3-4-5 Disagree 
22 Maldives Gov. Satisfied Satisfied 3-4-1-2 2-5-4-3-1 Agree 
23 Mauritius Gov. Unsatisfied Unsatisfied 2-4-3-1 3-2-4-1-5 Agree 
24 Mexico Gov. Unsatisfied Unsatisfied 2-3-4-1 1-2-4-3-5 Neutral 
25 Nepal Gov. Unsatisfied Neutral 2-3-4-1 1-2-3-5-4 Disagree 
26 Netherlands Gov. Unsatisfied Neutral 1-2-3-4 3-5-2-4-1 Neutral 
27 Nigeria Gov. Unsatisfied Satisfied 2-4-1-3 2-3-4-1-5 Agree 
28 Palestinian Territories Gov. 
Neutral Unsatisfied 2-4-3-1 1-3-4-5-2 Disagree 
29 Poland Gov. Unsatisfied Unsatisfied 1-3-2-4 2-1-4-3-5 Agree 
30 Portugal Gov. Unsatisfied Neutral 2-3-4-1 1-2-5-3-4 Strongly Agree 
31 Portugal Gov. Unsatisfied Unsatisfied 2-3-4-1 4-5-2-3-1 Disagree 
32 Portugal Gov. Satisfied Neutral 1-4-3-2 2-4-3-1-5 Strongly Disagree 
33 Portugal Gov. Neutral Neutral 4-2-3-1 5-2-3-4-1 Strongly Agree 
34 Portugal Gov. Unsatisfied Neutral 4-3-1-2 3-2-4-1-5 Disagree 
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35 Portugal Gov. Neutral Unsatisfied 3-2-4-1 1-2-4-3-5 Agree 
36 Portugal Gov. Unsatisfied Unsatisfied 3-1-2-4 4-5-2-3-1 Disagree 
37 Portugal Acad. Satisfied Neutral 3-1-2-0 2-1-4-3-0 Strongly Agree 
38 Portugal Acad. Satisfied Neutral 3-2-1-0 2-1-4-3-0 Disagree 
39 Portugal Acad. Satisfied Satisfied 2-3-4-1 4-5-3-2-1 Strongly Agree 
40 Russia Gov. Satisfied Neutral 1-2-3-4 1-4-2-5-3 Strongly Agree 
41 Senegal Gov. Unsatisfied Unsatisfied 2-3-4-1 4-1-5-2-3 Strongly Agree 
42 Slovakia Gov. Unsatisfied Unsatisfied 3-4-2-1 4-3-5-2-1 Agree 
43 South Africa Gov. Unsatisfied Satisfied 4-2-3-1 3-2-1-4-5 Strongly Agree 
44 Sri Lanka Gov. Unsatisfied Unsatisfied 4-3-1-2 5-3-4-2-1 Disagree 
45 Sudan Int’l Orgs. 
Unsatisfied Satisfied 1-3-4-2 2-3-4-5-1 Strongly 
Disagree 
46 Tanzania Gov. Neutral Unsatisfied 3-4-2-1 3-1-5-4-2 Disagree 
47 Tunisia Gov. Unsatisfied Neutral 1-4-3-2 1-3-5-4-2 Neutral 
48 Turkey Gov. Unsatisfied Unsatisfied 2-3-1-4 1-2-4-3-5 Agree 
49 UK Gov. Neutral Unsatisfied 1-2-4-3 1-2-4-3-5 Agree 
50 USA Gov. Satisfied Satisfied 2-3-4-1 1-2-4-3-0 Neutral 
 
Question (2) 
Measuring the level of satisfaction with the performance of the current 
multilateral system, the results are as follows: 
0 Very Satisfied  
12 Satisfied 
14 Neutral 
24 Unsatisfied 
0 Very Unsatisfied 
 
Question (3)  
 Measuring the level of satisfaction with the current reform agendas in the UN, 
the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, the results are as follows: 
0 Very Satisfied 
11 Satisfied 
17 Neutral 
 
 
 
DOUTORAMENTO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS 
 
 
 
Questionnaire Results 
304
20 Unsatisfied 
2 Very Unsatisfied 
 
Question (4) 
 Asking the participants to arrange four assumed challenges to multilateralism in 
ascending order, besides asking them if they consider other challenges, the results were 
calculated using weighted summations on the basis of the following formula: 
Coming 1st  4 Points 
Coming 2nd   3 Points 
Coming 3rd  2 Points 
Coming 4th  1 Point 
 Using this weighted formula and the orders elaborated in the above table, the results are 
as follows: 
Complexity of Current Challenges    142 Points (1st) 
Proliferation of Actors in the International System  108 Points (4th) 
Global Power Shifts      118 Points (3rd) 
Lack of Political Will      131 Points (2nd) 
It should be noted here that two participants thought that the last challenge, lack of 
political will, is not relevant and did not tick it at all, and as a result this challenge was give zero 
score in both cases. 
In addition, eight participants indicated additional challenges as follows: 
1- Lack of equitable representation of small states in some of the most important organs 
(Colombia). 
2 Power politics (Egypt – Gov.). 
3- Lack of accountability on local and international levels, and cultural differences (Egypt – 
Gov.). 
4- Proponents of multilateralism do not apply gradualism (Egypt – Gov.). 
5- The consensus rule in multilateral institutions (Luxembourg). 
6- North/South divisions (Nepal). 
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7- Informal multilateralism, global interdependence and fragile leaderships (Portugal – 
Gov.). 
8-  New or recent problems, organized crime, climate change and the international financial 
architecture (Portugal – Gov.).  
 
Question (5) 
 Asking the participants to arrange five potential future scenarios of the multilateral 
system according to probability, the results were calculated using similar weighted summations 
on the basis of the following formula: 
Coming 1st  5 Points 
Coming 2nd   4 Points 
Coming 3rd  3 Points 
Coming 4th  2 Points 
Coming 5th  1 Point 
 
Using this weighted formula and the orders elaborated in the above table, the results are 
as follows: 
Maintaining the Status Quo/Lack of Clear Direction  193 Points (1st) 
Multilateralism à la Carte/Multi-Multilateralism  170 Points (2nd) 
Effective Multilateralism     116 Points (4th) 
Re-emergence of Multipolar International Politics  147 Points (3rd) 
Global Chaos       112 Points (5th) 
 It should be noted here that three participants thought that the last scenario, global chaos, 
is not possible and did not tick it at all, and as a result this scenario was given zero score in the 
three cases. 
  
Question (6) 
Measuring the level of approval of the possibility of adapting state democracy to 
the international setting, the results are as follows: 
8 Strongly Agree  
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13 Agree 
8 Neutral 
17 Disagree 
2 Strongly Disagree 
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Questionnaire Results 
Questions 7-12 
 
 Country Field (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1 Argentina Gov. Neutral Strongly Agree Agree 1-3-2 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 
2 Botswana Gov. Insignificant Strongly Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 
3 Chile Gov. Insignificant Agree Disagree 1-2-3 Strongly Agree 3-2-1 
4 Colombia Gov. Neutral Strongly Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 Disagree 1-2-3 
5 Egypt Gov. Significant Strongly Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 3-1-2 Agree 1-3-2 
6 Egypt Gov. Significant Agree Agree 2-3-1 Strongly Agree 2-3-1 
7 Egypt Gov. Significant Agree Strongly Agree 2-1-3 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 
8 Egypt Gov. Significant Strongly Agree Agree 2-3-1 
Strongly 
Agree 3-2-1 
9 Egypt Gov. Insignificant Agree Disagree 1-2-3 Strongly Agree 2-3-1 
10 Egypt Gov. Significant Strongly Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 1-2-3 
Strongly 
Agree 
2-3-1 
 
11 Egypt Gov. Significant Agree Agree 3-1-2 Strongly Agree 3-1-2 
12 Egypt Gov. Significant Strongly Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 1-2-3 
Strongly 
Agree 1-2-3 
13 Egypt Int’l Orgs. Insignificant Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 3-2-1 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 
14 Egypt Int’l Orgs. Neutral 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 3-2-1 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 
15 France Gov. Significant Neutral Disagree 1-3-2 Agree 1-2-3 
16 Germany Gov. Significant Agree Agree 2-1-3 Strongly Agree 2-3-1 
17 Ghana Gov. Significant Neutral Neutral 2-1-3 Agree 3-2-1 
18 Japan Gov. Significant Agree Disagree 1-3-2 Agree 1-2-3 
19 Latvia Gov. Neutral Neutral Neutral 1-3-2 Strongly Agree 2-1-3 
20 Libya Gov. Very Significant 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 2-3-1 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 
21 Luxembourg Gov. Significant Agree Neutral 2-1-3 Agree 1-3-2 
22 Maldives Gov. Significant Agree Strongly Agree 1-3-2 
Strongly 
Agree 2-1-3 
23 Mauritius Gov. Significant Agree Agree 2-3-1 Strongly Agree 1-2-3 
24 Mexico Gov. Very Strongly Agree 1-3-2 Agree 1-3-2 
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Significant Agree 
25 Nepal Gov. Neutral Strongly Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 3-2-1 Agree 2-1-3 
26 Netherlands Gov. Significant Neutral Neutral 2-3-1 Strongly Agree 1-3-2 
27 Nigeria Gov. Significant Strongly Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 1-2-3 
Strongly 
Agree 2-3-1 
28 Palestinian Territories Gov. Insignificant 
Strongly 
Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 2-3-1 Agree 3-2-1 
29 Poland Gov. Insignificant Neutral Disagree 3-2-1 Agree 1-3-2 
30 Portugal Gov. Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 2-1-3 Neutral 1-2-3 
31 Portugal Gov. Significant Strongly Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 2-1-3 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 
32 Portugal Gov. Neutral Agree Agree 1-3-2 Agree 1-3-2 
33 Portugal Gov. Significant Agree Neutral 1-2-3 Strongly Agree 3-2-1 
34 Portugal Gov. Significant Neutral Disagree 2-1-3 Strongly Agree 2-3-1 
35 Portugal Gov. Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 2-3-1 
Strongly 
Agree 3-2-1 
36 Portugal Gov. Insignificant Agree Agree 2-3-1 Strongly Agree 3-1-2 
37 Portugal Acad. Insignificant Strongly Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 3-1-2 Disagree 3-1-2 
38 Portugal Acad. Significant Disagree Neutral 0-0-1 Strongly Agree 0-0-1 
39 Portugal Acad. Significant Agree Agree 2-1-3 Agree 3-1-2 
40 Russia Gov. Very Significant Neutral 
Strongly 
Disagree 1-2-3 Agree 1-3-2 
41 Senegal Gov. Very Significant 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 1-2-3 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 
42 Slovakia Gov. Significant Disagree Neutral 3-1-2 Strongly Agree 1-2-3 
43 South Africa Gov. Very Significant 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 1-2-3 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 
44 Sri Lanka Gov. Significant Strongly Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 Disagree 1-3-2 
45 Sudan Int’l Orgs. Insignificant 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 3-2-1 
Strongly 
Agree 2-3-1 
46 Tanzania Gov. Significant Agree Agree 1-2-3 Strongly Agree 1-3-2 
47 Tunisia Gov. Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 1-2-3 
Strongly 
Agree 1-3-2 
48 Turkey Gov. Neutral Agree Agree 2-1-3 Strongly Agree 3-2-1 
49 UK Gov. Very Significant Agree Disagree 2-1-3 
Strongly 
Agree 1-2-3 
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50 USA Gov. Significant Neutral Disagree 0-0-1 Neutral 3-1-2 
 
 Question (7) 
Measuring the expectations about the future role of the UN in world order, the results are 
as follows:  
6 Very Significant 
25 Significant  
10 Neutral 
9 Insignificant 
0 Very Insignificant 
 
Question (8) 
 Measuring the level of support to enabling the UN General Assembly to serve a 
bigger role in global governance, the results are as follows: 
18 Strongly Agree  
20 Agree 
8 Neutral 
3 Disagree 
1 Strongly Disagree 
 
Question (9) 
Measuring the level of support to further empowering the UN General Assembly 
to step in if the Security Council fails to act on international peace and security, the 
results are as follows: 
20 Strongly Agree  
12 Agree 
7 Neutral 
8 Disagree 
3 Strongly Disagree 
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Question (10) 
 Asking the participants to arrange three argued roles for the UN General Assembly in 
ascending order according to their approval, the results were calculated using weighted 
summations on the basis of the following formula: 
Coming 1st  3 Points 
Coming 2nd   2 Points 
Coming 3rd  1 Point 
 Using this weighted formula and the orders elaborated in the above table, the results are 
as follows: 
Global Governance Platform     108 Points (1st) 
Parliament of Man      92 Points (3rd) 
Clearing House of Global Governance   94 Points (2nd) 
 It should be noted here that two participants thought that the first two argued roles, global 
governance platform and parliament of man, are not relevant and did not tick them at all, and as a 
result these two choices were given zero score in both cases. 
 
Question (11) 
Measuring the level of support to enlarging the UN Security Council, the results 
are as follows: 
33 Strongly Agree  
12 Agree 
2 Neutral 
3 Disagree 
0 Strongly Disagree 
Question (12) 
 Asking the participants to arrange three suggested reform options of the veto power in 
ascending order, the results were calculated using weighted summations on the basis of the 
following formula: 
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Coming 1st  3 Points 
Coming 2nd   2 Points 
Coming 3rd  1 Point 
 Using this weighted formula and the orders elaborated in the above table, the results are 
as follows: 
Should Be Abrogated      113 Points (1st) 
Should Keep the Status Quo     80 Points (3rd) 
Should Extend to New Permanent Members   104 Points (2nd) 
 It should be noted here that one participant thought that the first two suggested options, 
abrogation and keeping the status quo, are not possible and did not tick them at all, and as a 
result these two options were given zero score in this case. 
 
Additional Comments 
 Some participants made additional comments as follows: 
1- The UN Security Council should be enlarged and the veto power should be 
abrogated, as a sign of a new, more realistic and democratic world order. 
However, this is improbable, because neither the old superpowers nor the newly 
emerging ones are showing interest in that (Argentina). 
2- One problem of multilateralism is the lack of balanced representation of 
countries in the system. Other problems include the veto power and the 
excessive importance of the UN Security Council. These are features of the 
Cold-War world that hardly work for our world today (Colombia). 
3- Cultural diversity should be stressed and reflected as a factor in the study, and 
the role and behavior of medium powers should not be discarded. The level of 
education and good governance are also important (Egypt – Gov.).  
4- The major challenge before the multilateral system is the continuation of the 
supremacy of national interests over global challenges, at the time no one wants 
to move first (Egypt – Gov.). 
5- The Peace and Security Council of the AU could be a reliable example for the 
reform of the UN Security Council (Egypt – Int’l Orgs.). 
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6- The veto power in the UN Security Council is unfortunately a necessary evil 
serving the interests of mainly three permanent members, i.e. Russia, China and 
the USA. However, these nations are not ready to give up their veto power.  In 
addition, reaching consensus on matters like Iran, the Middle East peace process 
or North Korea gravely dilutes the content and hampers the effective work of the 
Security Council and sometimes even ridiculizes its role, especially when weeks 
are needed in an urgent crisis situation (Luxembourg).  
7- The application of consensus decision-making should remain limited to areas of 
utmost importance such as the use of force and the imposition of sanctions (The 
Netherlands).  
8- Multilateralism is the only hope for all countries. However, the veto power 
remains a cause of contention and hinders speedy progress on urgent issues. In 
contrast, UN reform efforts should be based on democratic options and the UN 
General Assembly should be further empowered to address conflicts and wars if 
the Security Council fails to yield any definite solution. In addition, UN 
development efforts should be focused on major projects and aim at making 
recipient countries self-reliant for sustainable development (Nepal). 
9- Emerging regional powers in Africa, Asia and Latin America should be 
accommodated in the UN Security Council. In addition, resolutions of the 
General Assembly must be binding on all members without exception (Nigeria). 
10- The UN Security Council is an obsolete body and should disappear in the long 
run. Meanwhile, it should be enlarged to new emerging powers such as Brazil 
(Portugal – Gov.).  
11- There is a need for a functional and issue-wise approach to global governance, 
which goes far beyond the central unit of nation-state on which the whole UN 
architecture is based. Thus, effective global governance is going to look 
differently and involve a different set of diverse actors in different issue-areas, 
from hardcore security to migration and environmental issues (Portugal – 
Acad.). 
12- The UN Security Council should definitely be reformed to make it more 
representative of the 21st century, but it also needs to be effective and able to 
take decisive action in a timely and responsible manner. Unfortunately, the 193 
countries are not expected to do that. Thus, a representative Security Council 
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backed up by a strong General Assembly and, of vital importance, reformed and 
well-functioning UN agencies seems to be the best answer (UK). 
